










The handle  http://hdl.handle.net/1887/81993 holds various files of this Leiden University 
dissertation. 
 
Author: Antonov, M.V. 
Title: Formalism, realism and conservatism in Russian Law 
Issue Date: 2019-12-18 
 
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism in Russian Law
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism.indb   I 10-10-19   14:53
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism.indb   II 10-10-19   14:53
Formalism, Realism and 
Conservatism in Russian Law
PROEFSCHRIFT
ter verkrijging van
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden
op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof. mr. C.J.J.M. Stolker,
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties




geboren te Sint Petersburg, Rusland 
in 1973
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism.indb   III 10-10-19   14:53
Promotores: prof. dr. W.B. Simons
Promotiecommissie: prof. dr. K. Hendley (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 
USA)
 prof. dr. R.A. Lawson
 prof. dr. K. Malfliet (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 
Belgium)
 dr. J. Oversloot
 prof. dr. E. van der Zweerde (Radboud Universiteit, 
Nijmegen)
Lay-out: AlphaZet prepress, Bodegraven
Printwerk: Ipskamp Printing
© 2019 Mikhail Valerievich Antonov
Behoudens de in of krachtens de Auteurswet van 1912 gestelde uitzonderingen mag niets uit deze 
uitgave worden verveelvoudigd, opgeslagen in een geautomatiseerd gegevensbestand of openbaar 
gemaakt, in enige vorm of op enige wijze, hetzij elektronisch, mechanisch, door fotokopieën, opna-
men of enig andere manier, zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de auteur.
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any other 
means without written permission of the author.
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism.indb   IV 10-10-19   14:53
Table of Contents
Aknowledgements VII
List of Abbreviations IX
Introduction 1
1 Background of the Study 1
2 Outline of the Research 9
3 Research Questions, Research Subject and Scope of the Study 15





2 Historical Development 28
3 The Anti-formalist Element in Soviet Law 32
4 A Dual System of Law? 37
5 Legality, Decisionism and Formalism 40
6 Actual Implications 44
Conclusion 48




1 The Problem of Russian Exceptionality and Legal Education 55
2 Russia’s Accession to the ECtHR: A Step toward Modernization? 63
3 Valerii Zorkin’s Rejoinder to Disproportionate Westernization 68
4 Valerii Zorkin’s Legal Philosophy 71
Conclusion 83
3 Conservatism in Russia and Sovereignty in Human Rights 85
Foreword 85
Introduction 86
1 Russian Law Faces a Choice: International Principles or 
National Sovereignty 90
2 European Human-Rights Law from the Perspective of 
Russian Courts 95
3 The Nature of International Law in the Light of the Russian 
Constitution and Its Interpretations 100
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism.indb   V 10-10-19   14:53
VI Table of Contents
4 The Philosophical Background of Discussions on Sovereign 
Democracy 105
5 The Roots of Exceptionalism in Russian Social Philosophy 114
Conclusion 118




1 Contestation of Rights through Religion 130
2 Traditional Values versus Posited Legal Rules in Court 132
3 The Statutory-Law Framework 136
4 The Constitutional-Law Framework 139
5 Case Law of the RF Constitutional Court 141
6 Case Law of the Courts of General Jurisdiction 147
7 Russia and Europe: A Discordant Dialogue 150
Conclusion 154
5 Religious Beliefs and the Limits of Their Accommodation 




1 Constitutional Ambiguity 160
2 Methodology 164
3 The Russian Supreme Court on Religious Freedoms: 
A Selective Analysis 170
Conclusion 176
6 Concluding Chapter 179
Samenvatting (Dutch summary) 207
Curriculum Vitae 209
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism.indb   VI 10-10-19   14:53
Aknowledgements
I would like to thank my Leiden supervisor, Professor William Simons, for 
his patience and guidance while I engaged in the research for this work. 
During the course of several years, he helped to foster an atmosphere which 
encouraged my engagement with the topic of the dissertation. I am con-
vinced that our constant back-and-forth interactions greatly improved the 
quality of this manuscript. Also, I would like to thank my colleagues from 
Tartu University (Estonia)—especially Professor Lauri Mälksoo. Their sup-
port and the collegial atmosphere which characterized my time as a Research 
Fellow at this University—when I started working at the topic of this disser-
tation in the period 2013-2016—have been invaluable. Sincere thanks also 
go to Professor William Pomeranz. He offered me friendly guidance during 
my 2016 research scholarship at the Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars (Washington, DC) and, more recently, also generously gave of 
his time to read a preliminary version of this thesis and share with me his 
insightful comments. I have sought to take account of all the remarks given 
me throughout my work on this thesis by all who kindly have read it but, 
nevertheless, realize that I may not always have succeeded in doing so fully. 
Furthermore, any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author; not 
of those who kindly helped to steer me along the way.
The agreement of Brill Academic Publishers, Cambridge University 
Press, and ISORECEA, for me to use my articles—first issued in their publi-
cations—in the present dissertation (in revised form) is something which I
sincerely appreciate. To my colleagues from my home university—the 
Higher School of Economics (Russia)—I offer my heartfelt thanks for their 
generous help, manifest in numerous ways, in finalizing my work; particu-
larly to the dean of the Law Faculty, Professor Anton Ilyin.
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism.indb   VII 10-10-19   14:53
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism.indb   VIII 10-10-19   14:53
List of Abbreviations
CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States
CPSU: Communist Party of the Soviet Union
ECHR: European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR: European Court of Human Rights
EU: European Union
Foreign Agents Registration Act (22 U.S.C., §§611-621; FARA)—1938 US FARA
Levada Center: Yuri Levada Analytical Center
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NKVD: People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs
PACE: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PEGIDA: Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident
RF CAO: Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation
RF Constitutional Court: Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
RF Supreme Court: Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
ROC: Russian Orthodox Church
RSFSR: Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
SZRF: Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation
UN: United Nations
Venice Commission: European Commission for Democracy through Law
WTO: World Trade Organization
***
All translations from Russian and other languages into English are made by 
the author unless otherwise indicated.
The author followed the rules of transliteration of Russian names set forth 
by the American Library Association and the Library of Congress except the 
cases when there are other generally accepted versions of transliteration.
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism.indb   IX 10-10-19   14:53
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism.indb   X 10-10-19   14:53
Introduction
1 Background of the Study
The present volume deals with some particular features of Russian legal 
culture that are connected with the intellectual context in which legal norms 
are created, interpreted and applied. Russian law mostly uses the same 
conceptual apparatus as in Western legal systems. Historically taken from 
the West (mainly from German and French law), foreign legal concepts 
invariably become intertwined in a specific Russian intellectual context. In 
a new normative context, they have been adapted to the native legal culture 
in which respect to rights is lower than in the Western legal tradition and 
where legal validity is understood on the base of prerogative power. In the 
20th century, a distinct legal theory—based on a specific combination of 
legal formalism and decisionism—was molded in Soviet law. This theory, 
inherited by Russian jurisprudence from the Soviet past, continues to shape 
the mind-sets of Russian lawyers and to nourish ideological narratives. 
Although in the last century, the rule-of-law, human rights and other West-
ern legal concepts have been adopted into Russian law, they underwent a 
profound reconceptualization in terms of this theory. This has led to their 
“metamorphosis”: their interpretation and application often yielding differ-
ent results—to a greater or lesser degree—as compared with the meaning 
of these concepts in the original (Western) legal culture. There can be many 
explanations for these differences; from institutional or semantic distinc-
tions to more profound divergences in the way of thinking about the law 
and rights. It is on this latter aspect that the works, included in this volume, 
are focused.
In Russia, the general communitarian perception of rights implies that 
they have no independent value but, rather, only are accepted insofar as 
they serve some supreme collective values (strong statehood, political unity, 
etc.). Even if Peter the Great made efforts in the 18th century to modernize 
Russia—in the sense of its Westernization—these efforts, continued by his 
successors, have not (yet) affected basic social conventions about rights and 
freedoms in Russian society. His reforms touched on various aspects such as 
trade, military forces, and cultural habits but did not attempt to profoundly 
change the governance structures. Peter and his successors—including the 
present Russian leadership—have tended to adhere to the assumption that, 
given its specific culture, Russia does not need liberal freedoms. In this 
respect, in order for it to survive, it must retain its distinctiveness.1
1 Jan Kusber, “Die Kontinuität der Fremdheit. Russland als das andere in historischer Per-
spektive”, 63(2-3) Osteuropa (2013), 257-268.
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The central question for Russian social philosophy was not the ques-
tion about what makes a social order one which is justified and, therefore, 
binding. The more important topic was how to secure social solidarity and 
to achieve collective goals, sacrificing individual rights and freedoms, and 
the extent to which this sacrifice might be acceptable to society (if there has 
been any extent at all). Great masterpieces of Russian literature—such as 
Pushkin’s Boris Godunov, Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment and The Broth-
ers Karamazov, Tolstoy’s Resurrection and War and Peace, or Solzhenitsyn’s In 
the First Circle—can be cited to justify this thesis.
This collectivist perception of rights in Russian legal thinking, in turn, is 
revealed in two main aspects. The first is a strict adherence to legal formal-
ism; giving priority to state commands over individual rights, insofar as 
the state receives its power and sovereignty from the collective. Therefore, 
in case of a conflict between individual rights and state interests, the latter 
shall triumph because the state embodies this collective (society) and its 
interests. The image of the almighty Leviathan is appropriate to illustrate 
the relationship between the state, its law, and individual rights. (The 
Russian context is illustrated in a 2014 film of Andrey Zvyagintsev, “Levia-
than”.) The second aspect justifies exceptions made by judges and other legal 
actors when a formalist reading of constitutional or statutory laws allegedly 
goes against collective interests. Naturally, the problem of a rule and an 
exception thereto is universal; not specifically Russian. However, the way 
in which Russian legal doctrine and practice deal with this problem unveils 
one of the specific features of legal rationality in the Russian context. And 
this is precisely what the present volume envisages doing.
This research is theoretical rather than empirical—remaining mostly on 
the theoretical level of analysis of legal concepts and their interpretations. 
It does try, however, to connect legal texts with the societal environment in 
which they are active and with their intellectual background, and to retrace 
the feedback that is produced in this interaction between the texts and their 
interpretations.2 This may reveal ideal-typical representations in that they 
prepare the conceptual apparatus necessary to make a selection and abstrac-
tion from social realities in Russia. As exemplified in a 2011 study of the 
policies and strategies of the European Court of Human Rights,3 Weberian 
sociology provides a set of reflexive tools for understanding courts as 
evolutionary institutions that develop specific legal rationalities for their 
2 A similar approach was advocated by the late Justice Scalia. See Antonin Scalia, A Mat-
ter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 
1997).
3 Mikael R. Madsen, “The Protracted Institutionalization of the Strasbourg Court: From 
Legal Diplomacy to Integrationist Jurisprudence”, in Mikael Madsen and Jonas Christof-
fersen (eds.), The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford, 2011), 43-60; and Richard Munch, “Constructing a European Society by 
Jurisdiction”, 14(5) European Law Journal (2008), 519-541. The avalanche of scholarly litera-
ture on the socializing role of the ECtHR can also be mentioned (but will not be cited) here.
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decision-making processes. This perspective also can be applied to other 
international courts and, surely, to domestic courts; in our situation, to Rus-
sian courts and other state agencies interpreting and applying the law.
Such a methodological approach suggests that the structure of the 
present work should move from the general to the particular. Starting with 
the theoretical analysis of the formalist and decisionist elements in Russian 
(previously, Soviet) law, the volume will proceed to a reconstruction of 
these elements in the writings of the Chief Justice Zorkin. These works are, 
in the present author’s opinion, representative for the mindsets of many 
Russian lawyers, especially of the older generation. Valerii Zorkin discusses 
these elements against such normative backgrounds as human rights, legal 
validity or sovereignty. His output reveals a number of important facets that 
illustrate implications of this combination of formalism and decisionism for 
the intellectual culture of Russian lawyers. Such a theoretical reconstruction 
invites one to address the philosophical context in which this theory has 
been formed, i.e., one which is conservative in nature. After setting out these 
theoretical landmarks in the first three chapters, we proceed to an analysis 
of the practical impact of this intellectual framework for Russian law. With-
out undertaking the immense task of examining all the areas of Russian 
law, we will concentrate on two demonstrative examples: the protection of 
religious rights and of sexual minorities. This examination will reveal how 
the decisionist element in Russian law can, on the one hand, override the 
formal provisions of the statutory law and, on the other, can construct a 
symbiosis with the conservative mentality.
While constitutions and laws were copied and transplanted from the 
West in the early 1990s, they have not radically changed the legal landscape 
of Russia and other ex-USSR countries. The “law in books”—with almost 
the same textual content as its Western counterparts—is interpreted and 
applied quite differently. Instead of the expected Westernization, the Rus-
sian legal system has continued to work according to the logic of the statist 
legal theory. This system works as a medium of political will, while human 
rights and other constitutional guarantees were utilized more, in the years 
of Yeltsin, as “window-dressing” to display the desire of Russia to adhere to 
the “Western world”.
However, soon it became clear that even adopting the Western-style 
1993 Russian Federation Constitution, ratifying international human-rights 
treaties and covenants—including those for membership in the Council of 
Europe and other European institutions—Russia reads them in a particular 
way; asserting its civilizational distinctiveness that arguably allows Russia 
to depart from its international obligations. Perhaps, it could not be other-
wise: legal rights can be “political trumps” against the state and its coercion 
only if they are conceived of as independent of commands of the political 
rulers. In order for rights to become truly binding upon the state, they need 
to be the primary reasons for action both of ordinary citizens and of state-
court judges. In other words, reasons of political expediency need to step 
back when confronted with individual rights in courts of law. These rights, 
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thus, form the borderlines for the realization of state actions which will be 
overturned when they conflict with these rights.
These preconditions are not entirely fulfilled in Russian law. One can 
even argue that—for political, social and other reasons—such intellectual 
preconditions are absent (or at least underdeveloped) in Russian legal cul-
ture. A century ago (in 1909), the “Landmarks” (Vekhi) authors voiced this 
problem, and undoubtedly addressing it remains an actual issue for Russian 
law. An approach to Russian law from this perspective has its focal point in 
various historically grounded rationalities of Russian legal cultures;4 in the 
ways in which these cultures reflect society and the general moods domi-
nating this society. Such definitions, in turn, should help to shed light on 
the impact of landmark court decisions on the rationalization of law in the 
context of contestation over defining the “legal field”5 in the sense of dis-
cussions about interpreting constitutional and international texts—the field 
on which, in recent years, Russia has been waging an intellectual war with 
the ECtHR, the Venice Commission, PACE and other European institutions.
As suggested above, one plausible explanation can be that the Russian 
vision of law is not centered on individuality; not on the protection of 
rights and freedoms of an individual but—first and foremost—on securing 
collective interests, social order and a strong, sovereign statehood.6 This 
tendency can be traced back in history and confirmed, for example, in the 
post-war period when Soviet international lawyers at the UN (and, also, at 
other organizations) insisted on the primacy of collective and social rights, 
downplaying the individual rights advocated by the Western countries that 
did not fit the Soviet theoretical approach. 7 This approach suggested that 
individual rights only have a secondary character as they are derived from 
the material conditions of the collective in which individuals are included. 
These material conditions are central for legal regulation which needs to be 
focused on rights such as the right to labor, the means of production, medi-
cal care, and other guarantees granted by the state to individuals. Basically, 
this approach prevails in the Russian legal scholarship until now.
4 We expressly use the term “legal culture” in plural to underscore the pluralist perspec-
tive which suggests that different social (national, economic, religious, etc.) communities 
within one society might well have different attitudes toward the law, religion, and sexu-
ality. On this methodological issue, see Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism and Legal 
Culture: Mapping the Terrain”, in Brian Z. Tamanaha, Caroline Mary Sage and Michael 
Woolcock (eds.), Legal Pluralism and Development: Scholars and Practitioners in Dialo-
gue (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2012), 66-82.
5 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Judicial Field” (Richard 
Terdiman, transl.), 38(5) Hastings Law Journal (1987), 805-853; and Bruno Latour, La fabri-
que du droit: Une ethnographie du Conseil d’Etat (La Découverte, Paris, 2002).
6 E.g., Manfred Hildermeier, “Das Privileg der Rückständigkeit: Anmerkungen zum 
Wandel einer Interpretationsfi gur der neueren russischen Geschichte”, 244 Historische 
Zeitschrift (1987), 557-603; and Stefan Hedlund, Russian Path Dependence (Routledge, Lon-
don, 2005).
7 Lauri Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2015).
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One can consider decision-making processes in Russian courts not 
through the prism of a political analysis of respective influences but, rather, 
in the light of a socio-philosophical analysis (in the sense specified above). 
This will allow the reader to assess these processes in a more general frame-
work of social development and social control in Russia. We are far from 
denying that political interference was and still is an important hallmark of 
Russian (previously Soviet) law; rather, we firmly believe that this interfer-
ence is not the only important factor which shapes Russian law. The politi-
cal powers do, sometimes, intervene in the judicial field—and not only in 
Russia. However, even in Soviet Russia with its notorious “telephone law’, 
the Communist Party never went as far as repealing the judiciary function 
performed by judges who worked in their “semi-autonomous” field. 8
We will argue that this communitarian (traditionalist) reading of 
rights is one of the pillars of Russian (Soviet) legal thinking which, in part, 
explains Russian exceptionalism in its relationship with the West. This read-
ing was used in appreciating the working of the Russian Empire—not only 
the Soviet Union—and still characterizes the legal landscape of Russia. The 
theoretical scheme of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationhood” (Pravoslavie, 
Samoderzhavie, Narodnost’) goes back to German romanticism of the 19th 
century as adapted to the Russian political and legal context. This scheme is 
cemented by the following chain of ideas: it is only by living in society that 
one can become a human being; no contemporary society can exist without 
a state; rejecting state-created legal norms undermines the social order and 
will lead to the destruction of humanity. Therefore, state legal norms are 
absolutely binding and cannot be trumped by any other reasons or values.
At face value, the prevailing legal theory in Russia is positivist and fol-
lows the traditions of the first positivism of the 19th century in the spirit of 
John Austin or Jeremy Bentham: law seen as a set of the sovereign’s com-
mands. 9 Consequently, within this positivist paradigm, only subsumption 
can be accepted as the proper means for applying the law. The Russian 
legal system traditionally has demonstrated its propensity to adhere to this 
theory. It functions on the premise that the main task of judges is to inter-
pret and apply the letter of the law (the conception of legality (zakonnost’)).
8 Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR: An Interpretation of the Soviet Law (Harvard Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, MA, 1962, 2nd ed.).
9 See William E. Butler (ed.), Russian Legal Theory (New York University Press, New York, 
NY, 1996). In this work, we will not make a strong distinction between the similar—but 
theoretically distinct—terms “positivism”, “statism” and “formalism”. In ordinary legal 
parlance, these terms refer to the idea that legal rules can be created (directly or indirectly, 
through recognition) by the state; that they contain state will which can be established 
and carried out on the base of the texts of these rules. For the purposes of the present 
work, such a language use can serve as a guideline, although in a broader philosophi-
cal perspective one can surely establish more nuanced distinctions between these terms. 
Throughout this work, we will address these distinctions where it will be relevant for the 
topics discussed.
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Given the hierarchy of legal rules set out in Article 15 of the 1993 RF Con-
stitution—the Constitution itself; international law; constitutional and ordi-
nary statutes (zakony)—judges have no authority to apply any principles 
except those expressly fixed in laws and other posited sources of the law 
and, furthermore, are prohibited from refusing to apply laws because of 
their presumed contrariety to such principles. In this way, Russian legal 
theory retranslates the 19th-century positivistic ideal of Rechtsstaat where the 
law is independent and prevails over other social regulatory mechanisms.10
However, pure legal formalism is not observed in each and every court 
decision, including the practice of the RF Constitutional Court. The reality 
of the Russian legal order (and it was, also, the reality of Soviet law) is that 
it combines two underlying theoretical tendencies, reflecting the two pillars 
characterized above: statism and decisionism.
The first is about the rigid positivism as concerns the pedigree criterion 
of law: there can be no law unless it is promulgated (or accepted) by the 
state; the law is a means of coercion; the law’s function is the coercion of 
lower, exploited social classes by the dominant class: the state uses its law 
for domination. In contemporary Russian law, this logic has been tweaked 
slightly: the link between the state and the dominant (proletarian) class has 
been removed. The state no longer is understood as serving the interests of 
a particular class. It is seen as an autotelic, absolutely independent entity 
with its own interests. This underscores the value of sovereignty in describ-
ing of the nature of the state and of the limits (to wit, lack of any limits) of 
its power.
Another tendency is based on the decisionism in which the law is what-
ever policy-makers consider indispensable for protecting and promoting 
the collective interest, so that legal norms do not really matter. In Soviet 
legal theory, fidelity to the “letter of the law’ frequently was invaluable to 
the ends of the Soviet regime. In current Russian legal theory, the strict posi-
tivist attitude toward law is mitigated by these decisionist considerations 
allowing judges to avoid application of the law to the letter in “high-profile 
cases”, exemplified by such prosecutions “to order’ as those of Vladimir 
Gusinskiy,11 Mikhail Khodorkovskiy,12 and Aleksey Navalnyy.13
10 Frances Nethercott, Russian Legal Culture Before and After Communism: Criminal Justice, 
Politics and the Public Sphere (Routledge, London, 2007).
11 ECtHR Judgment Gusinskiy v. Russia (19 May 2004) Application No.70276/01.
12 ECtHR Judgment YUKOS v. Russia (20 September 2011) Application No.14902/04.
13 ECtHR Judgment Navalnyy and Offi tserov v. Russia (4 July 2016) Applications No.46632/13 
and 28671/14.
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Theoretically, the state can restrict itself by adopting certain con-
stitutional acts or by ratifying international treaties and conventions.14 
Nonetheless, from a monistic perspective—largely supported by Russian 
international lawyers—the state always retains the power to rescind these 
restrictions and to make its will triumph over any legal limitations by refer-
ring to its sovereign authority. Such logic repeatedly has come to the surface 
in the years-long polemics between the RF Constitutional Court and the 
ECtHR about the admissibility and the criteria for restricting human rights 
in Russia. These polemics consistently revolve around several central topics 
such as the limits of sovereignty, the binding force of legal rules, and the 
nature of human rights.15
These topics regularly refer to a set of arguments stemming from two 
different and contradictory logics: that of formalism and that of decisionism. 
On the one hand, the legal formalism—prevailing in Russian legal educa-
tion and scholarship—neglects principles (although, according to Art.18, RF 
Constitution, human rights are defined as principles of law) either in favor 
of fixed rules or for the sake of the smooth and predictable operation of 
the legal machinery. It does not endorse human rights but, rather, delimits 
them; it does not respect individual autonomy and subordinates individual 
choice to collective interests. 16 In this intellectual sense, the Russian legal 
system stands apart from contemporary Western law in spite of its official 
constitutional texts based on Western standards and principles.17 From this 
14 In this sense, Russian constitutional theory is still based on Georg Jellinek’s concept of the 
State’s self-restriction (Selbstverpfl ichtung). In the Russian case, such restrictions are set 
forth in the 1993 liberal RF Constitution and, also, in a number of international treaties of 
which Russia is a member (such as ratifi cation of the ECHR on 5 May 1998 which became 
an integral part of Russian law by virtue of para.4 of Art.15 of the RF Constitution).
15 See Mikhail Antonov and Ekaterina Samokhina, “The Realist and Rhetorical Dimensions 
of the Protection of Religious Feelings in Russia”, 40(3-4) Review of Central and East Euro-
pean Law (2015), 229-284.
16 In particular, this Weltanschauung can be seen in the contentious Postanovlenie Konsti-
tutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ruling of the RF Constitutional Court on the 
Primacy of the Constitution over International Law] (14 July 2015) No.21-P, “O proverke 
konstitutsionnosti polozheniia stat’i 1 Federal’nogo Zakona ‘O ratifi katsii Konventsii ...’” 
[On Verifying the Constitutionality of Art. 1 of Federal Law “On Ratifi cation of the Con-
vention…”]. Texts of this and other rulings of the Constitutional Court of Russia cited in 
the present work can be found on the Court’s website at <www.ksrf.ru>.
17 However, some contemporary Russian legal scholars and practitioners do criticize these 
intellectual frameworks underpinning Russian law. See the book of RF Constitutional 
Court Justice Yaroslavtsev in which he underscores the primary importance of the sense 
of justice (spravedlivost’) in the judicial process and investigates how this sense infl uences 
judicial rule-making in Russia: Vladimir Yaroslavtsev, Nravstvennoe pravosudie i sudeiskoe 
pravotvorchestvo [A Moral Judiciary and Law-making in Courts] (Justitsinform, Moscow, 
2007). It is demonstrative that calling for wider application of morality in Russian courts, 
Yaroslavtsev systematically refers to the doctrine of Christianity. His basic thesis is that 
justice prevails over the law (zakon) because “application of the laws is not the ultimate 
goal of judges—they are there to search for justice and truth” (ibid., 9).
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perspective, the notorious Russian exceptionalism and anti-Western stances 
of interpreting and applying human rights or norms of international law 
can be considered as results of different axiomatic propositions: rights as 
independent reasons for action in Western legal discourse versus rights as 
the sovereign’s commands from a Russian perspective. It should come as 
no surprise that legal mentality may, significantly, influence the practice of 
interpreting and applying statutes so that similar texts and laws can have 
different effects in different cultural environments.
This exceptionalism is based on a system of traditionalist rhetoric 
about Russian legal, political and religious culture. These arguments have 
underpinned political and legal narratives since the Middle Ages, so that 
Hilarion’s idea about the prevalence of morality and religion over law 
(“Slovo o zakone i blagodati” (Sermon on Law and Grace)) written in the mid-
11th century) or Philotheus’ understanding of Russia’s missionary role in 
the logic of the Third Rome (formulated in the 16th century and revived 
by Russian traditionalists in the late 19th century) can be seen as still hold-
ing sway over Russian legal thinking. As will be shown below, this aspect 
is clearly revealed in the way Russian judges interpret statutes in light of 
accepted truths about the prevalence of some “traditional” confessions over 
others; about the pernicious effect of “non-traditional” values upon social 
solidarity and legal security. 18
To be sure, this traditionalist rhetoric is not something peculiar to Rus-
sian law or Russian legal culture. It has existed for centuries, also in Western 
legal systems. Traditionalism19—serving as the philosophical base of 
investing such “accepted truths” with legal validity—implies that supreme 
societal value is ascribed to collective unity. Individuals are considered, 
first of all, as members of the collective and, thus, have no independent 
worth apart from that accorded to the social unit to which they belong. 
18 Several cases of Jehovah’s Witnesses—considered by the ECtHR during the past 
decade—clearly show this tendency of state agencies interfering with religious ceremo-
nies or inquiring into personal information with overly vague references to the alleged 
common good: ECtHR Judgment Kuznetsov and Others v. Russia (11 January 2007) Appli-
cation No.184/02; ECtHR Judgment Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia (10 June 2010) 
Application No.302/02; ECtHR Judgment Avilkina and Others v. Russia (6 June 2013) 
Application No.1585/09; and ECtHR Judgment Krupko and Others v. Russia (26 June 2014) 
Application No.26587/07.
19 Here we utilize this term not in the sense of the traditionalist school (perennialism) 
asserting that all the world’s great religions share the same origin and are based on the 
same metaphysical principles; rather, by “traditionalism” we refer here to the set of anti-
individualistic ideas in epistemology and ethics developed by the Counter-revolutionists 
in France in the fi rst decades of the 19th century. Among the most important works of 
these French traditionalists are: Joseph de Maistre, St Petersburg Dialogues: On the Con-
versation on Temporal Government of Providence, (McGill University Press, Montreal, 1993, 
Richard Lebrun, transl.); and Louis G. de Bonald, The True and Only Wealth of Nations: 
Essays on Family, Society and Economy (Ave Maria University Press, Notre Dame, IN, 2006, 
Christopher Blum transl.). See, also, Frederick Coplestone, 19th and 20th Century French 
Philosophy (Continuum, London, 1975), 1-18.
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With certain differences, this idea has been developed from Antiquity as 
formulated by such philosophers as Plato and Aristotle (the whole prevails 
over its parts, and therefore society prevails over individuals), through the 
Middle Ages on up to Modernity: Alexis de Tocqueville, Benjamin Constant, 
Edmund Burke, or Joseph de Maistre. Other thinkers of the 19th century 
include Hegel, Kant and Marx who Karl Popper considered to be “enemies 
of the open society” precisely because of this traditionalist aspiration 
toward the communitarian ideology.20
In appealing to this traditionalism—as regards the delimitation of 
rights—Russian leaders sometimes choose to justify their position as one 
reflecting not only the “true Russian” but, also, the “true European” legal 
tradition, thereby seeking to legitimize themselves as protectors of “Euro-
pean values” against liberal distortions and misinterpretations brought 
about by globalization.21 The Russian leadership considers itself a part of 
those European conservative powers seeking to push aside liberal values; 
to protect Europe from becoming a melting pot of heterogeneous cultures, 
religions, and civilizations and, as a result, losing its “spiritual buckles”.22
2 Outline of the Research
Before and after the 1917 Russian Revolution, the political environment 
was not favorable to encouragement of individual liberties, so that the 
Constitutional Acts of 1905 and the Soviet Constitution of 1936—with their 
liberal provisions about human rights—remained “paper law’. Human-
rights observers frequently make the same conclusions about the 1993 RF 
Constitution. In their interpretations of religious freedoms in particular, 
and of human rights in general, these observers argue that the RF Consti-
tutional Court (and other courts in Russia) fail to give proper justification 
to their decisions. The argumentation of Russian judges is usually based 
only on references to metaphysical concepts and constructions such as 
20 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 
and Oxford, 2013; fi rst published in 1945).
21 Vladimir Baranovsky, “Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart from Europe?”, 76(3) Interna-
tional Affairs (2000), 443-458; Andrey Makarychev, “Rebranding Russia: Norms, Politics 
and Power”, in Nathalie Tocci (ed.), Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European 
Union and Its Global Partners (Centre for European Policy Study, Brussels, 2008), 156-210; 
and Alina Polyakova, “Strange Bedfellows: Putin and Europe’s Far Right”, 177(3) World 
Affairs (2014), 36-40.
22 See, e.g., the brilliant analysis of this strategy by Ivan Krastev: “Russia as the ‘Other 
Europe’”, Russia in Global Affairs (17 November 2007) No.9779, available at <https://eng.
globalaffairs.ru/number/n_9779>.
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“social consciousness” (obshchestvennoe soznanie). 23 This latter term aptly 
combines Marxist philosophy—studied by today’s senior Russian judges 
in their youth—with certain metaphysical ideas about the supra-individual 
psychological reality that stands over human beings and their minds and 
unites them into mystical communions. For maintaining traditional values, 
it may well justify limitations on rights and freedoms.
This logic of interpretation has been defended by the Chief Justice of the 
RF Constitutional Court, Valerii Zorkin—one of the most influential con-
servative legal scholars in Russia today. He insists that human beings are 
limited by chains of social solidarity which impede them from making an 
arbitrary choice about use of their rights, and that courts have to promote 
and impose this solidarity on individuals. Without addressing Rousseau, 
Marx or other Western thinkers, Zorkin finds in Russian legal philosophy a 
rich source of ideas for his argumentation. Referring to such conceptions as 
Boris Chicherin’s “liberal conservatism”, Zorkin legitimizes restrictions on 
human rights with references to the political, cultural or historical context of 
the “transitional period” (meaning the post-Soviet era in Russia). 24
Logically, these narratives of Zorkin also have involved discussions 
about the power of judges to interpret law and overrule statutory norms 
which they deem to be inadequate, to make a reference to “social conscious-
ness”, and to other metaphysical entities.25 If courts may in fact abolish 
23 Such references are abundant in the argumentation of the RF Constitutional Court. Cita-
tion here is made only of two examples: one RF Constitutional Court Ruling (28 June 
2007) No.18-P on the interdiction of political parties based on religious credos; the other 
its famous 2007 decision on the constitutionality of the statutory interdiction against 
burying presumed terrorists in public cemeteries: Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ruling of the RF Constitutional Court] (28 June 2007) No.8-P, “O 
proverke konstitustionnosti stat’i 14(1) Federal’nogo zakona “O pogrebenii i pokhoron-
nom dele” i “Polozheniia o pogrebenii lits, smert’ kotorykh nastupila v rezul’tate pre-
secheniia sovershennogo imi terroristicheskogo akta” v sviazi s zhaloboi grazhdan K.I. 
Guzieva i E.H. Karmovoi” [On Verifying the Constitutionality of Art.14(1) of Federal 
Law “On Burials and Burial Services” and of the Regulation “On Burying Persons Whose 
Death Was Caused When Interrupting a Terrorist Act Committed by Them” in connec-
tion with Complaints of Citizens K.I. Guziev and E.H. Karmova], Rossiiskaia gazeta (4 July 
2007) No.4404.
24 V.D. Zorkin, “Pravo epokhi moderna” [The Law of the Epoch of Modernity], Rossiis-
kaia gazeta (25 June 2006) No.5217; id., “Apologiia Vestfal’skoi sistemy” [An Apology of 
the Westphalian System], Rossiiskaia gazeta (22 August 2006) No.4150; id., “Put’ k svo-
bode” [The Path to Freedom], Rossiiskaia gazeta (16 September 2009) No.4997; id., “Predel 
ustupchivosti” [The Limit of Concession], Rossiiskaia gazeta (29 October 2010) No.5325; 
id., “Pravo—i tol’ko pravo” [Law and Only the Law], Rossiiskaia gazeta (23 March 2015) 
No.6631; and id., “Rossiia i Strasburg. Problemy realizatsii Konventsii o pravakh chelove-
ka” [Russia and Strasburg: The Problems of Implementing the ECHR], Rossiiskaia gazeta 
(21 October 2015) No.6809.
25 See the discussion between Zorkin and one of Russia’s constitutional-law lawyers, Ele-
na Lukianova, about Zorkin’s references to “spiritual buckles” and other metaphysical 
terms: E.G. Luk’ianova et al., #KRYMNASH. Spor o prave i o skrepakh dvukh iuristov i ikh 
chitatelei [#Crimea Belongs to Us. A Discussion about Law and about Buckles between 
Two Lawyers and Their Readers] (Kuchkovo pole, Moscow, 2015).
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certain legal norms or change their contents, what are the justification and 
limits for it, if any? In this respect, Russian legal theory is in a difficult posi-
tion. From the point of view of the command theory, all judicial discretion is 
prohibited. Judges are only to speak the words of the law and not to change 
it in any way. The law is objective in the sense that one can unmistakably 
deduce from the words of the law the presumed will of the sovereign 
(parliament, the people or the president). However, in some situations it 
is possible to override the literal meaning and to establish an “objective” 
meaning contrary to the literal text of the law.26
Seemingly, Zorkin and other important lawyers do not try to reconsider 
the command theory and to go beyond it. At the same time, they are looking 
for analytical tools to justify judicial freedom of interpretation. As a matter 
of fact, in many cases, the command theory is awkwardly combined with 
historical or sociological jurisprudence, or uncritically mixed with some 
ideas from realist jurisprudence. Normally, it leads to contradictions and 
inconsistencies and the presumed objectivity unfrequently turns into the 
pure subjectivity of judges.27
Addressing this theoretical issue of subjectivity and objectivity in 
law, the present volume will first analyze the combination of decisionism 
and formalism in Russian and Soviet legal theory. As argued in the first 
Chapter “Decisionism in Soviet and Russian Jurisprudence”, the particular 
character of Russian (Soviet) law can be explained against the backdrop of 
this theoretical combination of conservative social philosophy, the Schmit-
tean conception of exception, methods of legal positivism and the spirit of 
decisionism. These particularities and their methodological background are 
among the distinguishing features of Russian law and legal culture.
The major theoretical challenge for Russian legal theorists is to choose 
between two principal theses (excluding smaller methodological and con-
ceptual issues): either the judge is bound by the law, or the judge is free 
26 Typically for this style of reasoning, in 2000 the RF Constitutional Court found (7 June 
2000) No.10-P that, despite the express wording of Art.5 of the RF Constitution—deem-
ing constituent republics of the Russian Federation to be “states”—these republics shall 
not be referred to as “states” and are not considered as possessing sovereignty (contrary 
to the text of the 1992 Federal Treaty), because the wording of the Constitution and the 
Federal Treaty should not be taken literally and, rather, must be interpreted “with respect 
to national, historical and other factors” (para.2.1.). Another exemplary case is the inter-
pretation which the RF Constitutional Court gave to the RF Constitution’s provisions (in 
Art.15) about the priority of international law over domestic law: (14 July 2015) No.21-P, 
op.cit. note 16. In spite of the explicit language of para.4 of this Article, the Court decided 
that it should be interpreted in a way that makes the direct effect of international-law 
norms and principles dependent on the RF Constitutional Court’s interpretations about 
the applicability of such norms and principles in light of “Russian constitutional values” 
(rossiiskie konstitutsionnye tsennosti).
27 E.g., Kathryn Hendley, “The Puzzling Non-Consequences of Societal Distrust of Courts: 
Explaining the Use of Russian Courts”, 45(3) Cornell International Law Journal (2012), 517-
567; and Bill Bowring, “Russia and Human Rights: Incompatible Opposites?”, 1(2) Got-
tingen Journal of International Law (2009), 257-278.
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to decide cases against the law, basing her decision on principles that she 
might extract from traditional values and other metaphysical sources. In 
other words, the judge shall either abide by legal norm—even in cases 
brought to the courts by individuals against the state and its interests; or she 
may depart from them to secure the best interests of the state—even when 
these interests are contrary to the individual rights posited in the law.
Exemplarily, from this perspective, the idea of “socialist legality” did 
not, in fact, bind the hands of Soviet law-enforcement officers, let alone 
those of secret-service agents, when the supreme interests of the Soviet State 
or the Communist Party were at stake and required action contrary to the 
law. In Soviet jurisprudence, this exceptionalist conception of legality was 
reinforced with such categories as “class struggle”. In our days, this excep-
tionalist approach to the law is based on ubiquitous references to “sover-
eignty” or “traditional values”. It is remarkable that, in both cases, similar 
ideas—although with varying axiological content—are utilized to achieve 
the same conceptual goals: with the aid of broadly interpreted exceptions, 
to justify unchecked sovereign power to act above the law and to deny the 
inviolable rights of citizens. The analysis undertaken in the first Chapter 
of this work leads to the conclusion that the old legal mentality still holds 
sway among most Russian lawyers; in turn, giving rise to the proposition 
that revisiting established theoretical ideas could be one of the main steps 
toward reaching a better understanding between Russia and the West.
The philosophical conception of the Chief Justice of the RF Constitu-
tional Court, Valerii Zorkin, is examined in the following Chapter “Phi-
losophy Behind Human Rights: Valerii Zorkin vs. the West?”. The position 
taken by Zorkin in his numerous writings and public speeches is exemplary 
for the philosophical underpinnings of Russian exceptionalism in legal 
matters. Zorkin’s thesis about the prevalence of the whole (the collective) 
over the individual inevitably leads to an apology for elitism and autocracy. 
Zorkin entrusts the state with the task of moral education of the citizenry; 
implicitly endorsing authoritarian rule in Russia until this education bears 
fruit. This holist and conservative philosophy is incompatible with the 
liberal understanding of human rights which, historically, have appeared as 
individual freedoms and which have served to save individuality from the 
tyranny of the majority, of the state, of elites, and of the clergy.
Zorkin’s approach is based on the normative ideal of a consistent and 
full legal system, with texts that provide answers to each question and rule 
out possible discretion—this ideal being the starting point for Zorkin’s 
exceptionalism and for many similar theoretical constructions of other 
Russian legal scholars. However, this formalist ideal cannot stand in the 
light of Zorkin’s ideas about the primacy of unofficial (traditional) law 
over official (statutory) law. In their turn, Zorkin’s ideas on these matters 
are based on non-positivist theories which presume that there is only one 
correct morality—for example, the one that prioritizes certain values of 
the traditional family, traditional religion, and the like. Consequently, the 
official traditionalist narrative (including Zorkin’s) turns out to be intoler-
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ant of competing moral conceptions that may prioritize the innovative over 
the traditional, individual choice over collective interest, freedom over 
stability and security. The choice made among formally equal constitutional 
rights and values reveals the apriorism of the traditionalist ideology which 
provides the framework for judicial discretion and its justification in the 
contemporary Russian law.
This dichotomy between the formalist (the command theory of law) 
and the discretional dimensions of Russian law—and its relevance for the 
conceptualization and protection of human rights in Russia—are addressed 
in the next Chapter “Conservatism in Russia and Sovereignty in Human 
Rights”. It examines the correlation between concepts of sovereignty, 
human rights, and democracy in Russian legal and political debates, ana-
lyzing this correlation in the context of Russian philosophical discourse. It 
argues that sovereignty can be used in Russian law as a powerful argument 
which allows the overriding of international humanitarian standards and 
the formal constitutional guarantees of human rights.
The specific understanding of democracy in post-Perestroika Russia 
serves as an illustrative example. Focusing on the concept of “sovereign 
democracy”, we examine debates about democracy in light of Russian 
conservative traditions. We accept that conflicts between sovereignty and 
human rights also can be observed in other countries. In Russia however, 
this conflict is aggravated by certain characteristic features of the traditional 
mentality which frequently favors statism and collective interests over indi-
vidual ones; by the state building a “power vertical” (vertikal’ vlasti) sub-
ordinating regional and other particularistic interests to the central power. 
These features and policies are studied in the context of the 19th century 
Slavophile-Westernizer philosophical divide and its contemporary versions. 
This divide reveals the pros and contras discussed by Russian supporters of 
the isolationist (conservative) policy throughout history, and especially in 
the sovereignty debates in recent years.
The image of the decaying West picturesquely portrayed by Soviet 
propaganda was not, in the final analysis, its invention. It had already been 
widely used by the Slavophiles, and similar images of the West had been 
pictured by Russian intellectuals even since the Great Schism of the 11th 
century. In the present work, we argue that—as they invoke Russia’s spe-
cific historical mission—contemporary Russian authorities rehash the same 
old discourse and find a nation-wide audience ready to support it and to 
legitimize the authorities. It should come as no surprise that the authorities 
use this rhetoric to reinforce their legitimacy. This traditionalism adjoins 
rational legitimacy which promotes respect toward law and rationality, 
which are conceived of differently than in the West. The ideology in ques-
tion represents an attempt to formulate a new legal philosophy based on 
first legal positivism and opposed to “post-positivist’, “new-positivist’ or 
“non-positivist’ legal philosophies.
The next Chapter “Religion, Sexual Minorities and the Rule of Law in 
Russia: Mutual Challenges” examines the appropriation and utilization of 
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these theoretical arguments in the case law of the Russian Supreme Court 
and the RF Constitutional Court concerning rights of sexual minorities. We 
analyze the cultural constraints that are factually imposed on the actors of 
the Russian legal system by the prevailing social philosophy characterized 
by a significant degree of conservatism. This conservatism is predictably 
opposed to sexual minorities and to those who want to defend or justify 
them. This analysis demonstrates that religious conceptions have a strong 
impact on decision-making in Russian courts and, sometimes, can overrule 
the formal provisions of Russian constitutional and statutory law granting 
protection to sexual minorities. This situation can be explained with refer-
ence to the prevailing social philosophy promoting conservative values and 
emphasizing collective interests. In its turn, this conservative social philoso-
phy and the communitarian morality are based on religious patterns which 
still shape mind-sets and attitudes of Russians. These attitudes cannot be 
ignored by judges and other actors of Russian legal system who, to some 
extent, are subject to the general perception of what is just, acceptable, and 
reasonable in the society.
This religious context reveals the internal logic of legal regulation 
which outweighs the fundamental rights of sexual minorities with the help 
of moral argumentation based on a conservative philosophy. In order to 
maintain coherence in the legal order, judges and other legal actors have to 
balance the statutory interdictions and restrictions (like those against gay-
pride parades or religious sects) with basic constitutional freedoms. Such 
balancing is the main argumentation point in court cases connected with 
“non-traditional” minorities; implicitly present also in the federal legislation 
and in the discourse of the supreme judges. This argumentation provides 
some clues to the philosophy underpinning Russian exceptionalism in mat-
ters of the rights of minorities. A closer look at this philosophy also discloses 
its anti-universalist stances. The proponents of this conservative approach 
stress that Russia has religious, cultural and other civilizational particulari-
ties which may justify an exemption of Russian law from the universalist 
non-discrimination standards of the West.
This analysis shows the deep interconnection between the religious and 
moral convictions that frequently serve as a normative ideal for judges to 
shy away from granting legal protection to minorities. Continuing this anal-
ysis in the next Chapter “Religious Beliefs and the Limits of Their Accom-
modation in Russia: Some Landmark Cases of the Russian Supreme Court”, 
we will demonstrate how this logic works out in the cases concerning rights 
of religious minorities. These minorities are under the protection of the 
Russian Constitution which establishes liberal principles for the exercise of 
religious freedoms. But Russian statutory law fails to provide explicit rules 
on how to implement these principles and what the limits thereof are. This 
puts Russian courts in an ambiguous situation: they have to grant accom-
modations in religious cases pursuant to constitutional law but, practically, 
are precluded from granting such accommodations since, otherwise, courts 
could be viewed as snatching the legislative function away from the parlia-
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ment. Meanwhile, Russian legislative authorities are reluctant to legitimize 
such accommodations for minorities, and yet they remain reluctant to 
formally accord a clearly privileged status to the Orthodoxy.
The courts generally are indisposed to recognize that their decisions 
develop statutory law. Therefore, they tend to hide their approaches and 
criteria behind the formalistic language of their decisions. Yet their case 
law does reveal how judges utilize their discretion to favor the prevailing 
religious denominations and to limit the rights of religious minorities. The 
analysis shows that the Russian Supreme Court has, in its arsenal, flexible 
methods of reasoning which enable it to avoid applying this legislation to 
the prevailing denominations—granting them exemptions from general 
legal obligations. However, utilizing the technique of “doublespeak”, Rus-
sian courts shy away from making this argumentation transparent and do 
not explicitly recognize the substantial difference in protecting “traditional” 
and “non-traditional” religions. On the contrary, courts insist that the 
protection is equal and that they abide by constitutional principles. As fol-
lows from the analyzed case law, the real situation is different—predictably 
leading this doublespeak to contradictions in argumentation of the Russian 
Supreme Court and its subordinated courts.
3 Research Questions, Research Subject and Scope of the Study
The present volume examines the collectivist (conservative or traditional-
ist) reasoning as a counterpart that is not present formally in Russian 
constitutional texts but, in reality, sets out constraints limiting the appli-
cation of constitutional and statutory rights and freedoms by courts and 
law-enforcement agencies. The main research question is therefore: how is 
legal formalism aligned with conservative philosophies (these, in their turn, 
justify anti-formalism and decisionism) in Russian legal thinking, and can 
this alignment be considered to reflect the specific style of this thinking? 
Answering this main question implies addressing a number of topics about 
the theoretical, cultural and historical reasons of the specific conceptualiza-
tion of rights in Russian legal culture, and identifying what the normative 
relevance may be of this conceptualization for interpreting and applying 
law.
We will argue that in many instances, this conservative reasoning justi-
fies the exceptions that judges make in interpreting and applying constitu-
tional and statutory law. This exceptionalism has been subject to numerous 
philosophical debates and controversies, the most notorious of which is that 
from the 19th century between Westernizers and Slavophiles. Traditionalism 
was very much congruent with relativism and exceptionalism, while the 
universalist approach fitted well with the agenda of Russian liberals who 
believed that legal development has the same trajectory in different societ-
ies and, therefore, implies the same legal principles and values everywhere. 
Evidently, seen from these two different vantage points, human rights, con-
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stitutionality, the rule-of-law and many other fundamental legal concepts 
may be interpreted in radically divergent ways; what, in fact, happens with 
Russian law.
In line with the relativist theory based on such a conservative philoso-
phy, Russian law schools and academia translate and reproduce the state-
centered perspective of the law understood as a set of commands of the 
sovereign having absolute power to create and enforce any legal enactments 
whatsoever. The state possesses sovereign powers allegedly delegated to 
the state by the people, and in this light the state is immune to any criticism 
of its laws and regulations. From the standpoint of the relativism inherent in 
the positivist theory of law, there can be no superior criteria to evaluate the 
legality and validity of these commands.28 Another normative message that 
lies in the theoretical foundation of Russian law is that judges can discard 
legal norms if these do not fit the values prioritized by the prevailing social 
and political philosophies. Analyzing the interplay of these two elements 
can provide a response to the research question outlined above, and this is 
the research subject addressed in the five chapters of the present work.
This combination of two incompatible elements (legal formalism and 
decisionism) predictably leads to theoretical contradictions and to practical 
tensions between supporters of different political views who can find jus-
tification for their positions in either of these two elements. It happens also 
in other legal orders: for example, the dialectics of originalism and interpre-
tivism in US constitutional law. In a number of important issues, tensions 
between decisionism and formalism suggest to Russian legal scholars and 
practitioners that they should take issue with the ensuing theoretical and 
practical problems.
***
This dissertation has been written according to the Leiden University rules 
which permit submission of a PhD dissertation prepared on the basis of 
articles published or submitted for publication. Each chapter in the present 
work was developed first as stand-alone articles; they are revised for the 
present work. We have sought to connect these chapters and introduced 
into them a number of changes reflecting the main methodological idea 
of the present research. Nonetheless, since each of them was written as a 
stand-alone work on one of the many aspects characterizing the problem, 
the chapters do not flow from one another as otherwise would be the case.
Without pretending to deal with the problem of rights (human rights, 
minority rights, and religious freedoms) in Russian law in all their pos-
sible implications and aspects, we will concentrate in the present work on 
examining the impact of tensions between formalism and decisionism on 
28 For some positivists (such as Hans Kelsen, for example), it is possible to utilize interna-
tional law as such a criterion. However, this utilization would require “purifying” the 
legal science from value judgments, which is hardly conceivable in light of Russian intel-
lectual tradition and language use.
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the conceptualization of rights in Russian law. In the concluding Chapter, 
we summarize our theoretical findings to explain contemporary Russia’s 
exceptionalism in the matter of rights against the backdrop of the officially 
supported versions of conservative philosophy. The conclusion tries to 
outline certain regularities in this interconnection between the underlying 
conceptual background and its practical effects in Russian case law and 
legal scholarship. We are fully aware of the complexity of this interconnec-
tion and many other of its aspects remaining outside of the scope of this 
volume. Nonetheless, we hope that this study will be a modest contribution 
to discussions pertaining to this matter.
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1 Formalism and Decisionism in Soviet 
and Russian Jurisprudence29
Foreword
In this first Chapter, we will analyze the combination of the decisionist and 
formalist elements in Russian law, and previously Soviet law. This analysis 
will prepare the methodological ground for further elaborations on the 
impact of this combination on different aspects of legal regulation in Russia.
We will argue that Soviet law is often viewed as based on legal positiv-
ism, while its ideological background and the practices of political interfer-
ence are considered in an extralegal (political) dimension. This Chapter calls 
this approach into question and suggests that the alleged dualism can be 
considered in light of the basic presuppositions and methods of the Soviet 
(Russian) theory of law and state. The methodological presumption that we 
develop in the present Chapter is that Russian jurisprudence was and still is 
based on a combination of formalism and anti-formalism, which provided a 
certain degree of unity and coherence of legal knowledge. Our examination 
addresses the philosophical and methodological origins of this decision-
ism and argues that the particular character of Russian (Soviet) law can 
be explained against the backdrop of this theoretical combination, which 
brings together conservative social philosophy, the Schmittean conception 
of “exception’, methods of legal positivism, and the spirit of legal nihilism. 
These particularities and their methodological background are, in our opin-
ion, among the distinguishing features of Russian law and legal culture. In 
the following chapters, we will show how the study of these particularities 
can provide clues for a better assessment of the conservative attitude of 
Russian law toward minority rights.
29 A previous version of this Chapter was fi rst presented at the 2018 Annual Conference 
“Legal Identities and Legal Traditions in Central and Eastern Europe” of the Central and 
Eastern European Network of Legal Scholars (CEENELS) at the University of Latvia 
(Riga). The Chapter benefi ted enormously from feedback from a number of colleagues 
who gave their feedback during and after the Conference, especially Dr. Rafał Mańko 
and Professor Cosmit S. Cercel. An elaborated version of this Chapter was published in 
43(4) Review of Central and East European Law (2018), 483-518. The present Chapter is an 
updated version of that work.
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Introduction
One of the interesting comparative-law ideas in recent years has been the 
argument that there is a specific (Central and) Eastern European legal tradi-
tion (family, circle) that is distinguished from other traditions (including 
the Western legal tradition) by common history, ways of legal thinking, 
and specific approaches to the application of the law.30 This idea can be 
a rich source of parallels and comparisons about legal developments on 
the European continent and helpful for explaining why similar institutions 
transplanted from the Western legal tradition have different effects in the 
countries of Eastern Europe (the countries of the former Soviet bloc).
What might be the correct tertium cooperationist (along with history, 
institutions, and other criteria well established in comparative law) in order 
to determine the correct explanation for differences in legal traditions? 
Every system (in continental-law countries at least) departs from the general 
formula: legal norms are established by competent social institutions (the 
state), they must be observed regardless of one’s personal convictions, but 
they can be disobeyed in certain situations. This principle, albeit common to 
many legal systems, is developed in Russian law through a set of theoreti-
cal ideas about the law, its nature, machinery, purposes, and value. In the 
following pages, we will dwell on some of the particularities of Russian law 
that result from different intellectual frameworks. This analysis will also 
require us to address Soviet law as the historical source of contemporary 
Russian law.
There is something specific about Russian attitudes to the law that often 
strikes foreigners who do business with Russians or simply observe how 
Russians use their laws.31 This elusive “something” can be conceptualized as 
a set of ideas and attitudes in a legal community,32 a general consciousness 
or experience of law that is widely shared by those who inhabit a particular 
30 Rafał Mańko, Cosmin S. Cercel, and Adam Sulikowski (eds.), Law and Critique in Central 
Europe: Questioning the Past, Resisting the Present (Counterpress, Oxford, 2016); and Rafał 
Mańko, Martin Škop, and Markéta Štěpáníková, “Carving Out Central Europe as a Space 
of Legal Culture: A Way Out of Peripherality?”, 6(2) Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration 
& Economics (2018), 4-28.
31 The descriptions of Russian legal culture in the 19th century made by the Marquis de 
Custine provide paradigmatic examples of Western perceptions of Russian law and of 
the culture that underpins this law. See Astolphe de Custine, Letters from Russia (Review 
Books Classics, New York, NY, 2002). See, also, George F. Kennan, The Marquis de Custine 
and His Russia in 1839 (Hutchinson, London, 1972); and Vladimir Bibikhin, Vvedenie v 
fi losofi iu prava (Institut fi losofi i RAN, Moscow, 2005). For a more generalized perspective, 
see, for example, Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, “Russian Legal Culture and the Rule of 
Law”, 7(1) Kritika (2006), 61-70.
32 Roger Cotterrell, Law’s Community: Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1995). In this respect, the present analysis will be confi ned only to the ideas 
and attitudes of legal professionals and will not imply any generalizations about the Rus-
sian population.
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legal environment.33 The general consciousness of law was (in the Soviet 
past) and still is (in contemporary Russia) situated at the crossroads between 
legal formalism and decisionism. Still, in this respect, Russian law is far from 
unique, and its epistemic schemas are similar to how rules and exceptions 
are conceptualized in other countries, as their dichotomy is central to every 
legal system, e.g., the textualism and judicial activism in US courts and the 
respective legal philosophies behind these approaches, which Karl Llewellyn 
once generalized as “formal style” and “grand style”, respectively. However, 
there are some particularities of the theoretical combination of formalism 
and decisionism in Russia that will be partly examined in the present 
Chapter.
For the purposes of this Chapter, the former will mean the priority of a 
literal interpretation of the law, the mechanical conception of the application 
of the law, and the idea that the law is limited to sources that are established 
or recognized by the state. Decisionism will refer to somewhat contrasting 
ideas: the law is what law officers (judges, prosecutors, police officers, etc.) 
consider to be legally binding for themselves and others, with these law 
officers being limited not by legal texts but by factual power relations.
In the previous version of this Chapter, the term “realism” was utilized 
to describe this second (decisionist) dimension of law. This terminology 
prompts lengthy discussions between legal philosophers as to what is to 
be understood by “realism” in law. The ordinary language usage refers 
to American legal realism represented by such names as Jerome Frank, 
Karl Llewellyn or Felix Cohen. This version of realism borrowed methods 
from the social sciences to carefully study the law as experienced by law-
yers, judges, and average citizens and promoted a progressive vision for 
American law and society. There are some affinities between this version 
of legal realism and what we describe in the present volume by the term 
“decisionism”, although affinities do not mean a “proximity” or “identity”. 
Reviewing this volume, Professor Kathryn Hendley has justly indicated at 
the fact that for an average reader “legal realism” will mean its American 
version and that this could result in confusion. Therefore, we have revised 
the terminology accordingly. In fact, this volume has not been intended to 
be a place for philosophical debates about legal realism, which would lead 
the research in a quite different direction. Still, the affinity between the idea 
that the law is what judges say the law is and decisionism—in the practice 
of Russian (Soviet) courts—can have the same methodological base. The 
scholarly debates of the early 20th century gave rise to anti-formalist legal 
conceptions not only in the USA but, also, in the Russian Empire (the ideas 
of Leon Petrażycki or his followers, who are often called “the Polish school 
33 Roger Cotterrell, “Comparative Law and Legal Culture”, in Mathias Reimann and Rein-
hard Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2006), 710-737.
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of legal realism” or the school of “Eastern European legal realism”34). In 
addition, there is the rich literature of the Scandinavian legal philosophers 
also known as “legal realists”: Karl Olivecrona, Alf Ross, Axel Hägerström 
and others. In contemporary legal philosophy, one finds also the French 
(Michel Troper, Eric Millards and others), the Italian (Ricardo Guastini, 
Enrico Pattaro and others) and other national schools of legal realism which 
do not follow the methods of American realism.
As a matter of fact, the term “realism” is broader than the method-
ological approach usually labeled as “American legal realism”: it is pluri-
semantic and reveals several competing meanings. From the philosophical 
point of view, realism implies that there is an object of cognition that exists 
independent of our conceptual schemes. In international law, realism is 
another term for Realpolitik, meaning that everything goes if backed by 
the strongest power, and legal issues are therefore decided by struggles 
between powers, as a final resort. In legal philosophy, realism refers to 
theories that assert that court decisions are products of judicial discretion 
and are not essentially determined by an interpretation or application of 
legal norms. In the arts, realism refers to the requirement to represent an 
object truthfully, without artificiality. The common feature in these different 
types of realism is that it conceptualizes a concern for “objective reality” 
and rejects impractical and visionary (ideal) dimensions: later, this will help 
us distinguish between realism and natural law. Applied to the law, the 
term “realism” in all these contexts could be utilized as a shortcut for the 
idea that the substance of the law is formed at the moment of interpretation 
and application of the law.
These two approaches are mutually exclusive in theory, but they were, 
nonetheless, combined in the legal practices of the Soviet regime and in 
Soviet legal theory. This contradiction was due to, among other reasons, the 
original ambiguity of the Marxist-Leninist attitude to the law. The law was 
understood as a tool of class oppression and at the same time as a necessary 
means of state governance under the conditions of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. Following ardent debates in the 1920s about the nature and the 
future of the law, Soviet legal theory and practice in the late 1930s became a 
binary combination of formalism and decisionism—their characteristic fea-
tures throughout Soviet history, which still survive in Russian law to this day.
The image of an experienced investigator, Gleb Zheglov (played by 
Vladimir Vysotsky), who trampled on the law in order to apprehend and 
convict criminals in the 1979 cult Soviet film Mesto vstrechi izmenit’ nel’zia 
34 Kazimierz Opałek, “The Leon Petrażycki Theory of Law”, 27(3) Theoria (1961), 129-150; 
Anna Ovsiannikova, “Rossiiskii pravovoi realizm” [Russian Legal Realism], in Evgenii 
Tonkov (ed.), Tolkovanie zakona i prava [Interpretation of Statutory Laws and Law] (Ale-
teiia, St Petersburg, 2015); Edoardo Fittipaldi, “Introduction: Continental Legal Realism”, 
in Enrico Pattaro and Corrado Roversi (eds.), A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General 
Jurisprudence, Vol. 12, tome 2 (Springer, Berlin, 2016), 297-316; and Jerzy Stelmach, Bartosz 
Brożek, and Julia Stanek (eds.), Russian Legal Realism (Springer, Berlin, 2018).
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(The Meeting Place Cannot Be Changed), reflects this feature. One of the 
main lines in the film was uttered during a disagreement between Zheglov 
and a young, idealistic investigator named Sharapov, who saw the law as 
having value in itself and thought that it should not be trampled upon even 
with the best of intentions. Zheglov looked at things more realistically and 
insisted that “a thief’s place is in prison, and the public could not care less 
about how I put him there”. To that end, Zheglov argued in favor of using 
dubious tactics such as planting evidence. The ideological message of the 
film—and of legal ideology in general—was the idea that the “regime of 
socialist legality” did not, in fact, bind the hands of Soviet governmental 
officials, let alone those of the secret service or law-enforcement agents, 
when the supreme interests of socialist society (which meant of the Soviet 
state or of the Communist Party) were at stake and that required one act 
contrary to the law. As we will see below, the Soviet authorities adopted the 
same strategy.
The sympathies of those who watch the film obviously remain with 
Zheglov’s position, which is confirmed by the actions in the film. However, 
the logic of this conflict does not fit in the divide between anti-formalism 
and formalism, as there are no doubts that formal law is good and neces-
sary: it is simply that, in some situations, excessive formalism might pre-
clude the attainment of the goals enshrined in the law itself, and in these 
situations, formalism must be dropped. Problematizing the situation of 
exceptions to legal norms (their defeasibility) nudged Soviet lawyers in the 
direction of questions about the conditions and limits of this permanent 
state of exception in a way similar to Carl Schmitt or Giorgio Agamben. 
In the reality of the Soviet regime, however, no such discussion could 
have taken place, although it was implied in many scholarly discussions 
between Soviet lawyers. To a certain extent, the profound interest of some 
contemporary Russian scholars and politicians in Carl Schmitt and his ideas 
about sovereignty as the right to decide about exceptional situation s35 can 
be explained with reference to this decisionist dimension of Soviet (Russian) 
legal thinking .36
The formalist element in Soviet and contemporary Russian law has been 
documented by many scholars37 and is beyond doubt, but the decisionist 
35 As demonstrated by Professor Bowring, an important number of those Russian scholars 
close to political decision-making processes, such as Aleksandr Dugin, Aleksandr Filip-
pov, and others, base their conclusions and recommendations on Schmittean ideas. These 
ideas are also expressed in political discussions about Russia’s political leadership. See 
Bill Bowring, Law, Rights and Ideology in Russia: Landmarks in the Destiny of a Great Power 
(Routledge, Abingdon and New York, NY, 2013), 194-203.
36 On the intellectual proximity of Schmitt’s political theology and the Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat, see Cosmin S. Cercel, Towards a Jurispruden-
ce of State Communism: Law and the Failure of Revolution (Routledge, Abingdon and New 
York, NY, 2018), 72-96.
37 Eugene Huskey, “Vyshinskii, Krylenko, and the Shaping of the Soviet Legal Order”, 46(3-
4) Slavic Review (1987), 414-428.
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element so far largely has been viewed and criticized as a result of ideologi-
cal indoctrination or political manipulation. Along with these perspectives, 
this combination of formalism and anti-formalism in Soviet law can also be 
explained against the background of the theoretical dualism between posi-
tivist and decisionist ideas that formed the starting methodological point in 
Soviet legal scholarship and education after 1938. This theoretical heritage is 
not thoroughly reconceptualized in Russian law, and an analysis of it might 
shed more light on the intellectual roots of the continued discrepancies 
between Russia and the West on sovereignty, human rights and other key 
legal issues.38
1 Methodology
In comparative legal studies, different social attitudes to the law in vari-
ous areas of the world are frequently analyzed through the lenses of “legal 
culture”, which can be broken down into external (societal) and internal 
(juristic) legal culture.39 Nonetheless, this term stirs ardent debates in com-
parative-law scholarship, as it is suspected of being a means of arbitrarily 
ascribing cultural features to peoples and nations whose legal systems 
are different from the Western legal tradition.40 By way of example, the 
literature on Russian legal culture is abundant with narratives about Rus-
sian “legal nihilism, which in fact refers to quite a wide and multifaceted 
range of phenomena and evaluations. The 19th-century Russian philosopher 
Alexander Herzen once expressed this nihilism in the celebrated words: 
“Complete inequality before the law has killed any trace of respect for 
legality in the Russian people. The Russian, whatever his station, breaks the 
law wherever he can do so with impunity; the government acts in the same 
way. ”41 Strongly condemned by the Russian intelligentsia in the 1909 work 
Vekhi,42 this assumed Russian “aversion” to law became, over the years, 
proverbial in Western political scholarship, sometimes even becoming truly 
grotesque, suggesting that aversion to law in the nature of Russians.43
38 See, for example, Mikhail Antonov, “Conservatism in Russia and Sovereignty in Human 
Rights”, 39(1) Review of Central and East European Law (2014), 1-40.
39 Lawrence M. Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective (Russell Sage Foun-
dation, New York, NY, 1975), 194ff. Regarding Russian legal culture, see Frances Net-
tercott, Russian Legal Culture Before and After Communism: Criminal Justice, Politics, and the 
Public Sphere (Routledge, Abingdon and New York, NY, 2007).
40 On methodological problems connected with the use of the term “legal culture”, see 
David Nelken, “Using the Concept of Legal Culture”, 29 Australian Journal of Legal Philo-
sophy (2004), 1-26.
41 Alexander Herzen, “Du développement des idées révolutionnaires en Russie”, cited by 
Bogdan Kistiakovskii in his contribution to Marshall S. Shatz and Judith E. Zimmerman 
(transl. and eds.), Vekhi: Landmarks (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY, 1994), 130.
42 Vekhi: Landmarks, op.cit. note 41.
43 Jessica C. Wilson, “Russia’s Cultural Aversion to the Rule of Law”, 2(2) Columbia Journal of 
Eastern European Law (2008), 195-232.
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It is not at all unusual to read comments about “culturally predeter-
mined” ways in which Russians allegedly express their lack of respect for 
the law, and swarms of Russian and Western commentators repeat mantras 
about Russian legal nihilism as if it were a universal intellectual tool for 
picking the lock of Russian law.44 For example, Marina Kurkchiyan gener-
alizes about today’s “Russian way of thinking and doing things”, in legal 
matters, as “something that combines the glossy outward trappings of west-
ern law with the more cynical inward conniving of the Russian tradition”,45 
concluding that “Russia is not on the way to a rule of law culture”.46
Such an approach can be challenged from at least two perspectives. 
On the one hand, as one reads from sociological polls, different groups in 
Russian society may demonstrate different attitudes depending on their 
education, age, and other variables, and these are not so different from 
the attitudes of Western Europeans or North Americans .47 On the other 
hand, cultural perceptions of law are not identical among Russians. The 
attitudes advocated by Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, and Solzhenitsyn are certainly 
anti-formalist and underplay law as inferior to morality or religion. If we 
think about the Russian liberal tradition,48 however, things would appear 
differently and would definitely call into question black-and-white pictures 
of the Russian legal culture and its supposed “aversion” to the law.
44 See the analysis and criticism of this approach in Kathryn Hendley, “Who Are the Legal 
Nihilists in Russia?”, 28(2) Post-Soviet Affairs (2012), 149-186. In this article and on many 
other occasions, Professor Hendley persuasively shows that Russians are not more nihil-
istic about their legal rights and obligations than other peoples.
45 Marina Kurkchiyan, “Researching Legal Culture in Russia: From Asking the Question to 
Gathering the Evidence”, in Reza Banakar and Max Treves (eds.), Theory and Methods in 
Socio-Legal Research (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005), 277.
46 Ibid. Professor Kurkchiyan’s analysis of informal practices and paralegal mechanisms in 
Russia is correct. However, her general conclusion misses the point, as such practices and 
mechanisms normally thrive in every society, even in those that are paragons of a rule-of-
law culture. This is well attested by of the extensive literature on legal pluralism (e.g., Bri-
an Z. Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global”, 30(3) 
Sydney Law Review (2008), 375-411), of which Professor Kurkchiyan is undoubtedly aware 
but—for some unclear reason—discards in her analysis of the “shadow law” in Russia (a 
term coined by the Russian legal theorist, Professor Vladimir Baranov). See Vladimir M. 
Baranov, Tenevoe pravo [Shadow Law] (NA MVD RF, Nizhnii Novgorod, 2002).
47 See, for example, Marina Kurkchiyan, Varvara Andrianova, Kathryn Hendley, Gilles 
Favarel-Garrigues, and William Simons, Experiences of Law in Contemporary Russia: Report 
and Analysis of a Workshop Held at Wolfson College, Oxford 4 October 2012 (The Founda-
tion for Law, Justice and Society, Oxford, 2012), available at <http://www.fl js.org/sites/
www.fl js.org/fi les/publications/Law-in-Contemporary-Russia_0.pdf>; Sergei Mel’kov, 
“Kak rossiiane sami otsenivaiut sostoianie svoei pravovoi kul’tury?” [How Do Russians 
Themselves Evaluate the Status of Their Legal Culture?], lawinrussia.ru (29 October 2016), 
available at <http://lawinrussia.ru/content/kak-rossiyane-sami-ocenivayut-sostoy-
anie-svoey-pravovoy-kultury>; and Kathryn Hendley, Everyday Law in Russia (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, NY, and London, 2017).
48 Andrzej Walicki, Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism (University of Notre Dame Press, 
Notre Dame, IN, 1992).
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To avoid intellectual traps of essentially contested terms like ‘(legal) 
culture”, some comparative legal scholars (see below) suggest examining 
ways of conceptualizing legal concepts and institutions in different legal 
epistemic communities. One can use the perspective of legal theories49 to 
determine whether there is any specific way to theorize about law in East-
ern European countries.
This terminological choice needs a brief clarification. The main theoreti-
cal questions for lawyers everywhere are how to find a solution to a legal 
problem and what they have to do in situations where their legal system 
does not provide a clear-cut solution. Finding a solution in such penumbra 
and lacunae cases logically implies an array of other questions: about the 
sources of validity, the nature and limits of interpretation, the hierarchy of 
norms, and so on—something close to what H.L.A. Hart dubbed the “sec-
ondary rules” of legal systems.
The conceptual limits within which different epistemic communities 
search for and formulate responses to these questions normally shape a 
country’s “working legal theory”, although their boundaries are not always 
clearly distinguishable. In this sense, one may say: “according to the pre-
vailing Russian legal theory, there are so many approaches to this issue, and 
namely […]”. Surely, there can in fact be different legal theories accepted 
among different groups of legal scholars or practitioners. The “jurispru-
dence” (both in the sense of case law and of the legal theory underpinning 
that case law) of one high court can be based on theoretical premises that 
are different from the premises accepted by another high court. The same 
goes for different law schools and think tanks. This notwithstanding, 
our hypothesis is that it is possible to generalize a set of ideas (a legal 
theory) that is more or less uniformly shared by most Russian scholars and 
practitioners.
We will not get into debates about the best terminology for describing 
differences between what Zweigert and Kötz labeled Rechtskreise,50 which 
is a particularly contested issue in comparative law.51 Culture, tradition, 
mentality, ideology, or other terms can serve for this purpose, and the choice 
between them is purely a terminological matter, as they are in fact used in 
an interchangeable manner. Thus, in the words of John H. Merryman, “legal 
tradition is a set of attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of law in 
the society and the polity, about the proper organization and operation of a 
49 Thomas Grey spoke in this context of the “working legal theory” shared by lawyers of a 
given legal community, as opposed to the “high theory” of legal scholars. See Thomas C. 
Grey, Formalism and Pragmatism in American Law (Brill Academic Publishing, Leiden, The 
Netherlands, and Boston, 2014).
50 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1998). In the English translation from the German original, Rechtskreis was trans-
lated not as “legal circle” but as “legal family”.
51 On these debates, see the Chapter “Comparative Law and Legal Cultures” in Reza Bana-
kar, Normativity in Legal Sociology (Springer, Berlin, 2015), 145-168.
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legal system, about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, per-
fected and taught”.52 It is also quite close to Pierre Legrand’s understanding 
of legal culture as legal mentality or episteme53 or to what William Ewald 
called “law in the minds” .54 One could argue that this difference is a matter 
of the intellectual culture (or tradition) of lawyers: the particular ways they 
understand, interpret, and apply law.
For the purposes of the present analysis, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, 
and the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus will be included in the 
category of Eastern European countries. In this sense, this tradition also 
covers countries that, strictly speaking, do not belong to Europe geographi-
cally. Due to their common history, they developed similar legal theories 
known under the banner of “Soviet theory of state and law”, which still 
has a grip on their legal education and research. Historically, these societies 
were included, although to different extents, in the Russian cultural sphere 
(including that of the legal technique and the intellectual representations 
that underpin this technique). Russia is the paradigmatic example of the 
Eastern European legal tradition, as it used to exert considerable cultural, 
political, and other influences on its neighboring countries in the region that 
once belonged to the Russian Empire, and then to the Soviet Union and 
also to the former Soviet bloc. From this vantage point, one can speak about 
Eastern European legal theory as, to some extent, tantamount to Russian 
legal theory.55
A disclaimer must be added in advance to avoid misinterpretation. 
Speaking about a prevailing legal theory in the Soviet Union, and then in 
Russia and in other former Soviet countries, we do not suppose that this 
theory is shared by each and every Soviet/Russian lawyer. Undoubtedly, 
there are Russian lawyers who are completely skeptical about this theory 
and who do not teach it to their students, offering them other theories 
instead. But these possibilities are limited in several respects. On the one 
hand, students already at secondary school are inculcated with the formal-
ist legal theory uniformly taught within the discipline of Social Sciences 
(Obshchestvoznanie). On the other hand, legal theory is intended to prepare 
52 John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Wes-
tern Europe and Latin America (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1985, 2nd ed.), 1-2.
53 Pierre Legrand, “European Legal Systems Are Not Converging”, 45(1) The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly (1996), 52-81.
54 William Ewald,  “Comparative Jurisprudence I: What Was It Like to Try a Rat?”, 
143(6) University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1995), 1889-2149; and id., “Comparative 
Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants”, 43(1) The American Journal of Compa-
rative Law (1995), 489-510.
55 Doubtlessly, many prominent legal thinkers in the Russian Empire or in the Soviet Union 
were not Russians (e.g., the Ukrainian Bogdan Kistiakovskii, the Latvian Piotr (Peteris) 
Stuchka, the Pole Leon Petrażycki, and the Lithuanian Evgeny Pashukanis). Therefore, 
speaking about a “Russian theory”, we use this term as a reference point to describe com-
mon features of the legal thinking developed in the Russian Empire and then in Soviet 
Russia; surely, this thinking was not ethnically Russian.
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law students for further practical courses (constitutional law, criminal law, 
and so on) that are often taught by professors with the ironclad formalist-
nihilist background acquired in Soviet times. And, unfortunately, it is true 
that law students, having learned the prevailing theory, would be better 
prepared for professional survival in the Russian legal system after gradua-
tion than those students who have learned natural-law doctrines and other 
theories that are marginal for Russian law. There are also compulsory edu-
cational standards imposed by the Russian Ministry of Education on the 
majority of Russian universities that reinforce this theory at law schools.56 
There is no need to mention the force of intellectual inertia and the interest 
of legal continuity and stability that is secured by stable conceptual and 
linguistic frameworks. These factual, normative, and intellectual constraints 
shape the prevailing legal theory in Russian jurisprudence.
2 Historical Development
The development of this prevailing legal theory in Russia (and in the Soviet 
Union before) can also be described as an interplay of the formalist and 
decisionist approaches. On the one hand, there was a statist theory of law 
uniformly imposed in Soviet legal scholarship in the late 1930s, and, on 
the other hand, there was a disrespect for rights that permeated the legal 
system and justified anti-legal practices in situations considered exceptional 
(be it the struggle against “enemies of the people” or building a socialist 
society) .57 The obvious contradiction between these theoretical premises 
could be easily tolerated through the prism of Marxist-Leninist (Hegelian) 
dialectics, which sought the truth by the way of opposing two contradictory 
theses: a thesis and its negation lead to a true synthesis that overcomes the 
contradiction.58
56 See the 2016 “Jurisprudence” bachelor ’s degree standard, available at <https://
минобрнауки.рф/документы/9604/файл/8790/Приказ%20№%201511%20от%20
01.12.2016.pdf>; and the 2010 “Jurisprudence” master’s degree standard, available at 
<http://www.edu.ru/db-mon/mo/Data/d_10/prm1763-1.pdf>.
57 This disrespect, implying that expediency should triumph over legality, was analyzed 
by Vladimir Gsovski as a “pragmatic Soviet concept of law”. See Vladimir Gsovski, “The 
Soviet Concept of Law”, 7(1) Fordham Law Review (1938), 1-43, at 13-29. However, the 
term “pragmatism” does not seem to fi t here, as many Soviet ideas and projects were 
rather irrational, as were the steps designed to carry out these projects.
58 Facing an evident contradiction between the Marxist thesis that the state would wither 
away under the conditions of socialism and his own thesis that the new socialist society 
needed to have “the mightiest and strongest state power that has ever existed”, Stalin did 
not shy away from recognizing this contradiction, reasoning that “this contradiction is 
bound up with life, and it fully refl ects Marx’s dialectics”. See Joseph V. Stalin, “Political 
Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU”, in id., Collected 
Works, Vol.12 (Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1955), 38.
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In the context of Soviet legal theory, the dialectical solution to the 
contradiction between formalism and anti-formalism implied that the 
law did not have its own value and that effective social regulation could 
be successfully carried out through administrative command and control. 
Professor Cercel writes that “the basic feature of this jurisprudential simu-
lacrum is the art of contradiction, supporting a return to positivism and 
formalism, while at the same time pretending that this theoretical gesture is 
still consistent with Marxist theory”.59 However, there were more coherent 
Marxists. For example, in the 1920s Evgeny Pashukanis argued that the best 
means of social coordination is to replace laws by directives that work like 
a railroad schedule regulates the movement of trains, and instead of court 
litigation to impose decisions in the way medical prescriptions are deliv-
ered to sick people.60 Following Marx’s writings, every Marxist theoretician 
had to acknowledge that in the bright future, the state and its law would 
wither away, that the classless future would put an end to the contradiction 
between the form and the substance of law. This anti-legal thesis of Marxist 
philosophy was gradually softened by Soviet legal theorists who argued 
that the attainment of such a bright future could take a long time and that, 
in the meantime, Soviet law could be an effective tool for attaining said 
bright future and the hallmark of a new, Socialist society.61
Accessing Soviet legal tradition, researchers often indicate a strict 
positivistic approach to interpretation and application of law (some scholars 
dub this approach “hyperpositivism”62), which is attributed to the influ-
ence of the German Begriffsjurisprudenz of the 19th century and to the statist 
doctrine of law rooted in the legal systems of the Soviet countries. In some 
opinions, the command theory of law propelled by Soviet legal positivists 
was a good match for the authoritarian political regimes in tsarist and then 
Soviet Russia and elsewhere.63
This can be completely true in the case of pre-revolutionary legal theory 
in Imperial Russia, where the statist conception of the law, although in dif-
ferent forms,64 clearly prevailed. It is more controversial when applied to 
59 Cercel, op.cit. note 36, 105.
60 Evgeny Pashukanis, “The General Theory of Law and Marxism”, in id., Selected Writings 
on Marxism and Law (Academic Press, London and New York, NY, 1980), 32-131.
61 See Rudolf Schlesinger, Soviet Legal Theory: Its Social Background and Development (Rout-
ledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1945), 258-272.
62 Rafał Mańko, “Weeds in the Gardens of Justice? The Survival of Hyperpositivism in Pol-
ish Legal Culture as a Symptom/Sinthome”, 7(2) Polemos: Journal of Law, Literature and 
Culture (2013), 218-226.
63 See, for example, Marc Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State (Yale University Press, New 
Haven, CT, 1983); and Rafał Mańko, “Survival of the Socialist Legal Tradition? A Polish 
Perspective”, 4(2) Comparative Law Review (2013), 1-28.
64 About different variants of positivism in Russian philosophy, see Andrzej Walicki, A His-
tory of Russian Thought: From Enlightenment to Marxism (Stanford University Press, Stan-
ford, CA, 1979), 349-370.
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Soviet jurisprudence, although there are good reasons to argue that legal 
positivism always had a strong theoretical impact on Soviet legal theory. 
Nonetheless, fidelity to the letter of the law was not common among Soviet 
legal practices or moral standards, while a general disrespect for rights 
could not fail to influence the conceptualization and teaching of law, let 
alone its application.65
These main features of this theory in the Soviet era (the formal require-
ment of fidelity to the letter of the law and a factual disrespect for legal 
rights and enactments) reflected the doublespeak of the communist 
ideology :66 to proclaim one thing (e.g., the guarantees and lofty ideals 
enshrined in the 1936 Soviet Constitution) and to do the contrary (the 
appalling atrocities carried out in purges under Stalin that began just 
after the adoption of this Constitution). But explaining law only through 
the prism of ideological indoctrination cannot satisfy lawyers, even if 
they accept that law is permeated by ideology.67 Unlike ideologists, who 
may eventually be satisfied with a “false consciousness”,68 legal theorists 
are supposed to provide coherent descriptions and explanations in order 
to intellectualize the law as it exists (and/or as it should exist). As shown 
by Harold Berman, Soviet law itself was not homogeneous and included 
at least three different intellectual components: socialist ideology, Rus-
sian legal culture, and a system of moral precepts (in Berman’s terms, the 
“parental factor”), which could eventually come into conflict.69 Although 
the theoretical synthesis obtained by Soviet lawyers was not perfect, it 
provided for conceptual solutions that assured the unity of theoretical 
reflection about law and that still remain influential in post-Soviet legal 
theory. Its variables might differ (“constitutional identity” instead of “class 
consciousness”, “traditional values” instead of “communist morality”, etc.) 
65 This conceptualization took place in the fi rst years of Bolshevik rule: the idea that law is 
the means for imposing the class interest enshrined in the “Rukovodiashchie nachala po 
ugolovnomu pravu RSFSR” [Guidelines on Criminal Law of the RSFSR], Sobranie uzako-
nenii RSFSR (1919) No.66 item 590. As Stuchka explained later: “When the Collegium 
of the Popular Committee of Justice […] needed to formulate its own, so to say ‘soviet 
understanding of law’, we agreed the following formula: ‘law is a system (or an order) of 
social relations that corresponds to interests of the dominating class and protected by the 
organized force of this class’.” See Piotr I. Stuchka, Izbrannye proizvedeniia po marksistsko-
leninskoi teorii prava [translation] (Latgosizdat, Riga, 1964), 58.
66 Hans Kelsen, The Communist Theory of Law (Praeger, New York, NY, 1955). To some extent, 
this doublespeak characterizes every ideology, which might suggest more general con-
clusions, not only about communist ideology.
67 “Law is both real and ideological, insofar as ideology in itself emerges from real, material 
structures and it hints [at] an unarticulated real. Yet, it also distorts the perception of real-
ity, and this distortion is constitutive of reality.” See Cercel, op.cit. note 36, 67.
68 This defi nition of “ideology” derives from the Marxist theory of social class and refers 
to the systematic misrepresentation of dominant social relations in the consciousness of 
subordinate classes.
69 Berman, op.cit. note 8. 
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and even be described using terms borrowed from Western law, but the 
schema largely remains the same .70
Historically, the ground for this dualism in Soviet legal thinking was 
prepared by legal developments that took place in tsarist Russia. In the 
course of the Westernization launched in Russia by Peter the Great in the 
early 18th century and continued by his successors, the legal culture of the 
landowning nobility and of officialdom (chinovnichestvo) was clearly sepa-
rated from the mass legal culture of the peasantry71 and other social strata: 
the former having its hallmark in the statist perception of the law, while the 
latter tended to identify the law with moral truth (pravda) and to challenge 
the validity of formal legal enactments that eventually collided with the 
generally accepted precepts of truth.72 This duality prompted a discussion 
about the best fit between positivism and natural law in the Russian legal 
philosophy of the Silver Age,73 as well as debates about the value of law 
that followed the publication of Vekhi in 1909.74 These discussions revealed 
that the basic theoretical assumptions were incompatible: the revolutionary 
intelligentsia could criticize the law, understood as an incarnation of the 
state’s will and consequently as a means of class oppression, while liberals 
asserted that the law was not about the sovereign’s commands (at least, not 
70 As to human-rights law, the Soviet doctrine of human rights presupposed that “the sub-
stance of human rights has a social content and meaning determined by the social, eco-
nomic, and political structure of a given society in which the rights in question exist and 
function”. See Christopher Osakwe, “Soviet Human Rights Law Under the USSR Consti-
tution of 1977: Theories, Realities and Trends”, 56 Tulane Law Review (1981-1982), 249-293, 
at 255. There is only a very slight, if any, difference between this theoretical position and 
today’s exceptionalist discourses about a Russian constitutional identity determined by 
social and cultural particularities. See Benedikt Harzl, “Nativist Ideological Responses to 
European/Liberal Human Rights Discourses in Contemporary Russia”, in Lauri Mälk-
soo and Wolfgang Benedek (eds.), Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: The 
Strasbourg Effect (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017), 355-384.
71 The majority of the population in the rural world lived according to their own legal 
norms independent of the offi cial law, while there was another world that “represented 
an underdeveloped but emerging civil society of classes, defended by a reformist bureau-
cracy willing to face a modern world that traditional Russia preferred to ignore”. See 
Frank Wcislo, “Soslovie or Class? Bureaucratic Reformers and Provincial Gentry in Con-
fl ict, 1906-1908”, 47(1) The Russian Review (1988), 23. Something began to change at the 
turn of the 20th century (Jane Burbank, Russian Peasants Go to Court (Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington, IN, 2004)), but this process was not completed before the 1917 Revo-
lution.
72 Richard Wortman, The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, IL, 1976).
73 This term denotes the Silver Age of Russian culture, which encompasses the fi rst two 
decades of the 20th century.
74 Vekhi: Landmarks, op.cit. note 41.
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only about them) but about justice—this implied the theoretical possibility 
of distinguishing between the legal and the arbitrary.75
On the one hand, the main feature of the Marxist-Leninist theory of 
state and law that replaced the intellectual diversity of legal scholarship in 
Imperial Russia was rigid positivism in what concerns the pedigree crite-
rion of law: there can be no law unless it is established or recognized by 
the state. On the other hand, the specifically Marxist approach to law was 
to consider it as a means of class domination. As Marx and Engels put it 
in The German Ideology, law is an expression of class relations and a juristic 
form of the ideology that allows one class, through the intermediary of the 
state, to dominate another.76 From this point of view, the state is the very 
expression of class dominance,77 while law was conceived only as a means 
of state coercion78 and could not be conceptualized the other way round: as 
compelling the state to respect the rights of its citizens.
This theoretical mixture was reflected in the definition of law coined by 
Vyshinsky: “The totality of the rules of conduct, expressing the will of the 
dominant class and established in legal order”.79 Seen this way, Soviet law 
meant “the aggregate of the rules of conduct established in the form of leg-
islation by the authority of the toilers and expressive of their will”, and no 
law was possible without “the entire coercive force of the socialist state”.80
3 The Anti-formalist Element in Soviet Law
The definition mentioned above does not, however, represent something 
that can be unambiguously characterized as “legal positivism”, as this 
theory did not suppose that power holders were bound, in their actions, by 
the law or by the notorious “will of the legislator’. Rather, on the contrary, 
this perspective implies that there is a supreme law above the statutory law 
that allows power holders to determine what will qualify as exceptions 
to the legal rules, remaining unaccountable for their choice and for their 
75 Frances Nettercott, “Russian Liberalism and the Philosophy of Law”, in G.M. Hamburg 
and R.A. Poole (eds.), A History of Russian Philosophy: 1830-1930 (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 2010), 248-265; and Andrzej Walicki, “Russian Marxism”, ibid., 
305-325.
76 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (Prometheus Books, Amherst, NY, 
1998).
77 Ibid., 60: “The rule of a defi nite class of society, whose social power, deriving from its 
property, has its practical-idealistic expression in each case in the form of the state.”
78 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (International Publish-
ers, New York, NY, 2007), 26: “Your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a 
law for all, a will whose essential character and direction are determined by the economic 
conditions of existence of your class.”
79 Andrei Vyshinsky (ed.), The Law of the Soviet State (The Macmillan Co., New York, NY, 
1948, Hugh W. Babb, transl.), 50.
80 Ibid., 51.
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exercise of power in general .81 This supreme law refers to “a living reality, 
expressing the essence of the social relationship between classes” .82 There-
fore, it reflects “objective realities” (economic relations, class struggle, etc.) 
and for this reason has greater validity as compared with statutory law. This 
latter notion stems from the subjective will of legislators, who can distort 
these objective realities.83 This became particularly evident in Pashukanis’ 
commodity exchange theory of law and in Stuchka’s conception of revolu-
tionary consciousness, as well as in the class theory of law generally.
Even if Stuchka’s and Pashukanis’ conceptions were, in the end, 
rejected and condemned by the Soviet theory of state and law,84 the anti-
formalist element of Soviet law remained undisputed: the state could do 
whatever it wanted with the rights of citizens, provided that a “legal form” 
was observed. This decisionism was justified in terms of the basis-and-
superstructure logic with reference to objective needs supposedly reflected 
in the social consciousness that made it possible to overrule statutory norms 
in situations of exception. Such an attitude toward the law can be charac-
terized as legal cynicism that wanted the law to be whatever pleased real 
81 Lev S. Yavich, Sushchnost’ prava. Sotsial’no-fi losofskoe ponimanie genezisa, razvitiia i funktsio-
nirovaniia iuridicheskoi formy obshchestvennykh ontoshenii [The Nature of Law: A Sociophi-
losophical Understanding of the Genesis, Development and Functionning of the Legal 
Form of Social Relations] (Izdatel’stvo LGU, Leningrad, 1985); and Olufemi Taiwo, Legal 
Naturalism: A Marxist Theory of Law (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1996). Char-
acteristically, the same way of thinking is followed by contemporary Russian lawyers, 
including the Chief Justice of the RF Constitutional Court. See Valerii D. Zorkin, “The 
Essence of Law. Lecture before the participants of the VII St. Petersburg International 
Legal Forum on 18 May 2017”, ksrf.ru, available at <http://www.ksrf.ru/en/News/
Documents/V.D.Zorkin_The%20Essence%20of%20Law_Lecture_2017-05-18.pdf>.
82 Andrei Vyshinsky, “The Fundamental Tasks of the Science of Soviet Socialist Law”, in 
Soviet Legal Philosophy (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1951, Hugh W. Babb, 
transl.), 38.
83 This suggested to some scholars that the class theory of law had affi nities with natural-
law doctrines. See Francis F. Homan Jr., “Soviet Theory of Jurisprudence”, 14(2) Cleveland 
State Law Review (1965), 402-410. This author concludes that in Stuchka’s legal theory: 
“there was “natural law’ growing out of social intercourse. This “natural law’ had pre-
cedence over “artifi cial law” consisting of statutes and governmental decrees”. Ibid., 405. 
However, the Soviet conception of objectivity (e.g., Sergei S. Alekseev, “Ob”ektivnoe v 
prave” [Objective Law], Pravovedenie (1971) No.1, 112-118) had only a superfi cial likeness 
to the objectivity on which natural-law doctrines are based. Unlike these doctrines, Soviet 
legal theory denied absolute values and universal principles of practical rationality, so 
that this “objectivity” referred only to the economic basis. This basis was thought to be 
refl ected in ideological superstructures, including the law.
84 Stalin’s attorney-general, Andrei Vyshinsky, was a proponent of this theory. On the theo-
retical situation at that time, see Lon L. Fuller, “Pashukanis and Vyshinsky: A Study in the 
Development of Marxian Legal Theory”, 47(8) Michigan Law Review (1949), 1157-1166.
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power holders,85 who had sovereign power to determine ways of attaining 
social objectives. This resulted in the practical conclusion that legal norms 
and individual rights could be legitimately trampled upon if this was con-
sidered expedient by those power holders.
Inviolable individual rights and freedoms were considered a hallmark 
only of the bourgeois law stemming from private property, while more 
progressive forms of social cohesion (socialism and communism) would 
deny this bourgeois “atomization” of society: its division into a mass of 
independent individuals each with their own inalienable and inviolable 
rights egoistically utilized against others and against the collective. “In a 
higher phase of communist society […] the narrow horizon of bourgeois 
right will be fully left behind.”86 In the bright future, people will learn not 
to distinguish between their personal interests and social interests; then the 
state and its law will wither away, and law books will be handed over to 
museums as reminiscences of the barbaric past.87
This sort of cynical attitude prepared the intellectual ground and 
provided the ideological justification for building up, along with legal 
formalism, a parallel decisionist dimension of the law. In accordance with 
this theoretical construct (a mix of public morality, communist ideology, and 
materialist philosophy), “important’ cases are decided in the best interests 
of society without regard to legal norms.88 This construct unveiled the deci-
sionist dimension of Soviet legal theory, according to which law is nothing 
but a result of an interplay between political and economic powers. If there 
are formal legal rules and informal rules employed in decision-making in 
courts and elsewhere, it is rather these informal rules that play the decisive 
role insofar as they are supposedly based on the “objective” structure of 
85 “Power holders” is a broad category that includes not only state offi cials but, also, party 
bosses and cronies of political leaders who formally do not belong to state offi cialdom. 
The term “nomenklatura” would fi t this category quite well in the context of this Chapter, 
but its connotation is linked only to the Soviet regime. See, for example, Michael Voslen-
sky, Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class, an Insider’s Report (Doubleday, Garden City, 
NY, 1984, Eric Mosbacher, transl.), while this analysis refers to a more general situation in 
various cultures and under different political regimes.
86 Karl Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Programme”, in D. MacLennan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selec-
ted Writings (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977), 569.
87 Frederick Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (International 
Publishers, New York, NY, 1972, Eleanor Burke Leacock intro. and notes), 232: “Society 
[…] will put the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into the museum of 
antiquity, by the side of the spinning-wheel and the bronze axe.”
88 Surely, this might also happen in legal systems that can express a strict commitment to 
a rule-of-law culture. On this problem in the European Union, see Gunnar Beck, “The 
Court of Justice, Legal Reasoning, and the Pringle Case: Law as the Continuation of Poli-
tics by Other Means”, 39(2) European Law Review (2014), 234-250; and id., “The Court of 
Justice, the Bundesverfassungsgericht and Legal Reasoning During the Euro Crisis: The 
Rule of Law as a Fair-Weather Phenomenon”, 20(3) European Public Law (2014), 539-566. 
The US Supreme Court and its living constitutionalism doctrine, which explicitly allows 
decisions that are contrary to the letter of the law, represent another paradigmatic exam-
ple.
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society, which, in turn, reflects the economic basis of social life. Unlike 
the similar ideas of Roscoe Pound and the US legal realists about “law in 
books” and “law in action”, the real decision makers are not judges but state 
or party officials who are empowered to express and implement the will of 
the ruling class or, in other words, the state.
In practice, this decisionism implied that when provisions of a formal 
legal code (e.g., a civil or criminal code) collide with the principles set out 
in moral codes (e.g., the Moral Code of the Builder of Communism89 or the 
Communist Party program), nothing guarantees that the former would 
prevail even in court. Moreover, the validity (binding force) of law in this 
logic was conceived as dependent on how the power holders appreciate 
the expediency of the application of legal norms in a given case.90 If, in the 
opinion of judges and other law officers individual rights are against the 
collective interest, these rights would, predictably, hardly win any legal 
protection. Surely, in the avalanche of mundane cases, this reasoning was 
not applied, but in “high-profile” cases such “objective needs”91 could be 
referred to as grounds for an exception.
Legal proceedings against several Soviet dissidents (Volpin, Litvinov, 
Bogoraz, and others) in the 1960s can serve as examples of this exceptional-
ism: the dissidents presented their defense based on the Soviet Constitution 
and the statutory laws that directly allowed demonstrations (Art.124, 1936 
Soviet Constitution, guaranteed Soviet citizens the freedom of speech and 
the right to meetings and demonstrations) and did not establish criminal 
liability for publicly expressing an opinion, while the prosecution and the 
charge framed the issue in larger socio-political and moral dimensions and 
condemned such “legal formalism” on the part of the dissidents.92 Another 
example is the 1960-1961 trial of illegal street currency traders (fartsovsh-
chiki). In 1960, three fartsovshchiki—Ian Rokotov, Vladislav Faibishenko, and 
89 Twelve principles that every member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of 
the Komsomol was supposed to follow. See Moral’nyi kodeks stroitelia kommunizma [The 
Moral Code of a Builder of Communism] approved in 1961 as a part of the Third Pro-
gram of the CPSU at the XXII Convention of the CPSU, available at <http://krotov.info/
lib_sec/11_k/kom/munizm.htm>. On the correlation between legal and moral regula-
tion in Soviet Russia in general, see Georges C. Guins, Soviet Law and Soviet Society (Mar-
tinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1954); and George L. Kline, “Socialist Legality and Communist 
Ethics”, 8(1) The American Journal of Jurisprudence (1963), 21-34.
90 As Stuchka wrote in 1926, “From the standpoint of historical materialism, law does not 
exist as an independent power that regulates social relations.” Piotr Stuchka, Entsiklope-
diia gosudarstva i prava (Izdatel’stvo Komakademii, Moscow, 1926), 14. See, also, Augusto 
Zimmermann, “Marxism, Communism and Law: How Marxism Led to Lawlessness and 
Genocide in the Former Soviet Union”, 2 The Western Australian Jurist (2011), 1-60.
91 In 1938, Vladimir Gsovski stated that: “Although now the soviet jurists wish to use the 
traditional legal concepts […] they are not prepared to inscribe on their banner the real 
supremacy of law and rights. They take the body of traditional jurisprudence but repudi-
ate its soul.” Gsovski, op.cit. note 57, 43.
92 See Robert Horvath, The Legacy of Soviet Dissent: Dissidents, Democratization and Radical 
Nationalism in Russia (Routledge, Abingdon and New York, NY, 2005).
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Dmitrii Iakovlev—were sentenced to eight years in prison for conducting 
illegal currency transactions, which was the maximum prison sentence for 
this corpus delicti according to the RSFSR Criminal Code. Just before the 
trial, the Criminal Code had been amended to introduce a maximum pen-
alty of 15 years in prison for this corpus delicti. This new wording was not 
applied because of Article 6 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, which explicitly 
prohibited the retroactive application of laws that impose stricter punish-
ment. When the verdict was brought to the attention of Khrushchev, he 
demanded harsher punishment based on the opinion of the working class. 
At the Politburo, Khrushchev cited letters from factories that discussed the 
case from moral and political standpoints and demanded that “tendencies 
hostile to society” be put to an end. The verdict was reconsidered, and the 
fartsovshchiki received the maximum prison sentence of 15 years. Still dis-
satisfied, Khrushchev adopted, in July 1961, a retroactive decree introducing 
the death penalty for conducting illegal currency operations, and at a third 
trial in 1961, the three fartsovshchiki were sentenced to death. This verdict 
was evidently contrary to the letter of Soviet criminal law but was justified 
based on the moral, political, and economic foundations of Soviet society.93
Soviet legal scholarship formed a theory that reflected this doublespeak 
and dualism and revealed the formalist and the prerogative (decisionist) 
dimensions of the law. This more or less uniform legal dogma is, with no 
significant methodological changes since the Vyshinsky era, still widely rec-
ognized and taught at law schools, only superficially decorated with some 
odd elements that are alien to it, such as human rights or constitutionalism. 
For example, one leading Soviet/Russian legal theorist just replaced in his 
theory the concepts of “the state will” and “the will of the ruling class” with 
the concept of “the state will of the society”, arguing that this replacement 
made it possible to integrate human-rights and rule-of-law discourses into 
Russian legal positivism, hoping thereby to link Soviet legal theory with the 
Western legal tradition.94 The statist and anti-liberal character of this Soviet 
legal dogma that survived the fall of Soviet rule still shapes the mindsets 
of Soviet (Russian) lawyers in a certain way and prompts them to draw 
93 See Aleksandr E. Khinshtein, “Koroli i kapusta” [Kings and Cabbage], Moskovskii komso-
molets (21 December 1997), available at <https://public.wikireading.ru/64142>.
94 Mikhail I. Baitin, Sovremennoe pravoponimanie na grani dvukh vekov [The Contempo-
rary Understanding of Law at the Turn of Two Centuries] (Pravo i gosudarstvo, Mos-
cow, 2005), 59ff. See criticism of such approaches in Andrei V. Kashanin and Sergei V. 
Tret’iakov, “Obshcheteoreticheskie osnovaniia issledovaniia problem pravoprimeneniia” 
[General Theoretical Bases for Researching Problems of Applying the Law], in Iu.A. Tik-
homirov (ed.), Pravoprimenenie: teoriia i praktika [Application of Law: Theory and Practice] 
(Formula prava, Moscow, 2008), 12-73; Leonid Golovko, “Postsovetskaia teoriia prava: 
trudnosti pozitsionirovaniia v istoricheskom i sravnitel’no-pravovom kontekste” [The 
Post-Soviet Theory of Law: Problems with Its Positioning in a Historical and Compara-
tive Context], in Problemy postsovetskoi teorii i fi losofi i prava. Sbornik statei (Iurlitinform, 
Moscow, 2016), 92-126; and Nataliia Varlamova, “Geterarkhichnost’ sovremennykh pra-
vovykh sistem i postsovetskaia teoriia prava” [The Heterarchy of Contemporary Legal 
Systems and the Post-Soviet Theory of Law], ibid., 30-71.
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conservative conclusions that fit contemporary exceptionalist narratives 
in Russia and turn out to be appropriate for the prevailing conservative 
ideology .95 It is around this intellectual axis that legal thinking is organized 
in the community of Russian (Soviet) lawyers, and it is through this prism 
that this community creates and applies Russian law.
4 A Dual System of Law?
This construction could serve as justification for the widespread practices 
of extralegal reprisals, although to different degrees: from the extraordinary 
troika tribunals that, in the years of Stalin’s purges, condemned millions to 
death without following the established criminal-court procedures (with 
the exception of some demonstrative mock trials) to the notorious practices 
of “telephone law’96 in the years of zastoi. The presence of such practices 
in Soviet law gave some Western scholars reasons to speak about a “dual-
ism” that reflects two concomitant legal orders: one, formal order imposing 
general legal rules applicable by default in “normal cases” and another, 
prerogative order that reserved privileges for power holders to interfere 
with “special cases” in an extralegal way.97
Following Fraenkel’s famous book on dual states,98 such scholars iden-
tified two legal systems in the Soviet Union:
“One legal system that, day in, day out, maintains law and order, enacts and 
enforces the law, and adjudicates the disputes that inevitably arise among citi-
zens and institutions in modern societies. Existing alongside this legal system is 
an arbitrary and repressive system used to punish critics of the regime.”99
The dualist logic is undeniably apt for describing political systems: in every 
politically organized society, we can find some channels for political powers 
that work according to the posited law and other channels that work inde-
pendent of the posited law or even contrary to it. This logic is particularly 
suitable for a description of Russian political life over many centuries: from 
95 See, for example, Angelika Nussberger, “Der ‘russischer Weg’: Widerstand gegen die 
Globalisierung des Rechts?”, 53(6) OstEuropa Recht (2007), 371-386.
96 This term refers to formal infl uence or pressure exerted by the Communist Party on the 
Soviet judiciary, usually by way of telephone calls. See Alena V. Ledeneva, “Telephone 
Justice in Russia”, 24(4) Post-Soviet Affairs (2008), 324-350.
97 Robert Sharlet, “Stalinism and Soviet Legal Culture”, in Robert C. Tucker (ed.), Sta-
linism: Essays in Historical Interpretation (W.W. Norton, New York, NY, 1977), 155-179. 
Apparent in criminal- and public-law cases, this dualism also can infl uence civil and 
commercial cases.
98 Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State (Oxford University Press, New York NY, 1941).
99 Gordon B. Smith, Soviet Politics: Continuity and Contradiction (Palgrave, London, 1988), 
137-162, at 137. See, also, Sergei Alekseev, Pravo: azbuka – teoriia – fi losofi ia. Opyt kom-
pleksnogo issledovaniia [Law: ABC, Theory, Philosophy: An Experience of Multifaceted 
Research] (Norma-Infra, Moscow, 1998), 482-483.
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the zemshchina and oprichnina division under Ivan the Terrible to the coex-
istence of the Soviet system and the Communist Party system in the Soviet 
Union, and, with some modifications, also today.100
However, attempts to apply this logic to the legal sphere can result in 
unresolvable theoretical deadlocks for lawyers, although ordinary people 
have no trouble accepting it.101 If one admits that the prerogative use of 
law constitutes a parallel legal system, then one may conclude that Stalin’s 
repressions were illegal from the vantage point of official Soviet law and at 
the same time were legal from the standpoint of another, parallel system of 
law. Legally, this would make no sense. Having two parallel legal systems, 
we can figure out what happens if a competent person in one system (a 
judge acting under the posited law, for example) makes one decision and 
a competent person in another system (a party boss acting under party 
law, for example) makes a decision with the opposite effect. In legal terms, 
these two decisions would collide, and a lawyer would have to decide on 
the prevalence of one of the decisions. Obviously, this description does not 
fit the realities of Soviet (and eventually Russian) law and is normatively 
erroneous.
To a lawyer, it is preferable to describe this configuration as one legal 
system in which a cohort of officials have factual discretionary power to 
decide about exceptions in the application of the law, although in terms of 
the official law such practices were illegal, or at least their legal validity 
was uncertain. A parallel system of justice existed only for a relatively short 
period of time in the years of Stalin’s purges when troikas (commissions of 
NKVD officers who dealt with accusations against “enemies of the people’ 
in the late 1930s) rendered millions of verdicts,102 coexisted with the state-
run criminal courts. Professor Feldbrugge justly remarks that:
“In striving for a full understanding of Soviet law one cannot disregard mani-
festations which indicate a rejection of certain values and principles basic to 
most legal systems in the West […], the belief that law should be more than just 
an instrument of politics, that the state most of all should respect certain basic 
human rights.”103
100 Richard Sakwa, “The Dual State in Russia”, 26(3) Post-Soviet Affairs (2010), 185-206; and 
id., The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011), 1-52.
101 For an interesting sociological examination of how legal dualism might be refl ected in the 
mindsets of ordinary people, see Kathryn Hendley, “Varieties of Legal Dualism: Making 
Sense of the Role of Law in Contemporary Russia”, 29(2) Wisconsin International Law Jour-
nal (2011), 233-262.
102 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2008), 286ff.
103 Ferdinand J.M. Feldbrugge, “Law and Political Dissent in the Soviet Union”, in D. Barry, 
W. Butler, and G. Ginsburgs (eds.), Contemporary Soviet Law (Nijhoff, The Hague, 1974), 
55.
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It is hard to see what the added value might be of considering this parallel 
system as legal, at least for those who do not confuse the law and organized 
coercion, which can exist semi-autonomously in relation to one another. 
In the end, the verdicts of the troikas were found to be invalid (contrary 
to Soviet criminal law of the time), and the victims of the purges were 
rehabilitated during the Khrushchev Thaw. The same goes for “telephone 
law’ and similar illegal practices in the Soviet system that were formally 
prohibited but went unpunished. As a result, they did not become legally 
valid and therefore cannot be classified as legal, constituent parts of a paral-
lel legal system. A description of Russian law in terms of this institutional 
dualism would lead to serious conceptual confusion. In order to avoid such 
confusion, lawyers should carefully distinguish between de iure and de facto, 
between normative imputation and factual coercion.
A more appropriate tool for describing the dualism that was visible in 
Soviet law and is still apparent in contemporary Russian law is an analysis 
of legal thinking. On the one hand, from the standpoint of both Soviet 
and Russian law, judges and other law officers are bound only by the law 
(Art.112, 1935 Soviet Constitution; Art.155, 1977 Soviet Constitution; and 
Art.120, RF Constitution). On the other hand, lawyers in these legal systems 
do not consider legal norms as independent imperatives (whose validity 
is not dependent on someone’s will). Law is conceptualized formalistically 
as a set of imperatives (commands) mandated by the sovereign power. The 
specific Russian connotation of the term “state” (gosudarstvo)—prima facie 
referring not to the institutions but to the person of the ruler104—could not 
but reinforce the decisionist element in Russian law. Based on this logic, the 
law is always a means to implement someone’s will: not the abstract will 
of an abstract legislator (which conceptually leads to conferring lawmak-
ing power on judges) but the real will of political rulers or other power 
holders. To avoid subjectivism in the application of the law, judges are 
asked to implement the will of these power holders, which is real or, in 
this sense, objective for these judges, who are not trained to find “objective 
constraints” in practical rationality and in tacit social conventions.105 This 
prompted the Soviet theory of state and law to look for a synthesis between 
formal and decisionist dimensions of the law.
104 Oleg Kharkhordin, “What Is the State? The Russian Concept of Gosudarstvo in the Euro-
pean Context”, 40(2) History and Theory (2001), 206-240.
105 In this light, one can explain the fact that most legal norms in Russia have always ema-
nated from the bureaucracy (decrees, instructions, etc.) and not from an independent par-
liament. See William E. Pomeranz, Law and the Russian State: Russia’s Legal Evolution from 
Peter the Great to Vladimir Putin (Bloomsbury, London, 2018).
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5 Legality, Decisionism and Formalism
One of the theoretical curtains used to hide the decisionist dimension of 
the law in Soviet legal scholarship was the conception of socialist legality 
(zakonnost’). This legality was conceived as permeating all activities of all 
authorities and, in some interpretations, all important aspects of private life 
too.106 The idea of legality first appeared in the first years of Soviet rule 
when “revolutionary legality” was proposed by Stuchka as a counterargu-
ment to bourgeois legal theories of the rule of law.107 As a matter of fact, 
this idea was coextensive with the concept of “revolutionary expediency” 
and contained a sort of theoretical solution to the problem of exception in 
law.108 As Professor Cercel notes, the Soviet conceptualization of legality 
implied the exceptional character of the application of the law, as “legality 
was historically consubstantial with a normalized state of exception marked 
by extrajudicial measures, deportations and killings, and which was itself a 
state of exception”.109
At face value, this conception presupposed that the law is a set of inde-
pendent directives that leave no room for interpretation to judges or other 
law officers. From the vantage point of formalism, there can be only one 
correct interpretation of a legal rule: the interpretation that reveals the true 
will of the sovereign, who imperatively sets out this will in statutes and 
other legal texts. This will is supposed to control all social relations. The 
coherence or persuasiveness of legal reasoning is irrelevant when it comes 
to the correct interpretation of this will. A judge simply has to establish the 
sovereign will (which in fact can well be the will of the Politburo (the Politi-
cal Bureau of the CPSU which was the supreme government body in the 
USSR), a partburo (a local bureau of the CPSU) or a partkom (a committee of 
the CPSU) and settle cases based on that will regardless of the justification 
(if any) the judge gives for their decision or how coherent their reasoning 
is. This positivist account of law was (and still is) widely accepted at Soviet 
(Russian) legal academies, constituting one of the main conceptual founda-
tions of the Soviet theory of state and law.
106 In the words of one of the main proponents of this theory, socialist legality is “a strict and 
indisputable observance and execution of Soviet laws by all organs of the Soviet state, by 
all establishments and social organizations, by all offi cials and citizens”. See Mikhail S. 
Strogovich, Osnovnye voprosy sovetskoi sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti [Key Problems of Soviet 
Socialist Legality] (Nauka, Moscow, 1966), 3. On this theory, see Gordon B. Smith, “The 
Development of ‘Socialist Legality’ in the Soviet Union”, in Peter B. Maggs, Gordon B. 
Smith, and George Ginsburgs (eds.), Law and Economic Development in the Soviet Union 
(Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1982), 77-97.
107 Postanovlenie IV Vserossiiskogo Chrezvychainogo S”ezda Sovetov (8 November 1918) 
“O revoliutsionnoi zakonnosti” [On Revolutionary Legality], Sobranie uzakonenii RSFSR 
(1918) No.90 item 908.
108 See, for example, Aron Trainin, “O revoliutsionnoi zakonnosti” [On Revolutionary Legal-
ity], Pravo i zhizn’ (1922) No.1, 5-8.
109 Cercel, op.cit. note 36, 103.
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But this was only one side of the coin. On its flipside, this conception of 
legality supposed the freedom of action for those decision makers who did 
not belong to law enforcement or the judiciary. If judges had to be bound 
by the law, this did not mean that high-ranking members of the Communist 
Party and other privileged individuals had to be bound by it as well. On the 
contrary, the Communist Party, as “the leading and guiding force in Soviet 
society”, had to specify the social priorities and the manner of implement-
ing those priorities, including identifying cases in which it would be expe-
dient not to observe the law .110 Evidently, the “bright communist future” 
could not be built by observing the law. In many practical situations, legal 
formalism only impedes the attainment of such lofty goals, and in this light 
certain political bodies were vested with the power to decide about the state 
of exception, to put this in Schmittean terms.
This conclusion is not surprising: if the law is conceived of not as a 
tool of practical rationality that makes it possible to reasonably manage 
individual and eventually public affairs, the application of the law (the law 
being taken as the sovereign’s will) would easily result in irregularities—the 
will of the sovereign (the state, the ruling class, etc.) is only an intellectual 
construct that cannot be established in any empirical way. Soviet judges and 
lawyers faced the same problems as their confrères in the West: in certain 
situations, the literal application of legal norms could result in injustice, and 
therefore the legal system had to provide a way to avoid this undesirable 
effect. The question was how to determine just what justice and injustice 
meant. If the law was understood merely as a set of commands, while the 
interpretation of the law in such situations required law officers to address 
not a practical rationality but the “objective needs” of the Soviet state, 
judges in such difficult cases should have consulted Party functionaries who 
could, ex officio, provide some “competent” advice. In this sense, telephone 
law was a logical sequence stemming from the prevailing legal theory, 
and in many instances it was a judge who called a partkom in uncertain 
110 Art.6 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution defi ned the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as 
“the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system”, 
which, armed with Marxism-Leninism, “determines the general prospects for the devel-
opment of society and the course of the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR, directs 
the great constructive work of the Soviet people, and imparts a planned, systematic and 
theoretically substantiated character on their struggle for the victory of communism”. 
Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, adopted at 
the Seventh (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Ninth Convocation, 
on 7 October 1977, in F.J.M. Feldbrugge (ed.), The Constitutions of the USSR and the Union 
Republics: Analyses, Texts, Reports (Sijthoff and Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Neth-
erlands, 1979).
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situations (where judges were not confident about the best interpretation of 
Soviet law), and not the other way around.111
This concept was reconfigured in 1937, when Vyshinsky tried to provide 
a theoretical justification for Stalin’s invectives against those Soviet legal 
scholars who denied the law and its value. Denouncing these “nihilist’ 
moods that did not toe the Bolshevik Party line, Vyshinsky argued against 
Pashukanis and Stuchka, saying that:
“In reducing the law to policy, these gentlemen have depersonalized the law as 
the totality of statutes, undermining the stability and authoritativeness of the 
statutes, and suggesting the false idea that the application of the statute is deter-
mined in the socialist state by political considerations, and not by the force and 
authority of the Soviet statute. Such an idea means bringing Soviet legality and 
Soviet law into substantial discredit [… and results in] disarming the working 
class in the face of its foes, and in undermining the socialist state.”112
In Soviet jurisprudence, this exceptionalist conception of legality was 
developed with such categories as the “interests of the class struggle” 
or the “interests of building Communism” (interesy kommunisticheskogo 
stroitel’stva). Today, this exceptionalist approach to the law is based on 
ubiquitous references to sovereignty or traditional values, and it is not hard 
to recognize this line of thinking in contemporary debates about inviolable 
Westphalian sovereignty and the “limits of concession”.113 It is remarkable 
that, in both cases, similar ideas, although with different axiological content, 
are utilized to achieve the same conceptual goals: to justify the unchecked 
sovereign power to be above the law and to deny the inviolable rights of 
citizens with the help of broadly interpreted exceptions. One could argue 
that this dualist attitude toward the law (the hyper-positivism and decision-
ism in the prevailing legal theory) still persists in Russian approaches to the 
law.114
111 Robert Sharlet, “The Communist Party and the Administration of Justice in the USSR”, 
in D. Barry et al. (eds.), Soviet Law after Stalin, Vol. 3 (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen aan 
den Rijn, The Netherlands, 1979), 321-392; and Peter Solomon Jr., “Soviet Politicians and 
Criminal Prosecutions: The Logic of Intervention”, in J. Millar (ed.), Cracks in the Mono-
lith (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY, 1992), 3-34. This situation resembles the référé legislatif in 
revolutionary France, where judges had to ask the parliament how to interpret and apply 
the law if they were unclear about its meaning. It should be mentioned in passing that the 
1789 Revolution in France was considered to be among the immediate predecessors of 
the 1917 October Revolution in Russia and, therefore, its events and experience could be 
legitimately referred to as a source of useful examples.
112 Andrei Vyshinsky, K polozheniiu del na fronte pravovoi teorii [About the Situation on the 
Legal Front] (Iurizdat, Moscow, 1937), cited in Soviet Legal Philosophy (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1951, Hugh W. Babb, transl.), 329.
113 Valerii Zorkin, “An Apologia of the Westphalian System”, 3(2) Russia in Global Affairs 
(2004), available at <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_3371>; id., “Predel ustupchi-
vosti”, op.cit. note 24.
114 For an example of the Russian-specifi c attitude toward international law, see Mälksoo, op.
cit. note 7.
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In the years of the Khrushchev Thaw after Stalin’s death, some Soviet 
legal scholars (including Alfred Stalgevich, Stepan Kechekian, and Andrei 
Piontkovskii) sought to reconsider the formalist approach imposed by 
Vyshinsky. They argued that the law is based not only on state commands 
but, also, on social relations, consciousness, ideology, and other societal 
phenomena that shape legal normativity. However, the all-pervasive “state 
will” was supposed to be in the background of these “objective” elements 
of legal regulation.115 Therefore, this “broader approach” could not create 
theoretical obstacles for state officials or party bosses to carry out their 
intentions under the cover of “state will”. To legitimize their discretion, it 
sufficed to mention that statutory norms would be overruled for the sake of 
some “objective needs” or “social determinisms”. To a certain extent, in the 
1960s this exceptionalist approach enshrined the use of general clauses in 
legislation that allowed very different interpretations.116
In this way, anti-formalism, the second element of Soviet legal theory, 
hidden in the shadows in Vyshinsky’s legal theory, once again rose to the 
surface in the form of “objective determinisms” allegedly reflected by the 
collective consciousness, the official ideology, or social practices. Unlike in 
Western non-positivist legal theories, these “determinisms” did not address 
human rationality or moral principles as reference points for identifying a 
law’s validity. The lengthy and extensive discussion among Soviet lawyers 
about both narrow and broad approaches to the law in the second half of 
the 20th century117 practically focused, for the most part, on the question 
of whether it was laudable or not to depict the law as it is (distorted in 
its applications by ideology and discretion) or to hide this prerogative side 
of Soviet law behind theoretical curtains. These debates were still ongoing 
on the eve of perestroika, and a group of influential Soviet legal theorists 
in 1986 called for “re-establishing on a broader theoretical foundation the 
unity of law, once analytically undermined, for representing law as a whole 
where all its parts interact, and for showing the place and the function of 
each part”.118
115 See, for example, Marksistsko-leninskaia obshchaia teoriia gosudarstva i prava: osnovnye insti-
tuty i poniatiia [The Marxist-Leninist General Theory of State and Law: The Basic Institu-
tions and Concepts], Vol.1 (Iurlit, Moscow, 1970), 377-378.
116 Gianmaria Ajani, “Formalism and Anti-formalism under Socialist Law: The Case of Gen-
eral Clauses within the Codifi cation of Civil Law”, 2(2) Global Jurist Advances (2002), 1535-
1661.
117 The main points of these debates were summed up during a 1979 discussion among Sovi-
et legal theoreticians about their understanding of Soviet law. Their proceedings were 
published in two issues of the central Soviet law review as “O ponimanii sovetskogo 
prava” [About An Understanding of Soviet Law], Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo (1979) 
Nos.7&8.
118 Vladimir P. Kazimirchuk, Vladimir N. Kurdiavtsev, and Aleksei M. Vasiliev, Pravovaia 
sistema sotsializma: poniatie, struktura, sotsial’nye sviazi [The Legal System of Socialism: Its 
Concept, Structure, Social Links], Vol.1 (Iurlit, Moscow, 1986), 28-29.
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6 Actual Implications
The persistence of such ideological attitudes does not necessarily mean 
that there are real social or cultural foundations for this theoretical dual-
ism: taken as “false consciousness”, ideology does not imply any necessary 
congruence between its postulations and real facts, although it still can 
direct our social behavior .119 Therefore, this conceptual dualism in legal 
thinking does not necessarily presuppose any factual dualism between 
how mundane cases and high-profile cases are considered in Russian 
courts.120 Because of their different characters, moral standings, personal 
experiences, or life conditions, judges can be closer to one or another pole 
of this dichotomy, no matter what they learned at law school. Nor is there 
any conceptual need to construct two parallel legal systems to explain the 
systematic practice of political meddling in judicial (and, more broadly, 
legal) decision-making.
It is rather an evaluative judgment to say that the number of high-
profile cases justifies putting them into a particular class (a prerogative 
legal system that supposedly coexists with the system of official law) and, 
therefore, justifies a binary logic in describing Russian law. Given our focus 
on the intellectual representations that an epistemic community of lawyers 
may have about their law, we do not need to discuss whether the ideol-
ogy that underlies these representations corresponds to facts or not. At the 
same time, logical inconsistencies do not weaken ideologies. One may well 
criticize the defeasible argument from authority (the cornerstone of the 
command theory of law) for its fallacy or argue that the formalist fidelity 
to the letter of the law logically excludes nihilist contempt for the posited 
law. However, these logical confusions do not necessarily discredit and 
sometimes may even reinforce ideological constructs and their “fetishistic 
mode of functioning”.121
This characterization of the prevailing legal theory (not of the legal 
system) in the Soviet Union as a dualist one leads to the conclusion that the 
positivism (formalism) that allegedly reigns in Central European jurispru-
119 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (Verso, London and New York, NY, 2008); 
and Rafał Mańko, “‘Reality is for Those Who Cannot Sustain the Dream’: Fantasies of 
Selfhood in Legal Texts”, 5(1) Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics (2015), 
24-47.
120 One may well argue that political interference could potentially take place in any legal 
system, although to different degrees. The law is politics everywhere, as Duncan Ken-
nedy and other proponents of critical legal studies (CLS) would say, and in this sense 
every legal system may reveal some elements of its “dark”, prerogative side—examples 
of cases decided in favor of power holders and contrary to the letter (spirit) of the law. 
The number of such cases would be lower in established democracies with lengthy rule-
of-law traditions such as the United Kingdom, the United States, France and Germany 
than in authoritarian states or in transitioning legal systems, but this proviso does not 
undermine the veracity of the general postulation of CLS.
121 Žižek, op.cit. note 119.
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denc e122 did not unconditionally prevail in the Soviet Union or in former 
Soviet countries. Both in Soviet legal theory and in current Russian theory, 
the strict positivist attitude toward the law has always been significantly 
mitigated by decisionist considerations that made it possible to avoid 
applying the letter of the law in “high-profile cases”. Slavophiles, populists 
(narodniki), and monarchists underplayed the relevance of legal norms in 
imperial times: for the communist ideology, fidelity to the letter of the law 
was anything but valuable for the purposes of the Soviet regime.
This inevitably raises the question: what then could work as the 
supreme criterion of validity? Or, in other words, how can judges and 
other law officers identify the state of exception and/or those who have 
the power to decide about this state? A simple reference to formal legal acts 
(including constitutions) would not work here, as these acts are themselves 
defeasible and can be repealed by way of exception. The factual will of 
individual political rulers is a better indicator, and Pashukanis was well 
aware of this when he suggested that the administration in a socialist soci-
ety would not need norms at all and would be better managed manually. 
As elucidated above, however, a number of practical reasons prompted the 
Soviet authorities to keep the law as a means of social regulation and to 
tackle this question in a different manner. One apparent response to this 
question follows logically from Lenin’s idea that there are some objective 
realities (‘material basis”) that predetermine our thinking and action, which 
only reflect these realities.123
But even this reflection is indirect. First, this basis is mirrored in the 
social consciousness, which is a reservoir of collective values and ideas and 
serves as the supreme source of normativity in society,124 imposing itself 
over individual consciousness. Norms or principles that do not fit these 
sources can be considered devoid of binding force. The latter should rather 
be sought in vague conservative ideals that supposedly serve as manifesta-
tions of these realities. As hinted at above, this approach has many affinities 
with the natural-law doctrine, which is based on the same methodological 
strategy: to construe two parallel legal systems (posited law and natural 
law, the latter being the criterion of validity of the former).
122 Zdenek Kühn, The Judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe: Mechanical Jurisprudence in 
Transformation?, in William B. Simons (ed.), Law in Eastern Europe, No.61 (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2011).
123 Jane Burbank, “Lenin and the Law in Revolutionary Russia”, 54(1) Slavic Review (1995), 
23-44.
124 Typical of this logic, the fi rst Bolshevik Decree on Courts “O sude” [On Courts], Sobranie 
uzakonenii RSFSR (1918) No.26 item 404, proclaimed that the legal norms of the previous 
government were valid to the extent that they did not confl ict with the “revolutionary 
legal consciousness” (revoliutsionnoe pravosoznanie). This consciousness did not refer to 
the personal legal feelings and emotions of judges but rather to collective intuitions alleg-
edly shared by the working class (the author of this decree, Mikhail Reisner, was a fol-
lower of the Polish legal realist Leon Petrażycki).
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Both Soviet legal theory and natural-law doctrines thereby recognized 
that there is some “objective reality” that is supposed to be behind the law. 
Nonetheless, unlike in ius naturalist philosophy, such suppositions in Soviet 
law did not lead to discussions about moral or intellectual dimensions of 
this “objectivity” or about ways to rationally ascertain these dimensions. 
Having turned Hegelian philosophy upside down, Marx and his followers 
could not recognize the superiority of ideals over social practices, which is 
the central point in most natural-law doctrines.125 Then, this “objectivity” 
is usually proclaimed from above, so that establishing objectivity implies 
an intellectual deconstruction of the ideological messages of political (or 
in some situations judicial) authorities by way of guesswork, fishing from 
them what ought to be done. This dimension was clearly visible in the 
ideological messages from the Communist Party, the Komsomol, and other 
ideological bodies in the Soviet Union and, to some extent, in directing 
guidelines decreed by the Soviet supreme courts.126
History repeats itself, albeit with different configurations, in Russia 
and in other former Soviet countries where challenges to official narratives 
about this “objectivity” (be it national values, spirit, or identity) are often 
seen as subversive: in the end, they risk calling into question the lawmak-
ing power of the state. If there were social authorities (public opinion, the 
legal community, the expert community, international bodies, and so on) 
that could assume the power to decide about an “objective dimension” of 
the law, their evaluations could undermine the prevailing scheme of the 
binding force of the law—everything decreed by the state is legally binding. 
In democratic countries, such “moral authorities” can exert far-reaching 
influences on lawmaking and on the application of the law, and they 
normally constitute an important element in the societal system of checks 
and balances that prevent the state from becoming authoritarian.127 There 
is no need to point out how dangerous such “moral authorities” (be it the 
legal community or any other societal organism) could possibly become for 
authoritarian political regimes.
125 One could well argue that Marx’s wishful thinking about the proletarian revolution and 
classless society rested equally on idealism and not on material realities. See, for example, 
Nikolai A. Berdyaev, The Origin of Russian Communism (Univ. of Michigan Law School, 
Ann Arbor, MI, 1959, R.M. French, transl.). This is evidently true, but what matters here is 
how Russian Marxist-Leninists understood this perspective and not whether their under-
standing was correct.
126 Such directing guidelines (rukovodiashchie raz”iasneniia) were set forth in normative rul-
ings (postanovleniia) of the presidiums of the supreme courts of the Soviet Union and of its 
constituent republics. Such guidelines contained instructions to lower courts on how to 
interpret and apply the law and were binding on them.
127 David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006). Surely, these mechanisms can be subject to improper 
interference and lobbying, which can distort their work even in democratic countries. 
In light of the voluminous critical literature, there is no way to idealize these mechanisms 
in Western countries, and we do not attempt to do so here.
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In this light, disrespect toward the law in Russia (the notorious “legal 
nihilism”) is not the inevitable result of a nihilist legal culture that, accord-
ing to some scholars,128 is specifically Russian. It can be understood as a 
result of an indoctrination that is not premeditated but that is the result 
rather of intellectual inertia. Accepted theoretical opinions about the law 
suggest that it be considered instrumentally, only as a means of carrying out 
the sovereign will, while rights are valid only insofar as they are tolerated 
by state power.129
The many negative sides of legal nihilism notwithstanding, some 
philosophers would nonetheless argue that this dualist attitude toward the 
law is not something intrinsically wicked: such famous Russian thinkers as 
Vladimir Soloviev, Fyodor Dostoevsky or Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn justified 
contempt for the law by claiming that moral and religious precepts took 
priority over legal ones,130 even if it stands beyond doubt that the relentless 
application of the decisionist approach can often result in injustice. Also, 
in some situations, the decisionist approach will possibly lead to better 
results than strict positivism of the “Gesetz ist Gesetz” sort, especially in 
countries with relatively poor-quality statutory laws. This was, in particu-
lar, the source of inspiration for Russian proponents of precedent law (the 
so-called “precedent revolution” flagged by the chief justice of the former 
RF Supreme Commercial Court, Anton Ivanov131) who, several years ago, 
called for the vices of Russian legislation to be cured by allocating more 
freedoms to high courts to broadly interpret and change statutory norms .132 
128 Manfred Hildermeier, “Das Privileg der Rückständigkeit. Anmerkungen zum Wande-
leiner Interpretationsfi gur der Neueren Russischen Geschichte”, 244 Historische Zeitschrift 
(1987), 557-603; Laura Engelstein, Slavophile Empire, Imperial Russia’s Illiberal Path (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2009), 20-23; and René Provost, “Teetering on the Edge of 
Legal Nihilism: Russia and the Evolving European Human Rights Regime”, 37(2) Human 
Rights Quarterly (2015), 289-240.
129 Henry E. Hale, “Civil Society from Above? Statist and Liberal Models of State-Building in 
Russia”, 10(3) Demokratizatsiia (2002), 306-321; and Petr Preclik, “Culture Re-introduced: 
Contestation of Human Rights in Contemporary Russia”, 37(2-3) Review of Central and 
East European Law (2012), 173-230.
130 Realist approaches also exist in leading civil-law countries, e.g., the realist school of 
Michel Troper in France or the realist jurisprudence of Giovanni Tarello, Riccardo Guas-
tini, and others in Italy, not to mention realism in US legal philosophy. Surely, these are 
based on axioms and ideas that are quite different from the Russian context. It goes with-
out saying that realism in the Eastern European context leads to quite different results 
than in the Anglo-American or Scandinavian legal systems, where it does not have the 
nihilist connotation that is specifi c to the realist approach in Russian legal culture. The 
latter context refers to the absolute power of the sovereign to grant or take away rights.
131 Mikhail Antonov, “O nekotorykh teoreticheskikh voprosakh pretsedentnoi revoliutsii v 
Rossii” [Some Theoretical Questions Concerning the Precedent Revolution in Russia], 
34(4) Zhurnal konstitutsionnogo pravosudiia (2013), 9-14.
132 William Pomeranz and Max Gutbrod, “The Push for Precedent in Russia’s Judicial Sys-
tem”, 37(1) Review of Central and East European Law (2012), 1-30.
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Even after the Supreme Commercial Court was disbanded in 2014, this 
decisionism still holds sway in Russian jurisprudence on the basis of this 
theoretical justification.
Conclusion
This undercurrent theoretical combination of the formalist and anti-formal-
ist accounts of law existed throughout the history of Soviet law, implying 
that, on the one hand, there was a statist theory of law, and, on the other 
hand, there was decisionism inspired by the Marxist-Leninist class theo-
ry.133 It is this decisionism that transpires in Russian (Soviet) legal thinking 
where the law is only an epiphenomenon of economic relations, so that 
“within the Marxist position the signifier law does not denote, if anything, 
a self-referential, closed system of rules; rather it points towards a specific 
part of social normativity entangled in the fabric of economic dynamics”.134 
The law is represented as either the result of class struggle or, in current 
debates, as the result of struggle for identity and sovereignty. Legal norms 
(propositions) as such have never been prioritized in either Soviet or Rus-
sian legal theory—these norms are normally seen as indicators of what the 
political will is and not as imperative, independent of the political, judicial, 
or other will. What is legal is what the political authorities order—that is 
the point at which legal formalism and decisionism perfectly fit each other. 
The liberal narratives about the intrinsic value of rights and of the law used 
to be (in Soviet law)—and still are—taken by many scholars cum grano salis, 
and in the prevailing official discourse they are often considered an artificial 
cover for subversive influences conducted with the help of such ideas as 
human rights or the rule of law.
This follows quite clearly from this theoretical position. At best, the 
law was accepted in Marxist legal theory as a provisional means of regula-
tion until the enemies of the working class were defeated and a classless 
society emerged. Then the law would fade away as redundant, but, until 
that moment, the law should be tolerated and pragmatically utilized under 
the ideological supervision of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party. It goes 
without saying that this attitude did not imply any respect for the law: it 
could be disregarded whenever necessary for a higher cause (attainment 
133 Rett R. Ludwikowski, “Socialist Legal Theory in the Post-Pashukanis Era”, 10(2) Boston 
College International and Comparative Law Review (1987), 323-342.
134 Cercel, op.cit. note 36, 51.
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of communism or preservation of sovereignty).135 The logical conclusion 
from this theoretical posture implies that rights are not generally perceived 
as binding in virtue of their intrinsic meaning in an epistemic community 
(as preconditions of civilized interaction), but only insofar as they are com-
manded and supported by the state, or if their observance is consistent with 
the priorities of state policies.
It remains to be discussed whether post-Soviet Russia (and other 
countries in the region) can go beyond this theoretical impasse, as adopting 
new laws and constitutions is not enough to change mindsets. The analysis 
undertaken above leads to the conclusion that the old legal mentality still 
holds sway among lawyers, although this conclusion should not be under-
stood in black-and-white terms: there are non-conformist lawyers who may 
re-evaluate the Russian legal system from alternative standpoints. But so 
far, Russian legal theory and legal scholarship in general have done too 
little to catch up to the level of discussions taking place in the world and 
eventually to become a moral authority that could, through public debates, 
provide constraints against incompetent, excessive legislation and flawed 
court practices. Such a revision of the legal system and unveiling its intrinsic 
rationality to restore the genuine value of rights was the major message of 
Vekhi a century ago, and this task is likely to remain something that contem-
porary Russian lawyers need to deal with. Revisiting established theoretical 
ideas could be one of the main steps in this direction.
With this purpose in mind, in the next chapter, we will examine the 
conception of Chief Justice of the RF Constitutional Court, Valerii Zorkin, to 
reveal the methodological and philosophical premises of their works. These 
premises hinge on the theoretical constructions of Russian jurisprudence, 
developed in pre-revolutionary legal philosophy and, also, in Soviet legal 
scholarship. It is revealing to study these premises against the backdrop 
of Western legal conceptions to which Chief Justice Zorkin attempt to 
adjust Russian intellectual tradition. Despite their arduous efforts, this 
attempt fails. This failure only reveals the methodological distinctiveness 
between the premises in question and the relevant Western conceptions (the 
economic analysis of law and human rights doctrine, respectively). This 
confirms our thesis that any ideological changes in Russian law—involving 
135 As an example, we can cite Art.1 of the 1922 RSFSR Civil Code:
“Civil rights are protected by the law except in situations in which these rights 
are utilized contrary to their social and economic purpose.” Art.5 of the 1964 RSFSR 
Civil Code made this even more explicit: “Civil rights are protected by law, except in 
instances in which they are exercised in contradiction to their purpose in a socialist 
society in the period of the building of communism. In exercising their rights and per-
forming their obligations, citizens and organizations must observe the law, and must 
respect the rules of socialist communal living and the moral principles of a society 
which is building communism.”
 See Civil Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (Univ. of Michigan Law 
School, Ann Arbor, MI, 1965, Whitmore Gray and Raymond Stults, transl.).
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an adaptation of Western conceptions without revisiting the main method-
ological schemes and theoretical tools of legal thinking—will be only deco-
rative. Such changes will not touch upon the substance of Russian law and, 
quite likely, will end up in controversies, as the divergence of the starting 
methodological points sooner or later will come to the surface.
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Foreword
This Chapter continues to analyze the tension between formalism and 
decisionism against the background of Russian exceptionalism in legal 
matters. This analysis focuses on the writings and public discourses of 
another member of the Chief Justice of the RF Constitutional Court, Valerii 
Zorkin. Approaching this problem from the aspect of legal philosophy, the 
Chapter suggests that two key points are important to understanding this 
exceptionalism: that of human rights and that of sovereignty. The Russian 
exceptionalist understanding of these two key points largely foreshadows 
Russian international policy and its “living” constitutional order. The ideas 
set forth by Valerii Zorkin are highly illustrative of this exceptionalism and 
can serve as a litmus test for revealing the philosophical background of Rus-
sian policies toward the ECtHR and, more generally, toward the Western 
liberal tradition. The narratives of Valerii Zorkin can be seen as illustrative 
of the conservative backlash of the Russian judiciary which was initially 
enthusiastic about Western legal principles and standards. As many other 
Russian constitutional lawyers, Zorkin became more critical toward them 
when he saw their theoretical and practical consequences. In our opinion, 
this track is also characteristic for the moods of the Russian judiciary in 
general. These moods fit to the prevailing style of legal thinking that still 
is based on the positivist doctrine as well as on the political constraints 
imposed on sovereign state power by supreme legal principles such as 
human rights.
136 An earlier version of this Chapter was originally published in 2017 in Mälksoo and Bene-
dek, op.cit. note 70, 150-187. The present Chapter is an updated version of that work. Ref-
erences to page numbers, in parentheses, in the main text and footnotes of this Chapter 
are to works of the Chief Justice Zorkin.
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Introduction
The hurdles preventing the modernization of Russian law and the spread 
of a culture of human-rights law137 in Russia have already earned the 
attention of some leading Russian138 and Western139 experts. Their care-
ful examinations reveal the many structural challenges faced by Russian 
courts and legislators, including those connected with legal mentality.140 
Examination of these challenges consequently leads to questioning their 
cultural and other foundations and the ways in which Russia reacts to them. 
Historically, one Russian reaction used to be opposing itself to the West141 
considering itself as the last stronghold of Orthodoxy or as the main outpost 
of socialism. Experiencing difficulties in modernization, Russia is likely to 
137 By this term I mean the set of values, ideas and principles justifying the international-law 
constraints imposed on state policies and state legal rules for the sake of protection of 
basic rights and freedoms. See the description of this culture, its rise and its impact on 
international and constitutional law in the second half of the twentieth century in Samuel 
Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
MA, 2014).
138 For example, Anton L. Burkov, Konventsiia o zashchite prav cheloveka v sudakh Rossii [The 
Convention on Protection of Human Rights in Russian Courts] (Kluwer, Moscow, 2010); 
Sergei Iu. Marochkin, Deistvie i realizatsiia norm mezhdunarodnogo prava v pravovoi sisteme 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [The Validity and Application of Norms of International Law in the 
Russian Legal System] (Norma, Moscow, 2011).
139 For example, Bowring, Law, Rights and Ideology in Russia, op.cit. note 35; Angelika Nuss-
berger, “Russia and European Human-Rights Law: Progress, Tensions and Perspectives. 
Foreword”, 37(1) Review of Central and East European Law (2012), 155-157; and Lauri Mälk-
soo, “Concluding Observations. Russia and European Human Rights Law: Margins of 
the Margin of Appreciation”, 37(1) Review of Central and East European Law (2012), 167-170.
140 See Gennadii A. Satarov, Iurii N. Blagoveshensky, and Vladimir L. Rimsky, Sotsiologiches-
kii analiz pravosoznaniia sudei, naseleniia i predprinimatelei [A Sociological Analysis of the 
Legal Consciousness of Judges, The Populace at Large, and Enterpreneurs] (Indem, Mos-
cow, 2015). Based on public opinion polls, the authors point to many examples of how 
confusingly Russian judges perceive human rights. One of these examples is that 70% 
of the judiciary think that human rights are inherent to individuals, who entrust protec-
tion of these rights to the state; and at the same time 58% of the same judiciary think that 
human rights can be granted only by the state and do not exist before being recognized 
and posited by the state (p.60). This means that at least 28% of the judges interviewed do 
not see the fundamental difference between the two contradictory propositions, which 
evidently demonstrates the defi ciency of their basic legal education. Not surprisingly, 
more than 8% of judges fi nd that ECtHR judgments against Russia humiliate their coun-
try (p.31). The authors wisely remark that their research “undoubtedly shows that there 
are problems in legal education […], so that neither professional legal education nor daily 
legal practice exercises any impact on formation of the fundamentals of legal mentality” 
(p.119).
141 In this chapter, we utilize the term “West” or “Western” in an ideologically neutral sense, 
aiming to cover the culture and institutions that prevail in the countries of Western 
Europe and North America, keeping in mind that confl icts and inconsistencies can arise 
between certain cultures and institutions from different countries belonging to the same 
legal tradition and even within the same country. At the same time, we are not inclined to 
label as “Western” everything that comes from the EU and its structures—a good deal of 
differentiation is needed in this aspect.
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revert to the same strategy in the post-perestroika years. This is attested to 
not only by public speeches and discussions by political leaders but, also, by 
a series of legislative amendments and important court decisions.142 With 
that in mind, below we will undertake an analysis of some aspects of the 
prevailing legal thinking in Russia143 that, perhaps, underlies a great deal 
of exceptionalism in legal matters—especially as far as human rights are 
concerned.
The Russian legal system sometimes is represented as heterogeneous 
to Western law, as a regulative order with another ideology, mentality, and 
cultural attitude to law and legal institutions.144 These representations are 
methodologically questionable as very few of them focus on the dialectics 
of specificity/identity (i.e., to what extent a set of specific characteristics 
makes a country part of another “legal universe”, separating it from a set of 
other countries), without which one cannot appreciate the relevance of the 
differences that always exist between legal cultures. However, there is more 
than a grain of truth in describing Russian law as based on an intellectual 
background somewhat different from that of Western law. Entering into 
communication with Russian lawyers, their Western confrère (or a Russian 
lawyer with a Western education) can frequently sense that basic categories, 
principles, and concepts are perceived and applied quite differently—even 
if they bear the same titles and fulfill similar functions. As a rule, the dif-
ference does not go as far as the point of complete misunderstanding. Still, 
some preparatory work is reasonably needed to alert both sides to possible 
discrepancies in interpretations. Our experience is that, with this prepara-
tory work done beforehand, further communication goes more smoothly 
and normally leads to more or less positive results in particular issues of 
legal practice.
142 In light of the relationship between Russia and the ECtHR, the most important signs of 
this growing exceptionalism are: (A) a 2015 law empowering the RF Constitutional Court 
to rule out execution of certain judgments of the ECtHR: Federal’nyi konstitutsionnyi 
zakon [Federal Constitutional Law] (14 December 2015) No.FKZ-7 “Ob izmeneniiakh v 
Federal’nyi konstitutsionnyi zakon O Konstitutsionnom sude Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [On 
Amendments to the Federal Constitutional Law ‘On the Constitutional Court of the Rus-
sian Federation’”]; and (B) a Ruling of the RF Constitutional Court (14 July 2015) No.21-P, 
op.cit. note 16, holding that the Russian Constitution and its interpretations by the RF 
Constitutional Court enjoy primacy over international law and, also, over interpretations 
rendered by such supranational courts as the ECtHR. With these two legal acts, Russian 
exceptionalism has gained momentum after several years of ongoing controversies with 
European institutions.
143 Here and below, references to “Russian” or “Russia” will imply the Russian political 
leadership and judicial authorities whose rhetoric is the main subject matter of the pres-
ent chapter. If not indicated otherwise, such references will not imply anything about the 
opinions of the Russian population or about Russian culture in general.
144 See Jessica C. Wilson, “Russian Cultural Aversion to the Rule of Law”, 2(2) Columbia Jour-
nal of East European Law (2008), 195-231.
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This kind of preparatory work is something that, in our view, is criti-
cally missing in top-level relations between Russian and Western politicians 
and the judiciary, which is patently attested by mutual indictments about 
“information wars” or “propaganda’. As a rule, “propaganda’ turns out to 
be an interpretation from one standpoint which differs from the interpreta-
tion flowing from another standpoint, and “information wars” are related 
to coordinated policies to promote and justify these interpretations. Many 
scholarly papers are devoted to narrative analyses of such interpretations, 
and not a few ex-Sovietologists are thriving on these grounds. However, it 
is not the disparity between these interpretations that may constitute the 
object of important research but, rather, the distinction between the implicit 
conventions underpinning these respective standpoints.
To keep this chapter about Valerii Zorkin’s legal philosophy at a 
manageable arm’s length, we will not assess attitudes toward the ECtHR 
among the professional community of Russian lawyers or in the Russian 
population generally.145 Some of these important sociological inquiries have 
already been conducted146 offering many vital insights into the practical 
advantages, e.g., for lawyers and their clients to have the ECtHR as one 
more “appeal” instance. Nonetheless, even if their findings do shed light on 
the impact of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on the lives of Russians, the 
relevance of such public opinion polls is limited.
First, the population in general and even the community of lawyers in 
particular hardly possess full knowledge about all the convolutions and 
perplexities of membership, and the masses are hardly ever capable of bas-
ing their judgement on carefully elaborated and balanced scientific research; 
rather, drawing off-hand conclusions. From certain philosophical perspec-
tives, the masses can be construed as the bearers of supreme wisdom; 
societies can be thought of in terms of a big organism (like the Grand Être 
in Emile Durkheim’s sociology) developing a collective mentality which 
stands above and directs individual mentalities. However, we will hereafter 
base our analysis on the presupposition that only individual consciousness 
is real, and that all kinds of collective consciousness are merely intellectual 
constructs.
Second, popular and even professional opinions may fluctuate or be 
influenced by the (badly informed or biased) media. Therefore, nothing 
assures the relevance of human expectations to real institutional or cultural 
exigencies. At the same time, even if the focus of this chapter is not on 
145 For some interesting indicators, see Alexei Trochev, “All Appeals Lead to Strasbourg? 
Unpacking the Impact of the European Court of Human Rights on Russia”, 17(2) 
Demokratizatsiya (2009), 145-178.
146 For example, the detailed, 300-plus page report which was prepared by the Institute of 
Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2011: Dvadtsat’ let reform glazami rossiian 
(opyt mnogoletnikh sotsiologicheskikh zamerov) [Twenty Years of Reforms Seen through the 
Eyes of Russians (The Experience from Long-term Sociological Polls)] (ISRAN, Moscow, 
2011).
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popular mindsets or opinion polls, we briefly will address some available 
sociological data on legal education in Russia and on the “legal conscious-
ness” of Russian judges and lawyers.
After a concise estimation of the problem of exceptionality and of how 
Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe has (or has not) influenced 
the Russian legal system, we will characterize the philosophical foundations 
of Russian exceptionalism as they are set forth in Zorkin’s writings. This 
analysis will provide material for pondering how Russia’s membership in 
the ECtHR can contribute to overcoming deficiencies in prevailing legal 
thinking (and, in this sense, in the modernization of Russian law) and 
how the dialogue between Russia and the West about human rights could 
be better framed. This research question is not tantamount to evaluating 
whether ECtHR jurisprudence can (or should) establish the basic principles 
of Russian law or substitute/amend the principles already elaborated in 
the Russian legal system. These aspects undoubtedly are interconnected 
but not identical: analytically, it is possible that ECtHR jurisprudence will 
be supportive of modernization without having a direct binding (or even 
persuasive) force on the judiciary and the citizenry.
1 The Problem of Russian Exceptionality and Legal Education
Valerii Zorkin, the Chairman of the RF Constitutional Court, is highly 
influential in both the institutional and intellectual dimensions of the Rus-
sian legal sphere. If we choose Zorkin’s writings for further analysis, this 
surely does not signify that his thinking is absolutely representative of the 
Russian legal community as a whole. A picture of Russian legal scholarship 
cannot be drawn only in black-and-white terms, and if below we equate 
Zorkin’s attitudes to the general attitudes of Russian lawyers, this should 
be understood as an intentional shortcut for the sake of brevity and in the 
interest of a more concise analysis. That is why our conclusions should 
not be interpreted in terms of “each and every lawyer’ or “each and every 
stratum of lawyers”. For example, it is quite likely that our conclusions do 
not hold true for many human rights activists. Among Russian colleagues, 
there are some who also do not fall under this characterization although 
they are few in numbers. Our educated guess that the majority of Russian 
lawyers would readily share Zorkin’s philosophy is based—along with our 
professional experience and intuition—on our evaluation of the available 
sociological data about the Russian judiciary and legal community.147 But 
this guess is not a declaration of some objective and immutable truths.
147 Several important sociological agencies such as the Levada Center or WTsIOM which 
periodically publish polls and surveys on various questions including data concerning 
perceptions in Russian society of courts, of law-enforcement agencies, and so on. Some 
interesting data have been collected by such research centers as the St Petersburg-based 
Institute for the Rule of Law (<www.enforce.spb.ru>).
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The same caveat needs to be added to our description of the prevail-
ing legal education which, also, is rather a Weberian ideal type. The reality 
is that some (but still not many) Russian lawyers and law professors can 
read professional literature in foreign languages; some have a Western 
educational background or opportunities to go abroad for continued stud-
ies. However, these legal scholars and practitioners do not (yet) occupy key 
positions in the Russian political or academic establishment. They remain 
a negligible number as compared with the masses of those who graduate 
from Russian law schools and who stay to teach in those schools without 
experiencing any need for (discussions of) changes in the basic assumptions 
of their disciplines or, especially, any need whatsoever for (or rather, on the 
contrary, having an aversion to) “learning from the West’.
Consequently, intrusions into basic assumptions of the legal dogma 
taught in Russian legal academia (which, basically, repeats the dogma 
coined in the Soviet era) might easily be viewed by these “traditionalist” 
lawyers as destructive for legal science as a whole, as a part of the notorious 
“information war”148 waged by the West against Russia which is one of the 
most frequent topics in Russian official media. This is something that clearly 
comes to the surface of Zorkin’s narratives. In this sense, his writings are 
helpful to understanding the Weltanschauung underpinning the attitude 
which one can expect from an average Russian judge or law professor. Our 
hypothesis is that this Weltanschauung is not a random outcome of the Chief 
Justice’s intellectual development but reveals some important dimensions 
that characterize the basic legal education of Zorkin’s generation and of 
succeeding generations of graduates of Russian (Soviet) law schools.
Given his philosophical background, his strong personality149 and 
keen legal intuition, as well as his interest in alternative Western legal 
conceptions—which is still rather rarely encountered in other Russian 
judges—Zorkin better (or, perhaps, deeper) than anyone else illustrates 
148 Or “unfair competition”, another term specially utilized by Russia’s top justices—Vale-
rii Zorkin and, also, Anton Ivanov, former Chairman of the Supreme Arbitration (Com-
mercial) Court—to show that Russian courts are denigrated by their Western counter-
parts and, for this reason, are held to be corrupt and unprofessional. The term (“unfair 
competition” or “nedobrosovestnaia konkurentsiia” as applied to foreign courts and their 
policies toward Russian courts) was introduced in 2012 by Anton Ivanov in his speech 
under the pretentious title “The Declaration of Court Sovereignty”: Anton A. Ivanov, 
“Deklaratsiia sudebnogo suvereniteta”, presentation made on 17 May 2012 at the Second 
International Legal Forum in St. Petersburg, available at <http://www.arbitr.ru/press-
centr/smi/52305.html>. See the comments by RF Constitutional Court Chief Justice Zor-
kin on this idea: Valerii Zorkin, “Transformatsiia otnoshenii sobstvennosti: global’nye 
tendentsii i rossiiskii opyt” [The Transformation of Property Relations: Global Tenden-
cies and Russian Experience], presentation made on 31 May 2012 at the Dialogue of the 
Judges of the Russian and German Higher Courts in Moscow, available at <https://
rg.ru/2012/05/31/zorkin.html>.
149 Zorkin is famous for presiding over the RF Constitutional Court which, in 1993, declared 
as unconstitutional Yeltsin’s Edict No.1400 on disbanding the Parliament. Predictably, it 
led to Zorkin’s dismissal after Yeltsin shelled Parliament and gained the upper hand.
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how the majority of Russian lawyers are disposed to think about human-
rights law, and what implications this thinking might eventually bring 
about for the dialogue between Russia and the West about human rights. 
Zorkin’s deliberations are also remarkable because they reveal a relatively 
coherent philosophical position that might be illustrative of the conceptual 
difficulties connected with the modernization of Russian law.150 Unlike the 
shallow ideas of such Russian contemporary conservative thinkers as Alek-
sandr Dugin, Sergei Kurginian, or Vladislav Surkov, the Chief Justice tries 
to develop a balanced legal philosophy combining different approaches 
although solely within the perspective in which he himself understands law 
and sees the Russian legal Sonderweg.
Zorkin demonstrates a good deal of intellectual honesty when he 
directly admits his propensity to authoritarianism ;151 this is not an easy 
step for the constitutional chief justice of a country that, according to its 
constitution, is democratic. And of intellectual bravery: he undertakes an 
attempt to demonstrate philosophically that authoritarianism is better (for 
contemporary Russia) than “liberal” Western democracy exactly from the 
vantage point of the protection of human rights (sic!) .152 Educated as a legal 
philosopher—his 1967 PhD (candidate of sciences) thesis dealt with the 
legal philosophy of the Russian pre-revolutionary legal philosopher Boris 
Chicherin (1828-1904); and his 1978 habilitation thesis was devoted to posi-
tivism in Russian legal philosophy—Zorkin appositely discerns the central 
philosophical problem which may cast a shadow on the legal development 
of Russia. In Zorkin’s description, this problem pertains also to human 
rights and can be articulated as follows.
On the one hand, transplanting foreign institutions (human-rights 
principles and standards inclusive) can provide no solution to a country’s 
plight without appropriate shifts in legal culture and mentality. Transplan-
150 Here and in the following pages, we will use the term “modernization” only as far as 
legal systems are concerned and only in the sense of updating a legal system to the best 
and most effi cient achievement in other legal systems, to “best world practices”. How to 
defi ne what is best and effi cient, and if the best legal practices can be found only in the 
West, are separate questions that will not be addressed here.
151 In his 2014 speech at Moscow University, for example, he claimed that authoritarian-
ism is a “good travel friend” for independent courts in Russia for the time being. Valerii 
Zorkin, “Sudebnaia reforma Aleksandra II: uroki dlia Rossii” [The Court Reform of Alex-
ander II: Lessons for Russia], presentation made on 25 November 2014 at the IV Moscow 
Legal Week. Unless otherwise indicated, all discussions involving Zorkin will be cited 
according to their full versions available on the website of the RF Constitutional Court: 
<http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/News/Speech/> (one of the sections on the Constitutional 
Court’s webpage is especially devoted to public speeches by the Chief Justice).
152 In 2015, the RF Constitutional Court Chairman asserted that a profound gap exists 
between individual and collective rights, the former being based on the philosophy of 
individualism, meaning they are therefore destructive for society. Collective rights are 
rooted in Christian values, so that a full imposition of human rights in Russia would 
mean a confl ict between traditional Russian values and the individualist Western idea 
of rights. See Valerii Zorkin, “Pravo sily i sila prava” [The Law of Force and the Force of 
Law], presentation made on 28 May 2015 at the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum.
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism.indb   57 10-10-19   14:53
58 Chapter 2
tation also will be meaningless if new institutions are detached from the 
political and social realities of the recipient country and will, therefore, 
remain inactive and inefficient. The Chief Justice asserts that every society 
is a “super-complex system with its specific culture, tradition and morality, 
with its nuances of internal moral legislation” .153 This complexity implies 
that there is the primacy of “basic ethical values” over formal legal texts 
(including international declarations); that legal principles and rules (also 
human-rights law) created for societies with other cultures and mentalities 
cannot be simply transplanted without adaptation to these “basic ethical 
values” of the recipient country.154
On the other hand, in the contemporary world, a country the size 
of Russia cannot remain unresponsive to legal developments in other 
countries and in international law. This is also true of human rights, and 
Zorkin regularly underscores that his Court strives to incorporate the 
world’s best human-rights standards into the Russian legal order; that 
he personally does not intend to oppose the “Western doctrine of human 
rights.155 However, these principles and standards cannot be incorporated 
mechanically, without the aforementioned “cultural acclimatization” of 
human rights to Russian realities and to “basic ethical values”. That is why 
Zorkin’s speeches usually end up in ecumenical pleas about mutual dialog; 
in equable calls to elaborate, together, a kind of integral theory of human 
rights.156
It is from these two ultimate points that Zorkin proceeds and to which 
he constantly returns in his various papers and discourses on Russia’s place 
on the legal map of the world and on the protection of human rights in 
Russia. The solutions that he proposes for implementation of human rights 
in Russian law also oscillate between these two endpoints. Zorkin, to use 
his own metaphor, wishes to forge “scissors to suit the moral normativity 
of local Russian identities to legal enactments of a global world”.157 As a 
153 Zorkin, “Sudebnaia reforma Aleksandra II: uroki dlia Rossii”, op.cit. note 151, 13.
154 Ibid.
155 Zorkin, “Rossiia i Strasburg”, op.cit. note 24.
156 His fi gurative discussions are, however, often ambiguous. For example, he concluded a 
2016 narrative with a pathetic tirade that hinted at US world leadership saying that:
“The current epoch of change brings the risk that under the leadership of ‘conductors’, 
confi gured in a certain way, a ‘light music’ of legal texts would sound like a funeral 
march […] In the name of the rights of present and future generations, we must do 
everything so the bright music of ‘legal spheres’ does not turn into a death knell.”
 Valerii Zorkin, “Doverie k pravu – put k razresheniiu global’nykh krizisov” [Trust in the 
Law Is the Way to Solve Global Crises], presentation made on 19 May 2016 at the St. 
Petersburg International Legal Forum.
157 Valerii Zorkin, “Problemy konstitutsionno-pravovogo razvitiia Rossii (k 20-letiiu Kon-
stitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii)” [Problems of Russia’s Constittuional and Legal Develop-
ment (Dedicated to the Twentieth Anniversary of the Russian Federation’s Constitution)], 
presentation made on 26 November 2013 at the International Conference “Constitution-
alism and Legal System of Russia: Outcomes and Perspectives”, 22.
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism.indb   58 10-10-19   14:53
The Philosophy behind Human Rights: Valerii Zorkin vs. the West? 59
legal philosopher, the Chief Justice cannot ignore the hiatus between two 
extreme positions (exceptionalism and universalism) in understanding 
human rights but does hope to decrease this gap through further “positiva-
tion” or “codification” of international law—to wit, through the meticulous 
formulation of texts of treaties and conventions that would enable (as he 
claims) the elimination of “double standards” and restoration of confidence 
in international law that was shattered after the “bipolar world” ceased to 
exist .158
Provided that the very function of human rights is to serve as supreme 
criteria of the legality of positive state enactments, it is not evident that this 
gap can ever be covered in any satisfactory way. The idea of “positivation” 
sounds doubtful against the backdrop of the major findings of twentieth-
century legal philosophy (indeterminacy, defeasibility of legal texts, the 
impossibility of their “objective” interpretation).
Following this approach, Zorkin ends up with the thesis that Russian 
law is “particular, distinctive and not fitted for the framework of the Euro-
pean conception of human rights” and—repeating the words of Dostoevsky 
from his Notes from the Underground—paradoxically concludes that even if 
his (Zorkin’s) conception sounds “retrograde, it is better than nothing” .159 
However, the correct alternative here would be not “nothing” but, rather, 
a great deal of contemporary legal philosophy (including the modern 
versions of legal positivism) that could amply enrich and ameliorate the 
“dialogue with the West” for which Zorkin is desperately looking, and 
in which, in his opinion, the ECtHR has so far shown no serious will to 
engage. One could agree with Zorkin that what comes from the ECtHR as 
the “universalia of human rights” is not entirely democratically legitimated, 
and is sometimes conceptually contestable, but it does not justify his further 
thesis that “positivation of international law’ or exceptionalism can be good 
ways to move forward.
Numerous comparative lawyers count Russia among the continental-
law (civil-law) countries; some historical and ideological differences with 
other Romano-Germanic legal systems notwithstanding.160 In fact, from the 
18th century on, Russian law has been based on Western legal scholarship, 
especially German scholarship, and until now remains thoroughly imbued 
with Western concepts and techniques. But it is not only the historical aspect 
that matters: a swift look at the way Russian statutory law is crafted today 
shows clear traces of Western laws in almost every Russian draft bill. A 
striking example is the RF Civil Code (Part 1), largely inspired by the Dutch 
158 Valerii Zorkin, “Pravo v usloviiakh global’nykh peremen” [Law in the Conditions of 
Global Changes], presentation made on 15 May 2013 at the St. Petersburg International 
Legal Forum, 2.
159 Valerii Zorkin, “Tsivilizatsiia prava: sovremennyi kontekst” [The Civilization of Law: 
The Contemporary Context], presentation made on 18 June 2014 at the St. Petersburg 
International Legal Forum, 9.
160 See Peter Maggs, William Burnham, and Gennadii Danilenko, Law and Legal System of the 
Russian Federation (Juris Publishing Inc., Huntington, NY, 2012, 5th ed.).
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example, and even one of the most tarnished recent Russian laws—No.FZ-
121 (20 July 2012) on foreign agents—ultimately finds its roots in the 1938 
US FARA. This list could include many other examples, among which are 
curious attempts to incorporate Anglo-American rules on trust ownership 
into Russian law or to make Russian commercial courts follow the Anglo-
Saxon precedential style of reasoning and decision-making.161
However, these and other abundant examples of Western rules, stan-
dards, and institutions transplanted into Russian law do not assure that 
this law becomes truly modernized in the sense of following the Western 
models and practices. The use Russian lawyers and judges make of such 
rules and institutions demonstrates that—being transplanted into the Rus-
sian intellectual and institutional context—these rules and institutions are 
applied in a very different manner. Evidently, Russian civil law does not 
resemble Dutch civil law just because its Civil Code was transplanted; rules 
on trusts regulate completely different issues in Russia and in the United 
Kingdom (to the point that no genuine “trust ownership” has appeared in 
Russian law); and the impact of the Russian foreign-agents law on NGOs is 
different compared with that of the 1938 US FARA.
The question arises as to whether Russia’s ratification of the 1950 Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and its membership in the Council of Europe is not just a con-
tinuation of this long list of failed transplantations. Can it be that—while 
formally recognizing the primacy of international law and the supreme 
value of human rights—the RF Constitution (its Arts.15 and 2) does not 
correspond to Russia’s “living” constitution describing how the legal order 
is really organized, how it functions, and how it actually treats international 
law and human rights? Some observers readily draw this conclusion, assert-
ing that no genuine mechanisms for the protection of individual freedoms 
are available in Russia; that ECtHR jurisprudence provokes no substantial 
changes in Russian law; that it has not altered the mentality of the Russian 
judiciary in any way.162
The membership in the Council of Europe (and other European insti-
tutions) has undoubtedly influenced the development of Russian law. 
Nonetheless, ratification of treaties or transplanting statutes cannot, as such, 
bring about any substantial changes in the legal order or in the underpin-
ning legal mentality; indeed, to think otherwise would be a naivety.
This naivety was patent in the years of Yeltsin’s rule when Russian leg-
islation was modified drastically—and, to a certain extent, inaccurately—in 
accordance with Western models. The liberal 1993 RF Constitution, numer-
161 Andrei Zhdanov, “Transplanting the Anglo-American Trust in Russian Soil”, 37(1) Review 
of Central and East European Law (2012), 179-231; and William Pomeranz and Max Gut-
brod, “The Push for Precedent in Russia’s Judicial System”, 31(1) Review of Central and 
East European Law (2006), 1-30.
162 Johnathan D. Weiler, Human Rights in Russia: A Darker Side of Reform (Lynne, Boulder, CO, 
2004).
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ous statutes copied from Western prototypes, a raft of treaties and conven-
tions ratified—all this has left a visible imprint on the development of 
Russian law and, still, formally constitutes the cornerstones of the Russian 
legal order. Nonetheless, even if Yeltsin’s government was working hard 
on westernizing the country and its law, something seriously hindered and 
lowered the value of all these efforts. It does not appear that “political will” 
alone might have been the main cause of this, especially given that Yeltsin 
gained no small amount of political dividends by virtue of his Westerniza-
tion policy. This “something” might include many variables, among which 
could be institutional realities or civilizational differences. As to the latter, 
we do not see any such differences that would make Russian law irrec-
oncilable with Western legal systems, the famous nihilism being rather a 
catchword than any real penchant in Russian legal culture.163 To our mind, 
the most important of these variables is the prevailing approach in legal 
education and the legal reasoning which is reproduced and legitimized by 
legal education in Russia.
It comes as no surprise that old patterns of reasoning and mentality 
considerably distort transplanted rules and institutions, diminishing their 
effect or even making them reinforce the existing state of affairs rather than 
alter it. Nor is it a surprise to anyone that such patterns do not fade away 
overnight. Moreover, they tend to legitimize the institutional realities and 
le capital symbolique (according to Pierre Bourdieu) that secures the survival 
and existence of elites in high courts, in legal academia, and elsewhere. This 
“cultural capital” still largely prefigures the Russian legal landscape and, 
to some extent, provides individual lawyers with a reference point for their 
self-identification as “Russian jurists”. This scheme of mutual reproduction 
and legitimation between legal dogma and the legal community makes it 
much harder to carry out any consistent reforms which could compromise 
the basic assumptions of this dogma. The latter, due to this symbiosis, con-
tinues to mold the prevailing legal education and conceptual standards of 
reasoning in the legal community.
Realistically, this legal education and this legal dogma cannot be fully 
receptive to human rights if we recall what used to be the basic points of this 
education and of Vyshinsky’s legal theory in Soviet times.164 The assertions 
that human rights sprang up as smart inventions of the liberal bourgeoisie 
fighting with the nobility and the clergy and that, afterwards, these rights 
became an ideological tool legitimizing capitalist rule and individualistic 
culture are well known.165 Retrograde as they may seem, these viewpoints 
163 Kathryn Hendley, “Who Are the Legal Nihilists in Russia?”, 28(2) Post-Soviet Affairs 
(2012), 149-186.
164 Andrei Vyshinsky was the prosecutor-general of Stalin’s regime, famous for, in addition 
to his atrocities, coining Soviet legal theory based on the idea that law is everything that 
issues from the state. This theory was proclaimed in 1938 as the only truth and, therefore, 
obligatory for all Soviet lawyers.
165 Franciszek Przetacznik, “The Socialist Concept of Human Rights: Its Philosophical Back-
ground and Political Justifi cation”, 13 Belgian Review of International Law (1977), 239-278.
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still hold their grip on the older generation of lawyers who internalized 
them as students and who, in turn, expect to inculcate the same (or similar) 
ideas in their students today.
We will see how Zorkin, although in more careful words, reproduces 
this “socialist’ conception of human rights, at the same time swearing by 
his fidelity to the supreme value of human rights. However, if we trace the 
logical sequence of his approach, “human rights” here becomes a concept 
without a reference point. In condemning liberal Western “all-permissive-
ness”, the Chief Justice does not provide any other indicators for finding 
and identifying these rights in society, except the implicit logic of ipse dixit, 
or “human rights are what the Russian Constitutional Court says human 
rights are”. This ambivalence in attitude toward human rights—for which 
we provide here the example of Zorkin’s narratives only as an illustra-
tion166—represents one of the main impediments to the modernization of 
Russian law and seriously aggravates relations between the Russian top-
level judiciary and the ECtHR.
Legal education in Russia and in other former Soviet countries, on the 
one hand, was (and still is) based on the methods of German Rechtswissen-
schaft from the turn of the 20th century, and, on the other, has no coherent 
conceptual history, owing to Stalin’s purges, Vyshinsky’s dogmatization of 
legal theory in the late 1930s, the indoctrination of Marxism-Leninism into 
legal philosophy, and finally, for these reasons, being detached from the 
development of Western jurisprudence. From the vantage point of Soviet 
legal ideology (which succeeded the “first positivism” of the 19th century 
in this aspect), law was the will of the ruling class, statutes contained this 
will, and judges were there to reveal and interpret this will. As added value 
could be an explanation of how this will is formed: either it is the economic 
basis that prefigures the infrastructure, or a more or less ontologically 
independent collective mentality (obshchestvennoe soznanie) forms the “will 
of the people” for which the parliament serves as an oracle. Most of the 
explanatory and conceptual schemes in the jurisprudence of Russia and 
other former Soviet countries are still derived from these basic Marxist-
Leninist assumptions.167
Strange as it may seem, during the thirty years since perestroika began, 
very little has been done in terms of reconsidering these assumptions in 
light of the new Western standards of human rights to which Russia and 
many other former Soviet countries have declared their adherence. Needless 
to add, these assumptions are outlined rather conservatively with almost 
no place in legal education reserved for “proportionality”, “due process”, 
166 Assessing general Russian attitudes toward the West, Zorkin would paradoxically 
appear to be quite moderate as compared with other Russian judges and members of 
parliament.
167 An exception should, perhaps, be made as to the Baltic States where the intelligentsia did 
not experience the terrible Stalin purges of the late 1930s; where legal scholarship devel-
oped more organically and, therefore, was better suited for successful Westernization.
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“balancing of values”, “justification”, and other methods so important for 
contemporary Western legal scholarship. The accent is still on the sovereign 
and on the ways in which it creates and applies the law, so that protection of 
sovereignty stands quite predictably in the foreground of many of today’s 
discussions. This situation is aggravated by an authoritarian political rule 
that favors centralization and uniformity in almost every aspect of society, 
higher education included; and the concept of sovereignty and of law as the 
sovereign will fits very well with the needs of that centralization.
Consequently, legal scholarship in Russia comprehends law almost 
exclusively through the lenses of this exegetic jurisprudence, largely ignor-
ing not only non-positivist approaches but, also, the important conceptual 
achievement of legal positivism in the 20th century. The opposite theoretical 
element of decisionism (realism) that has been examined in the previ-
ous chapter does not gain any substantial attention among Russian legal 
scholars who tend to identify both the rule-making power and the power of 
discretion with the concept of sovereign (state) and thereby to evade serious 
scholarly discussions on justification and limits of power of exception.
This theoretical problem resonates in many contemporary tensions 
between the RF Constitutional Court and the ECtHR. Zorkin’s legal phi-
losophy can serve as a prominent example of this state of affairs in the 
Russian legal community and in the mindset of Russian lawyers. He abun-
dantly illustrates this mindset, reiterating that without the sovereign there 
would be no law; that without Westphalian sovereignty no “civilization of 
law” would be possible; and warns that human rights are not individual 
values but, rather, collective resources for better public governance.168 
In terms of the distinction drawn by Benjamin Constant as early as 1819 
between the “Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns”, 
Zorkin—with his understanding of human liberty—falls back to antiquity. 
Unsurprisingly, this collectivist understanding of freedom prefigures the 
place which can be allocated to human rights and to their protection.
2 Russia’s Accession to the ECtHR: A Step toward Modernization?
The question about the advantages and disadvantages of Russia’s member-
ship in the Council of Europe and the ECtHR is ambivalent. Gains and 
losses can hardly be evaluated from any objective standpoint putatively 
marking this membership as a historical phase on the way to any ultimate 
goal or any social ideal. This aspect can be better assessed from the per-
spective of what various actors may wish to achieve through membership. 
However, this evaluation represents an arduous task, insofar as it is far from 
easy to establish firmly and objectively what the real intentions of legal and 
168 This set of ideas was fi rst explicitly formulated in Zorkin’s 2006 article “An Apology of 
the Westphalian System”, op.cit. note 24.
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political actors are—this is true of each actor taken apart, let alone the large 
number of actors acting together in a huge legal system the size of Russia’s. 
An option for such an evaluation could be a comparative analysis of the 
objectives set forth in various official program documents (such as the goals 
proclaimed in the RF President’s 1995 Ukaz on legal reform in the Russian 
Federation169), and how these objectives have or have not been achieved or 
might or might not be achieved through interaction with the ECtHR and 
with the Council of Europe. Such an enterprise—even though important in 
certain aspects—nonetheless cannot yield a clear understanding of the real 
landscape given the distance between paper declarations, on the one hand, 
and the real actions of the Russian authorities (perhaps not only in Russia 
but, also, elsewhere) on the other.
Moreover, the benefits that political elites may draw from certain situa-
tions, e.g., from joining the ECtHR and interacting with it (or from obstruct-
ing such interaction), do not always amount to institutional gains for the 
entire legal system. And the other way around: some steps toward the 
enhanced protection of individual freedoms may endanger a system based 
on collective values and, thereby, affect actors whose leadership is legiti-
mized through those values. At the same time, the actors themselves often 
do not have clear strategies, so that their actions may be rather off-hand; not 
rationally premeditated. To a large extent, this was (and still is) true about 
the legal reforms undertaken in Russia so far. In spite of the existence of 
several official programs and conceptions on reforming Russian law, they 
remain largely paperwork. Decisions on concrete modalities and timing 
of reforms are, in fact, taken at the discretion of political leaders and their 
aides depending on varying circumstances and momentary needs. That is 
why an examination of formal legal texts is not of much help here, although 
we do not rule out that this might be important in some other dimensions 
such as a comparative analysis of regulations in two or more legal systems.
Turning our attention to the dynamics of Russian law and its rapproche-
ment with European standards in recent years, these dynamics inspire a 
rather positive mood. During the two decades as a member of the Council 
of Europe, Russia has significantly ameliorated its legislation as far as con-
cerns the execution of domestic judgments, pre-trial detention and prison 
conditions, legal capacity, re-registration of religious denominations, and 
other vital issues. These (and a number of other legislative amendments) 
evidently have been triggered by judgments of the ECtHR against Russia 
even if implementation of these judgments—requiring revision of Russian 
laws in the areas suggested by the Strasbourg Court—in each case remains 
mainly a question of the political will of Russia’s rulers.
169 Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Edict of the President of the Russian Federation] 
(6 July 1995) No.673 “O razrabotke kontseptsii pravovoi reformy v Rossiiskoi Federat-
sii” [On Elaborating a Concept of Legal Reform in the Russian Federation], SZRF (1995) 
No.28 item 2642.
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The Russian courts have learned to cite170 the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR; at least, the higher courts such as the RF Constitutional Court or the 
RF Supreme Court have done so. These higher courts also explicitly instruct 
the lower courts to apply the ECHR and to take into consideration171 
interpretations of the Convention by the ECtHR, remembering that the 
ECHR forms an integral part of Russian law pursuant to Article 15 of the 
RF Constitution. Even if in the latest interpretations of the RF Constitutional 
Court, the RF Constitution and the opinions of that Court prevail over the 
ECHR and the opinions of the ECtHR,172 both the Convention and ECtHR 
jurisprudence are formally “sources of Russian law” (i.e., something to 
which a court may and should refer in justifying its decisions). The very 
fact that the ECHR’s provisions can constitute grounds for justifying or, 
eventually, challenging a court decision at higher instances and that each 
case may potentially fall under the scrutiny of the ECtHR is a kind of sword 
of Damocles hanging over ordinary judges and, perhaps, cultivating them 
to respect human rights and freedoms somewhat more than if there were no 
recourse to any supranational courts whatsoever.
These institutional achievements are evident although certain suspi-
cions remain with the critical observer as to whether references to the juris-
prudence of the ECtHR are used by Russian courts merely for decoration 
and, as such, a pointless ornament for decisions sometimes plainly contra-
dicting the spirit of that jurisprudence. In recent years, this suspicion has 
grown progressively as the RF Constitutional Court learns to pick up and 
adroitly combine citations and arguments from ECtHR jurisprudence to cre-
ate the impression that some ECtHR judgments against Russia even violate 
the letter and the spirit of the ECHR. Perhaps a more alarming signal is that 
Russian politicians, the judiciary, and the media are seeking to undermine 
the authority of the ECtHR through accusations of usurpation of popular 
sovereignty; to shatter the entire European legal space—associating, in this 
enterprise, with Euroskeptics and conservative thinkers in Europe. Apart 
from their theoretical and philosophical weakness, these accusations may 
sometimes sound quite persuasive and could potentially constitute grounds 
for fighting the liberal values that buttress the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the ECHR, and other international (supranational) norma-
tive mechanisms for the protection of human rights.
Some human-rights activists and Strasbourg judges—enthused about 
a European consensus and the universality of human rights—can involun-
tarily contribute to such a result insofar as they are unwilling to enter into 
170 In needs to be kept in mind that the art of citation does not amount to the art of utilizing 
such tools properly.
171 However, this modality of the RF Supreme Court’s recommendations is quite ambigu-
ous: “prinimat’ vo vnimanie” is not tantamount to being bound to apply or even to use 
when justifying decisions.
172 As explained in the Ruling of the RF Constitutional Court (14 July 2015) No.21-P, op.cit. 
note 16.
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a discussion on the sources of the binding force of human rights and the 
limits of their validity, asserting that these rights are absolute and unques-
tionable. This may lead back to natural-law legal reasoning which, from 
the standpoint of legal philosophy, sounds less persuasive than the strictly 
positivist argumentation remaining as the conceptual core of civil-law 
scholarship. It is noteworthy that some Russian constitutional-law scholars 
and legal theoreticians have already attempted to incorporate into Russian 
law ideas of natural law (Elena Lukasheva or the late Sergei Alekseev can be 
mentioned as outstanding examples).173 Unfortunately, in trying to escape 
the stalemate of Vyshinsky’s legal positivism, such scholars often fall into 
the conceptual impasse of legal idealism. This also partly characterizes 
the views of Zorkin who tries to combine these irreconcilable conceptions: 
he is positivist when insisting that law cannot exist and survive without 
the sovereign will of the state, but he falls into idealism when suggesting 
that the validity of laws depends on the moral expectations of the majority 
or on some collective moral intuitions.174 Practically, this contradiction is 
softened by the implicit presumption of Zorkin that it is his Court which is 
competent to formulate these expectations and intuitions, the Court being at 
the same time a part of the sovereign power.
In these indirect debates with the West, the RF Constitutional Court 
gains the upper hand from the standpoint of legal theory prevailing in Rus-
sia which is also supported by the official media. It is no secret that the 
balancing and proportionality tests applied by the ECtHR frequently lead 
to different interpretations of the same provisions of the ECHR in differ-
ent cases. A normal situation from the conventionally accepted view of the 
role of the judiciary today, this approach is anathema to the first positivism 
which intends that judges merely be “mouths that pronounce the words of 
law” (Charles L. Montesquieu). From this perspective, each legal norm175 
should be understood as the word and will of the sovereign (in the case 
of an international treaty, of several sovereigns coordinating their volition). 
Thence, in different cases a court may attribute different meanings to the 
same norm would amount to undermining the principle of legality (zakon-
nost’). Such gouvernement des juges is atypical for civil-law countries since 
it putatively replaces the will of the people with the will of judges. It can 
173 See Elena A. Lukasheva, Pravo, moral’, lichnost’ [Law, Morality and Personality] (Nauka, 
Moscow, 1986); id., Chelovek, pravo, tsivilizatsiia: normativno-tsennostnoe izmerenie [Man, 
Law, Civilization: the Normative and Axiological Dimension] (Nauka, Moscow, 2009); 
Sergei S. Alekseev, Samoe sviatoe chto bylo u Boga na zemle [The Most Sacred of that which 
God Had on Earth] (Infra-M, Moscow, 1998); and id., Voskhozhdenie k pravu: poiski i reshe-
niia [Rising to the Law. Explorations and Decisions] (Norma, Moscow, 2001).
174 For example, Valerii Zorkin, Konstitutsionno-pravovoe razvitie Rossii [The Constitutional 
and Legal Development of Russia] (Norma and Infra-M, Moscow, 2011).
175 Prevailing Russian legal scholarship hardly distinguishes between norms (rules), prin-
ciples, and standards.
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be argued whether military men can have maternity leav e176 or whether 
prisoners may be allowed to vote ,177 but as a matter of fact the central 
argument between the RF Constitutional Court and the ECtHR is not about 
these varying issues but, rather, about what counts as law and how to arrive 
at the correct interpretation thereof.
These questions were intensively discussed in Western legal scholarship 
in the last century (and earlier) .178 Even if a certain discord still remains 
concerning the limits of judicial freedom, this scholarship has elaborated 
strong arguments against equating the application of the law with logical 
deduction/subsumption. Different theories may yield different solutions, 
and unsurprisingly the “first positivism” is by far not the only theory appli-
cable in these debates. For example, if one would follow the realist stand-
point and assert with Justice Oliver Holmes that the law is what judges say 
it is, or if one would adopt the Kelsenian perspective in which the words of 
law are merely a general framework to be filled in at the discretion of judges 
in each case, the lawmaking activities of the ECtHR (it is hard to contest that 
this Court creates new rules, principles, and standards179) can be assessed in 
a different light and will not be seen solely as an encroachment on popular 
sovereignty.
However, the dominant point of view in Russian jurisprudence still 
rules out such alternative approaches, or, at least, such approaches are not 
mentioned in official forums where “limits of concession” or “red lines of 
sovereignty” are discussed. Remarkably, Zorkin bases his argumentation on 
these implicit assumptions: law is the will of the sovereign, legal texts must 
be drafted so as to yield unambiguous answers for every situation, and so 
on. When challenging the ECtHR’s activism, the Chief Justice apparently 
stands on the platform of the “first positivism” although he admits that 
law should be based also on morality; that, in certain cases, the collective 
176 Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ruling of the RF Consti-
tutional Court] (15 January 2009) No.187-O-O in the case of Konstantin Markin; ECtHR 
Judgment Markin v. Russia (Grand Chamber) (22 March 2012) Application No.30078/06; 
and Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ruling of the RF Con-
stitutional Court] (6 December 2013) No.27-P, “O proverke konstitustionnosti polozhe-
nii stat’i 11 i punktov 3 i 4 chasti chetvertoi stat’i 392 Grazhdanskogo protsessual’nogo 
kodeksa v sviazi s zaprosom prezidiuma Leningradskogo okruzhnogo voennogo suda” 
[On Verifying the Constitutionality of Art.11 and of Points 3 and 4 of Paragraph 4 of 
Art.392 of the RF Code of Civil Procedure in Connection with an Inquiry of the Presidium 
of Leningrad District Military Court], Rossiiskaia gazeta (18 December 2013) No.6261, in 
the case of Konstantin Markin.
177 ECtHR Judgment Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia (4 July 2013) applications No.11157/04 
and 15162/05; and Ruling of the RF Constitutional Court (19 April 2016) No.12-P in a 
case about execution of the ECtHR Judgment in Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia.
178 For an overview of this problem in different jurisdictions and legal communities, see 
Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalized World (Hart Publishing, Aldershot, 
UK, 2015).
179 Samantha For example, A. Miko, “Norm Confl ict, Fragmentation, and the European 
Court of Human Rights”, 54(3) Boston College Law Review (2013), 1351-1383.
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morality (as established and interpreted by constitutional judges) should 
even prevail over statutory law (which, for Zorkin, amounts to “law” gener-
ally speaking180). Zorkin understands that the old-fashioned state-centered 
positivism—in the style of Andrei Vyshinsk y181—no longer is an option for 
Russian legal scholarship. He came to this understanding as early as in his 
book on Russian legal positivism published in 1978 which was quite a dar-
ing proposition for that time.182 In his later writings, he remains quite far 
from faithful to the letter of the law and insists on the necessity of a broad 
interpretation of laws and of the constitution in line with collective morality. 
But still Zorkin pays tribute to the sovereign and its will, stubbornly insist-
ing that this will is the supreme source of law.
Shared values or the acquis communautaire do not easily fall within legal 
exegetic logic—if they fall anywhere at all. That is why bringing “European 
values” to the Russian “legal market”—before changing the conceptual 
dimension of the latter—will predictably be unlikely to succeed, given that 
this “market” is thoroughly imbued with positivism. So far, Russia has not 
been inclined to become a principle-based legal order, evidently favoring a 
rule-based approach.
3 Valerii Zorkin’s Rejoinder to Disproportionate Westernization
The Chief Justice of the RF Constitutional Court has gained a prominent 
place in Russian intellectual debates due to his frequent public speeches 
and polemical articles, and many of his views have become emblematic 
(to recall, e.g., his famous discourses on “limits of concession” or “spiri-
tual buckles ”183). Zorkin allows himself freedom of public discussion in 
much wider confines than would be taken as normal for a US Supreme 
Court Chief Justice or for chief justices in other Western jurisdictions—to 
the extent that in 2014, the RF Constitutional Court was asked to decide 
about the admissibility of such engagement by its Chief Justice in public 
debates. Even though the Court turned down the application of Liudmila 
Kuzmina—reasoning that Zorkin may express his “scientific, theoretical, 
180 The Chief Justice Zorkin has repeatedly insisted on this point, stressing that no rights or 
freedoms can exist without state endorsement. In his 2005 article, for example, Zorkin 
wrote that “Rights and freedoms cannot be realized without an effective political power, 
outside of the state as a political community”. Valerii Zorkin, “Verkhovenstvo prava i 
konstitutsionnoe pravosudie” [The Rule of Law and Constitutional Justice], Zhurnal ros-
siiskogo prava (2005) No.12(108), 30-36, at 31.
181 Zorkin, “Pravo epokhi moderna”, op. cit. note 24. In this article, Zorkin criticizes this 
approach as “total legal positivism”.
182 Valerii Zorkin, Pozitivistskaia teoriia prava v Rossii [The Positivist Theory of Law in Russia] 
(Izdatel’stvo MGU, Moscow, 1978).
183 This fi gure of speech is used by Zorkin to substantiate his idea that Russians have tradi-
tionally underestimated the law and prioritized morality and religion. Zorkin, “Pravo—i 
tol’ko pravo”, op.cit. note 24.
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philosophical views about state and law, about the place and role of state 
and law in contemporary Russia and in the international arena”, thereby 
promoting the “legal enlightenment of the citizenry”184—the question 
remains about the extent to which the Court is bound by the ambivalent 
philosophy (conservative/liberal, positivist/idealist) which Zorkin apolo-
getically defends in his writings and which patently oozes out of many 
rulings of that Court. This can be an example of a more general attitude 
to combine different, perhaps contradictory approaches (tsarist and Soviet, 
liberal and conservative, ius-naturalist and ius-positivist, pro-European 
and anti-European, and so on) so that such a combination would match the 
expectations of all; this strategy of syncretism being, in some sense, also a 
prerequisite for successful political survival in the new realities after the 
collapse of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism.185
The Chief Justice’s standpoint cannot be labelled as consistently con-
servative, although, when oscillating between conservatism and liberalism, 
he frequently tips to the former. He admits that Russian law needs to be 
modernized but insists that modernization does not necessarily imply 
Westernization,186 particularly for Russia, “where traditional morality has a 
special role”.187 Probably, still under the intellectual influence of the author 
to whose work he devoted his doctoral thesis,188 Zorkin is searching for 
a solution to what he considers the key legal conundrum for Russia: how 
human rights can be effectively guaranteed and protected in a country with 
a firm centralization of political power and with the prevalence of a col-
lectivist mentality.
The keen philosophical intuition of the RF Constitutional Court Chair-
man cannot fail to notice the unbridgeable gap between an authoritarian 
political regime and the fullest realization of human rights. In his writings, 
Zorkin tries to strike a reasonable balance between them by insisting on the 
184 In response to a complaint fi led by Liudmila Kuzmina against Zorkin for his allegedly 
political activities, the RF Constitutional Court (8 July 2014) (there were no formal pro-
ceedings in this case and no fi le number was attributed to it) decided not to adopt any 
formal ruling in this matter and rejected the complaint. The response of the RF Consti-
tutional Court was signed by Vice-Chair Ol’ga Khokhriakova. “Konstitutsionnyi Sud 
RF: vyrazhenie nauchno-teoreticheskikh i fi losofsko-pravovykh vzgliadov iavliaetsia 
politicheskoi deiatel’nost’iu” [The RF Constitutional Court: An Expression of Scientifi c 
and Theoretical Views is a Political Actitity] (30 July 2014), available at <http://mhg-
 monitoring.org/konstitucionnyy-sud-rf-vyrazhenie-nauchno-teoreticheskih-i-fi losofsko-
 pravovyh-vzglyadov-ne>.
185 When discussing contemporary legal theories in his 2006 paper, Zorkin fi rmly suggested 
that a pluralist approach is needed to understand the law. Zorkin, “Pravo epokhi mod-
erna”, op.cit. note 181.
186 Zorkin, “Pravo sily i sila prava”, op.cit. note 152, 9.
187 Zorkin, “Problemy konstitutsionno-pravovogo razvitiia Rossii”, op.cit. note 157, 21.
188 Zorkin passionately characterizes the pre-revolutionary Russian legal philosopher Boris 
Chicherin as an “ideal Russian liberal” and praises his formula “liberal measures and 
powerful authority” as a formulation of supreme political wisdom for Russia: “liberal 
conservatism”. Zorkin, “Pravo sily i sila prava”, op.cit. note 152, 26.
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specificity of Russia’s transitional society. How long this transition would 
last and to what extent human rights can be limited by an authoritarian 
regime for the sake of legal modernization of the country and guaranteeing 
legal security in it—on these dangerous questions, Zorkin remains silent. In 
a series of recent publications, he repeats that Russia has, so far, not passed 
the “legal barrier’.189 This metaphor means that the Russian people are not 
mature enough for the rule of law because they are unable to appreciate 
the values of security and order that law brings about. Zorkin seems to be 
confident that the people (the individuals constituting the people) cannot 
correctly utilize human rights before passing this “barrier”.
For the Chief Justice, the constitution is a “living document”, and as 
between originalism and interpretivism in American constitutional doc-
trine, he would evidently prefer the latter, potentially more liberal doctrine. 
Statutory law is unable to cover all the issues of social life, and lawyers 
have to find other regulatory norms to secure social order. Zorkin’s thesis 
here sounds quite sociological: these norms are to be found in society itself. 
Disquietingly, he confers priority onto these social norms;190 sometimes, to 
the point of affording them priority over national statutory law and interna-
tional law. In his view, constitutional judges should evaluate the legitimacy 
(constitutionality) of (statutory or international) norms comparing them 
with the “living constitution” which is not a formal document promul-
gated as a constitution but, rather, is what “societal legal consciousness” 
(obshchestvennoe pravosoznanie) holds to be just and unjust. What exactly this 
metaphysical legal consciousness (Rechtsbewusstsein, which is conceptu-
ally akin to the Volksgeist of the German historicists of the 19th century) is, 
and how to establish and verify its prescriptions correctly, remains in the 
penumbra—Zorkin’s clarifications here are mostly intuitivist and usually 
merely appeal to some self-evident truths.
Undertaking below a short analysis of Zorkin’s conception, we will 
not present an apology for this conception. At the same time, criticiz-
ing Zorkin’s conception, we do not intend to condemn it as erroneous or 
politically biased which is frequently the case with Western and Russian 
observers writing about Zorkin’s views.191 Taking for granted that, in the 
existing political realities, Zorkin—as one of the key political figures in the 
189 See, for example, Valerii Zorkin, “Konstitutsionnaia iustitsiia na perekhodnom etape raz-
vitiia Rossii” [Constitutional Justice at the Transitory Stage of Russia’s Development], 
presentation made on 17 May 2016 at the conference “Contemporary Constitutional Jus-
tice: Challenges and Problems”, St Petersburg.
190 The Chief Justice is critical both of exclusive (“total”, in his terms) legal positivism and of 
international law, which is imbued with the pernicious spirit of globalization. E.g., Zor-
kin, “Pravo epokhi moderna’, op.cit. note 24.
191 See, for example, the comments on Zorkin and his strategies in Robert Ahdieh, Russia’s 
Constitutional Revolution: Legal Consciousness and Transition to Democracy (Pennsylvanian 
State University Press, University Park, PA, 1997). See, also, interesting comments in Wil-
liam Pomeranz, “Uneasy Partners: Russia and the European Court of Human Rights”, 
19(3) Human Rights Brief (2012), 17-21.
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country—cannot be but supportive of the regime (no matter whether he 
genuinely wants to be or does not want to be), we will simply leave this 
political in the parentheses of our analysis and will assess his philosophy on 
its philosophical merits, this inevitable political bias notwithstanding (but 
keeping it in mind).192
4 Valerii Zorkin’s Legal Philosophy
Zorkin’s ideas have not changed cardinally over time. His writings are usu-
ally imbued with alarmist moods about the dangers of globalization and 
postmodernism.193 The Chief Justice begins and ends his allocutions with 
more or less similar propositions: the world is changing, we are at the cross-
roads of globalization which “brings colossal instability into our life thereby 
disclosing the fragility and unsustainability of the contemporary world”,194 
uncovering “the abyss from which utterly inhuman archaic monsters enter 
the world” .195 After all, no one knows what will happen as a result of “tur-
bulently-chaotic globalization”196 which accelerated in the early 1990s with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Hyperbolically speaking, “a Pandora’s Box 
was then opened, from which have sneaked all the demons of global politi-
cal destabilization”.197 Among these demons, who are the main foes of “the 
civilization of law”, Zorkin distinguishes “transnational corporations, some 
family clans” ,198 and other cosmopolitan forces which “freely dominate in 
the world economy and become a kind of masters of the world”.199
192 Here, our analysis of Zorkin’s ideas is selective. In the scope of the present chapter, we do 
not undertake to provide a detailed description of all his writings and public speeches, 
a task that would rather require research for a separate monograph. Below, we examine 
what we consider the most representative from the latest ideas and conceptions of the 
Chief Justice.
193 In Zorkin’s narrative, “postmodernism” does not refer to any particular philosophical 
doctrine or to any specifi c author (Zorkin cites Jacques Derrida but with laudable tonality 
and, probably, does not count him among the “postmodernists” whom he blames), but 
indiscriminately covers all the views that contradict his own social philosophy: multi-
culturalism, atheism, ethical relativism, legal pluralism, a liberal conception of human 
rights, and so on. The issue of postmodernism in Zorkin’s interpretation will be dis-
cussed below.
194 Zorkin, “Pravo sily i sila prava”, op.cit. note 152, 1.
195 Valerii Zorkin, “Pravo protiv khaosa” [Law versus Chaos], presentation made on 24 
November 2015 at the International Conference “Strategy of National Development and 
Tasks of Russian Legal Science”, 4.
196 Zorkin, “Pravo sily i sila prava”, op.cit. note 152, 2.
197 Zorkin, “Pravo—i tol’ko pravo”, op.cit. note 24.
198 Valerii Zorkin, “Problemy sotsial’noi integratsii v sovremennom mire” [Problems of 
Social Integration in the Contemporary World], presentation made on 29 September 2014 
at the International Conference “Constitutional justice and social integration”, 1.
199 Zorkin, “Tsivilizatsiia prava: sovremennyi kontekst”, op.cit. note 159, 8.
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism.indb   71 10-10-19   14:53
72 Chapter 2
These dark forces endeavor to strip states of their sovereign powers 
and to replace the Westphalian international order with some kind of cos-
mopolitan rule which means: replacing the “language of legality” with the 
“language of justice and injustice”, changing legal prescriptions to “inter-
pretations of what is just and what is not”.200 These effects of globalization 
are fraught with the breakdown of legal regulation and with its replacement 
by extralegal regulators based on the “individualist morality of human 
rights”. In his paper dating from the mid-2000s, Zorkin affirms that glo-
balization will bring “lawless chaos” to our world201 and goes so far as to 
equate globalization, cosmopolitanism, and their proponents to the Nazis, 
citing the Nazi ideologist Alfred Rosenberg who proposed “launching an 
offensive on the old notion of the state”.202
Five years later, at the 2009 Cape Town conference on constitutional 
justice, Zorkin formulated his main philosophical theses on human rights, 
looking “to reconcile the duty to guarantee human and civil rights and 
freedoms with the need to protect national security” .203 Zorkin is still 
deeply concerned with the fact that “the world is becoming dangerously 
uniform”.204 In this aspect, he repeats his admonition about the inadmissi-
bility of the predominance of “extralegal reasons”205 in supranational courts 
and, trivially, insists that human rights should not be utilized as a pretext 
for interference in state sovereign powers. In his discussion, it already tran-
spires that these rights are of relative value as they “are not sufficient for the 
accomplishment of a human’s capacity as a rational creature possessed of 
freedom of will”.206
Especially disquieting to Zorkin is the prevalence of the liberal doctrine 
of human rights which is “groundless”207 because it absolutizes individual 
freedom, placing it above social solidarity, and unwarrantedly prioritizes 
minorities and their rights over the majority and their interests.208 The RF 
Constitutional Court Chief Justice resolutely disapproves of this liberalism, 
insisting that what makes us human beings is our “real participation in a 
200 Zorkin, “Pravo protiv khaosa”, op.cit. note 195, 11-12.
201 Valerii Zorkin, “An Apology of the Westphalian System”, 3(2) Russia in Global Affairs 
(2004), 29.
202 Ibid., 26.
203 Valerii Zorkin, “Human Rights within the Context of Global Jurisprudence”, presenta-
tion made on 23 January 2009 at the World Conference on Constitutional Justice, avail-
able at <http://www.venice.coe.int/WCCJ/Papers/RUS_Zorkin_E.pdf>. Perhaps the 






208 Valerii Zorkin, “Kak sokhranit’ gosudarstvo v epokhu etnosotsial’nogo mnogoobraziia” 
[How to Preserve the State in an Epoch of Ethnosocial Plurality], Rossiiskaia gazeta (13 
September 2009) No.5579.
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full societal life” so that “we live our lives not for ourselves” but, rather, for 
society and for fostering its unity.209 Here he evidently favors communitari-
anism over individual freedom, bidding farewell to the liberal conception of 
rights and stepping on the side of the “enemies of the open society” as Karl 
Popper portrayed some famous philosophers in 1945.210 Indeed, it is not 
by chance that Zorkin frequently mentions the wisdom of Plato, Aristotle, 
and Hobbes. However, the Chairman of the RF Constitutional Court does 
not draw ultimate conclusions from this collectivist philosophy; rather, 
suggesting that—in a situation of equality of interests of the individual/
society/state—it is up to constitutional courts211 to decide on the correct 
balance between social welfare and individual freedom. But he cannot hide 
his value preferences: “It is security that is always the most fundamental 
human freedom and absolute imperative […] Human rights are real and 
valid only provided that there are due guarantees and effective protection 
secured by a strong state.”212
Western societies have developed another, more liberal culture of 
human rights, as Zorkin readily admits. But contemporary Russian society 
is not fully suited to this culture. The Chief Justice begins his pamphlet in 
defense of the 2014 Ruling of the RF Constitutional Court No.6-P on the 
Crimean question213 with the following pathetic statement:
209 Valerii Zorkin, “V khaose net morali” [There Is No Morality in Chaos], Rossiiskaia gazeta 
(11 December 2012) No.5958. In an earlier speech, Zorkin insisted on the difference 
between negative and positive aspects of freedom, suggesting that the former (“freedom 
from […]”, which is the classical idea of rights) is a false ideal, while the latter (“free-
dom for […]” or the idea of social obligations) is the only authentic account of liberty. He 
praised real liberty as “a means for raising a human being, for securing him new oppor-
tunities for perfection and growth. Freedom is a unity of rights and obligations. Freedom 
is the happiness […] of being free for Russia”. Zorkin, “Put’ k svobode”, op.cit. note 24. 
The crucial question is apparently about who will decide what helps a human being to 
become more perfect and to grow and what impedes this. Zorkin reserves this preroga-
tive for the state authorities and does not consider this choice to be a matter of judicial 
discretion.
210 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 
2013).
211 Zorkin, “Human Rights within the Context of Global Jurisprudence”, op.cit. note 203, 19.
212 Constitutional courts are supposed to be “arbiters between the state, on the one hand, 
and the citizens and society, on the other”. Zorkin, “Pravo protiv khaosa”, op.cit. note 195, 
20.
213 Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossisikoi Federatsii [Ruling of the RF Constitu-
tional Court] (19 March 2014) No.6-P “Po delu o proverke konstitutsionnosti ne vstupiv-
shego v silu mezhdunarodnogo dogovora mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublikoi 
Krym o priniatii v Rossiiskuiu Federatsiiu Respubliki Krym i obrazovanii v sostave Ros-
siiskoi Federatsii novykh sub”ektov” [In the Case on the Verifi cation of the Constitu-
tionality of a Treaty Not Yet Having Legal Force Between the Russian Federation and 
the Republic of Crimea On the Integration of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian 
Federation and the Creation of New Subjects of the Russian Federation] (Rossiskaia gazeta 
(20 April 2014) No.6335.
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“For hundreds and even thousands of years Russia used to be maintained by 
supreme spiritual buckles [skrepy] that were called differently at different times. 
Being maintained by these buckles, Russia could be more or less negligent as to 
legal buckles.”214
The only way for the country to survive is to be bound by such buckles. 
However, after the breakdown of Soviet rule, Russia lost these spiritual 
buckles. It could appear therefrom that Russia should stick to the rule of 
law and democracy; but, unfortunately, it has not done so. Zorkin supposes 
that after the collapse of the Soviet Union,215 Russian society was split 
into several independent and conflicting strata with disparate ideas about 
morality and justice.216 As a result, moral foundations were shattered, and 
now the country is lacking a due level of societal consensus .217 Russia has 
not so far formed an identity allowing for smooth and progressive legal 
development. This identity is something that “historically predetermined 
the continued symphony of the peoples of Russia”,218 which formed “the 
unwritten norms of sound moral regulation which are accepted by the 
masses and which can fill ineffective statutory regulation” .219 To save the 
country from disintegration, “united moral regulation” needs to be restored 
in order to secure law and order in society.220
Zorkin utilizes the issue of national identity to stress that, as in many 
other traditional societies, normative regulation in Russia before the mid-
19th century had been based on altruism: the principle of love that provided 
for spiritual buckles keeping society together.221 However, after moderniza-
214 Zorkin, “Pravo—i tol’ko pravo”, op.cit. note 24.
215 For Zorkin, it was not only a political collapse but, also, the end of the “soviet identity” 
that had maintained social integration after the 1917 Revolution. Zorkin, “Problemy kon-
stitutsionno-pravovogo razvitiia Rossii”, op.cit. note 157, 8.
216 Ibid., 20.
217 Valerii Zorkin, “Obshchestvennoe doverie i ego rol’ v funktsionirovanii pravovoi siste-
my” [Social Trust and Its Role in the Working of the Legal System], presentation made on 
27 April 2013 at the RF Council of the Federation, 1.
218 Ibid., 18. The conception of symphony has a clear religious and political connotation. It 
came to medieval Russia from Byzantium, where it signifi ed a coordinated state policy 
where the Church stands beside the Emperor, helping him secure just governance. It is 
suggestive that in the same context but in another writing Zorkin explicitly recognizes 
that the question is about “the Orthodox symphony” and argues that “the Russian sym-
phonic culture engendered by Orthodoxy” lies in the foundation of the Russian constitu-
tional identity. Zorkin, “Tsivilizatsiia prava: sovremennyi kontekst”, op.cit. note 159, 5.
219 Valerii Zorkin, “Vzaimodeistvie pravovoi sistemy Rossii s pravovym polem 
ob”edinennoi Evropy” [The Interaction of the Russian Legal System with the Legal Field 
of a United Europe], presentation made on 16 May 2013 at the St. Petersburg Interna-
tional Legal Forum, 4.
220 Ibid., 12.
221 Zorkin, “Obshchestvennoe doverie i ego rol’ v funktsionirovanii pravovoi sistemy”, 
op.cit. note 217, 1.
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tion started with the reforms of Alexander II, Russian society lost this altru-
ist foundation and began to develop a kind of reasonable egoism which, 
in Zorkin’s description, is a feeling of solidarity expressed in moral ideas 
about the just and the unjust.222 This development was interrupted by the 
1917 Revolution. Consequently, Russia failed to “jump the legal barrier”, 
i.e., to fully develop this feeling that constitutes an informal mechanism of 
regulation, on the basis of which written law creates formal mechanisms, 
the latter always being dependent on informal regulation. This traditional-
ist argumentation implies that people must first be morally educated. Only 
thereafter can they be granted full rights and freedoms. In other words, 
Russia has to find a “formula for cultural identity of the nation”.223
In this vein, the Chief Justice makes one of his most controversial 
statements. Criticizing the liberal reforms of the 1860s, a central feature of 
which was the abolition of serfdom (krepostnichestvo) in 1861, he suggested 
that “serfdom was that spiritual buckle that maintained the unity of the 
nation”,224 and its abolition was one of the causes of the 1917 Revolution 
and of subsequent communist rule. Loosening the “collectivist buckle of 
communitarian morality”225 by liberal reformers under the guidance of 
Alexander II was an error. This error resulted in interrupting “historical 
continuity” and in removing archaic buckles without replacing them with 
anything new; this error was unbearable for the “unformed (undeveloped) 
social consciousness”.226 Zorkin’s conclusion on the issue of moderniza-
tion is that reforms are justified only if they contribute to social consensus, 
but are pernicious if they do not consolidate that consensus and provoke 
ruptures in the societal system of values and norms.227 This is true even if 
those reforms pursue the best goals and objectives such as the abolition of 
slavery, or—we can unmistakably continue his logic in this way—protection 
of human rights.
So far, so good: the Chief Justice recognizes that certain societal conven-
tions normally underpin the effectiveness of legal regulation which is evi-
222 Ibid., 5. This old Slavophile idea (love as the constitutive principle of spiritual Russian 
society that collides with rights as the constitutive principle of rationalist Western soci-
eties) is interpreted by Zorkin as a justifi cation for possible limitations on the rights of 
ethnic and other minorities.
223 Ibid., 9.
224 Zorkin, “Sudebnaia reforma Aleksandra II: uroki dlia Rossii”, op.cit. note 151, 10.
225 Zorkin, “Vzaimodeistvie pravovoi sistemy Rossii s pravovym polem ob”edinennoi Evro-
py”, op.cit. note 219, 5.
226 Zorkin, “Sudebnaia reforma Aleksandra II: uroki dlia Rossii”, op.cit. note 151, 6-8.
227 Ibid., 9-10.
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dent for sociologists.228 His judgment on the legal backwardness of Russia 
is more dubious—at least it is not informed by any sociological data. And 
his argument about serfdom is evidently flawed—at least, it contradicts uni-
versally (internationally) accepted approach to human dignity. In any case, 
Zorkin’s narrative is too generalized: he seemingly believes in the existence 
of an omnipresent coherent web of soft regulation covering the whole of 
society. From the sociological perspective, however, every community and 
social group has its own regulative framework which does not necessarily 
form any consistent and coherent set at the level of “society as a whole”. 
On the contrary, these moral, legal, or religious frameworks usually collide, 
and it is this collision which forms what we consider societal normative 
regulation. When Zorkin calls for implementation of social consensus 
through coherent societal regulation, he evidently overlooks this sociologi-
cal perspective of legal pluralism, and his belief in “basic ethical values”, 
which can secure social solidarity, is not warranted in this perspective.
Intuitively, the Chief Justice feels the conceptual danger of legal plu-
ralism for his conception and calls for “getting rid of the seductions of 
postmodernism”,229 which disrupt the normal functioning of the machinery 
of law. The Chairman of the RF Constitutional Court very generally charac-
terizes postmodernism as a set of ideas with no basic distinctions between 
good and evil, between justice and injustice, between objectivity and 
falsity,230 so that the partisans of postmodernism are unable to recognize the 
“morally correct priorities”.231 These priorities imply that human rights are 
protected insofar as they contribute to the “conservation and development 
of mankind”, so that freedom of the individual is possible only when and 
insofar as “mankind is maintained and freely develops”.232 Everything that 
causes any detriment to this ultimate goal is considered to be a deviation 
against this background of “social normativity” and allows for the restric-
tion of human rights.
Predictably, Zorkin is irritated by the “liberally-individualistic inter-
pretation of human rights which contradicts this imperative” and which 
enables human beings to consider the world as a means for “individual 
228 Zorkin cites a number of authorities, including Friedrich Hayek and his idea of sponta-
neous social orders. However, the suggestion that there are two legal orders: the formal 
(statutory law) and the informal (traditional law) and that it is the latter that is preva-
lent (Zorkin, “Pravo epokhi moderna”, op.cit. note 24), puts Zorkin on a dangerous track 
of discarding posited law (including posited norms of international law) for the sake 
of foggy societal ideals. Likening posited law to a ship and traditional law to the sea, 
Zorkin asserts that pure legal positivism would make the ship sink into the sea (Ibid.). He 
unjustly criticizes Hans Kelsen and his program of purifi cation of legal science from its 
dependence on facts and moral convictions, missing the entire idea of Pure Theory of Law 
and the decisive role that law can play in modernizing mores and traditions.
229 Zorkin, “Problemy sotsial’noi integratsii v sovremennom mire”, op.cit. note 198, 3.
230 Zorkin, “Pravo protiv khaosa”, op.cit. note 195, 10.
231 Zorkin, “Problemy sotsial’noi integratsii v sovremennom mire”, op.cit. note 198, 3.
232 Ibid., 3-5.
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prosperity and self-accomplishment”. Such liberal convictions are con-
demned by the Chief Justice as “the philosophy of absolute perversion in 
the spirit of the Marquis de Sade”.233 In Zorkin’s view, the duty of Russian 
lawyers is to reject the pernicious “liberally-individualistic interpretation of 
human rights”234 and to fight against the “propaganda of tolerance and of 
all-permissiveness which advocates deviations from social normativity”.235
Zorkin’s stances here and elsewhere are overly anti-individualist: 
he finds that the liberal and democratic interpretation of human rights is 
inadequate for the sustainable future of mankind.236 He also resolutely 
condemns the “coercive democratization”237 which supposedly works as 
“terrorism under the flag of democracy and human rights”,238 and criticizes 
Amnesty International and other human-rights NGOs for claiming that 
freedom of expression is one of the supreme freedoms, and for thereby sug-
gesting the “priority of rights of any individual and any community over 
society which legitimizes the degradation of human beings from the level of 
culture to primitive bestiality”.239 He resolutely rejects what he claims to be 
the basic principle of “Western liberal culture”, according to which human 
freedom is mainly understood as individual egoism.240 Drawing dispropor-
tional parallels with Napoleon’s 1812 invasion, the Chief Justice counts such 
NGOs and their Russian followers among “Western civilized barbarians” 
who are invading Russia with the help of “postmodernist informational 
falsifications”.241
It is this liberal postmodernism242 which legitimizes unlimited plural-
ism of moral and cultural norms thereby bringing chaos into social life.243 
Zorkin warns against the “postmodernist novelties” which undermine mass 
morality and attempt to replace this morality with the “comprehensive 
tolerance of all individual norms” resulting in the defeat of the “morally 
sound majority” of citizens.244 In this light, Zorkin praises a certain “societal 
(mass) morality that is rooted in the ethical and religious tradition of the 
people, in its historical culture, and in its specific mentality”.245
233 Zorkin, “Tsivilizatsiia prava: sovremennyi kontekst”, op.cit. note 159, 9.
234 Ibid., 10.
235 Zorkin, “Problemy konstitutsionno-pravovogo razvitiia Rossii”, op.cit. note 157, 11.
236 Zorkin, “Problemy sotsial’noi integratsii v sovremennom mire”, op.cit. note 198, 6.




241 Zorkin, “Pravo—i tol’ko pravo”, op.cit. note 24, 9.
242 Zorkin probably does not admit that some postmodernist authors may easily come to 
utterly conservative ideas, and for this reason does not specify that his criticism is direct-
ed only against the liberal wing of postmodernism.
243 Zorkin, “Pravo v usloviiakh global’nykh peremen”, op.cit. note 158, 5.
244 Ibid., 7.
245 Zorkin, “Tsivilizatsiia prava: sovremennyi kontekst”, op.cit. note 159, 3.
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Here again, Zorkin is apparently inconsistent: if “Soviet identity” has 
gone away, if now we face a deplorable “deterioration of mores”, and if 
no new “Russian identity” has been coined so far, how can this enigmatic 
morality serve as a criterion of constitutionality and of legal reforms? The 
theses of what he condemns as “postmodernist philosophy” sound more 
plausible, at least in this respect: if no authentic and verifiable collective 
morality can be found in society, then legal regulation does not need to 
address this morality and can go on with “tolerance and all-permissiveness” 
with respect to minorities and individuals.
It seems that Zorkin understands these problems, and in other frag-
ments of his writings he concedes that in a society as complex as Russia, 
morality cannot duly establish supreme values and serve as a criterion of 
constitutionality. Predictably—like Plato, Aristotle, and many other philoso-
phers before him—Zorkin moves toward elitism (explicitly paying tribute 
to Pareto and to his theory of elites) and recognizes that it is the legislators 
and supreme judges who should cure their society from the “deterioration 
of mores”. Curing society, in the Chief Justice’s logic, means to impose 
severe—but predictable and clear—legal regulations on the population. He 
stresses that “it is not admissible to sacrifice the severity of legal regulation 
for the sake of making it more flexible”,246 and that, on the contrary, only 
severe legal regulation can compensate for a “deficit of morality”.247
In other words, wise legislators and judges (the national elite) should 
educate their people and restore what their wisdom considers as the cor-
rect morality for these people. This is the age-old conservative logic of the 
children-parents’ analogy between the people and their government. Refer-
ring to the need for “a grain of sound conservatism”,248 the Chairman of 
the RF Constitutional Court suggests that during the transitional period, 
the authorities should carefully protect the Russian people from the false 
assertions of Western liberal philosophy. Paraphrasing the Russian conser-
vative philosopher Konstantin Leontiev, who in the 19th century issued a 
call to “freeze” Russia so that the “rotting West” did not infect it,249 Zorkin 
also calls for an authoritarianism that would temporarily “freeze” Russia
246 Zorkin, “Pravo v usloviiakh global’nykh peremen”, op.cit. note 158, 9.
247 Zorkin, “Pravo protiv khaosa”, op.cit. note 195, 20.
248 Zorkin, “Problemy sotsial’noi integratsii v sovremennom mire”, op.cit. note 198, 4. 
249 Konstantin N. Leontiev, Vostok, Rossiia i Slavianstvo [The East, Russia and the Slavic 
World] (Respublika, Moscow, 1996, fi rst published in 1885), 246. Leontiev is famous for 
advocating the Byzantine political system based on a Church-State symphony, and for 
claiming that Byzantium and its cultural heritage are better suited to Russia and are, 
in many respects, better than Western culture. This attitude and the language used to 
express it has its roots in the schism in the Christian church and, among other facts, the 
attack by Western crusaders (on their way to the Holy Land) on Constantinople as noted 
at the time by the offended Byzantines in terms that echoed in Leontiev’s writings. He 
suggested reshaping Russia according to the Byzantine political and cultural models, 
thereby reinforcing Russia in its stand against the inevitably hostile West.
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—impeding liberalism from penetrating Russia—and, thus, would save it 
from these maleficent influences.250
As are many other grand narratives, Zorkin’s is overladen with empty 
signifiers and hyperbolized images. The Chairman of the RF Constitutional 
Court abundantly compares society or the state with an organism, implicitly 
accepting that human beings are nothing but subordinated parts of this 
organism. For example, “the state, as with every organism, intensely needs 
a correct blood supply […]. The blood that supplies the state organs with 
true functionality is the social confidence which is also called legitimacy.”251 
What we need then is a “sound society” (which has “immunity” against 
destructive influences), and the state as a “super-institution that unites 
all social institutions” within society. Zorkin goes so far as to suggest that 
“without a sound society there would be no state at all”.252 All this imbues 
his narrative with the intonations of the Naturphilosophie of the 19th century, 
and of the Russian religious philosophies of the end of that century: the 
Slavophiles, the Soilers (pochvenniki), the monarchists. Zorkin realizes this 
conceptual peril and tries to stand aloof from the “religiously colored Rus-
sian philosophy of the 19th century”.253 But he clearly does not succeed in 
doing so: Zorkin’s vocabulary easily reveals the affinity between his posi-
tion and that of Russian idealist philosophers of the turn of the 20th century.
Along with these dubious images, in the best traditions of German 
romanticism, the Chief Justice refers to such supreme emotional values as 
love: citing Fyodor Tyutchev, a Russian poet and conservative thinker of 
the 19th century, Zorkin calls on the country to unite through the principle 
of love.254 Nothing new as compared with what Ivan Kireevsky, Aleksei 
Khomiakov, Dostoevsky, Tyutchev and other conservatively minded Rus-
sian writers were proposing more than a hundred years ago.255 Perhaps one 
can believe that the power of love will eliminate “the opposition between 
human beings, state and civil society that will thereafter coexist in syner-
getic unity”,256 but the question remains as to what extent this utopian ideal 
is relevant for a more or less realist account of society and legal regulation.
250 Zorkin, “Sudebnaia reforma Aleksandra II: uroki dlia Rossii”, op.cit. note 151.
251 Zorkin, “Obshchestvennoe doverie i ego rol’ v funktsionirovanii pravovoi sistemy”, 
op.cit. note 217, 3-4.
252 Ibid., 4.
253 Zorkin, “Problemy sotsial’noi integratsii v sovremennom mire”, op.cit. note 198, 6.
254 Zorkin, “Obshchestvennoe doverie i ego rol’ v funktsionirovanii pravovoi sistemy”, 
op.cit. note 217, 17.
255 Richard Pipes, Russian Conservatism and its Critics: A Study in Political Culture (Yale Uni-
versity Press, New Haven, CT, 2005). It is interesting to note that Pipes came to the same 
conclusions on the main point of Russian political history: “weakness of Russian society 
inevitably led to the growth and assertiveness of autocratic principles” (ibid., 185), as Zor-
kin did in 2014. Zorkin, “Sudebnaia reforma Aleksandra II: uroki dlia Rossii”, op.cit. note 
151.
256 Zorkin, “Pravo v usloviiakh global’nykh peremen”, op.cit. note 158, 10.
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In his works and speeches, the Chief Justice randomly cites Pierre Bour-
dieu, Jürgen Habermas, and other contemporary Western philosophers, but 
his sympathies are evidently with Hobbes whom Zorkin highly praises for 
his realistic description of society; whose construction of a “social compact” 
he utilizes on many occasions calling for unity and warning against bellum 
omnium contra omnes .257 It is the state, this mighty Leviathan, that appro-
priates the power of the majority and may, therefore, dictate any rules to 
minorities: “In every society there is a majority that is the bearer of general 
moral values and rules which secure peace and stability in that society 
[…] so that every effective legal normativity should take into account the 
values and rules of the majority.”258 From this vantage point, it is clear that 
minorities may not impose their rules and mores on society and should, 
unconditionally, abide by the regulations set by the state which is the ulti-
mate instance for deciding what—and to what extent—freedoms may be 
granted to minorities.
These philosophical considerations push the Chief Justice to counter-
act the “moral imperialism” of the West, pursuing the goal of creating a 
“worldwide democratic empire […] that would take the place of the state 
and become the supreme authority”.259 He is confident that this “imperial-
ism” is wrong: every country establishes its own “constitutional identity”; 
that national courts are better fitted for coining that identity given the 
cultural particularities and institutional constraints in every country. It is no 
surprise to see Zorkin’s indignation with the fact that some supranational 
bodies, such as the ECtHR, try to interfere with ethical issues and to univer-
salize their moral views. He seeks to confirm his argument by referring to 
the unavoidable relativity (sharing, here, the ground of relativism with the 
postmodernists he so pathetically denounces elsewhere): “the concepts of 
ought, good and just are substantially different in different socio-cultural 
areas of the world, and cannot be reduced to some universal paradigms of 
just law”.260
Moreover, the very fact that the ECtHR appropriates the right to define 
universal values in the field of human rights undermin es true representa-
tive democracy261 because international judges and their counsel do not 
enjoy any legitimate popular mandate. Following this line of reasoning, 
Zorkin equates interventions by the ECtHR in state sovereignty with an 
257 For example, Valerii Zorkin, “Verkhovenstvo prava i imperativ bezopasnosti” [The Rule 
of Law and the Requirement of Safety], Rossiiskaia gazeta (16 May 2012) No.5782. Zorkin 
has maintained an interest in Hobbes and his political ideas over the years: Valerii Zor-
kin, “Politicheskoe i pravovoe uchenie Tomasa Gobbsa” [The Political and Legal Legacy 
of Thomas Hobbes], Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo (1989) No.6, 111-118.
258 Zorkin, “Pravo protiv khaosa”, op.cit. note 195, 16.
259 Zorkin, “Verkhovenstvo prava i imperativ bezopasnosti”, op.cit. note 257.
260 Zorkin, “Pravo sily i sila prava”, op.cit. note 152, 3.
261 Zorkin, “Vzaimodeistvie pravovoi sistemy Rossii s pravovym polem ob”edinennoi Evro-
py”, op.cit. note 219, 10.
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encroachment on popular sovereignty .262 He insists that there should be no 
supranational judicial instance pretending to possess “super-knowledge” 
and, therefore, the final say on the protection of rights and freedoms .263
These pretentions on the part of the ECtHR create the danger that 
“certain individual ideas about values, human rights and about their viola-
tions will be represented as universal solutions although these ideas are 
elaborated in a narrow circle of experts whose position stands in flagrant 
contradiction to the ideas and values of other social groups”.264 This makes 
Russia fiercely protective of its constitutional identity,265 and the Chief 
Justice has persistently repeated that—by participating in treaties and con-
ventions—Russia never delegated any part of its sovereignty and maintains 
the sovereign right to final decisions on human rights.266 It follows that 
implementation of international law and of the judgments of supranational 
courts in Russia should be based on a “national specificity which expresses 
itself in the particular societal structure of values and norms, and foremost 
in societal morality”.267
Zorkin’s exceptionalism and Eurosceptic logic might be persuasive and 
even attractive for certain conservative mindsets. Perhaps he does not miss 
the point when he asserts that “many forces in Europe are crying out for 
the cultural and social plenitude of national sovereignty”.268 However, the 
philosophical foundations of this logic are questionable, at least in three 
dimensions.
First, Zorkin’s holism cannot be accepted without further clarification: 
the thesis about the prevalence of the whole (the collective) over the indi-
vidual has been well known since Plato and even earlier; but it is inevitably 
used to lead to an apology for elitism and autocracy. This was the case for 
Hobbes, Hegel, and many other idealist thinkers. Zorkin explicitly gravi-
tates in the same direction, entrusting the state with the task of moral edu-
cation of the citizenry and endorsing authoritarian rule in Russia until this 
education bears fruit. The basic philosophical question from this point of 
view is whether this holist philosophy is compatible with the idea of human 
rights which have historically appeared as individual freedoms and which 
have served to save individuality from the tyranny of the majority, of the 
262 Valerii Zorkin, “Problemy realizatsii Konventsii o pravakh cheloveka” [Problems of 
Implementing the ECHR], presentation made on 22 October 2015 at the International 
Conference “Ameliorating National Mechanisms for the Effective Implementation of the 
ECHR”, 3.
263 Valerii Zorkin, “Polozhenie i perspektivy konstitutsionnogo pravosudia” [The Situation 
and the Perspectives of Constitutional Justice], presentation made on 17 October 2013 at 
the International Conference “State and Perspectives of Constitutional Justice”, 20.
264 Zorkin, “Vzaimodeistvie pravovoi sistemy Rossii s pravovym polem ob”edinennoi Evro-
py”, op.cit. note 219, 11.
265 Zorkin, “Problemy realizatsii Konventsii o pravakh cheloveka”, op.cit. note 262261, 1.
266 Zorkin, “Pravo sily i sila prava”, op.cit. note 152, 13-14.
267 Zorkin, “Tsivilizatsiia prava: sovremennyi kontekst”, op.cit. note 159, 3.
268 Zorkin, “Problemy konstitutsionno-pravovogo razvitiia Rossii”, op.cit. note 157, 18.
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state, of elites, and of the clergy (representing the interests of the Supreme 
Being). This question remains unanswered, and the Chief Justice never hints 
that he is aware of the philosophical pitfalls of appealing to solidarity—such 
appeals, in the last resort, may justify the worst violations of individual 
freedoms for the sake of maintaining social integrity.
Second, Zorkin develops his conception of human rights on foundations 
that are pretty much obsolete. His normative ideal is a consistent and full 
legal system, with texts that provide answers to each question and rule 
out possible discretion. When he regrets “legally vague formulations in 
international law which are grey zones providing leeway for turbulence 
and chaos”,269 the Chief Justice apparently does not conceive the problems 
of indeterminacy and defeasibility in law that were discussed in the 20th 
century by such prominent legal philosophers as H.L.A. Hart. Zorkin hopes 
that “coherent legal formalization of the basic principles of the UN would 
exclude legal collisions and arbitrary chaotic interpretations”.270 However, 
this hope is based on the oversimplified conception of the “first positivism” 
and ignores the difference between rules and principles: the latter, as argued 
by Ronald Dworkin,271 conceptually cannot be formalized and never 
works in an “all or nothing” way. The Chief Justice apparently follows 
an outdated legal dogma that equates the process of interpretation with 
finding the “origi nal intention of the legislator”272 and, therefore, believes 
in a “correct interpretation of the law, or interpretation of legal norms in 
accordance with the letter and the spirit of the law”.273 However, asserting 
such a thesis would normally require tackling the basic philosophical and 
theoretical questions which are involved in such key legal issues as deter-
minacy, consistency or predictability of law and of its interpretation, also 
in light of Zorkin’s ideas about primacy of unofficial (traditional) law over 
official (statutory) law. So far, the Chairman of the RF Constitutional Court 
has not taken this analytical step, at least not in his publications and public 
speeches.
Third, Zorkin is too optimistic when he considers reconciling exegetic 
legal philosophy (equating law with the sovereign’s will) with the idea of 
the primacy of collective morality over statutory and international law. If 
the validity (not effectiveness!) of law is dependent on its congruence with 
that morality, then the sovereign’s will is legally binding only insofar as 
it matches collective moral intuitions. In other words, there should be a 
superior instance that stands above the sovereign and decides which of 
269 Zorkin, “Pravo v usloviiakh global’nykh peremen”, op.cit. note 158, 8.
270 Zorkin, “Pravo protiv khaosa”, op.cit. note 195, 21.
271 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 
1977).
272 Zorkin, “Polozhenie i perspektivy konstitutsionnogo pravosudia”, op.cit. note 263, 9.
273 Zorkin, “Pravo—i tol’ko pravo”, op.cit. note 24.
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his enactments can be approved or invalidated.274 Evidently, that instance 
cannot be bound by sovereign will since it is precisely that very will which 
is checked in this case. Normally, this instance should not form part of the 
sovereign (the state) whose enactments are assessed; and in this light, an 
international court would logically be justified more than a national court 
(even a constitutional one). Invalidating state positive enactments, this 
instance (be it a constitutional or a supranational court) addresses certain 
societal conventions that delimit what counts as “extreme injustice” (Gus-
tav Radbruch) beyond which these enactments cease to be legal. Making 
the choice in favor of collective or individual morality, of traditional or 
informal ethics, of religious or secular values, and in many other respects 
remains the issue of each member of society. Presuming that there is only 
one correct morality—for example, the one that prioritizes certain values 
of the traditional family, traditional religion, and the like—Zorkin seems 
to be intolerant toward competing moral conceptions that may prioritize 
the innovative over the traditional, the individual choice over the collective 
interest, freedom over stability and security, and so on.
Conclusion
Not only Russia but, also, other countries are affected by the globalization 
threatening, metaphorically speaking, to sweep away not only interstate 
frontiers but, also, states themselves. Transnational and international legal 
regulation makes state legal systems step back in a number of important 
fields: along with human-rights law, one could also mention ius mercatoria, 
environmental law, and so on. Within some regional blocs such as the EU, 
state legal systems are retreating in many other directions, ceding priority to 
regional or supranational law. The Council of Europe, the EU, and national 
governments strategically seek to establish their own sovereign interpreta-
tion of basic concepts in the legal domain. Furthermore, with regard to fun-
damental rights themselves, conflicts are inherent in their construction, with 
rights-claims of one individual coming up against those made by another 
or by a collectivity. Given that the major task of high courts is to decide 
on a balance between competing rights-claims, these courts are required 
to pay close attention to developments in other legal systems, measuring 
the future justification of their decisions in open discussion forums—one of 
which should be the ECtHR.
274 Implicitly, Zorkin reserves this place for his Court, but he dares not pronounce that the 
RF Constitutional Court stands above the sovereign political authorities. However, his 
position in 1993 against Yeltsin’s coup is emblematic of this implicit presumption.
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From the aspect of legal philosophy, two key points are important to 
understand in this approach: that of human rights and that of sovereignty. 
The Russian exceptionalist understanding of these two key points can serve 
as a litmus paper for the contemporary Russian international policy and its 
“living” constitutional order. The ideas set forth by Valerii Zorkin are highly 
illustrative of the philosophical background of Russian policies toward 
the ECtHR. These ideas, pragmatically, lead to conservative conclusions in 
what concerns balancing between the freedom of individual choice and the 
value of national tradition, with the evident proclivity toward this latter. 
As will be demonstrated in the following Chapters of the present volume, 
this proclivity is apparent in Russian judicial practice touching on such sus-
ceptible matters as sovereignty, religious freedoms and the rights of sexual 
minorities.
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Foreword
Examining the narratives of the Chief Justice Valerii Zorkin in the previ-
ous Chapter, we have established a number of philosophical (and at the 
same time ideological, political, and conceptual) orienteers around which 
these narratives are organized. In contemporary Russian legal and political 
debates, these narratives invariably hinge on such concepts as sovereignty, 
human rights, rule of law and democracy. Sovereignty often is used as a 
powerful argument which allows the overruling of international humani-
tarian standards and the formal constitutional guarantees of human rights. 
This conflict between sovereignty and human rights also recurs in other 
countries, and many legal scholars are demanding the revision or even 
abandonment of the concept of sovereignty as incompatible with the con-
cept of human rights.
In Russia, this conflict is aggravated by some characteristic features 
of the traditional mentality favoring statism and collective interests over 
individual ones, and by the state building a “power vertical” subordinat-
ing regional and other particularistic interests to the central power. These 
features and policies are studied in the present Chapter in the context of the 
Slavophile-Westernizer philosophical divide and its contemporary reper-
cussions. These repercussions are echoed in isolationist and authoritarian 
policies which, in 2006, led to their amalgamation in the concept of “sov-
ereign democracy”. This concept is considered in the present Chapter as a 
recurrence of the Russian conservative tradition. Even though, in its literal 
meaning, the concept has been abandoned by its author and supporters, 
most of its ideas remain on the cusp of official political discourse repro-
ducing the pivotal axes of Russian political philosophy of the 19th century. 
This analysis allows us to trace the link between official narratives about 
Russia’s distinct identity, the specific understanding of democracy and a 
larger philosophical background against which are discussed the limits of 
protection of human and civil rights. This background will be important for 
our analysis of the rights of minorities in the following chapters and crucial 
in explaining how this conceptual background can justify the imposition of 
constraints on minorities’ rights.
275 The fi rst version of this Chapter was published in 39(1) Review of Central and East European 
Law (2014), 1-40. The present Chapter is an updated version of that work.
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Introduction
The celebrated phrase—“predel ustupchivosti” (the limit of compromise)—
used in a 2010 polemic by the Chief Justice of the RF Constitutional Court, 
Valerii Zorkin, against the European Court of Human Rights276 demarcates 
one of the key trends in Russian legal thought in the 2000s with regard to 
relations between the Russian authorities and supranational organizations 
in particular and international law in general. Zorkin argues Russia should 
decide on its own whether or not to cooperate with international courts and 
agencies—to take their values and principles in consideration as she sees 
fit—because Russia enjoys sovereignty immunity from any external pres-
sure in issues such as human rights or democratization.277 This isolation-
ist strategy was explicitly based on the so-called Westphalian concept of 
sovereignty to which Zorkin had dedicated his “apology-piece” in 2006.278 
Curiously, in a December 2012 speech delivered to the Congress of Rus-
sian Judges, Zorkin softened his argumentation: i.e., acknowledging that 
sovereignty cannot outweigh human rights and calling for a new concept of 
sovereignty compatible with the idea of human rights. While he takes care 
to stress that “the participation of Russia in various international conven-
tions and treaties does not imply refusing or abandoning the principle of 
state sovereignty (in favor of so-called soft sovereignty and other doctrines 
which are popular nowadays)”, the Chief Justice went on to argue that “in 
a globalized world […] we no longer can orientate ourselves to the older 
Westphalian model of sovereignty […]”. He envisages creating a new “legal 
concept of national sovereignty based on formal equality” and defending 
it “in all the international forums where decisions important for Russia are 
taken” .279 It remains uncertain what exactly the content of this new model 
of sovereignty will be ;280 yet there is little doubt that it will affect—and 
indeed, that it already has begun to affect—judicial practice in politically 
charged cases in Russia connected with human rights.
276 Zorkin, “Predel ustupchivosti”, op.cit. note 24.
277 “The limit of our compromise is the protection of our sovereignty, of our national institu-
tions and our national interests […] If someone imposes an external “guidance” over the 
legal situation in our country ignoring the historical, cultural, and social situation, then 
we need to correct such ‘guides’ [dirizhery]. Sometimes, in a very resolute manner […] 
Russia shall fi ght for both protection of its sovereignty and for careful handling with the 
European Convention, safeguarding the latter from inadequate and dubious decisions” 
(ibid).
278 Zorkin, op.cit. note 24.
279 Valerii Zorkin, “Konstitutsionno-pravovye problemy sudebnoi sistemy RF” [Constitu-
tional and Legal Problems of the Judicial System of the RF], (18 December 2012), available 
at <http://rapsinews.ru/judicial_analyst/20121218/265821471.html#ixzz2PToA6OFO>.
280 Characterizing Zorkin’s position, Professor Bowring states that “his speeches and articles 
make frequent reference to “sovereignty” in the special sense given to it by the Putin 
regime”. Bill Bowring, Laws, Rights and Ideology in Russia. Landmarks in the Destiny of a 
Great Power (Routledge, London, 2013), 7.
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In this Chapter, this model will be analyzed against the backdrop of 
another political-philosophical scheme. This specific scheme can be traced 
back to its formulation, several years ago, under the title “sovereign 
democracy” which “arose as a label for the governing team’s thinking about 
Russia’s path of political modernization” .281 In this context, it will be impor-
tant for us, first, to examine whether there are any normative restrictions 
in Russian constitutional law preventing implementation of this idea, and 
to consider how the Russian judiciary and politicians might use it in their 
reasoning.282 To understand the philosophical background of the problem, 
we then will address the controversy between the Slavophiles and the West-
ernizers which reveals the main pros and contras for the Russian supporters 
of the (conservative) isolationist policy which forms the central element of 
the theory of sovereign democracy. In this way, we will be in a position 
to analyze: (a) the traditional concept of state sovereignty which has been 
accepted by a number of Russian senior judges; (b) some of the challenges 
to this concept as well as reactions thereto which have been expressed in 
the concept of “sovereign democracy”, followed by (c) a consideration of 
philosophical theories underpinning the particular attitude to sovereignty 
and human rights in Russia.
As an example of the interest in such research, one can refer to Anton 
Burkov’s line of reasoning. He finds that for Russia “the major problem with 
the application of the Convention [the ECHR] in the domestic legal system 
is ignorance on the part of those who had to operate the instrument”.283 
This fact can be explained through “a lack of familiarity with the Conven-
tion mechanism of human rights protection”.284 However, why does one 
ignore it and lack familiarity with it? Burkov points to the “unwillingness 
of the judiciary, particularly of the Supreme Court, to alter their own and 
other courts’ jurisprudence”285 and, finally, to the fact that “the Russian 
Federation has not clearly decided what place judgments of the ECtHR 
should occupy within its legal system”.286 A careful analysis of these cases 
concludes that the impact (if any) was in fact reduced to supporting argu-
mentation rendering decisions which already had ripened on the political 
level (or on the highest level of judicial policies). Burkov masterfully dis-
tinguished several levels of the use of ECtHR case law in argumentation of 
281 Patrick McGovern and John P. Willerton, “Democracy Building Russian Style: Sovereign-
ty, the State, and a Fledgling Civil Society” (18-22 March 2009), 23, available at <http://
wpsa.research.pdx.edu/meet/2012/willerton.pdf>.
282 Our analysis here will be limited to several landmark cases of the RF Constitutional 
Court and relevant key rulings of the RF Supreme Court’s Presidium. A comprehensive-
ness analysis of Russian case-law in this issue requires an independent research project.
283 Anton Burkov, “Russia” in Leonard Hammer and Frank Emmert (eds.), The European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Central and Eastern Europe (Elev-
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Russian courts: (1) when judges completely ignore or react with hostility to 
the case law of the ECtHR; (2) when judges very briefly mention it but do 
not analyze the arguments; (3) when judges briefly state that the “party’s 
reference to the Convention is unfounded” without giving reasons to such 
a conclusion; (4) when judges base their decisions on the case law of the 
ECtHR although “this happens quite rarely”.287 In our opinion, the primary 
reasons for such unwillingness and indecision needs to be sought in a con-
ceptual dimension.
The word “sovereignty” is a powerful one working as an active force 
for social and political development. As Louis Henkin argued in 1999: “the 
meaning of sovereignty is confused and its uses are various, some of them 
unworthy, some destructive of human values […] its application to mod-
ern states has inevitably brought distortion and confusion. ”288 In fact, in 
Western legal doctrine, international law has not always been accepted as 
a tool which can bind states in the exercise of their political power. Accord-
ing to traditional positivist legal doctrine, there is no higher political entity 
above the sovereign state. For this reason, John Austin—the founding father 
of legal positivism—was reluctant to consider international law as “law 
properly so called” (insomuch as law is identified only with the commands 
of sovereign states) and agreed to accept it only as “law’ in a figurative 
sense.289 
Whether international law has binding force on national policy, whether 
this force derives from the free choice of the concerned state or is mandatory 
and imposes absolute obligations on states—are debates which form one 
of the focal points in 20th century legal theory.290 These issues especially 
are pertinent in such legal matters as human rights and democracy: if the 
state is the only agency which creates law, it (or, in reality, the discretion 
of its agents) therefore must stand above the law. No legal limits for state 
activities logically can be inferred in the framework of this approach to law. 
As a result, the discourse on human rights and democracy can serve as an 
ideological camouflage for various political games where the power-holders 
(or their opponents) may play this card.291 Only the superiority of interna-
tional law and the monist model of the relationship between international 
287 Ibid., 457.
288 Louis Henkin, “That Is Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et 
Cetera”, 68(1) Fordham Law Review (1999), 1-14, at 1-2.
289 The version to John Austin’s 1832 work to which reference is made here is: The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995).
290 See a brilliant summary made half a century ago by Hans Kelsen, Principles of Internatio-
nal Law (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, NY, 1967). See, also, André Nollkaemper, 
“Rethinking the Supremacy of International Law”, 65(1) Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 
(2010), 65-85.
291 This is a wide-spread opinion of legal positivists. A noteworthy example of one the most 
prominent thinkers of this philosophical trend is Hans Kelsen and his opus: What Is Justi-
ce: Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of Science (University of California Press, Berkeley, 
CA, 1957).
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and domestic law constitute an effective mechanism for the legal protection 
of individual liberties against an omnipotent state as has been argued per-
suasively by Hans Kelsen in a number of different works.292 
With regard to these issues, Russia represents a particular case for 
studying the connection between the conceptualization of sovereignty and 
the practical steps taken by politicians and lawmakers in the field of human 
rights and democratic institutions.293 This is because while in the Western 
legal tradition, the accent in a liberal democracy as a system generally is 
placed on the protection of individual liberty,294 references in Russian politi-
cal debates to “genuine” (antique, medieval) democracy place the emphasis 
on the well-being of the polity—not of its individual members.295 From this 
perspective, democracy also can be viewed as an instrument for protection 
of national rather than individual interests. This is the main postulate of the 
theory of “sovereign democracy” as analyzed below, voiced by numerous 
influential Russian politicians (and also judges).
As the reader undoubtedly will know, the 1648 treaty of Westphalia 
marked the beginning of the contemporary doctrine of state sovereignty as 
an absolute unrestricted power. Already in the 16th century, Jean Bodin had 
defined “sovereignty” as: “la puissance absolue et perpétuelle d’une Répub-
lique” (“the absolute and perpetual power of the state”). The sovereign is 
the one who exercises such power; the sovereign has the right to arbitrarily 
decide any domestic issue. This understanding continues to form the domi-
nant doctrine in the Russian theory of international law; in this regard, very 
few things have changed since the 19th century.296 To be sure, this tradi-
292 See Jochen von Bernstorff, The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2010).
293 Naturally, it not only is Russia which is confronting these issues in a changing world. 
While the focus of our attention here is on the Russian problem, it should not be mistaken 
for an intent to ignore similar problems in the US or EU (which, nevertheless, are not 
as acute as those in Russia owing to differing political and legal contexts and, also, to 
[somewhat] different cultural mindsets). For the sake of brevity in this work, we will not 
engage in a comparative analysis of the impact which various concepts of sovereignty 
can have on lawmaking and politics in other countries.
294 This accent on individual liberty was conspicuously made in 1859 by John Stuart Mill in 
his treatise On Liberty (J.W. Parker and Son, London, 1859). On the varying approaches to 
democracy see David Held, Models of Democracy (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006, 3rd ed.).
295 A classic distinction between the ancient and the modern conceptions of democracy was 
introduced in the early 19th century by Benjamin Constant in his: “The Liberty of the 
Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns” (fi rst published in French in 1819), in Ben-
jamin Constant’s Political Writings (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, Bianca-
maria Fontana transl.).
296 See the conclusions drawn by Maria M. Fedorova, “Sovereignty as a Political-Philosophi-
cal Category of Modernity”, 52(1) Russian Social Science Review (2011), 29-43. See, also, the 
general review of the development of the notion of sovereignty by Dieter Grimm in his 
Souveränität. Herkunft und Zukunft eines Schlüsselbegriffs (Berlin University Press, Berlin, 
2009). A comprehensive analysis of Russian theories of international law can be found 
in Lauri Mälksoo, “The History of International Legal Theory in Russia: A Civilizational 
Dialogue with Europe”, 19(1) European Journal of International Law (2008), 211-232.
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tional concept also continues to hold sway in the theory of international law 
worldwide.297 But a fundamental difference in most other jurisdictions is 
that some important signs point to changes in the attitudes of Western law-
yers, there, vis-à-vis this concept.298 Nowadays, a number of theoreticians 
claim the end has arrived of the would-be monopoly of the nation-state 
on sovereignty.299 They argue that the necessary connection between state 
and “Westphalian sovereignty” is no longer relevant in the contemporary 
world. Human rights, global security, trade and commerce, and many other 
important social fields are regulated and protected at the global level; as a 
result, particular national states are bound with the international standards 
(rules, principles) in these fields and cannot simply do whatever they please 
with human rights—even with recourse to the argument of sovereignty.300
1 Russian Law Faces a Choice: International Principles or 
National Sovereignty
The idea of “the deconstruction of sovereignty” has been discussed by 
Günter Teubner and others under the rubric of “globalization” which 
implies that there is a tendency towards a growing interconnection and 
interdependence among all countries and societies in the world; this inter-
connection is supposed to result in the merger of all the national societies 
297 The isolationist legal policy of the US and other countries toward the international law is 
a subject for another study where different contexts and the underlying reasons are to be 
examined. For a general theoretical perspective see, e.g., Stephane Beaulac, “The Social 
Power of Bodin’s “Sovereignty” and International Law”, 4(1) Melbourne Journal of Interna-
tional Law (2003), 1-28.
298 See Stephen D. Krasner, “Problematic Sovereignty,” in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), Proble-
matic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Responsibilities (Columbia University Press, 
New York, NY, 2001), 1-24; Ineke Boerefi jn and Jenny E. Goldschmidt (eds.), Changing 
Perceptions of Sovereignty and Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Cees Flinterman (Intersen-
tia, Mortsel, Belgium, 2008); and Utsav Gandhi, “State Sovereignty as a Major Hurdle 
to Human Rights” (17 March 2013), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2234573>. 
While this process of change also can be observed in modern-day Russian legal theory, 
for political, legal and philosophical reasons it is developing much slower in Russia as we 
shall investigate below.
299 See Saskia Sassen, Losing Control: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (Colombia Univer-
sity Press, New York, NY, 1996); William Twining, Globalization and Legal Theory (Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000); Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New 
Legal Common Sense (Butterworths, London, 2002); and John Agnew, Globalization and 
Sovereignty (Rowman and Littelfi eld, New York, NY, 2009).
300 That is why it was ex ante impossible to persuade most Russian lawyers and politicians 
that the sovereignty argument does not constitute a defense against preventive use of 
force in the Kosovo case aimed at protecting human rights. Cf. the analysis of the differ-
ent arguments in Eric Alan Heinze, “Human Rights in the Discourse on Sovereignty: The 
United States, Russia and NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo” (24-27 March 2002), available 
at <http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/heinze.html>.
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into a single, “global village”.301 A key question in the case of Russia is: 
does Russia form a part of this globalized world? If so, will it therefore 
share common standards and principles with the rest of the international 
community? Or can one still consider the national state as an independent 
actor freely deciding if (and to what extent) it will be subject to international 
law, and to dismiss the globalization discussion because of its ideological 
nature? The answers to these questions are crucial for shaping internal legal 
policies—especially in the domain of human rights where the “the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations” (to cite Art.38(1) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice) often are the only defense 
against unjust and disproportional legal norms wielded by a state.
The formal provisions of post-1991 Russian law yield an ambigu-
ous response to this dilemma. The correlation between state law and 
international law seems to be clearly stated in Article 15 of the 1993 RF 
Constitution:
“The commonly recognized principles and norms of international law and inter-
national treaties of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal 
system. If an international treaty of the Russian Federation stipulates rules other 
than those stipulated by Russian law, the rules of the international treaty shall 
apply.”
Yet, as clear as that may be upon a first reading, upon reflection one can 
observe a discrepancy between two policies set forth in Article 15: (1) not 
only treaties but, also, principles and norms of the international law are 
incorporated into the legal system of Russia. At the same time, pursuant to 
the literal text (2): only treaties have priority in the case of conflicts with state 
law. The question thus arises: if international principles and norms form 
component parts of the Russian legal system, what place do they occupy 
in the normative hierarchy of Russia’s legal order ?302 What is the source 
of their binding force: merely discretionary recognition by state or part of 
an objective international legal order? There is an even more important 
issue with practical implications: can these international principles and 
301 Günter Teubner, “Global Bukovina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society”, in Gunter Teu-
bner (ed.), Global Law Without a State (Ashgate Publishing, Furnham, UK, 1997), 3-28; and 
Brian Z. Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global”, 
30(3) Sydney Law Review (2008), 375-411. Cf. on the theoretical aspect of the globaliza-
tion discussion: Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond 
Borders (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012); and Mikhail Antonov, “In the 
Quest of Global Legal Pluralism”, in Aulis Aarnio et al. (eds.), Positivität, Normativität und 
Institutionalität des Rechts. Festschrift für Werner Krawietz zum 80. Geburtstag (Duncker und 
Humblot, Berlin, 2013), 15-30.
302 For a discussion at length on this topic, see Gennady Danilenko, “Implementation of 
International Law in CIS States: Theory and Practice”, 1(10) European Journal of Interna-
tional Law (1999), 51-69. The late Professor Danilenko argued that Russia is under “an 
obligation to give direct domestic effect to decisions of international bodies, including the 
European Court of Human Rights” (ibid., 68).
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norms overrule norms of domestic law and principles (formulated by the 
judiciary) in the case of a conflict?
The discourses of political and legal practitioners in Russia reveal a pro-
pensity for the first option which implies the dualist concept of international 
order: the binding force of norms of international law depends on their 
recognition, by the authorities, of the particular state concerned. In some 
way, this question had already been posed in the USSR. Article 29 of the 
1977 Constitution303 provided a similar statement that the USSR shall fulfill 
“the obligations arising from the generally recognized principles and rules 
of international law, and from international treaties signed by the USSR”. 
But this statement did not signify a real incorporation of international law 
into the law of the USSR; it remained mainly “paper law’ without almost 
any impact on adjudication in Soviet courts.304 The formal inclusion of this 
phrase into the new 1993 RF Constitution is symptomatic of the continuity 
of the legal traditions from prior decades.305 After, as before, the end of the 
Soviet Union, the imperative international norms of human rights and other 
norms of ius cogens have had no serious impact on domestic legal practices. 
The USSR followed these norms (for example, in the case of granting 
permission for Soviet Jews to emigrate) only as a kind of random “trump 
card”—played when it needed to negotiate oil contracts or other material 
issues with the West.
Nowadays, the policies of Russia in this sphere likewise are oscillating: 
having oil and gas resources and getting a good price for them, Russia’s 
political leaders are tempted to ignore Western moralizing about legal val-
ues. In order to join the WTO, the Russian authorities needed to concede to 
some “Western values”—or, at least, to refrain from violating them during 
the negotiating sessions. (This situation is evidently more or less common 
not only for Russia but, also, for China and a number of other countries.) 
While claiming Russia’s fidelity to human rights, Russian authorities have 
felt free to dismiss any criticism connected with its legislation dealing with 
LGBT and “foreign agents”, for example, in which the Russian Federation 
clearly follows a different understanding of human rights than the ECtHR 
and humanitarian agencies worldwide.
In his late 2013 state-of-the-nation address (poslanie) to the Russian 
Parliament, Vladimir Putin reiterated his conservative stances about “tra-
ditional values”; he characteristically chided the West for treating good and 
evil alike when promoting human rights worldwide. The President was 
furious that:
303 Konstitutsiia (Osnovnoi zakon) Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik [Consti-
tution (The Basic Law) of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics] (signed 7 October 
1977), Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR No.41 item 617. See the English translation in 
Feldbrugge, The Constitutions of the USSR and the Union Republics, op.cit. note 110.
304 However, Tarja Långström has argued that Soviet courts also “were able to invoke trea-
ties” in her Transformation in Russia and International Law (Brill Academic Publishers, 
Leiden & Boston, MA, 2003), 361.
305 Ibid., 345ff.
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“[…] strangely as it might seem, nowadays they demand that good and evil be 
treated as being equal although these concepts are opposites to one another. Such 
destruction of the traditional values “from above” not only involves negative 
consequences for societies but, also, essentially is antidemocratic, as this policy is 
conducted being basing on some abstract and metaphysical ideas which contra-
dict the will of the majority who do not accept such change and revision.”306
From this perspective, Putin praised Russia for its “great history and cul-
ture which are far removed from the sexless and fruitless tolerance”. One 
of his main messages in this address seemed to be a call “to defend inter-
national law through insistence on respect toward national sovereignty” 
which means protecting “traditional values”, “the traditional family and 
real [podlinnaia] human life, not only material but, rather, the spiritual one 
[…]”.307 Evidently, this rhetoric forms a part of the ideological background 
for the continued suppression of LGBT and other “untraditional” practices 
contrary to the international human-rights law.
It is not surprising tha t—when facing criticism against unjust laws 
and court decisions—some Russian lawyers are tempted to look for a 
defense against such criticism in the traditional concept of sovereignty as 
an absolute, unrestricted power which is incompatible with the idea of 
the objectivity of international law.308 The practical underpinnings of this 
defense are easily traceable, as this position provides the justification for 
virtually unlimited public interventions into individual liberties: “any scru-
tiny of international human rights without the permission of the sovereign 
could arguably constitute a violation of sovereignty by its “invasion” of the 
sovereign’s domaine réservé”.309 From this point of view, there seem to be no 
limits to sovereign power in the traditional concept of sovereignty under 
which sovereignty is defined as unaccountable. Here, one can recall the 
remarkable characterization which Martti Koskenniemi gave in 2006 to the 
traditional, 19th century theory of sovereignty: “especially useful for diplo-
306 “Poslanie Prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniiu” [The Address of the President to 
the Federal Assembly] (12 December 2013), available at <http://www.kremlin.ru/
news/19825>.
307 Ibid.
308 The typical justifi cation of strong federalism in the relations between the Federation and 
minorities with references to the sovereignty argument was advocated in 2003 by one 
of the Justices of the Constitutional Court, Vladimir Iaroslavtsev, in his address “Con-
stitutional Court of the Russian Federation and Protection of Minorities”, Conference 
of the Constitutional Court of Andorra, “La protecció de les minories i els Tribunals 
Constitucionals” (3 October 2003), available at <http://www.tribunalconstitucional.
ad/docs/10aniversari/J-RUSSIAN.pdf>. In spite of the clear wording of Art.69 of the 
Constitution guaranteeing the rights of indigenous peoples in accordance with the uni-
versally recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties, Justice 
Iaroslavtsev stresses that these rights can be restricted with reference to sovereignty of 
Russia (even where no such exemption is provided either by the Constitution, referring 
only to international principles and norms, or by these principles and norms themselves).
309 Michael Reisman, “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law”, 
84(4) The American Journal of International Law (1990), 869.
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mats and practitioners, not least because it seemed to offer such compelling 
rhetoric for the justification of most varied kinds of State action”.310 It is 
this concept of sovereignty which can be attractive as a tool for legitimizing 
the disciplinary power of the state,311 seen as thus being independent of 
endorsement by international law and being immune to any and all criti-
cism “from abroad”.
In its turn, it is this “immunization” which leads to legitimizing the 
discretionary power of members of the executive and of the judiciary who, 
thus, feel themselves empowered to decide themselves on the “limits of 
compromise” concerning human rights. These limits are to be defined by 
Russian judges when deciding which human rights are to be protected (and 
defining what the content of the protected rights should be) and, also, by 
politicians when deciding whether the people are “ripe” enough to have 
human rights (not only basic but, also, political and cultural ones) .312 This 
means counter-weighing internationally recognized values of democracy 
and human rights against the value of national sovereignty, and it this latter 
concept which often turns out to have more weight in court battles in Russia 
than the former.
Louis Henkin characterized this style of argumentation in 1999 as fol-
lows: “And so, state sovereignty at the end of the twentieth century—and 
at the beginning of the twenty-first—can be summarized as: “sovereignty 
means “leave us alone”. Sovereignty is: “we will engage in a minimal 
amount of cooperation, if we as sovereign states consent.’ Sovereignty 
is subject to some “creeping” international human rights, to the extent 
sovereign nations consent.”313 This argument has been echoed by Prime 
Minister Dmitry Medvedev: “[...] we never transferred so much of Russia’s 
sovereignty as to allow any international court or foreign tribunal to render 
decisions that would change our national law.”314
310 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge & New York, NY, 2006), 89.
311 Cf. a postmodernist analysis of sovereignty as a disciplinary mechanism of state power 
in Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty. Intervention, the State and the Symbolic Exchange 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995).
312 An allusion to the words of the main ideologist of sovereign democracy, Vladislav 
Surkov, who—in his speech to the Center for Preparation of the Staff of United Russia (7 
February 2006)—asserted that the people are not prepared “to live under the conditions 
of the contemporary democracy”. Vladislav Surkov, “Suverenitet: eto politicheskii simp-
tom konkurentosposobnosti” [Sovereignty is a Political Equivalent of Ability to Com-
pete], in Nikita Garadzha (ed.), Suverenitet (Evropa, Moscow, 2006), 46.
313 Henkin, op.cit. note 288, 5.
314 Dmitry Medvedev, “Neobkhodimo sokratit’ chislo obrashchenii rossiian v mezhdun-
arodnye sudy” [It is necessary to reduce the quantity of applications of the Russian citi-
zens to international courts] (4 February 2010), available at <http://grani.ru/Politics/
Russia/m.174350.html>; translation cited according to Andrei Susarov, “The Constitu-
tion of the Russian Federation or the European Court of Human Rights?”, Russian Survey 
(August 2011), available at <http://www.russian-survey.com/main/47-the-constitu-
tion-of-the-russian-federation-or-the-european-court-of-human-rights>.
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2 European Human-Rights Law from the Perspective of 
Russian Courts
In their literal form, the provisions of the 1993 Russian Constitution seem 
to be more favorable to international law than were those contained in the 
1977 Soviet Basic Law, and Russian jurisprudence initially has been more 
open in this perspective. A 2003 Decree of the Plenum of the RF Supreme 
Court315 clearly stated that judges have to apply both sources (istochniki) of 
international law and the jurisprudence of international courts.316 Unfortu-
nately, the effect of the Supreme Court’s 2003 Decree had been but ideologi-
cal in nature, and Russian judges continue to apply such jurisprudence only 
as a supplement to the applicable rules of domestic Russian law. The same 
effect seems to characterize the “window dressing” argumentation in a 2013 
Decree where the Supreme Court has explained how Russian judges are to 
deal with ECtHR jurisprudence.317
It is not surprising given that even if Russian courts are formally 
required to refer to international law and particularly to ECtHR doctrine, 
most references in Russian court decisions have been rhetorical in nature and 
have been employed as “additional argumentation in support of the conclu-
sions based on the applicable constitutional provisions”.318 However, unlike 
the 2003 Decree, the 2013 Supreme Court Decree views ECtHR jurisprudence 
only as complementary to domestic Russian legislation and treaties:319 
“legal positions” (pravovye pozitsii) of the European Court need to be taken 
into consideration (uchityvaiutsia) when applying Russian legislation and 
treaties of the Russian Federation in the courts of general jurisdiction.
315 Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ruling of the Plenum 
of the RF Supreme Court] (10 October 2003) No.5, “O primenenii sudami obshchei iuris-
diktsii obshchepriznannykh printsipov i norm mezhdunarodnogo prava i mezhdun-
arodnykh dogovorov Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [On the Application by Courts of General 
Jurisdiction of the Generally Recognized Principles and Norms of the International Law 
and the International Treaties of the Russian Federation], Biulleten’ Verkhovnogo Suda RF 
(2003) No.12. An English text of this Resolution is available at <http://www.supcourt.
ru/catalog.php?c1=English&c2=Documents&c3=&id=6801>.
316 This interpretation was provided by the Supreme Court in points 10&11 of its 2003 
Decree with a view to ECtHR jurisprudence.
317 Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ruling of the Plenum 
of the RF Supreme Court] (27 June 2013) No.21, “O primenenii sudami obshchei iuris-
diktsii Konventsii o zashite prav cheloveka i osnovnykh svobod ot 4 noiabria1950 i proto-
kolov k nei” [On the Application by the Courts of General Jurisdiction of the Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as of 4 November 1950, and of the proto-
cols thereto], Biulleten’ Verkhovnogo Suda RF (2013) No.8.
318 Danilenko, op.cit. note 302, 62.
319 Point 2 of the 2013 Decree deals with the binding force of ECtHR judgments; points 3&4 
respectively treat the complementarity of ECtHR judgments to domestic Russian legisla-
tion and treaties. In point 11 of the 2003 Decree, the Court had stressed that “the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights has its own mechanism, including the obligatory juris-
diction of the European Court” which implied that judgments of this Court “are binding 
on all the state authorities of the Russian Federation, inclusive of the courts”.
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While the nuance of this may not be easily perceptible, it nevertheless 
is quite important. In a 2007 RF Constitutional Court Ruling320 and in the 
2003 Supreme Court Decree, ECtHR jurisprudence was deemed to be an 
independent source of law: enjoying priority over domestic legislation and 
directly transplanting ECHR rules and principles into the Russian legal 
system. But, in the 2013 Supreme Court Decree, this jurisprudence now only 
is characterized as “subsidiary” (subsidiarnyi) to the provisions of domestic 
Russian legislation and international treaties—as an instrument for enhanc-
ing their interpretation. This logic of “window dressing” of court decisions 
is well illustrated in Russian case law .321
Such logic seems to be prefigured in the reservations which Russia 
made when limiting the binding force of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
only to judgments awarded against Russia. In Article 1 of the 1998 ratifica-
tion instrument,322 Russia made a reservation that
“The Russian Federation, in keeping with Article 46 of the Convention acknowl-
edges ipso facto and without a special agreement the jurisdiction of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights to be binding regarding the issues of interpretation 
and application of the Convention and Protocols thereto in cases of supposed 
violation by the Russian Federation of the provisions of those treaties when a 
supposed violation has taken place after their entry into effect regarding the 
Russian Federation.”
320 Para.2.1. of Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ruling of the 
RF Constitutional Court] (5 February 2007) No.2-P, “O proverke konstitustionnosti statei 
16, 20, 112, 336, 376, 377, 380, 381, 382, 383, 387, 388, 389 Grazhdanskogo protsessual’nogo 
kodeksa Rossiiskoi Federatsii v sviazi s zaprosom Kabineta Ministrov Respubliki 
Tatarstan, zhalobami OAO ‘Nizhnekamskneftekhim’ i OAO ‘Khakasenergo’, a takzhe 
zhalobami riada grazhdan” [On Verifying the Constitutionality of Arts.16, 20, 112, 336, 
376, 377, 380, 381, 382, 383, 387, 388, 389 of the RF Civil Procedure Code in Connection 
with the Inquiry of the Cabinet of Ministers of Tatarstan Republic, the Complaints of 
OAO “Nizhnekamskneftekhim” and OAO “Khakasenergo”, and the Complaints of 
Some Citizens], Rossiiskaia gazeta (14 February 2007) No.4294. See Kirill Koroteev, “Judi-
cial Review in the Russian Supreme Court and Constitutional Court: Struggling for Juris-
dictional Powers Instead of Protecting Human Rights”, in William Simons (ed.), East 
European Faces of Law and Society: Values and Practices (Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2014), 221-250.
321 In English, see the most comprehensive account of how Russian judges cite the doctrine 
of the ECtHR by Anton Burkov, The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights 
on Russian Law: Legislation and Application in 1996-2006 (Ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart & Han-
nover, 2007). In this last perspective, a notable exception must be made only for the doc-
trine of the Constitutional Court several decisions of which have been infl uenced by the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. See William B. Simons, “Russia’s Constitutional Court and 
a Decade of Hard Cases: A Postscript”, 28(3-4) Review of Central and East European Law 
(2003), 655-678. See, also, William B. Simons and Rilka O. Dragneva, “Rights, Contracts, 
and Constitutional Courts: The Experience of Russia”, in Ferdinand Feldbrugge and Wil-
liam B. Simons (eds.), Human Rights in Russia and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Ger P. 
van den Berg (Brill, The Hague, London, Boston, 2002), 35-63.
322 Federal’nyi zakon [Federal Law] (30 March 1998) No.54-FZ “O ratifi katsii Konventsii o 
zazhite prav cheloveka i osnovnykh svobod i Protokolov k nei” [On Ratifying the ECHR 
and the Protocols Thereto], SZRF (1998) No.14 item 1514.
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To wit: only those judgments are binding in which Russian legislation has 
been involved and has been evaluated by the ECtHR. Judgments of the 
ECtHR against other members of the Council of Europe, formally, have no 
binding force or effect on Russia.
From this perspective, the “other” jurisprudence of the ECtHR can be 
viewed as a tool for better interpreting Russian laws in light of the ECHR 
but not as a source of law itself. This logically means that opinions of the 
ECtHR, regarding Russian legislation, will not be privileged in any way 
vis-à-vis opinions of the Russian courts—especially of the RF Constitutional 
Court. This implies that there needs to be one more instance (the RF Consti-
tutional Court) which decides on the conformity of these judgments, as con-
firmed the RF Constitutional Court in its 2013 Ruling in the Markin 2 case.323 
This solution has been lauded by Putin as “exceptionally correct from the 
legal point of view”; the judges have been praised by the President for “the 
ruling [in Markin 2] in which you, in fact, protected the supreme status of 
our Constitution and proposed an algorithm of actions in situations when a 
judgment of the ECtHR contradicts the rules of our Constitution”.324
In its 2013 Markin 2 Ruling, the RF Constitutional Court likewise stated 
that judgments of the ECtHR, interpreting provisions of the ECHR,
“[…] like the Convention, to the extent that they interpret, in accordance with 
generally recognized principles and norms of international law, the content of 
the rights and freedoms enshrined by the Convention, are an integral part of the 
Russian legal system, and for that reason must be taken into consideration by the 
federal legislator when regulating social relations and by the law-enforcement 
agencies when applying the corresponding norms of law”.325
This formulation of the RF Constitutional Court’s Ruling does not confirm 
the interpretation of Anton Burkov who finds that that “the entire ECtHR 
case law was admitted as a source of Russian law” through the jurispru-
dence of the RF Constitutional Court,326 so that all the ECtHR judgments 
are compulsory insomuch as “recognized as sources of Russian law and law 
enforcement practice, thus, they must be taken into account when cases are 
considered by national courts”.327
323 Ruling of the RF Constitutional Court (6 December 2013) No.27-P, op.cit. note 176.
324 “Vstrecha V.V. Putina s sud’iami Konstitutsionnogo suda” (12 December 2013) [Vladimir 
Putin meets Judges of the Constitutional Court], available at <http://www.kremlin.ru/
news/19832>. See, also, Vladimir Churov and Boris Ebzeev, “Reshenie ESPCH po delu 
“respublikanskaia partiia Rossii protiv Rossii’ ili utrachennye illuzii” [Judgment of the 
ECtHR in the Case of “the Republican Party of Russia v. Russia” or Lost Illusions], Kon-
stitutsionnoe i munitsipal’noe pravo (2011) No.12, 2-11; and Aleksandr Kokotov, “Nasushch-
nye voprosy regulirovaniia deiatel’nosti Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
[Actual Issues of Regulation of the Activity of the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation], Rossiiskii iuridicheskii zhurnal (2012) No.2, 20-27.
325 Ruling of the RF Constitutional Court (6 December 2013) No.27-P, op.cit. note 176.
326 Burkov, op.cit. note 321, 415.
327 Ibid., 418.
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism.indb   97 10-10-19   14:53
98 Chapter 3
First, these judgments assumed to have legal effect not per se but, rather, 
as manifestations of international law (and the margin of appreciation of 
this link between international and constitutional law belongs to the RF 
Constitutional Court as it reasoned in the 2013 Markin 2 case).328
Second, “taking into account” may imply different extents of binding 
force and does not necessarily signify “an obligation of a court to apply” or 
a “compulsory effect”.329 This opinion is confirmed by the recent jurispru-
dence of the RF Constitutional Court and by Chief Justice Zorkin who is con-
fident that ECtHR judgments have “only subsidiary character, and relations 
between the ECtHR and highest national judicial organs cannot be regarded 
as one-way street”.330 However, both opinions (about the necessary media-
tory role of the RF Constitutional Court and about the direct effect of ECtHR 
jurisprudence) are not wholly mutually incompatible: rather, they reflect 
two different aspects of the situation: what “Is” and what “Ought to Be”.331
One of the reasons for this change, in our opinion, is that adjudication 
in most Russia courts, in many regards, is still shaped according to the old 
syllogistic model: the role of a judge is to subsume the facts of the case under 
an ideal model given in a positive norm so as to render a judgment as a 
logical sequence thereof.332 This syllogistic framework leaves little room for 
balancing principles, values, or the reasons for doing so, especially in the 
lower courts—let alone leave room for comparisons of domestic and interna-
tional law. The latter, i.e., comparisons of domestic and international law, is 
something which formally is required of judges of the courts of general juris-
diction under the 2003 Decree but for which the judges are neither trained 
328 Op.cit. note 176.
329 See Sergey Golubok and Kirill Koroteev, “Judgment of the RF Constitutional Court 
on Supervisory Review in Civil Proceedings: Denial of Justice, Denial of Europe”, 7(3) 
Human Rights Law Review (2007), 619-632.
330 See the interview with Valerii Zorkin (December 2008), available at <http://www.con-
sultant.ru/law/interview/Zorkin/>. For another position (about the binding effect of 
all ECtHR “legal positions” in one of the works of a retired justice of the RF Constitu-
tional Court, see Nikolai Bondar’, “Konventsional’naia iurisdiktsiia Evropeiskogo suda 
po pravam cheloveka v sootnoshenii s competentsiei Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii” [Conventional Jurisdiction of the ECtHR as Compared with the Competence 
of the RF Constitutional Court], Zhurnal rossiiskogo prava (2006) No.6, 113-127. See, also, 
Aleksei Laptev and Mariia Filatova, “K voprosu o statuse pravovykh pozitsii Evropeisk-
ogo suda po pravam cheloveka i o roli Konstitutsioonogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 
ego opredelenii” [On Question of the Status of Legal Positions of the ECtHR and the RF 
Constitutional Court’s Role in Defi ning this Status], 1(80) Sravnitel’noe konstitutsionnoe 
obozrenie (2011), 124-156; and Aidar Sultanov, Evropeiskie pravovye standarty, uroki istorii i 
pravoprimenitel’naia praktika [European Legal Standards, the Lessons of History and Law 
Enforcement Practice] (Statut, Moscow, 2012), 268-293.
331 This intellectual opposition between descriptive statements about “what is” and norma-
tive statements about “what ought to be”—known as Hume’s law—was fi rst formulated 
by David Hume in his Treatise on Human Nature (John Noon, Cheapside, 1739).
332 See, e.g., the characterization of this “syllogistic and non-problematic style of judicial 
writing” in Russia by Alexander Vereshchagin, Judicial Law-Making in Post-Soviet Russia 
(Routledge, New York, NY, 2007), 236.
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nor fully motivated so that they end up following the general understanding 
of judicial functions which still dominates Russian legal theory. According to 
such understanding, this function is reduced to applying the traditional sub-
sumption method in jurisprudence which relies on legal logic so as to derive 
the solution of a case from the law which proclaims the sovereign will.333
Similarly to most of the constitutions of Western democratic states, law-
making in Russia is conceived (pursuant to the Constitution) as one of the 
inalienable prerogatives of the sovereign people (whose will is represented 
by parliament and elected officials). From the perspective of contemporary 
Russian legal doctrine, it implies that only the sovereign people can adopt 
legal rules—immediately, via a referendum, or thorough the intermediary 
of an elected parliament.334 If foreign actors (including organizations of the 
international community such as the ECtHR) were to impose binding legal 
rules from the outside (or, otherwise, undermine the validity of Russian 
legislation), it would be regarded by this doctrine as an unlawful encroach-
ment on the sovereign rights of the people. Thus, for many Russian lawyers 
(including judges), the very possibility of influencing national lawmaking 
and law-enforcement constitutes a threat to the existence of the state. From 
this standpoint, skepticism towards international courts has widened in 
post-Soviet Russia. It is symptomatic that a retired, activist Justice of the 
Constitutional Court, Tatiana Morshchakova, stated in 2007 that “[u]nfortu-
333 A typical understanding can be found in a work of the Chief Justice of the RF Supreme 
Court Viacheslav Lebedev, Sudebnaia vlast’ v sovremennoi Rossii: problemy stanovleniia i 
razvitiia [Judicial Power in Contemporary Russia: Problems of Formation and Develop-
ment] (Lan’, St. Petersburg, 2001). Professor Shvarts of St Petersburg State University has 
remarked that:
“[…] understanding of the very nature of judicial power and of its limits, functions 
and prerogatives will change. Taking into consideration legal positions of the Euro-
pean Court will inevitably enforce changes in the civil procedure, as such “taking 
into consideration’ is impossible within the framework of the traditional procedural 
forms”.
 Mikhail Shvarts, “K voprosu o predmete sudebnoi deiatel’nosti v grazhdanskom sudo-
proizvodstve v sovremennykh usloviiakh” [On the Question of the Object of Judicial 
Activity in Civil Procedure Under Contemporary Conditions], in Tamara Abova et al. 
(eds.), Kontseptsiia razvitiia sudebnoi sistemy i sistemy dobrovol’nogo i prinuditel’nogo ispol-
neniia reshenii KS RF, sudov obshchei iurisdiktsii, arbitrazhnykh, treteiskikh sudov i Evropeiskogo 
suda po pravam cheloveka [The Conception of Development of the Court System and of the 
System of Voluntary and Compulsory Execution of Decisions of the RF Constitutional 
Court, Courts of General Jurisdiction, Arbitrazh Tribunals, Arbitration Courts and the 
ECtHR] (Iuridicheskii Tsentr, Krasnodar, St. Petersburg, 2007), 252.
334 See, e.g., a work of a former Chief Justice of the RF Constitutional Court, Marat Baglai, 
Konstitutsionnoe pravo Rossii [Constitutional Law of Russia], (Norma, Moscow, 2007, 6th 
ed.), 121-126. It is appropriate to note here that after the adoption of the Russian Consti-
tution through a referendum of 12 December 1993, no other referenda have since been 
held in Russia. In the present work, we are unable to provide a conclusive opinion as to 
why similar constitutional texts about the sovereignty of people in the Russian and the 
Western constitutions provoke different reactions in the respective jurisdictions and legal 
communities; such a task would constitute a separate comparative research project.
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nately, our country is moving into collision with a politicization of judicial 
decisions […] undermining trust in the international judicial system” .335
In particular in recent years, the debates about barring international 
courts from intruding into the sovereign affairs of Russia have been marked 
by several controversies between the ECtHR, the Constitutional Court and 
the Supreme Court of Russia. The sovereignty argument played a major role 
in the 2012 landmark Markin case where the Russian government insisted 
that “[b]y assessing Russia’s legislation, the Court would encroach upon the 
sovereign powers of the Parliament and the Constitutional Court”336 even 
if the subject matter of this case was about the seemingly minor issue of 
parental leave for military personnel. Likewise, the sovereignty “card” has 
been played by Russian authorities as the prima facie reason for opposing 
the US Magnitsky Act; deemed to be an encroachment on sovereignty of 
the Russian state by imposing sanctions against RF officials in retaliation 
for alleged legal lapses in dealing with Magnitsky whereby the adoption 
of Russian children by US citizens was banned in order to protect Russian 
national sovereignty.337
3 The Nature of International Law in the Light of the Russian 
Constitution and Its Interpretations
In the 2013 Mass Meetings case,338 the Court already has implied that inter-
national standards (at least, those in the field of political democracy) are 
not binding on Russia and that the ECtHR “does not have, as its task, the 
standardization of all the systems which exist in Europe” (para. 2.2.). The 
issue of the universality of human rights had been argued intensively before 
335 Cited in Bill Bowring, “Russia and Human Rights: Incompatible Opposites?”, 1(2) Got-
tingen Journal of International Law (2009), 51.
336 Markin v. Russia, op.cit. note 176, para. 85.
337 HR 6156-112th Congress: Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Mag-
nitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 19 July 2012, available at <http://www.gov-
track.us/congress/bills/112/hr6156>. And a reply of the Russian authorities: Federal’nyi 
zakon [Federal Law] (28 December 2012) No.272-FZ, “O merakh vozdeistviia na lits, pri-
chastnykh k narusheniiam osnovopolagaiushchikh prav i svobod grazhdan Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii” [On Measures to Infl uence Those Who Are Connected with Violation of Fun-
damental Rights and Liberties of Russian Citizens], SZRF (31 December 2012) No.53 item 
7597.
338 Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ruling of the RF Consti-
tutional Court] (14 February 2013) No.4-P, “O proverke konstitustionnosti Federal’nogo 
zakona “O vnesenii izmenenii v Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii ob administrativnykh 
pravonarusheniiakh i Federal’nyi zakon “O sobraniiakh, mitingakh, demonstratsiiakh, 
shestviiakh i piketirovaniiakh” v sviazi s zaprosom gruppy deputatov Gosudarstvennoi 
Dumy Rossiiskoi Federatsii i zhaloboi grazhdanina E.V. Savenko” [On Verifying the Con-
stitutionality of the Federal law “On Amending the RF Code of Administrative Offenses 
and the Federal Law “On Gatherings, Meetings, Demonstrations, Parades and Pickets” in 
connection with the inquiry of a group of deputies of the RF State Duma and the Compli-
ant of Citizen E.V. Savenko], Rossiiskaia gazeta (27 February 2013) No.6018.
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by the court, e.g., in a 2007 case dealing with the prohibition against bury-
ing terrorists339 where worldwide humanitarian standards had to cede to 
concerns of national security and sovereignty. This 2007 RF Constitutional 
Court decision was controversial: three justices of the Constitutional Court 
disagreed with the majority view and, in their dissenting opinions,340 
insisted that the majority’s opinion was a manifest contradiction to the very 
idea of human rights: Justice Kononov argued that this opinion was “abso-
lutely immoral—reflecting the most uncivilized, barbaric and base views of 
previous generations”. The final page of the story was written in 2013 when 
the RF Constitutional Court’s decision was overruled by the ECtHR. In its 
judgment,341 the Strasbourg Court accused the RF Constitutional Court of 
misinterpretation of standards of a democratic society (paras. 221-238).
Surprisingly, this ECtHR judgment has not yet drawn much atten-
tion from Russian lawyers and politicians (putatively, because the main 
complaint against Russia—concerning the allegedly unlawful killing of 
the Chechen leader Maskhadov—was turned down), although it was 
the first time that the Strasbourg Court has overruled a “positive” ruling 
(postanovlenie) of the RF Constitutional Court where the latter had rendered 
a substantial interpretation on the constitutionality of a RF federal law. In 
Markin and other cases where conflicts in the interpretation of laws have 
arisen between the ECtHR and the RF Constitutional Court, the Strasbourg 
Court dealt with “negative” judgments (opredeleniia) in which the RF Con-
stitutional Court had dismissed petitions without substantiating its opinion.
In December 2013, the RF Constitutional Court considered another 
petition of Konstantin Markin concerning execution of the 2010 ECtHR 
judgment where the Strasbourg Court had overruled the opinion of the 
Constitutional Court from 2009 year. In January 2013, the Leningrad District 
Military Court had submitted an inquiry to the RF Constitutional Court 
asking whether it should implement the ECtHR judgment which is con-
trary to the position of the RF Constitutional Court and, therefore (in the 
opinion of the Military Court), to the RF Constitution. On the one hand, 
the Constitutional Court evaded formulating a direct reply to the Military 
Court’s inquiry by dismissing it on procedural grounds (reasoning, that 
the question only would be ripe after the Military Court had rendered a 
judgment and Markin had filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court). 
On the other hand, in its December 2013 ruling, the RF Constitutional 
Court expressly has forbidden Russian courts from implementing allegedly 
unconstitutional judgments of the ECtHR and, also, has barred these courts 
339 Ruling of the RF Constitutional Court (28 June 2007) No.8-P, op.cit. note 23.
340 The Court includes nineteen judges, three of whom disagreed with the majority of fi fteen 
judges (one of the judges being absent). The Dissenting Opinions (osobye mneniia) of Jus-
tices Kononov, Gadzhiev, and Ebzeev have been published separately at Vestnik Konsti-
tutsionnogo Suda RF (2007) No.4.
341 ECtHR Judgment Maskhadova and Others v. Russia (6 June 2013) Application No.18071/05, 
Dissenting Opinions of Justices Dedov and Hajiyev.
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from assessing the constitutionality of Russian legislation which is applied 
in such cases .342
This notwithstanding, the very fact of the ECtHR’s intervention in 
issues which already have been adjudicated by the RF Constitutional Court 
cannot but lead to irritation among the members of this latter Court, let 
alone the Russian legal community and society at large. The level of this 
irritation was, nonetheless, different as we have shown in the beginning of 
this Chapter in describing two positions of the Court’s Chief Justice. The 
position which Valerii Zorkin articulated in 2013343 seems to support this 
vigilant attitude towards the jurisprudence of the ECtHR—increasingly 
suspected by some parts of Russian society of endangering Russian national 
security. Confirming that Russia will abide by the Human Rights Conven-
tion, by other international treaties and by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, 
the Chief Justice also has insisted that:
“At the same time, the Russian state shall have instruments to exercise influence 
on the decisions of such jurisdictional organizations which concern the legal 
system of Russia and which are in some way connected with its sovereignty.”344
342 Para.3.1, Ruling the RF Constitutional Court (6 December 2013) No.27-P, op.cit. note 176.
 Here, the RF Constitutional Court additionally confi rmed its triumph over the RF Supreme 
Court in their long-lasting struggle about the direct applicability of the RF Constitution. 
Prior to 16 April 2013, the Supreme Court had instructed its lower-level (common jurisdic-
tion) courts to apply directly the RF Constitution where these courts had found that a fed-
eral law (or a presidential edict) contradicted the Constitution and to refrain from applying 
such legislation or edicts (points (b), (v), (g), para.2, Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo 
Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ruling of the Plenum of the RF Supreme Court] (31 October 
1995) No.8, “O nekotorykh voprosakh primeneniia sudami Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Feder-
atsii pri osushchestvlenii pravosudiia” [On Some Questions Pertaining Application of the 
RF Constitution by Courts when Administering Justice], Rossiiskaia gazeta (28 December 
1995) No.247. In a 1998 Ruling, the Constitutional Court had condemned this practice rea-
soning that no court can abstain from applying legislation unless such legislation has been 
deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo 
Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ruling of the RF Constitutional Court] (16 June 1998) No.19-P, 
“O tolkovanii otdel’nykh polozhenii statei 125, 126 i 127 Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federat-
sii” [On Interpreting Some Provisions of Arts.125, 126 and 127 of the RF Constitution], 
SZRF (1998) No.25 item 3004. This discrepancy between two jurisdictions has lasted 15 
years until the Supreme Court abandoned its position and deleted the controversial points 
from its Ruling. See Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Rul-
ing of the Plenum of the RF Supreme Court] (16 April 2013) No.9, “O vnesenii izmenenii v 
Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii (31 October 1995) No.8, ‘O neko-
torykh voprosakh primeneniia sudami Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii pri osushchestv-
lenii pravosudiia’” [On Amending a Ruling of the Presidium of the Supreme Court No.8 
of 31 October 1995 “On Some Questions Pertaining to the Application of the RF Consti-
tution by Courts when Administering Justice”], Rossiiskaia gazeta (24 April 2013) No.89.
343 Zorkin, op.cit. note 279.
344 Zorkin, op.cit. note 279, 8. Such calls for communication between the European and the 
national jurisdictions also have been suggested by some European lawyers. See Anthea 
Roberts, “Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and 
Enforcing International Law”, 60(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2011), 
57-92.
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The authoritarian and isolationist trends in Russian internal policy have 
been used (going back to Soviet times) to favor such argumentation in order 
to defend Russia against “Western moral imperialism”.345
This official rhetoric meets some constraints in the text of the 1993 
RF Constitution. So, the supremacy of international standards in human 
rights can be found in Article 17: human rights in Russia are recognized 
and ensured “according to the generally recognized principles and norms 
of international law”. Nonetheless, for some observers, this reference to 
international law appears to be a mere statement of policy.346 A strictly for-
malist reading of Article 15 of the Constitution can lead one to the following 
conclusion: only the treaties to which the state has ceded its sovereign will 
are binding upon the Russian judiciary, the parliament and the government; 
the general norms and principles of international law which have not been 
ratified are not deemed to be a source of international law347 and only will 
have persuasive or informative effect.348 From this perspective, one can 
conclude that the standards of human rights protection and the principles 
of democracy—in certain circumstances—can be abandoned for the sake 
345 See Derek Averre, “Sovereign Democracy and Russia’s Relations with the European 
Union”, 15(2) Demokratizatsiya (2007), 173-190.
346 E.g., it was stated almost twenty years ago that, with respect to the implementation of 
international human rights in Russia, Art.15 of the Constitution seems “to be more theory 
than practice”. “Report on the Conformity of the Legal Order of the Russian Federation 
with the Council of Europe Standards, 15 Human Rights Law Journal (1994), 249-250. See, 
also, Jonathan Weiler, Human Rights in Russia: A Darker Side of Reform (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Boulder, CO, 2004); and Anna Politkovskaya, Putin’s Russia (Harvill Press, 
London, 2004).
347 Art.22 of the RF law on international treaties contains an “indirect protection of sover-
eignty’ clause:
“If an international treaty contains rules requiring the change of individual provisions 
of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the decision concerning consent to its 
binding nature for the Russian Federation shall be possible in the form of a Federal 
Law only after making the respective amendments to the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation or a revision of its provisions in the established procedure.”
 Federal’nyi zakon [Federal Law] “O mezhdunarodnykh dogovorakh Rossiiskoi Fed-
eratsii” [On International Treaties of the Russian Federation] (15 July 1995) No.101-FZ, 
SZRF (1995) No.96 item 2756. See, also, Bogdan Leonidovich Zimnenko, International Law 
and the Russian Legal System (Eleven Publications, Utrecht, 2007, W.E. Butler, ed., transl. 
introd.), 80ff. (in Russian: Bogdan Leonidovich Zimnenko, Mezhdunarodnoe pravo i pravo-
vaia sistema Rossii. Obshchaia chast’ (Statut, Moscow, 2010), 63ff.).
348 In order to stress that the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court does not have binding 
force in Russia, some Russian lawyers propose to treat ECtHR’s judgments as a “per-
suasive” or “informative” precedent [ubezhdaiushchii, informatsionnyi pretsedent]: Alek-
sandr Bonner, “Sudebnyi pretstedent v rossiiskoi pravovoi sisteme” [Judicial Precedent 
in the Russian Legal System], 3 Rossiiskii ezhegodnik grazhdanskogo i arbitrazhnogo protsessa 
(2004), 151-161; and Igor’ Iastrzhembskii, “Sovremennoe ponimanie sushchnosti sudeb-
nogo pretsedenta” [A Contemporary Understanding of the Nature of Judicial Precedent], 
LXIII(1) Lex Russica (2010), 353-354. See, also, Kirill Koroteev, “Are Russian Courts Capa-
ble of Creating Precedents? Overcoming Inconsistency in Case Law”, 38(3-4) Review of 
Central and East European Law (2013), 341-362.
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of the protection of sovereignty under Article 4 of the Constitution.349 This 
conclusion is confirmed by Article 55(3) of the Constitution which provides 
that individual rights and freedoms may be restricted in order to protect the 
foundations of the constitutional system, the security of the country, or the 
security of the government.350 Article 2 of the Constitution—pursuant to 
which human rights are declared to be the highest priority (as the “supreme 
value” [vysshaia tsennost’] (Art.2, RF Constitution) in Russia—provides a 
defense against such a reading, although the text of Article 2 does not define 
the scope of the protected human rights.
Does this Article refer only to those mentioned in ratified treaties, or 
those which are internationally recognized, or even those which can be 
classified as “natural rights” and are not fixed in any treaty or convention? 
There are two main approaches to this problem in Russian international-law 
scholarship.
The first approach preserves the force of the sovereignty argument, as 
ratification implies that state concedes the application of an international 
treaty on its territory. The second is problematic in view of the afore-
mentioned ambiguities of the Constitution, which does not explicitly restate 
what shall be the balance between the concerns of human rights and those 
of sovereignty. At first glance, the second reading may seem favorable to uni-
versal humanitarian standards. Nonetheless, in the consequent logic of its 
implementation, it also can result in discarding “internationally recognized 
human rights”: putting them aside in order to give way to the “natural 
rights” found by courts in domestic traditional values and patterns.
A clear example of this latter approach can be seen in the attitude of the 
courts to gays and lesbians who allegedly are being prosecuted for express-
ing their opinions. As we shall show below, these prosecution stands in 
contradiction to international standards of human rights. Yet, in Russia such 
prosecutions are justified from both theoretical and practical standpoints 
with reference not only to the traditional family, gender roles, and religious 
commands but, also, to the sovereignty argument: to defend Russian society 
349 “The sovereignty of the Russian Federation shall cover the whole of its territory. The 
Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws shall have supremacy in the 
whole territory of the Russian Federation.” Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii (25 Decem-
ber 1993) (as amended), SZRF (2009) No.4 item 445.
350 “The rights and freedoms of man and citizen may be limited by the federal law only to 
such an extent to which it is necessary for the protection of the fundamental principles of 
the constitutional system, morality, health, the rights and lawful interests of other people, 
for ensuring defense of the country and security of the State.” (ibid.)
 Naturally, such limitation clauses are formulated also in other Constitutions; see an over-
view in Roza Pati, “Rights and Their Limits: The Constitution for Europe in International 
and Comparative Legal Perspective”, 23(1) Berkeley Journal of International Law (2005), 
223-280. But a key question remains: why does such a limitation on rights seem to work 
in other jurisdictions somewhat differently than in Russia? This question requires a spe-
cial comparative research which we are unable to undertake within the framework of the 
present chapter.
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from the West.351 The ECtHR’s 2010 decisio n352 in Alekseyev—in which the 
ECtHR unanimously found Convention violations in the restrictions which 
had been imposed by Moscow authorities on gay-rights marches—has had 
virtually no effect on Russian legal practice .353 The argumentation of the 
ECtHR has been overruled with references (see argumentation in the cases 
cited below) to cultural traditions of the Russian people which is sovereign 
and, therefore, can impose its values upon those stemming from interna-
tional law.354
4 The Philosophical Background of Discussions on Sovereign 
Democracy
If one looks carefully at the theoretical underpinning of the official Russian 
attitude to human rights, one can observe an outline of certain traditions 
of legal thinking which have been interiorized at the very basic levels of 
culture and, also, naturally during legal education. Discussing the official 
position on the sovereignty issue in Russia in their 2009 work, McGovern 
and Willerton find the main sources of this posture in “the Russian politi-
351 A noteworthy theoretical analysis of the conflict between the ideology of natural 
rights and that of the liberal human rights can be found in Gret Haller, Human Rights 
Without Democracy?: Reconciling Freedom With Equality (Berghahn Books, Oxford, 
2012). See, also, Alexander Dmitrenko, “Natural Law or Liberalism? Gay Rights in the 
New Eastern Europe” (2001), available at <https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bit-
stream/1807/15216/1/MQ63077.pdf>; and Cai Wilkinson, “Putting Traditional Values 
into Practice: Russia’s Anti-Gay Laws”, 138 Russian Analytical Digest (2013), 5-7.
352 ECtHR Judgment Nikolay Alekseyev v. Russia (21 October 2010) Applications No.4916/07, 
25924/08 and 14599/09.
353 Characteristically, in dismissing Aleskeyev’s petition in 2013, based on the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR in the 2010 case of this petitioner (op.cit. note 352), in para. 2.2. of its ruling, 
the RF Constitutional Court held that this ECtHR judgment is not binding as far as it 
does not preclude the Constitutional Court from “the necessity to defi ne on the basis of 
balancing of the competing constitutional values […] limits for realization of rights and 
freedoms by such persons [i.e., gays] so that they do not violate the rights and freedoms 
belonging to other people”. Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
[Statement of the RF Constitutional Court] (24 October 2013) No.1718-O, “Ob otkaze v 
priniatii k rassmotreniiu zhaloby grazhdanina N.A. Alekseeva na narushenie ego konsti-
tutsionnykh prav stat’ei 7.1 Zakona Sankt-Peterburga “Ob administrativnykh pravona-
rusheniiakh v Sankt-Peterburge” [About the Denial to Accept for Consideration a Com-
plaint of Citizen N.A. Alekseev About Violation of his Constitutional Rights by Article 
7.1. of St Petersburg Law “On Administrative Offenses in St. Petersburg”], available at 
<http://base.garant.ru/70524914/>.
354 Here we shall not enter into a detailed account of case law in Russia on this matter, indi-
cating only selected judicial cases which we argue should serve as examples of this atti-
tude: e.g., the Decision of the Gagarinskii District Court of Moscow (20 July 2010) No.2-
2415/2010, Alekseev v. Ministry of Justice (about the registration of “The Movement for 
Equality of Marriage”); and the Decision of Arkhangelsk Regional Court (22 May 2011) 
No.3-0025, Vinnichenko v. the Arkhangelsk Council of Deputies (about the illegality of the 
regional law prohibiting gay propaganda). The decisions have not been offi cially pub-
lished but are available at <http://судебныерешения.рф>.
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cal philosophical tradition emphasizing statism, collectivism, and national 
sovereignty that has long differentiated the country’s political outlook and 
experience from that of many Western countries”.355
This conclusion leaves one with an ambiguous impression. On the one 
hand, the disregard of differences in Weltanschauung can be cited as one of 
the main reasons for the failure of Western attempts to accomplish a mission 
civilisatrice aimed at educating Russians to respect the values of democ-
racy, freedom, and individual liberties without noticing that these values 
are perceived somewhat differently in Russia. On the other hand, such a 
difference should not be overestimated since Russian history also shows 
strong tendencies towards democracy and self-government which can be 
compared (yet, nota bene: not identified!) with Western European ones.356
In arguing that there is some specificity in the Russian culture of legal 
thinking, we do not share the dubious conservative conclusions that Rus-
sians do not have the mentality needed for understanding the social value 
of law. According to the famous diction of Alexander Herzen:
“The legal insecurity that has hung over our people from the time immemorial 
has been a kind of school for them. The scandalous injustice of one half of the 
laws taught them to hate the other half; they submit only to force. Complete 
inequality before the law has killed any respect they may have had for legality. 
Whatever his station, the Russian evades or violates the law wherever he can do 
so with impunity; the government does exactly the same thing.” 357
355 McGovern and Willerton, op.cit. note 281, 3. As such, this approach to the issue is fruit-
ful even if we cannot share the characterization of the Russian mentality as “decidedly 
traditional, and in many regards undemocratic” (ibid., 17), as a “collectivist mindset” 
(ibid., 26). This mentality is much richer and more diverse than has been suggested by 
McGovern and Willerton; it also can be characterized by references to the intellectual leg-
acy of Chicherin, Gradovsky, Kavelin and other Russian liberals. Cf. the classic work by 
Andrzej Walicki, Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism (University of Notre Dame, Notre 
Dame, IN, 1992). From a historical standpoint, one also can trace the common roots of 
Eastern and Western European legal cultures; see, e.g., Mikhail Antonov, “Du droit byz-
antin aux pandectistes allemands: convergences de l’Europe occidentale et de la Russie”, 
in Anna Karuso (ed.), Identita del Mediterraneo: elementi russi (AM&D Edizioni, Cagliari, 
2012), 253-263.
356 See Nicholas S. Timasheff, “Free Institutions and Struggle for Freedom in Russian His-
tory”, 35(1) Review of Central and East European Law (2010), 7-25; and F.J.M. Feldbrugge’s 
introduction to this piece: “Nicholas Timasheff’s Views on the Role of Freedom in Rus-
sian History”, 35(1) Review of Central and East European Law (2010), 1-5.
357 Alexander Herzen, “O razvitii revoliutsionnykh idei v Rossii” [On the Development of 
Revolutionary Ideas in Russia] (fi rst published in 1869), in Alexander Herzen, Sobranie 
sochinenii v 30 tomakh, Vol. 7 (Moscow, 1956), 121. See an interesting analysis of the alleged 
legal nihilism of the Russians in Kathryn Hendley, “Who Are the Legal Nihilists in Rus-
sia?”, 28(2) Post-Soviet Affairs (2012), 149-186, where Professor Hendley writes that “legal 
nihilism is an inescapable feature of Russian legal culture” (ibid., 179). There are even 
more resolute statements in Western scholarship; see, e.g., Jessica C. Wilson, “Russia’s 
Cultural Aversion to the Rule of Law”, 2(2) Columbia Journal of European Law (2008), 195ff.
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The first proposal (a particular mentality) does not necessarily involve the 
second (legal nihilism). In spite of all the intricacies of the historical devel-
opment (the Tartar yoke, the tsarist autocracy, or communist rule), on the 
whole Russia belongs to the continental legal tradition of Western civiliza-
tion.358 The difference is nevertheless perceptible, and as Bill Bowring has 
argued: “there is a distinctively Russian tradition of thought and argument 
about human rights”.359 This tradition is not to be found at the level of a 
mystical Volksgeist but, rather, in the manner in which students are taught 
law; the way in which judges and law-enforcement officers are instructed to 
find, protect and enforce the law.360
Historically, this Weltanschauung has been expressed in philosophical 
ideas about a religio-mystical unity between society and individuality, 
in “the eternal conflict between the instinct of statehood’s power and the 
instinct of freedom and sincerity of the people”.361 As Berdyaev wrote in his 
1937 tome, one result of these ideas can be seen in the unhappy experiment 
with Russian Communism pretending to carry out the traditional Russian 
values of Sobornost’ or communitarianism (the mystic idea of religious inte-
gration of an individual into the collective spirituality).
The emphasis on the collectivity—superposing individuality—often 
has been mentioned as one of the key elements of Russian culture. This 
cultural peculiarity is seen as promoting egalitarian values and community 
fellowship. For Margaret Mead, it is in shifting away from an emphasis 
on the solitary communicant to one on the congregational experience of 
community.362 For Russian ideal-realist philosophy, this shift does not 
lead to the annihilation of individuality for the sake of universality; yet, 
ideally, it does aim at a fuller development of the personality which only 
can exist as a part of the totality (the people, the Church, the rural com-
munity (mir [world]), etc.). The gap between this ideal dimension and the 
historical reality of the domination of the collective over the individual for 
Nikolai Berdyaev, Vladimir Soloviev and many other Russian intellectuals 
is explained by Orthodox religiosity: justifying individual existence solely 
358 Even if one can legitimately argue that in the case of Russia we deal with a kind of transi-
tory, hybrid or mixed system combining Western elements with those of different legal 
traditions. On this problem see Esin Örücü, Mixed Legal Systems at New Frontiers (Wildy, 
Simmonds & Hill Publishing, London, 2010).
359 Bowring, op.cit. note 335, 238. See, also, Bill Bowring, “Rejected Organs? The Effi cacy of 
Legal Transplantation, and the Ends of Human Rights in the Russian Federation”, in Esin 
Örücü (ed.), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (UKNCCL, BIICL, London, 
2003), 159-182.
360 Cf. the thoughtful examination of the particularities of the Eastern European legal 
mentality and of the connection between this mentality and judicial practices in Justice 
Kühn’s The Judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe, op.cit. note 122.
361 Nicolai Berdyaev, The Origin of Russian Communism (G. Bles, London, 1937), 15.
362 Margaret Mead, “Soviet Attitudes toward Authority. An Interdisciplinary Approach 
to Soviet Character”, in M. Mead, J. Rickman and G. Gorer, Russian Culture (Bergbahn 
Books, Oxford, 2002, fi rst published in 1951), 96.
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in the eschatological perspective of salvation. In turn, this is possible only 
through collective action.363
This philosophical hypothesis of the union between the social and the 
individual easily could divert Russian thinkers from the “western” model of 
democracy, the main function of which is to check (to reign in where neces-
sary) behavior of government vis-à-vis the individual. The idea of the spiri-
tual union of the people and government is undergirded by the “antique 
model” of democracy where state (polity) and people should work as in a 
“symphony” (the old Byzantine idea364 penetrated into Russia in the early 
Middle Ages) to safeguard the totality from disintegration.365 The organic 
relationship between the people and the government presupposes that they 
are spiritually united to accomplish a “national idea” (natsional’naia ideia, 
another powerful slogan in the vocabulary of the Russian conservators from 
Sergei Uvarov, Ivan Ilyin to Vladimir Putin366), this national idea being to 
uphold collective concern for national sovereignty in the guise of “sover-
eign democracy”.
Two major stages can be identified in discussions about sovereignty 
in Russia. The first is connected with the “failing” model of federalism 
introduced in the 1993 Constitution.367 The Constitutional Court, step-by-
363 Cf. Charalambos Vlachoutsicos, “Russian Communitarianism: An Invisible Fist in the 
Transformation Process of Russia”, Working Paper No.192 presented at the William 
Davidson Institute of the University of Michigan Business School (28-28 September 1997), 
available at <http://wdi.umich.edu/fi les/publications/workingpapers/wp192.pdf>.
364 “The concept of Byzantine symphony characterizes a political theory in which the power 
of secular government is combined with the spiritual authority of the church.” Cristian 
Romocea, Church and State: Religious Nationalism and State Identifi cation in Post-communist 
Romania (Continuum International, London, 2011), 78.
365 Cf. on this trend in the Russian legal philosophy Mikhail Antonov, Istoriia russkoi pravovoi 
mysli [History of the Russian Legal Thought] (Vysshaia shkola ekonomiki, St. Petersburg, 
2012), 94-106.
366 On the advantages of this symbiosis of ideas for the official ideology see Vladimir 
Solov’ev, Putin: putevoditel’ dlia neravnodushnikh [Putin: A Guide for the Not-Indifferent] 
(Eksmo, Moscow, 2008). (This contemporary author is a namesake of the great Russian 
philosopher of the end of 19th century and should not be confused with him.)
367 Many Western observers have noticed that the attempts of the federal government to 
restore the integrity of Russia resulted in the shrinking of activity of democratic insti-
tutes and the protection of human rights. E.g., Cameron Ross argues that Russia’s weak 
and asymmetrical form of federalism has played a major role in thwarting the consoli-
dation of democracy. Federalism and democratization in Russia exist in contradiction 
rather than harmony. Cameron Ross, Federalism and Democratization in Russia (Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 2002). On the role of the Constitutional Court in balanc-
ing strong federalism and liberal democracy see Edward Morgan-Jones, Constitutional 
Bargaining in Russia: Institutions and Uncertainty (Routledge, Abingdon, UK, 2010). These 
remarks are partly correct as centralization reforms often involve “Blood and Iron” (Eisen 
und Blut, the title of the famous 1862 speech of German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck 
about the unifi cation of the German territories). But federalism and democracy are far 
from being incompatible and, rather, can imply one other as it has been shown by Alexis 
de Tocqueville in his Democracy in America (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 
2000, fi rst published in French in 1835 as De la Démocratie en Amérique).
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step, has dismantled the concept of shared sovereignty (formerly supposed 
to belong both to the federation and to its members368), overturning the 
differently formulated sovereignty clauses in regional Russian constitu-
tions (konstitutsii and ustavy). These steps of the Court were accompanied 
by centralization reforms launched by Putin during the term of his first 
presidency (2000-2004) .369 Once the “integrity” of the country was restored 
in mid-2000 (to wit: breakaway movements in the Russian regions being 
suppressed370), the debates took another direction; this time, about the 
limits of independence of Russia in the sphere of international law and 
inside international organizations (the UN, WTO, etc.). The controversies 
between Russia and European institutions (PACE, the ECtHR, etc.) in such 
politically engaged cases as those of YUKOS, the Chechen and the Georgian 
campaigns, and the Magnitsky affair led to a reassessment of the attitude 
of Russian politicians and senior judges towards international human-
rights standards. The criticism was not against the standards as such but, 
rather, against the “irresponsible behavior” (bezotvetstvennoe povedenie) of 
international organizations.371 This criticism was not directed against “the 
International”; rather, its target has been “the Western” with its pretensions 
of supplanting the International. Independence from Western influence was 
seen, in this context, as the basic precondition for the “normal” develop-
ment of Russia (in the sense of a development which would be congruent 
with certain cultural norms inherent to Russian civilization).
368 This conception was expressly fi xed in the 1992 Federal Compact which symbolically 
mentioned “sovereign republics included into the Russian Federation”. Dogovor o raz-
granichenii predmetov vedenia mezhdu federal’nymi organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti 
Rossiiskoi federatsii i ogranami vlasti suverennykh respublik v sostave Rossiiskoi Fed-
eratsii [Treaty on Delimitation of Competence Between Federal State Authorities of the 
Russian Federation and Authorities of Sovereign Republics-Members of the Russian Fed-
eration] (31 March, 1992), in Federativnyi Dogovor. Dokumenty. Kommentarii (Respublika, 
Moscow, 1992) (not an offi cial publication).
369 On this fi rst stage see Mikhail Antonov, “Theoretical Issues of Sovereignty in Russia and 
Russian Law”, 37(1) Review of Central and East European Law (2012), 95-113.
370 One of the latest echoes of this fi ght is the introduction of criminal liability for separatist 
propaganda which provides up to three years of imprisonment for “inciting publicly to 
acts aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation”. Art.280.1, RF 
Criminal Code, introduced on the basis of Federal’nyi zakon [Federal Law] (28 December 
2013) No.433-FZ, “O vnesenii izmeneniia v Ugolovnyi kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [On 
Amending the RF Criminal Code], Rossiiskaia gazeta (30 December 2013) No.295.
371 See Sinikukka Saari, Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in Russia (Routledge, London 
and New York, NY, 2009).
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The main ideologist of this idea was Vladislav Surkov who, in 2006,372 
was deputy head of the Administration of the then Russian President, 
Vladimir Putin. The rhetoric around sovereign democracy was developed 
by Surkov with reference to the set of ideas introduced in 1990s by the neo-
conservative Francis Fukuyama.373 The most impressive contribution to 
the debates was made by Surkov during a 2006 Round Tabl e374 where—in 
referring to the Slavophile ideas (“The Russian people must develop them-
selves organically, must have a total representation of themselves”)—he 
called for a “sovereign democracy” which “appeals to the dignity of the 
Russian people and the Russian nation in general”.375 This conception was 
laid down in a collection of articles376 in which Surkov and other authors 
insisted that Russia has a special vocation to protect its national specificity 
(natsional’naia osobennost’) against Western nihilism.377
In a 2006 speech,378 Surkov posited “sovereign democracy” as a societal 
structure where the supreme power belongs to the Russian nation which 
is entirely independent of the external (that is: Western) forces. There are 
372 On 27 December 2011, Surkov was appointed RF Deputy Prime Minister, from which 
post he resigned on 8 May 2013. Since 20 September 2013, he has been the RF President’s 
aide (pomoshchnik) for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Although Surkov sometimes is 
regarded in the West as a “gray cardinal” of Putin’s administration (Steve Gutterman, 
“Russia’s Putin Brings “Grey Cardinal’ Surkov Back to the Kremlin”, Reuters (20 Septem-
ber 2013), available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/20/us-russia-surkov-
idUSBRE98J0VK20130920>), we draw our attention to his conception not for its own sake 
but, rather, since it seems to us to be representative of the ideas of Putin’s circle and of 
Putin himself (who carefully abstains from philosophical debates). It is in this line that 
we seek to characterize the “sovereign democracy” conception in the prism of Putin’s 
latest speeches.
373 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, New York, NY, 1992); 
and id., The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (Free 
Press, New York, NY, 1999).
374 Round Table “Suverennoe gosudarstvo v usloviiakh globalizatsii: demokratiia i 
natsional’naia identichnost’” [The Sovereign State in the Conditions of Globalization: 
Democracy and National Identity] (30 August 2006). The discussion is available at Ekat-
ernia Dobryinina, “Prishli k golasiiu” [Arriving at Agreement], Rossiiskaia gazeta (9 Sep-
tember 2006), available at <http://www.rg.ru/2006/09/06/diskussia.html>.
375 Ibid. 
376 Andranik Migranian, Viacheslav Nikonov, Dmitrii Orlov, Mikhail Rogozhnikov, and 
Vladislav Surkov, Suverennaia demokratiia: ot idei k doktrine [Sovereign Democracy: From 
Idea to Doctrine] (Evropa, Moscow, 2006).
377 For interesting refl ections on these debates viewed from the perspective of the Slavophile 
philosophy see Andrei Okara, “Reprivatizatsiia budushchego. Suverennaia democratiia: 
ot poiskov novoi russkoi idei k missii korporatsii ZAO Rossiia” [Reprivatization of the 
Future. Sovereign Democracy: From the Search for a New National Idea to the Mission 
of the Corporation Russia Inc.], Rossiiskaia politika (2007) No.1, 85-95. An abridged Eng-
lish version is Andrei Okara, “Sovereign Democracy: A New Russian Idea or a PR Proj-
ect?”, 5(3) Russia in Global Affairs (2007), 8-20, available at <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/
number/n_9123>.
378 Surkov, op.cit. note 312.
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three basic conceptual premises of sovereign democracy: (a) sovereignty 
legally prevails over (liberal) democracy; (b) one can correctly balance the 
sovereign rights of the state with individual human rights because there 
is an “organic relationship” between the people and the government, and 
because an individual is nothing more than a part of the collective; and (c) 
the democratic tradition need not be introduced to Russia from abroad but, 
rather, will be found in the Russian thousand-year culture of statehood 
which is based on the communitarian traditions. Individual interests cannot 
stand above societal ones; in the case of a conflict, the rights of (certain) 
individuals can be sacrificed on the altar of national, collective rights (i.e., 
the rights of the people/nation to be sovereign: politically, economically, 
helper culturally and in many other aspects).
The main political conclusion of this doctrine is the connection between 
maintaining state sovereignty and the preservation of state control, includ-
ing the introduction of a strong state ideology to insulate political power 
from international criticism.379 Russia must move toward democracy 
cautiously, under the permanent parental control of the government .380 
It is questionable whether this political concept undermines the univer-
sal idea of democracy,381 and whether there are any universalities in the 
multicultural postmodern world. But such a question would redirect us 
to vast philosophical debates which are beyond the scope of this work. In 
the context of the present Chapter, it should suffice to highlight the main 
379 This ideology underpins Federal Law (20 July 2012) No.121 imposing restrictions on 
activities of Russian NGOs funded from abroad and, for this reason, considered to be 
“foreign agents”. The opinion of the ECtHR in Assotsiatsiya NGO Golos and Others v. Rus-
sia (Application No.41055/12) and the reaction of the Russian authorities remain to be 
seen. In the same vein is Putin’s rhetoric in favor of “deoffshorization”, i.e., the compul-
sory repatriation of capital deposited by Russian businesspeople in foreign banks; a sur-
vey of private transactions is still proposed under the pretext of the protection of sov-
ereignty. “Poslanie Prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniiu” [The Address of the President 
to the Federal Assembly] (12 December 2012), available at <http://eng.kremlin.ru/tran-
scripts/4739>. The list of basic values for the development of Russia that Putin outlines 
in this Address, is demonstrative of the ideas which we are discussing in this chapter:
“The ruling parties, governments and presidents may change but the core of the state 
and society, the continuity of national development, sovereignty and the freedoms of 
the people must remain intact.”
 The sequence is emblematic: 1) state; 2) nation; 3) sovereignty; and 4) freedoms of people. 
This list leaves no room for individual liberties and human rights—let alone for democ-
racy.
380 From the general line of this rhetoric, it follows that this task is entrusted only to the 
federal government (not regional or municipal), so that “sovereign democracy is nothing 
more than democracy under the authorities’ supervision”. Vladimir Ryzhkov, “Sover-
eignty vs. Democracy?”, Russia in Global Affairs (2005) No.4, 101-112, at 104.
381 Michael McFaul, “Sovereign Democracy and Shrinking Political Space”, 14(2) Russian 
Business Watch (2006).
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philosophical implication of this position: collective interest takes precedent 
over individual interests .382
In a 2007 lecture held in the Russian Academy of Sciences,383 Surkov 
tried to connect these ideas them with the conceptions of Russian conserva-
tive philosophers (such as Nikolai Berdyaev or Ivan Ilyin). Surkov stressed 
a “holistic cultural mentality” of the Russians suggesting three political 
requirements: (a) “political unity though centralization of governmental 
competences”; (b) “idealization of the means of political struggle”: and 
(c) “personification of political institutes”. On this base Surkov concluded 
that “many people think that a powerful political center is a guarantee 
of the integrity of Russia—in the territorial, spiritual and other senses”. 
The political implications of this philosophy for contemporary Russia are 
self-evident: “The integrative activity of President Putin is successful and 
widely approved exactly since it is guided by the Russian mentality, respect 
for Russian political culture and by a love of Russia”. So, “the conception 
of sovereign democracy matches the best the Russian political culture [...], 
legitimizes centralization […] and interprets policy of President Putin”.384 
Sovereign democracy was actively discussed for several months: from the 
summer of 2006 through autumn of the following yea r.385 The last impor-
tant discussion took place in September 2007 at the Faculty of Philosophy 
of St Petersburg State University where philosophers ruthlessly derided the 
discrepancies and paradoxes of sovereign democracy.386 Already in 2006, 
Dmitry Medvedev had posited that “if you take the word “democracy” and 
start attaching qualifiers to it, that would seem a little odd”387 while, in the 
382 This in no way is a new idea. This implication was common for many thinkers, from 
Plato and Aristotle to Hegel and Marx, who were labeled by Karl Popper as “enemies of 
the open society”. See Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, in 2 vol. (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1971). A successful parallel between “sovereign democ-
racy” and the conservative ideas of Francois Guizot and Karl Schmitt is drawn in Ivan 
Krastev, “Russia as the ‘Other Europe’”, Russia in Global Affairs (2007) No.4, 66-78.
383 Vladislav Surkov, “Russkaia politicheskaia kul’tura. Vzgliad iz utopii” [Russian Political 
Culture. A View from Utopia], Russ.ru (8 June 2007), available at <http://www.russ.ru/
pole/Russkaya-politicheskaya-kul-tura.-Vzglyad-iz-utopii>.
384 Ibid.
385 The remnants of this theory can be found at the site of the “Center for the Investigation 
of the Problems of Sovereign Democracy” (Chelyabinsk State University) created at that 
time (the site was last updated in 2009), available at <http://www.sd.csu.ru/>.
386 “O diskussii vokrug poniatiia “suverennaia demokratiia’” [On the Discussion Surround-
ing the Concept of Sovereign Democracy], Politex (2007) No.3, 268-302.
387 Dmitry Medvedev, “Dlia protsvetaniia vsekh nuzhno uchityvat’ interesy kazhdogo” [For 
the Commonweal, All Need to Take into Account the Interests of Each], Ekspert (2006) 
No.28, available at <http://expert.ru/expert/2006/28/medvedev/>.
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same year, Constitutional Court Chief Justice Valerii Zorkin suggested that 
this idea was a confused form of constitutionalism.388
This philosophical critique (almost all the philosophers were united 
in their deep skepticism toward this conception) was echoed by the 
President Putin. Although Vladimir Putin did not expressly take a stance 
on Surkov’s conception, he seemed indirectly to support the ideological 
and philosophical basis on which his assistant had constructed the idea 
of sovereign democracy.389 So, in his 2005 annual address to the Russian 
parliament, Putin emphasized that Russia needed to find its own path in 
building a “democratic, free and just society and state”.390 Seven years later, 
the attraction of this line of thinking for President Putin still seemed strong: 
in February 2012, he again referred to the idea “to reanimate the state, [and] 
restore popular sovereignty which is the basis of true democracy”.391
388 “Legally, in our Constitution, nothing is written other than Russia is a democratic and 
sovereign state. Consequently, Russian democracy is sovereign, and Russian sovereignty 
is democratic. Any other interpretation of the Constitution is confusing. So, do we need 
to apply any qualifi ers to democracy?” Speech of Valerii Zorkin at the Round Table “The 
Sovereign State in the Conditions of Globalization: Democracy and National Identity” 
(30 August 2006), op.cit. note 374. The position of the RF Constitutional Court’s President 
is nonetheless ambivalent, and Bill Bowring comments that “Surkov and his circle have 
strongly infl uenced senior fi gures in the judiciary, especially Valerii Zorkin”. Bowring, 
op.cit. note 280, 7. See, also, his analysis of the debate surrounding sovereign democracy 
(ibid., 197ff.).
389 See an analysis of this rhetoric in Viatcheslav Morozov, “Modernizing Sovereign Democ-
racy? Russian Political Thinking and the Future of the Reset”, PONARS Eurasia Policy 
Memo (2010), available at <http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/pepm_130.
pdf>.
390 In this Address, Putin set out the new program as follows:
“Russia will decide itself how it can implement the principles of freedom and democra-
cy, taking into account its historical, geopolitical and other specifi cities. As a sovereign 
state, Russia can and will independently establish for itself the time-frame and condi-
tions for moving along this path […] And this is why we will keep moving forward, 
taking into account our own internal circumstances and certainly relying on the law, on 
constitutional guarantees.”
 The translation is from Ryzhkov, op.cit. note 380, 102. Commenting on President Putin’s 
2005 Address to the RF Parliament, the infl uential Russian conservative political phi-
losopher Tret’iakov remarked that “sovereign (and just) democracy of Russia is the lin-
guistic and essential formula of Putin’s political philosophy, which is not fi xed expressis 
verbis in the Address, but factually is omnipresent in it”. Vitalii Tret’iakov, “Suverennaia 
demokratiia. O politicheskoi fi losofi i Vladimira Putina” [Sovereign Democracy. On Vlad-
imir Putin’s Political Philosophy], in Leonid Poliakov (ed.), PRO suverennuiu demokratiiu 
[PRO Sovereign Democracy] (Evropa, Moscow, 2007), 9.
391 Vladimir Putin, “Demokratia i kachestvo gosudarstva” [Democracy and the Quality of 
State], Kommersant (6 February 2012) No. 20/П (4805), available at <http://www.kom-
mersant.ru/doc/1866753>.
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In September 2013, Putin outlined a major program of national 
ideology .392 Even if he, yet again, chose not to refer explicitly to the idea 
of “sovereign democracy”, his speech was very well attuned to it as the 
citations below will illustrate. Putin expressed his anxiety about the fact of 
“objective pressure of globalization on the national identity [of Russia]”, 
accusing “quasi-colonial elites” (Khodorkovskii and other oligarchs) of 
impeding Russians from elaborating a national idea with the intention 
“to better steal assets and transfer them abroad”. Transplanting Western 
legal ideologies to Russia has turned out to be fruitless as “such attempts 
to civilize Russia have not been accepted by the overwhelming majority of 
its population insomuch as in our national character we have a tendency 
to independence, to sovereignty in spiritual, ideological and international 
[vneshnepoliticheskii suverenitet] affairs”. He put the West on notice that “the 
sovereignty, independence and integrity of Russia are absolute [bezuslovny], 
no one is allowed to cross these “red lines””, and criticized it as follows:
“The Euro-Atlantic countries […] have abandoned their roots, inclusive of 
the Christian values which form the basis of the Western civilization. This has 
resulted in a denial of moral principles and of any traditional identity: national, 
cultural, religious and even sexual, in a policy which equates a family full of 
children to a one-sex marriage, a belief in God to a belief in Satan […] One 
aggressively tries to impose this model upon everyone, upon the entire world. 
I am convinced that this is a direct way to degradation and primitivization, to a 
profound demographic and moral crisis.”393
5 The Roots of Exceptionalism in Russian Social Philosophy
In these theses, we find a striking affinity to the Russian conservators of the 
19th century whose ideas we will describe below to finally compare them 
with the neo-conservatism of Putin and his circle.
First of all, is this paternalist attitude to democracy preprogrammed by 
the Russian intellectual tradition, as some Western authors have asserted?394 
392 “Vystuplenie Vladimira Putina na zasedanii kluba ‘Valdai’” [Vladimir Putin’s Speech at 
the Conference of the “Valdai” Club], Rossiiskaia gazeta (19 September 2013), available at 
<http://www.rg.ru/2013/09/19/stenogramma-site.html>.
393 Ibid.
394 For an example of such rhetoric see Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul, “Are Rus-
sians Undemocratic?”, Carnegie Endowment Working Papers (June 2001) No.20, available at 
<http://carnegieendowment.org/fi les/20ColtonMcFaul.pdf>. One also could construct 
a banal syllogism from the assertion that every people merits its government, to the fact 
of autocracy of the most Russian governments which allegedly attests the proclivity of 
Russians for authoritarianism, with the premature conclusion that Russians do not merit 
true democracy. It is paradoxical but quite explicable that neo-conservatives from two 
opposite sides (Western and Russian) arrive at the same point. See Surkov, op.cit. note 
312, on the unpreparedness of the Russians for democracy.
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We do not think so since there always were (and still are) different trends 
in this tradition in Russia. Many controversies can be seen as evidence of 
our assertion; taking one of the preeminent examples, we will address the 
Slavophiles-Westernizers debates.395 The Westernizers (liberals and revo-
lutionary democrats) insisted on modernization through “westernization” 
believing that Russian and Western civilizations have common tasks to 
accomplish. During those 19th century discussions, they insisted that the 
universal standards of political and legal organization of society are similar 
(though not identical) for the both. Landmark Westernizers have included 
Piotr Chaadaev, Aleksander Herzen, Timofei Granovsky, Konstantin Kav-
elin and numerous others who believed that Western civilization reveals 
universal values of cultural (political, legal, etc.) development in relation 
to which Russia has just fallen behind and needs to catch up the West.396 
For contemporary Russian legal thought, this means that Russia need not 
painfully fight for the particularity of its development and that it can catch 
up with Western intellectual tradition, in particular, accepting common 
standards of human rights.397
395 Cf. an attempt to construct the consequent development of Russian history throughout 
this divide in Esther Kingston-Mann, In Search of the True West: Culture, Economics and Pro-
blems of Russian Development (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1999). We limit 
our analysis here to the main confl icting principles of these two schools which are repro-
duced in the debates about sovereign democracy. It does not amount to asserting that 
Russian political thought did not reveal other aspects of the understanding of human 
rights and democracy. See Anastasia Tumanova and Roman Kiselev, Prava cheloveka v 
pravovoi mysli i zakonotvorchestve Rossiiskoi imperii vtoroi poloviny XIX – nachala XX veka 
[Human Rights in the Political Thought and Lawmaking of the Russian Empire from the 
Second Half of the 19th to the Beginning of the 20th Century] (Vysshaa shkola ekonomiki, 
Moscow, 2011).
396 Andrzej Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nine-
teenth-Century Russia (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975); and Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thin-
kers (Penguin Books Ltd, London, 1978), 117ff. For a German-language discussion on 
Russian “backwardness”, see Manfred Hildermeier, “Das Privileg der Rückständig-
keit. Anmerkungen zum Wandel einer Interpretationsfigur der Neueren Russischen 
Geschichte”, 244(3) Historische Zeitschrift (Jun. 1987), 557-603; id., “Osteuropa als Gegen-
stand vergleichender Geschichte”, in G. Budde, S. Conrad, and O. Janz (eds.), Transnatio-
nale Geschichte Themen, Tendenzen, Theorien (Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2006, 
2nd ed.), 117-113; and Carsten Goehrke, Russland: Eine Strukturgeschichte (Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung Verlag, Zürich & Berlin, 2010), 302-322. On some implications of this backward-
ness for the contemporary legal theory in Russia see Michail Antonow, “Unser schwerer 
Weg zum Recht: Grundprobleme der modernen theoretischen Rechtswissenschaft in 
Russland”, 38(1) Rechtstheorie (2007), 1-12.
397 For an interesting sociological survey which demonstrates this Slavophiles-Westernizers 
divide in the mentality of the Russian politicians see William Zimmerman, “Slavophiles 
and Westernizers Redux: Contemporary Russian Elite Perspectives”, 21(3) Post-Soviet 
Affairs (2005), 183-209. Similar sociological data also are reported in the research of the 
Russian scholars Leonid Blekher and Georgi Liubarskii, Glavnyi russkii spor: ot zapadni-
kov i slavianofi lov do globalizma i novogo srednevekoviia [The Principal Russian Controversy: 
From Westernizers and Slavophiles to Globalization and the New Middle Ages], (Aka-
demicheskii Proekt, Moscow, 2003).
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Slavophiles have espoused a theory wherein modernization is not 
necessarily connected to Westernization. Such Slavophiles as Aleksei Kho-
miakov (1804-1860) or Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (1918-2008) were attempting 
to embrace a new Russian identity: Russia represents a unique civilization 
and need not stick to ideas which are alien to the traditional mentality and 
culture of its people.398 They were persuaded that European civilization 
is permeated by a struggle among egoistic individuals. On the contrary, 
Russian society was founded on the collectivist principle of the commune 
(obshchina) united by the common interests of its members. The similarity 
with the ideals which the Bolsheviks sought to realize in Soviet Russia is 
striking and has been noticed by some Russian and Western intellectuals.399 
The social communitarian credo of Slavophiles was formulated by a promi-
nent 19th century Slavophile author, Ivan Kireevskii, which he distinguished 
from Western political ideals:
“In the West we find a dichotomy of the state, a dichotomy of estates, a dichot-
omy of society, a dichotomy of familial rights and duties, a dichotomy of morals 
and emotions […] We find in Russia, in contrast, a predominant striving for 
wholeness of being, both external and inner, social and individual [...] There one 
finds the precariousness of individual autonomy, here the strength of family and 
social ties.”400
The Slavophile ideal was—and still is—one of the integrity of society and 
of individuality, whereas European civilization and its political forms 
were—and still are usually—perceived as fragmented and individualistic. 
The Slavophiles did not deny the value of democracy as such (finding its 
ideal type in medieval Russia: e.g., the Veche in Novgorod401); rather, they 
challenged the individualist concept of liberal democracy developed in the 
West. The image of a commune (obshchina) suggested in 1852 by Konstantin 
Aksakov, one of the leaders of the Slavophiles, could be seen as a conceptual 
presentiment of “sovereign democracy” described one and a half centuries 
later by Surkov:
398 See Vasily Zenkovsky, A History of Russian Philosophy (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., New 
York, NY, 1953), 185ff.; and Peter Truscott, Russia First: Breaking with the West (I. B. Tauris, 
London, 1997).
399 E.g., George Guins “East and West in Soviet Ideology”, 8(4) Russian Review (1949), 271-
283; Peter Duncan, Russian Messianism: Third Rome, Revolution, Communism and After 
(Routledge, London, 2000); and Richard Sakwa, Communism in Russia: An Interpretative 
Essay (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2010).
400 Ivan Kireevsky, “On the Nature of European Culture and on Its Relationship to Russian 
Culture” (fi rst published in Russian in 1852 under the title “O kharaktere prosveshche-
niia Evropy i ego otnoshenii k prosveshcheniiu v Rossii”), in Boris Jakim and Robert Bird 
(eds.), On Spiritual Unity: A Slavophile Reader in Esalen-Lindisfarne Library of Russian Philo-
sophy (Lindisfarne Books, Hudson, New York, NY, 1998), 229.
401 See Ferdinand Feldbrugge, Law in Medieval Russia (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 
2008).
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“A commune is a union of the people, who have renounced their egoism, their 
individuality, and who express their common accord […], in the commune the 
individual is not lost, but renounces his exclusiveness in favor of the general 
accord—and there arises the noble phenomenon of harmonious, joint existence 
of rational beings; there arises a brotherhood, a commune—a triumph of human 
spirit.”402
Building such a brotherhood (bratstvo) requires suppression of egoistic indi-
vidualism inherent to members of the commune, and their mobilization into 
a “common accord” (soglasie). Evidently, neither liberal democracy’s protec-
tion of the minority against the majority, nor human rights defending the 
individual from the collective correspond to this project, so that new politi-
cal forms are needed instead of those developed by the “decayed West” 
(zagnivaiushchii Zapad). It should be noted that Aksakov’s position was not 
only anti-Western but, also, revealed evident anti-democratic and anti-legal 
stances. “The West developed legality insofar it felt a lack of moral truth 
[…] In the West, human soul is perishing […] consciousness is substituted 
by laws and internal motives: by regulations”, democratic order is necessar-
ily laic and uniquely is a product of Western religious individualism .403 And 
he draws his famous conclusion about the lack of need for any guarantees 
against the abuses of rights by government:
“Some would say that either the people or the government can betray each other 
and we need a guarantee. No need in guarantees! A guarantee is evil! There is no 
Good where one needs a guarantee; if a life is not based on Good and stands only 
with the help of evil, let it better be destroyed! […] All the power resides in moral 
conviction. And this treasure is in Russia. ”404
It is not that we insist the new rhetoric of sovereign democracy entirely 
repeats the old conservative schemes of the Slavophiles. This argument 
would be an evident oversimplification of the problem. Nil sub sole novum, 
and this is true also for political ideologies. But these ideologies never 
grow in an empty space and, almost always, are loosely rooted in previous 
debates. In our opinion, this is the case of sovereign democracy: it has deep 
roots in the Russian traditionalist philosophy (both religious and secular) 
from the end of the 19th century which, thereby, transmits an old intellectual 
tradition into contemporary political debates.
402 Cited in Nicholas Riasanovsky, Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles: A Stu-
dy of Romantic Ideology (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1952), 135.
403 Konstantin Aksakov, “Raznye otdel’nye zapiski” [Various Dispersed Notes], in Kon-
stantin Aksakov, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v 3 tomakh (Tipografi ia Bakhmet’eva, Moscow, 
1861), Vol.1, 625ff.
404 Konstantin Aksakov, “Ob osnovnykh nachalakh Russkoi istorii” [On the Principles of 
Russian History], in ibid., 9-10.
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An analysis of the philosophical quality of the concept of sovereign 
democracy has not been our task here; neither has our goal been to criticize 
isolationist/traditionalist ideologies. Our objective has been, rather, to 
show that a careful examination of the political rhetoric in Russia requires 
transcending (though not completely abandoning) the usual explanatory 
schemes formulated in terms of interplay of political (economical, corpo-
rate, etc.) interests and the re-translation of the Soviet ideological legacy.405 
An investigation into the philosophical dimension of this rhetoric aids 
in revealing—and, thereby, helping one to appreciate—a larger hidden 
cultural framework into which this rhetoric can be inscribed, regardless of 
whether or not the political actors concerned have been aware of this frame-
work. Today, Surkov’s conception is generally regarded as obsolete. But his 
“sovereign democracy” shows an inheritance from the past of philosophical 
ideas in current Russian political discourse.
Conclusion
This brief analysis draws several parallels between the reasoning of the 
Slavophiles and that of modern Russian conservatives on the issues of 
democracy and human rights.406 Both have condemned Western democracy 
and liberalism for their lack of spirituality and accentuated individualism, 
405 Richard Sakwa argues that in Putin’s Russia, “a modifi ed form of neo-Slavophilism pre-
dominates, no longer so much concerned with the development of a Slavic identity but 
focused on Russia’s autonomous development in partnership with the West but reassert-
ing its great power status”. Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (Routledge, New 
York, NY, 2008, 4th ed.), 280. On the interrelation between the ideas of Slavophiles and 
of the modern Russian conservators see also Judith Devlin, Slavophiles and Commissars: 
Enemies of Democracy in Modern Russia (St. Martin’s Press, New York, NY, 1999).
406 We admit that that the contemporary Russian conservative ideologists around Putin are 
not fully aware of this connection with the Slavophiles or fail to understand all its impli-
cations (like those formulated by Aksakov (see footnotes 403 and 404 above)). After Presi-
dent Putin’s Fall 2013 Valdai Speech (op.cit. note 392), political analysts intensively began 
analyze this connection. E.g., the right-wing political analyst Anatoly Stepanov in his 
2013 on-line publication “Ideologiia razvitiia nevozmozhna bez opory na traditsiiu” [An Ideol-
ogy of Development Is Impossible Without Reliance on Tradition], available at <http://
ruskline.ru/analitika/2013/10/16/ideologiya_razvitiya_nevozmozhna_bez_opory_na_
tradiciyu/>, in which characterized this speech as “a prologue to formulation of a state 
ideology” and offered thirteen “postulates” explaining why this new state ideology must 
necessarily be based on the philosophical tradition of the Slavophiles and other Russian 
conservative thinkers of the 19th century.
 In his remarks, Stepanov even came up with a proposal to create a Slavophile party (“a 
neo-Slavophile popular movement”) based precisely on the theses of Putin’s Valdai 
Speech. A Round Table was held in Moscow, on 15 October 2013, where this proposal was 
accepted and “the participants of the Round Table found it necessary to inform the RF 
President Vladimir Putin about their intention to set up a popular movement which will 
be able to help the President to carry out his objectives”, available at <http://ruskline.
ru/news_rl/2013/10/18/sozdat_dvizhenie_russkih_tradicionalistov/>.
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and stress the priority of the collective over the individual. Human rights 
in this perspective cannot gain the upper hand over state laws. These laws 
take their origin in popular national sovereignty and express the will of the 
people. At the same time, the pedigree of international law is obscure and 
suspected of being influenced by alien powers. This way of thinking stands 
in contrast to the constitutional provisions on the priority of human rights 
and of international law over domestic laws (Arts.15, 17, RF Constitution). 
However, the imperfect formulation of the Russian Constitution allows the 
judiciary frequently to circumvent these formulations by using them—and 
the principles of international law—as redundant plethoric arguments.
The conception of sovereign democracy by Surkov is not widely dis-
cussed these days, the author himself has abandoned it, and Kremlin ideol-
ogists seem to be reluctant to restate this conception. Nevertheless, one can 
conclude that the emergence of this concept was not an accident and that it 
can be considered as a recurrence of Russian conservatism. During the last 
two centuries, similar concepts often have been used in state propaganda. 
In imperial Russia, it was the case of the celebrated formula first used in 
1833) by Count Uvarov “Pravoslavie, Samoderzhavie, Narodnost’” (Orthodoxy, 
Autocracy and Popular Democracy407). This became one of the cornerstones 
of official Imperial ideology legitimizing the autocracy through references 
to Russian communitarian traditions. It also was the case of the “Soviet 
(also socialist) democracy”; this legitimized the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat and, in fact, the authoritarian (sometimes even totalitarian) rule of 
the Communist Party in Soviet Russia. “Sovereign democracy”, therefore, 
should not be seen as an “invention” but, rather, as a “reinvention” of a 
model of official political discourse.
The reiteration of this idea of a “democracy à la russe” by political lead-
ers and senior judges (with or without reference to sovereign democracy) 
conveys several ideological messages to Russians and to Russian officials 
and lawyers, in particular, about the correlation between individual and 
collective rights. One can discern three principal messages among them.
The first says that the sources of sovereignty are found in state power 
itself—not in society or in the international community. This message is 
translated by a simple syllogism: given that the Russian people are the only 
bearer of sovereignty (Art.3, RF Constitution), and given that the people do 
not realize their will directly (except during elections and referenda) and, 
rather, delegate its realization to the government, it follows that the govern-
407 The usual translation of “narodnost’” is “nationality”. Cf. Nikolay Riasanovsky, Russian 
Identities: A Historical Survey (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005), 132. In our view, 
this not the best translation: it conveys a connotation which, in the European political 
literature, refers to a substantially different set of ideas. For its founding fathers—the 
Russian romantic writers—the term “narodnost’” referred to the traditions of the self-gov-
ernment of the Russian peasantry. These traditions are in natural unison with the Russian 
autocratic regime, and this unison is legitimized by the Orthodox religiosity. This was the 
main message of narodnost’ in Uvarov’s formula. To note additionally that in Russian, the 
term “nationality” is literally transferred by the word “natsional’nost’.”
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ment is entitled (on behalf of the people) to take any and all measures to 
protect the people’s and national (these aspects are rarely differentiated in 
Russian political discourse) sovereignty indispensable for survival of the 
people. Therefore, no international courts or agencies are allowed to inter-
fere with the activities of the government or to criticize them—even where 
these interventions or criticisms might be based on humanitarian or other 
applicable standards.
Second, the “correct” way of thinking about sovereignty allows the Rus-
sian state and society to survive in the international community which is 
friendly only in appearance but which, in reality, is a conglomerate of envi-
ous states and corporations seeking to take hold of the national resources 
belonging to the Russian people, thus depriving it of its sovereignty.408 The 
main function of the state, therefore, is to detect the ideological dangers 
coming from the West in the guise of the liberal rhetoric for “idealization 
of pseudo-objective values” and to deflect these dangers through resolute 
dismissal of all the malevolent criticism of Russia coming from the West. 
Human rights and democracy are a mere pretext for the West to interfere in 
Russian internal affairs and to take control over its sovereignty.
Fear of social and political unpredictability, and traditional communitar-
ianism help to create an atmosphere favorable to the isolationism predicated 
by contemporary Russian officials as “a separate way of development” 
(osobyi put’ razvitiia) for Russia. In this light, the protection of sovereignty 
at any cost easily can be justified as conditio sine qua non for the survival of 
the Russian people. One readily can imagine that such historical experience 
has contributed to what Besançon describes as the formation of a “spirit 
of misadventure in the public sphere” in contemporary Russian culture409 
which results in mistrust of any kind of political discourse—including that 
revolving around democracy or human rights. Given this traditional inertia 
of Russians in political issues, the government sees itself able to act inde-
pendently of public opinion as long as Russians are not “ripe” enough to 
be widely engaged in political deliberation. While such assertions undoubt-
edly are highly questionable, they can—at least, partly—explain the objec-
tives of the “mobilization strategy” employed by the current authorities to 
urge Russian intellectuals to be vigilant towards Western values. If there is 
some mistrust in the great narratives about human rights among some Rus-
sians, the rhetoric about sovereignty should be able to increase the numbers 
of those who experience this distrust and reinforce the legitimacy of the 
authorities, otherwise challenged by their Western critics.
408 Ivan Krastev notes that “[f]or the Kremlin, sovereignty means capacity. It implies eco-
nomic independence, military strength and cultural identity”. Krastev, op.cit. note 382, 72.
409 Alain Besançon, Ubennyi Tsarevich: Russkaia kul’tura i natsional’noe soznanie: zakon i ego 
narushenie [The Dead Prince: Russian Culture and the National Consciousness, The Law 
and Its Transgression] (MIK, Moscow 1999, translation of his 1967 work Le Tsarévitch 
immolé), 208. Besançon means here the tendency of Russians to explain all their misad-
ventures by referring to the unjust political regimes.
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Thirdly, the West is proceeding in the wrong direction: admitting the 
paradigm of globalization where sovereignty loses its importance. Aban-
doning sovereignty in favor of softer international regulation would lead 
to the rule of transnational corporations and (in fact both local and foreign) 
oligarchs. Russia will not follow this new paradigm since it does not con-
form to the Constitution and the laws of Russia (they are clearly based on 
the Westphalian model of sovereignty) and is destructive—in opinion of the 
isolationists around Putin—for Russian society. This old idea of the “decay-
ing West” offered by the Slavophiles and appreciated by the Soviet regime 
(‘decaying capitalism”) also plays its role in dismissing the globalization 
arguments (“it can be true for the decayed West but not for Russia which 
keeps faithful to its traditions”). The globalization dangers might come 
true if Russia engaged itself in cosmopolitan culture and would admit the 
universality of democratic or humanitarian standards, destroying thereby 
its national uniqueness. These arguments—reiterated by Putin and other 
contemporary, conservative politicians—already had been developed in the 
19th century.
In these three messages,410 sovereignty mostly is understood as external 
independence, that is, the integrity and autonomy of the state as regards 
other states and the international community. In these discussions about 
“untouchable sovereignty”, no distinction is made among the sovereignty 
of a people, of a nation, of a state; as shown in this and other Chapters of 
the present volume, sovereignty is uncritically used in all messages for the 
same ideological purpose: to underscore the prevalence of public interest 
The “sovereignty debates” are not separated from the question about a 
monist/dualist foundation of the legal order; ideas about the priority of 
international law easily being seen as a threat to sovereignty.
Unfortunately, a good deal of current Western literature concerning 
“human rights, the ECtHR and Russia” problem is full of trivial conclusions 
constantly reiterating similar findings: Russia is backward in protection of 
human rights; it does not want to reform its legal system in full confor-
mity with the ECtHR jurisprudence; it is regrettable because Russia will 
not become a democratic state and will not fully assure its citizens’ rights. 
Doubtlessly, there are many grains of truth in this criticism, but the dis-
cussion more and more looks like a dialogue of the Deaf and the Dumb: 
“you must comply with our standards”; “we do not take them for gospel-
truths because […]”; “but you must comply despite your backwardness”. 
This Western rigidity leads the discussion down a dead-end alleyway. Not 
surprisingly, this deafness to the “because” argument of Russian authori-
ties becomes increasingly irritating for them, motivating them to seek for 
kindred spirits among authoritarian regimes.
410 For an analysis of this rhetoric see Dmitrii Orlov, “The New Russian Age and Sovereign 
Democracy”, 46(5) Russian Politics and Law (2008), 72-76; and Andrei Kokoshin, “Real 
Sovereignty and Sovereign Democracy”, Russia in Global Affairs (2006) No.4, 105-118.
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As we have endeavored to demonstrate in this Chapter, Russian politi cal 
philosophy often has stressed that Russia follows its own path of develop-
ment which does not coincide with the Western one, so that one can outline 
continuity of this logic from the Slavophiles in 19th century to the Putin’s cir-
cle in the 21st century. The official ideology makes more and more references 
to Russian conservative philosophers of the 19th-20th centuries, or to such 
influential Russian writers as Dostoevsky or Solzhenitsyn whose stances 
were overtly anti-Western, or to the dogma of the Russian Orthodox Church. 
The fact is that human-rights violations are alleged to be violated in Russia 
more often than elsewhere in Europe, and this naturally is regrettable. But 
there seems to be almost no theoretical and practical effect in the repeated 
lamentations about alleged violations of human rights and democratic stan-
dards in Russia and in the banal conjurations to respect them.411 It would be 
extremely useful for Western politicians to look at the situation in the same 
optic in which it is seen by the Russian authorities, to discern the “red lines” 
within which the government is ready to effectively cooperate with the West, 
and to employ the language understandable for the Russian political elite.412
Here, along with the usual technical comparison of the ECtHR juris-
prudence (and the underpinning values) with the national policies and 
laws (and the values that stand behind them), two more aspects are of 
importance.
First, it will be necessary to understand more fully the way in which 
the Russian authorities legally interpret the status of their country. This 
interpretation is based on a certain paradigm of international law where 
states are sovereign actors deciding on their own and without any external 
pressure.
Second, to more fully appreciate the philosophical backgrounds through 
which the Russian authorities interpret legal (and other) values and build 
up their reasoning about human rights. This background is rather conserva-
tive and tends to protect the alleged “uniqueness” of national development 
from the threats of globalization.
Of course, neither aspect is specific only to Russia; both also are reiter-
ated by conservatively-minded philosophers and politicians in the West 
although contexts (historical and cultural backgrounds, terminology and 
conceptions) necessarily differ. Studying this Russian intellectual context 
411 A caveat should be added here: it does not follow from our thesis that these aspects must 
be accounted for, that they are correct or that a “Russian understanding” of human rights 
and democracy must outweigh the Western one.
412 It is remarkable that some Western authors call upon their colleagues “to abandon their 
American-centric view of Russia and recognize the reality of Russian law and democ-
racy today”. Witney Cale, “Through the Russian Looking Glass: The Development of 
a Russian Rule of Law and Democracy”, 7(2) Loyola University Chicago International Law 
Review (2009), 129. Professor Hendley criticizes those scholars who “approach Russia as 
if it was a tabula rasa, disregarding what existed on paper as well as prevailing legal cul-
ture”. Kathryn Hendley, “Assessing the Rule of Law in Russia”, 14(2) Cardozo Journal of 
International and Comparative Law (2006), 353.
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should yield interesting results both for scientific conceptualization and, 
also, for an improved practical implementation of human-rights standards 
in Russia.
From this standpoint, there is no way one can predict the future devel-
opment of human rights and democracy in Russia nor can one undeniably 
qualify the position of the Russian authorities as anti-humanitarian; in 
contravention of the standards of democracy.413 As Vladimir Bibikhin, a 
contemporary Russian philosopher of law, insisted at the beginning of the 
2000s: Russian legal consciousness continually tends to create a modern 
democratic society of the European type and, at the same time, pushes 
it away.414 This contradiction reflects the tension between the formalist 
and decisionist elements of Russian law and is discernible in the debates 
about sovereignty, democracy, and human rights in Russia which we have 
endeavored to characterize in the present Chapter. In the following Chapter, 
we will look closer at this link against the backdrop of the case law on pro-
tecting sexual minorities. This would help to determine whether there is a 
necessary pragmatic connection between the conservatism of Russian law 
and the conception of sovereignty which is one of the intellectual founda-
tions of Russian law.
413 Some observers notice that “the strong Russian stating imperatives should not obscure 
the democratic potential that continued into the Putin-Medvedev period”. McGovern 
and Willerton, op.cit. note 281, 5.
414 Cf. Vladimir Bibikhin, Filosofi ia prava [Philosophy of Law] (MGU, Moscow, 2001); and 
Gadis Gadzhiev, Ontologiia prava [Ontology of Law] (INFRA-M, Moscow, 2012).
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Foreword
This Chapter continues to analyze the cultural constraints in the Russian 
legal system imposed by the prevailing social philosophy on the applica-
tion of law. This philosophy is characterized by a significant degree of 
religious conservatism and communitarianism. In Russia, as elsewhere, 
the religious conservatism is predictably opposed to sexual minorities and 
to those who want to defend or justify them. An analysis of the case law 
allows one to conclude that religious conceptions have a strong impact on 
decision-making in Russian courts. Referring to these conceptions, judges 
can sometimes overrule provisions of the Russian Constitution and the laws 
formally granting protection and guarantees to sexual minorities. This situ-
ation can be explained by the prevailing social philosophy, which promotes 
conservative values and emphasizes collective interests. The main tenets 
of this philosophy and their practical consequences for the perception of 
human rights, democracy and sovereignty in Russian law have been stud-
ied in the preceding Chapter. In the present Chapter we will demonstrate 
that this conservative social philosophy and social-communitarian morality 
are based on religious patterns still shaping the mindsets and attitudes 
of many Russians. These attitudes cannot be ignored by judges and other 
actors in the Russian legal system who, to some extent, are subject to the 
general perception of what is just, acceptable, and reasonable in society, and 
are factually bound by this perception. This perspective shows the tension 
between the formalist element of Russian law (the requirement of legality as 
the inviolable observance of the statutory law) and the decisionist element 
(mandating judges to go beyond statutory law to meet the expectations 
of the political authorities or of the general public, or both). This and the 
following Chapters will illustrate how the “law in minds” (examined in 
the three previous Chapters) is transformed into “law in action”, and how 
the link between religious and philosophical creeds of judges and their 
decision-making practically works.
415 The fi rst version of this Chapter was published in 2019 in 7(2) Journal of Law, Religion and 
State (2019), 152-183. The present Chapter is an updated version of that work.
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Introduction
The Russian Constitution resolutely prohibits any discrimination (Art.19), 
including based on sexual orientation, and solemnly proclaims that Russia 
is a secular state where religion and the state are separate (Art.14). After 
the adoption of the Constitution in 1993, however, certain anti-liberal devel-
opments took place in Russian society and among the Russian political 
establishment. For example, in 2013, the year after the Pussy Riot case,416 
the Russian parliament adopted a series of laws setting out to protect the 
feelings of religious believers. These laws provide statutory protection for 
believers against performances, statements, or any other actions that could 
insult their religious creeds and predispositions. The consequence is that 
non-believers and believers of “non-traditional” confessions have to accept 
the religious dogmas of the prevailing confessions (of the Russian Ortho-
dox Church (the ROC) first and foremost) as a part of their country’s legal 
order.417
This 2013 legislation brought more indeterminacy to the Russian legal 
order as it turned out that the religious feelings and creeds of quite a large 
number of people do not fit the country’s so-called “traditional values”. The 
official secularity of the state was also called into question because of the 
evident propensity of the state toward a limited number of religions. Only 
the major religious denominations (including the ROC, the mainstream 
Muslim and Jewish congregations, Catholics, and some other so-called 
historical Christian denominations) profited from these amendments, while 
other religious groups suffered not only from being “non-traditional” but, 
also, from differing from traditional Russian mindset which, therefore, put 
them at risk of being classified as “extremist”.
416 Prigovor Khoroshevskogo raionnogo suda Moskvy (17 August 2012) po delu No.1-
170/12 po obvineniiu Tolokonnikovoi N.A., Alekhinoi M.V., Samutsevitch E.S. v sover-
shenii prestupleniia, predusmotrennogo chast’iu 2 stat’i 213 UK RF [Verdict of the 
Khoroshevo District Court of Moscow (17 August 2012) in the case No.1-170/12 on the 
indictment of Tolokonnikova N.A., Alekhina M.V., Samutsevitch E.S. on charges of com-
mitting a crime under para.2 of Art. 213 of the RF Criminal Code], available at <http://
судебныерешения.рф/bsr/case/3738990>. For a short analysis of the argumenta-
tion behind the verdict, see Mikhail Antonov, “Beyond Formalism: Sociological Argu-
mentation in the ‘Pussy Riot’ Case”, 1 Revista Critica de Derecho Canonico Pluriconfesional 
(2014), 15-25.
417 One controversial case that was recently heard by a justice of the peace in the Stavropol 
Krai concerned the right of atheists to claim that God did not exist. In 2016, a Russian 
blogger named Viktor Krasnov was indicted for insulting the feelings of religious believ-
ers after posting on the Russian social network VKontakte a claim that there was no God 
and that the Bible was nothing but a book of Jewish fairytales. The case was closed in 
2017 because of the statute of limitations, but it prompted heated discussions about the 
rights of atheists to publicly express their opinion. See “Chuvstva veruiushchikh mogut 
sverit’ s Konstitutsiei” [The Feelings of Believers Can Be Verifi ed Againt the Backdrop of 
the Constitution], Kommersant (14 March 2006), available at <https://www.kommersant.
ru/doc/2937009>.
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A 2017 case involving the banning of the Jehovah’s Witnesses as an 
extremist organization by the Russian Supreme Court418 illustrates this hid-
den discrimination. The main argument for shutting down the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in Russia was their alleged extremism, understood as their claim 
to being the holders of supreme religious truth and of knowing the only 
path to salvation. Theoretically, this understanding of “religious extrem-
ism” applies to almost any religious denomination. What, in fact, makes 
a denomination “extremist”—in the eyes of Russian judges—is that its 
religious creed does not fit the conceptions of the ROC. The same logic, as 
we will argue in the present Chapter, may apply not only to religious but, 
also, to other minorities. Sexual minorities represent a paradigmatic case of 
such ambivalent attitude to “normal” and “abnormal” from the standpoint 
of the ROC and other traditional religions which stand up together with the 
ROC in this respect.
These 2013 amendments brought into sharper relief the normative 
conflict between two groups of values: the traditional (conservative) values 
largely promoting the creeds of historical religious denominations and 
liberal values prohibiting limitations of rights based on discrimination 
grounded in sexual orientation for example. Due to their basic religious 
conceptions, the traditional denominations (Russian Orthodox Christianity, 
Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism which—according to the Preamble to the 
1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations419—consti-
tute “an integral part of the historical heritage of the peoples of Russia”) are 
hostile toward sexual minorities to the extent that, frequently, there are open 
or latent conflicts between believers and sexual minorities especially in such 
418 The ruling that banned the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia was adopted by the RF 
Supreme Court on 20 April 2017 in case No.AKPI 17-238 (the full text in Russian is avail-
able at <http://www.jw-org.info/2017/05/tekst-reshenija-verhovnogo-suda-o-likvida-
cii-Svidetelej-Iegovy.html>. This ruling was upheld by the Appellate Collegium of the RF 
Supreme Court on 17 July 2017, available at <http://vsrf.ru/stor_pdf.php?id=1564706>, 
and on 16 August 2017, the RF Ministry of Justice put the Jehovah’s Witnesses on its list 
of extremist organizations.
419 Russian translation available at <http://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/freedo-
mofconscienceeng.html>. See, also, Lauren B. Homer and W. Cole Durham, Jr., “Russia’s 
1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations: An Analytical Apprais-
al”, 12(1) Emory International Law Review (1998), 101-246. The 1997 law is rather retrograde 
in that it worsened the position of minority religions as compared with the regulations in 
the RSFSR Law on Freedom of Religious Creeds.
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sensitive areas as education, adoption, and marriage .420 The 2013 legislation 
tipped the scales in favor of traditional denominations as religious feelings 
(stemming from “traditional” religious creeds and beliefs) have become 
a legitimate object of statutory protection. This added to the complexity 
involved in finding a judicial balance between these conservative values 
and liberal values (including freedom and equality) and emphasized the 
question of the justification of judicial choice between different values and 
principles. Over the last few years, the case law in Russia clearly has tended 
to support conservative values, thereby marking a departure from the lib-
eral principles enshrined in the 1993 Constitution.
Some observers claim that court decisions in Russia are politically pre-
determined and that judges, in fact, have no choice but to follow the line of 
the ruling party.421 This might be at least partly true, but we are unaware 
of any empirical data confirming an overwhelming political bias in Rus-
sian court decisions. Perhaps such a bias can be found in some high-profile 
cases, but these relatively rare cases do not suffice to make a judgment 
about the entire court system. Even if there are some politically motivated 
(high-profile) cases, it appears that there are relatively few of these, and in 
the most cases the judges are not bound by any political instructions.422 
Although there is no way to deny that judges might have pragmatic 
inclinations to abide by state ideologies and policies, and to decide cases 
accordingly, this is a natural strategy for professional survival/success in 
authoritarian countries. At the same time, given the impact of tradition and 
religion on culture, it should come as no surprise that many judges are in 
favor of the doctrines of Russia’s major religious denominations and are 
opposed to sexual minorities. Not to mention the influence of public opin-
ion which, for the most part, is conservative and which, predictably, exerts 
420 According to 2017 polls conducted by the Pew Research Center, 85% of Russians con-
sider homosexuality morally wrong. See “Religious Belief and National Belonging in 




efff8a5e05-400288249>. One can reasonably expect there to be a similar percentage of 
antigay attitudes among Russian judges. The government does not necessarily need to 
inspire repressive attitudes towards sexual minorities among Russian judges as these 
attitudes are already programmed by the prevailing conservative culture.
421 Authors claiming that political machinations are behind certain court decisions usually 
support their fi nding not with facts but rather with guesswork. See, for example, John B. 
Dunlop, “The Russian Orthodox Church as an ‘Empire-Saving Institution’”, in Michael 
Bourdeaux (ed.), The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (M.E. Sharpe, 
New York, NY, 1995), 15-40.
422 In her recent book, Professor Hendley justly remarks that politicized cases in Russian 
law “actually amount to a drop in the bucket” and argues that “careful observation of the 
routine behaviour of individuals, fi rms, and institutions reveal more about the role of law 
in Russian life than do sensational cases”. See Hendley, Everyday Law in Russia, op.cit. note 
47, 2.
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a rather strong influence on judges. This conservative attitude to sexual 
minorities has become one of the major points of controversy in relations 
between Russia and the West concerning human rights423—and it is exactly 
this aspect which draws our attention.424
In this Chapter, we examine the dichotomy that exists between formal 
legal texts (the Constitution, ratified treaties, and other legal acts that estab-
lish liberal and anti-discrimination rules and principles) and the factual 
situation where the state owes no small part of its legitimacy to adherence 
to so-called “traditional values” and to support of the ROC and other 
conservative forces. For a variety of historical reasons, these “traditional 
values” in Russia are, for the most part, based on the religious patterns of 
the major religious denominations which are, by definition, conservative 
in sexual matters. Furthermore, in recent years the government has readily 
utilized the slogan “traditional values” in its anti-Western and anti-globalist 
rhetoric, reinforcing its support from the conservatively minded masses.425 
In turn, this predictably leads to conflicts and discrepancies with suprana-
tional institutions and, in particular, with the ECtHR.426 In these conflicts, 
the Russian state plays the “constitutional identity” card which, in the case 
of LGBT rights, means that these rights are trumped by concern for protect-
ing the prevailing communitarian culture. This communitarianism, in turn, 
is historically rooted in religious traditions and culture, which inevitably 
423 See, for example, Alexander Kondakov, “Heteronormativity of the Russian Legal Dis-
course: The Silencing, Lack, and Absence of Homosexual Subjects in Law and Policies”, 
4(1) Oñ ati Journal of Emergent Socio-Legal Studies (2010), 4-23; and Aidar Sultanov, Zash-
chita svobody sovesti cherez prizmu postanovlenii Evropeiskogo suda po pravam cheloveka [The 
Protection of Freedom of Consciousness Through the Prism of Rulings of the ECtHR] 
(Statut, Moscow, 2013).
424 This is not only the case in Russia, as similar tendencies can be seen in other countries. 
For debates about the infl uence of religious beliefs on the decision-making of US judges, 
see Scott C. Idleman, “The Role of Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making”, 68(2) 
Indiana Law Journal (1993), 433-487; Wendell L. Griffen, “The Case for Religious Values 
in Judicial Decision-Making”, 81(2) Marquette Law Review (1998), 513-521; Gregory C. 
Sisk et al., “Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decision Making: An Empirical Study of 
Religious Freedom Decisions”, 65(3) Ohio State Law Journal (2004), 421-614; Stephen M. 
Feldman, “Empiricism, Religion, and Judicial Decision-making”, 15(1) William & Mary 
Bill of Rights Journal (2006), 43-57; Brian H. Bornstein and Monica K. Miller, “Does a 
Judge’s Religion Infl uence Decision Making?”, Court Review: The Journal of the American 
Judges Association (2009), 112-115; and Kermit V. Lipez, “Is There a Place for Religion in 
Judicial Decision-Making?”, 31(1) Touro Law Review (2015), 133-148.
425 On the role of “traditional values” in human-rights narratives in general, see Jacob W.F. 
Sundberg, “Human Rights and Traditional Values”, in Peter Wahlgren (ed.), Human 
Rights: Their Limitations and Proliferation (Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law, 
Stockholm, 2010), 125-154. For an analysis of Russia’s political objectives in protecting 
“traditional values”, see, for example, Melissa Hooper, “Russia’s ‘Traditional Values’ 
Leadership”, humanrightsfi rst.org (1 June 2016), available at <http://www.humanrights-
fi rst.org/sites/default/fi les/Melisssa%20Report.pdf>.
426 On the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the evolution of conservative and anti-
liberal polemics against liberal freedoms and against the ECtHR, see Kristina Stoeckl, The 
Russian Orthodox Church and Human Rights (Routledge, London and New York, NY, 2014).
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leads to a confrontation between this domestic conservative culture and 
the liberal culture transplanted from the West and embodied in the RF 
Constitution.
1 Contestation of Rights through Religion
The balance between the societal values rooted in religious traditions and 
the liberal values enshrined in the laws that protect minorities against the 
arbitrary rule of the majority can be a litmus test for determining the extent 
to which there is rule of law in Russia.427 Can minorities claim full judicial 
protection of their rights guaranteed by the Constitution and international 
treaties despite these rights contravening established patterns rooted in the 
prevailing religious paradigms or in so-called “traditional values”? Court 
practice in Russia, including the case law of the RF Constitutional Court, 
is rather ambiguous about this question and suggests a negative response.
Similar problems exist in other countries with a relatively strong influ-
ence of religious traditions on social life and mindsets. While adhering to 
international standards for the protection of minorities and ratifying the 
corresponding treaties, quite a few countries may in reality be unwilling to 
extend the full scope of such protection to some minorities that are stigma-
tized in public opinion. Guaranteeing rights for such stigmatized minori-
ties is, therefore, also a practical choice for the government in democratic 
countries—doing so could undermine its legitimacy and result in a loss of 
popular support which might mean lost elections. It comes as no surprise 
that traditionalist narratives are gaining popularity in political forums in 
Western societies and can be used as trumps in political strategies. There 
are plenty of discussions about the rise of populism in Europe, the United 
States, and elsewhere which, sometimes, has prompted liberal parties to 
accept anti-liberal policies as a part of their election strategies. This choice 
427 A strict reading of the rule of law principle would mean that politicized justice, in even 
a few cases, would mean that there is no rule of law. A soft reading would claim that an 
insignifi cant number of politically motivated decisions is present in every legal system 
and does not undermine the overall intergrity of legal system, unless this number reaches 
a certain treshhold. For the purposes of this Chapter the matter of politicized justice does 
not have primordial signifi cance. In terms of cause and effect, the conservative predispo-
sitions of the Russian population seem to be the cause, while the populist strategy of the 
Russian authorities to align their policies and ideological narratives with these predispo-
sitions and to garner popular support is, rather, the effect.
 For some interesting observations by one of Russia’s leading sociologists, see Igor Kon, 
“Homophobia as a Litmus Test of Russian Democracy”, 48(2) Sociological Research (2009), 
43-64. In a broader perspective, one can consider this issue in light of different strate-
gies of Russian modernization. See, for example, Marianna Muravieva, “Traditsionnye 
tsennosti i sovremennye sem’i: pravovye podkhody k traditsii i modernu v sovremen-
noi Rossii” [Traditional Values and Contemorary Families: Legal Approaches to Tradi-
tion and Modernism in Contemporary Russia], 12(4) Zhurnal issledovanii sotsial’noi politiki 
(2014), 625-640.
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is relevant not only for democratic countries where the outspoken support 
of minorities can lead to lost elections but, also, for authoritarian countries 
whose governments are, to a certain extent, dependent upon various con-
servative groups (the army, the clergy, etc.).
In Hungary, Poland, and elsewhere, these narratives are progressively 
gaining the upper hand and are challenging the established “European 
consensus” on sexual non-discrimination through the conservative Catholic 
morality prevailing in these countries. The same is happening in Russia 
where the conservative Orthodox culture is actively supporting antigay 
attitudes and opposes any attempts to grant more rights to sexual minori-
ties or even to implement the rights that are already established in statutory 
law.428 The statutory texts are insufficient, for an adequate assessment of the 
nuances and limits of this balance, as the issue of the accommodation and 
protection of religious feelings concerns underlying social conventions that 
have been historically formed and that may hold sway over the mindsets 
not only of ordinary people but, also, of legislators and judges.
To understand these conventions, one can analyze that part of Russian 
law regulating the rights of sexual minorities from the standpoint of the pre-
vailing social philosophy in Russia which has been analyzed in the previous 
Chapter. This can unveil, partly, the axiological background (i.e., the system 
of societal values) underpinning the legal regulation of sexual minority 
rights in the Russian Federation. The “prevailing philosophy” is understood 
as that which is promoted by the official media and in the discourse of polit-
ical leaders429 and, according to sociological surveys, shared by the majority 
428 There have been no sociological surveys among the Russian judiciary about their attitude 
toward different religions, and one can hardly expect judges to be straightforward on 
this point. Formally, state and religion are separate in Russia, and judges must render 
their decisions based only on laws, excluding any subjectivity and prejudice. But the facts 
are different. The Orthodox communitarian culture fi nds many proponents among the 
Russian judiciary and inspires in them a repressive approach to sexual minorities. For 
example, Constitutional Court Justice Nikolai Bondar’ wrote in 2013 that “the Russian 
Constitution contains a sort of genetic (sociocultural) code of the multinational people 
of Russia” and that the LGBT culture does not fi t this code. Nikolai Bondar’, “Bukva 
i dukh rossiiskoi Konstitutsii: 20-letnii opyt garmonizatsii v svete konstitutsionnogo 
pravosudiia” [The Letter and Spirit of the Russian Constitution: Twenty Years of Har-
monization in the Light of Constitutional Justice], Zhurnal rossiiskogo prava (2013) No.11, 
5-17, at 9. For elaborations on this point by another RF Constitutional Court Justice, see 
Mikhail Kleandrov, “Mozhet li sud’ia byt’ veruiushchim?” [May a Judge Be a Believer?], 
Pravosudie v Vostochnoi Sibiri (2003) No.4(12). On the legalist and conservative values and 
attitudes of Russian judges, see Vadim Volkov and Arina Dmitrieva, “Rossiiskie sud’i kak 
professional’naia gruppa: tsennosti i normy” [Russian Judges As a Professional Group: 
Values and Norms], in Vadim Volkov (ed.), Kak sud’i prinimaiut resheniia: empiricheskie 
issledovaniia prava [How Judges Make Decisions: An Empirical Research of Law] (Statut, 
Moscow, 2012), 128-155.
429 A short analysis of the structure of this discourse is aptly provided in Michael Urban, Cul-
tures of Power in Post-Communist Russia: An Analysis of Elite Political Discourse (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2010).
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of the population.430 (It is a separate question whether this philosophy is 
shared because it is officially promoted or it is officially promoted because 
it is supported by the masses431 which we will not discuss in this Chapter.)
After the above-mentioned 2012Pussy Riot case, legislation was enacted 
the following year establishing criminal liability for anyone convicted 
of insulting the feelings of believers or promoting LGBT ideology which 
resulted in an indirect limitation of basic constitutional freedoms (primar-
ily the freedoms of conscience and of expression), while also calling into 
question the principle of equality before the law.432 This has given rise to 
debates in Russian scholarly literature on the limits of moral regulation and 
the interplay between religion and law. Later legislation only confirms this 
interplay between legal norms and their societal background, and especially 
the so-called Yarovaia package of amendments in 2016433 which drew a 
distinction between “normal” religious cults and those “non-traditional” 
religious practices that potentially can lead to the propagation of terrorist 
ideologies. In the following sections, we will briefly scrutinize these devel-
opments, revealing their philosophical and historical background.
2 Traditional Values versus Posited Legal Rules in Court
Historically, traditions in Russia have been formed (at least concerning 
issues such as family, sexuality, and gender) under the strong influence 
of the Russian Orthodox Church,434 certainly as far as the Christian part 
430 Sociological surveys seem to confi rm that the authorities’ homophobic policy is in line 
with popular moods. According to polls by the Levada Center, 77% of Russians support-
ed the so-called gay propaganda law (which, as will be shown later, has a wider scope 
of regulation) in March 2015, as compared with 67% in February 2013. See “Nevidimoe 
bolshinstvo” [The Invisible Majority], levada.ru (5 May 2015), available at <http://www.
levada.ru/15-05-2015/nevidimoe-menshinstvo-k-probleme-gomofobii-v-rossii>.
431 For an interesting sociological explanation of how xenophobia in Russia is used by dif-
ferent groups to promote the philosophy of solidarity, see Vladimir Mukomel’, “Kseno-
fobiia kak osnova solidarnosti” [Xenophobia as a Ground of Solidarity], Vestnik obshchest-
vennogo mneniia (2013) Nos.3-4, 63-69.
432 See, for example, Alexander Kondakov, “Same-Sex Marriages inside the Closet: Decon-
struction of Subjects of Gay and Lesbian Discourses in Russia”, Oñati Socio-Legal Series 
(2011) No.1, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737357>.
433 Federal Law No.374-FZ (6 July 2016) and Federal Law No.375-FZ (6 July 2016) estab-
lished new anti-terrorism and anti-extremism measures. In particular, these laws treat 
as “extremist” and prohibit such missionary activities (sermons, proselytism, etc.) that 
might undermine traditional family values or prompt citizens to disobey the statutory 
law. For an overview, see “Overview of the Package of Changes into a Number of Laws 
of the Russian Federation Designed to Provide for Additional Measures to Counter-
act Terrorism”, International Center for Not-for-Profi t Law (21 July 2016), available at 
<http://www.icnl.org/research/library/fi les/Russia/Yarovaya.pdf>.
434 The same assertion about the decisive religious infl uence can be made about Russia’s 
second major denomination, Islam, which is the major religion in the Caucasus and in the 
Volga region where it has had a signifi cant infl uence on local cultures.
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of the population is concerned .435 This influence is reflected in, e.g., the 
Russian medieval collection of customary guidelines called the Domostroi 
(Household) where family issues are dealt with from a religious standpoint 
(even if this religiosity differed, substantially, from the canonical Russian 
Orthodox Christianity).436 Later texts contained ethical and, at the same 
time, legal (insofar as they were backed by organized coercion) prescrip-
tions of appropriate behavior. Gender roles and patterns of sexual behavior 
were prescribed in an imperative manner, with zero tolerance towards non-
traditional sexual orientations which still has repercussions to this day.437
The Westernization project undertaken by Peter the Great in the 18th 
century sought, inter alia, to westernize Russian traditionalist culture. This 
was, perhaps, one of the rationales for Peter’s reforming the Orthodox 
Church in 1721, when the Church became one of the governmental minis-
tries (the Holy Synod) headed by the Emperor.438 But if this great Russian 
reformer succeeded in his plans to change the Russian mentality, it was 
only at the highest strata of Russian society. The majority of the population 
(the peasantry, the clergy, the lower gentry, merchants) maintained their 
behavioral standards and mental outlooks, often being opposed to the west-
ernized morality and law imposed by the upper classes. For many Russian 
historians and philosophers, the 1917 Revolution is seen as a result of the 
clash between the Western values propagated by the highest classes and the 
traditionalist values imbued with evident religious connotations supported 
by the middle and lower classes.439
After the 1917 Revolution, there was little substantial change in the 
official attitude towards “non-traditional” sexuality and gender in the long 
term.440 The Soviets similarly persecuted homosexuals and banned femi-
nism from public discourse, maintaining, e.g., criminal liability for homo-
sexual intercourse. Nowadays, the issue of homosexuality has become a 
435 According to 2017 polls conducted by the Pew Research Center, 71% of Russians consid-
er themselves Orthodox Christians, 10% are Muslims, and 4% belong to other religious 
denominations. See “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern 
Europe”, op.cit. note 420.
436 Carolyn Pouncy, The Domostroi: Rules for Russian Households in the Time of Ivan the Terrible (
437 Peter Barta, Gender and Sexuality in Russian Civilization (Routledge, London, 2001).
438 James Cracraft, The Church Reform of Peter the Great (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
CA, 1971).
439 The most comprehensive interpretation of the Revolution from this point of view can be 
found in the work of Nicolas Berdyaev, The Origin of Russian Communism, (Paperback, 
Ann Arbor, MI, 1960, R.M. French transl.).
440 The unfortunate experiments with marriage and family construction in the fi rst years of 
Soviet Russia are worth a brief mention here: Lynn D. Wardle, “The ‘Withering Away’ of 
Marriage: Some Lessons from the Bolshevik Family Law Reforms in Russia, 1917-1926”, 
4(2) The Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy (2004), 469-521, but they were aban-
doned in the mid-1920s and had no signifi cant impact on Soviet family policies after-
ward.
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political rallying cry for conservatives in Russia441 claiming that the country 
must be saved from the “decadent West” that allegedly imposes a perverted 
form of sexual morality under the guise of liberalism and human rights.442
The 1993 Russian Constitution guarantees human rights such as the 
freedoms of conscience, expression, and assembly. These rights and free-
doms are basically the same as those that are set forth in the ECHR and 
in the constitutions of other European countries. However, the interpreta-
tion and implementation of these rights and freedoms in Russia differs, 
significantly, from how they are interpreted and implemented in Western 
Europe. Russian political leaders have constantly stressed that Russia is not 
prepared to recognize any active rights or freedoms for LGBT individuals, 
and this is one of those rare issues where both the ruling party and opposi-
tion liberal parties take the same stance.
While sexual minorities formally have passive rights (in the sense of 
the right to be tolerated),443 exercising these rights is considered amoral 
against the backdrop of communitarian religious morality. From the van-
tage point of “tradition” (be it Russian Orthodox, Muslim, or Soviet) or of 
“authentic family values”, such rights or freedoms are inadmissible and 
even intolerable. President Putin summed up this balance in 2019 as fol-
lows: “We have no problem with LGBT persons. God forbid, let them live 
as they wish […] But this must not be allowed to overshadow the culture, 
traditions and traditional family values of millions of people making up the 
core population.”444
However, Russia has to honor its international obligations and, there-
fore, has to tolerate minorities. This partly explains why the legal regulation 
of the LGBT community’s rights in Russia is passive, meaning that no active 
rights are explicitly recognized for sexual minorities in case law (e.g., the 
right to gay-pride parades as an element of the freedom of expression for 
441 The common conservative logic in Russian political discussions equates liberalism with 
all-permissiveness (a pejorative term for tolerance), which, in this logic, supposes free-
dom from moral and religious constraints and serves as justifi cation of homosexuality 
and other “perversions”. An example of this logic can be found in a 2017 speech by Chief 
Justice Valerii Zorkin, “Spravedlivyi miroporiadok: sovremennye podkhody” [A Just 
World Order: Contemporary Approaches] (30 November 2017), Juridical Forum of the 
BRICS countries (Moscow), available at <http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/News/Speech/Pag-
es/ViewItem.aspx?ParamId=83>.
442 Olga Malinova, “Russia and ‘the West’ in the Twentieth Century: A Binary Model of 
Russian Culture and Transformations of the Discourse on Collective Identity”, in Rein-
hard Krumm et al. (eds.), Constructing Identities in Europe: German and Russian Perspectives 
(Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2012), 63-82.
443 In addition to the constitutional principle of non-discrimination, homosexuality was 
decriminalized in 1993 (pursuant to Law No.4901-1 [29 April 1993]), which means that 
homosexuality no longer is subject to any criminal liability. Before 1993, individuals 
engaging in homosexual acts faced up to seven years in prison under Art.121, RSFSR 
Criminal Code.
444 “Vladimir Putin Says Liberalism Has Become Obsolete”, Financial Times (28 June 2019), 
available at <https://www.ft.com/content/670039ec-98f3-11e9-9573-ee5cbb98ed36>.
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the LGBT community), even if no formal discrimination is imposed on them 
in statutory or in constitutional law. This means that LGBT culture is only 
tolerated but not protected, and no allowance is legally granted to it.
This stratagem can be seen as a way to equilibrate Western moral and 
legal standards—to which Russia has subscribed through numerous inter-
national declarations and conventions—with the prevailing sense of what 
is just and normal in Russian society (from the standpoint of the major-
ity). Russian attitudes toward minorities differ, significantly, from what is 
considered just and normal in Western democracies. In particular, Russians 
in general are less tolerant toward the LGBT community than residents of 
Western countries445 which also, unsurprisingly, impacts judicial practice.
This dialectic of passive/active regulation explains why Russian federal 
statutory law does not de iure prohibit “homosexual propaganda” or homo-
sexuality (lesbianism and other non-traditional sexual orientations) directly 
although this prohibition works de facto—given the broad interpretation of 
the terms “non-traditional sexual relations” and “family values” in case law. 
In this normative ambiguity, other mechanisms of social control (primarily 
religion and traditional morality) are at work, shaping the attitudes both of 
ordinary people and of legal actors toward sexual minorities. With regard 
to the teachings of the main religious denominations in Russia (Orthodoxy, 
Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism)—and to the morality that is historically 
based on their dogmas—it is not surprising that this attitude is negative. 
References to “traditional”, “national”, and “authentic” values can easily 
become decisive factors in the adjudication process while statutory provi-
sions are silent and can be interpreted as tacitly prohibiting those behavioral 
patterns that are not directly allowed.446
In the absence of explicit legislative rules, the judiciary has gradually 
coined an implicit rule that is contrary to the general principle of antidis-
crimination: public performances, demonstrations, and mass actions that 
touch on the issues of gender and sexuality are tolerated insofar as they 
445 According to a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in June 2013: “The Global 
Divide on Homosexuality: Greater Acceptance in More Secular and Affl uent Countries”, 
pewglobal.org (4 June 2013), available at <http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/
the-global-divide-on-homosexuality/>. Similar fi ndings can be found in 2014 research 
conducted by two Russian sociologists. However, some authors fi nd that Russians are 
progressively becoming more and more tolerant toward LGBT: Margarita Fabrikant and 
Vladimir Magun, “Semeinye tsennosti rossiian i evropeitsev” [Family Values of Rus-
sians and Europeans] Demoskop (6-19 October 2014), available at <http://demoscope.ru/
weekly/2014/0613/demoscope613.pdf>. However, this increase in tolerance has so far 
not changed the balance of attitudes in Russian public opinion, and more recent polls 
have shown that 83% of Russians consider gay sex reprehensible. See “83 Percent of Rus-
sians Think Gay People Are Reprehensible”, pinknews.co.uk (11 January 2018), available at 
<https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2018/01/11/83-percent-of-russians-think-gay-people-
are-reprehensible/>.
446 Sergey Taskov, “Razresheno vse, chto ne zapreshcheno zakonom: pravovye i nravstven-
nye aspekty” [All which Is Not Prohibited by the Law Is Permitted: Legal and Moral 
Aspects], Rossiiskaia iustitsiia (2014) No.11, 50-51.
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do not contravene established value standards.447 This brings a drop of 
equivocality into the Russian legal system because this case law is at odds 
with the Constitution in at least two ways. First, according to prevalent 
legal doctrine and to constitutional law (Art.120, RF Constitution), the task 
of judges is to apply rules, but never to create them. This means that courts 
have no rule-making power: in attempting to establish such power, the 
judiciary would be contravening the constitutional principle of the separa-
tion of powers (Arts.10 and 11, RF Constitution). Second, constitutional law 
formally takes a favorable attitude toward various minorities, as it contains 
the same anti-discriminatory principles (Art.19, RF Constitution) that are 
common to Western constitutions.448
What is at play here is not so much positive law (in the sense of con-
stitutional and statutory law) but, rather, the informal constraints and 
regulations stemming from the societal environment and based on social 
conventions. These conventions in Russia—as in other countries where 
religion has a significant impact on the social sphere—are essentially con-
servative, banning from the public sphere any attempts to justify behavior 
considered to deviate from established sexual and other models. Consider-
ing the judicial function from a sociological standpoint, one can assert that, 
in their routine work, judges tend to uphold and reinforce these underlying 
conventions—lest they risk facing social pressure.449
3 The Statutory-Law Framework
Properly stated, there are no laws or directives about the status of LGBT 
people in Russia, and legal regulation in this field has a passive character. 
Statutory law is simply silent on the rights of the LGBT community which 
does not mean that there is no legal regulation at all. On the one hand, there 
are some statutory rules that do not directly restrict sexual minorities but 
that, in reality, negatively shape the limits of LGBT rights. On the other 
447 This is one of the major ideas of Russia’s anti-extremism legislation and of how it is 
enforced in the courts, which is summed up in Decree No.11 of the Russian Supreme 
Court Plenum “O sudebnoi praktike po ugolovnym delam ekstremistskoi napravlennos-
ti” [On Judicial Practice in Criminal Cases having an Extremist Character] (28 June 2011).
448 These arguments have been reiterated by LGBT activists in Russia but are ignored by the 
Russian courts. See Alexander Kondakov, “Resisting the Silence: The Use of Tolerance 
and Equality Arguments by Gay and Lesbian Activist Groups in Russia”, 28(3) Canadian 
Journal of Law and Society (2013), 403-424.
449 Kathryn Hendley, Peter Murrell, and Randi Ryterman, “Law Works in Russia: The Role 
of Legal Institutions in the Transactions of Russian Enterprises”, in Peter Murrell (ed.), 
Assessing the Value of Law in Transition Economies (University of Michigan Press, Ann 
Arbor, MI, 2001), 56-93; and Arina Dzmitryieva, “How the Law Really Works: The New 
Sociology of Law in Russia”, 13(2) Economic Sociology (2012), 13-20. Surely, the law works 
through unoffi cial channels not only in Russia but in “classical democracies” too. See 
Richard Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2008).
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hand, the factual limits of the LGBT rights in Russia are formed by social 
attitudes toward their sexual behavior,450 and this fact is gradually trans-
forming into normativity (what the German legal scholar Georg Jellinek 
called “the normative force of the facticity”) providing a kind of “soft law” 
that is not codified but that influences both political and judicial decision-
making.451 In Russian legalese, this system of regulation is referred to as 
“family values” or “traditional values”, and in law-enforcement practice it 
might be placed even above constitutional law, which may prescribe rules 
contrary to the “tradition” or “customs” of family life.452 In this aspect, the 
“living law” sometimes prevails over the “law in books”; with the approval 
of the political authorities and the popular majority but with the disap-
proval of international organizations or supranational courts.
Russian law contains two statutory rules containing a very powerful 
constraint on the rights of sexual minorities to declare their sexual orien-
tation, to provide argumentation for this orientation, and to foster public 
discussions on this topic. The first rule usually serves as the normative jus-
tification for prohibiting gay-pride parades and other public LGBT actions; 
the second is applied when LGBT activists are punished when attempting 
to organize such unauthorized actions. These provisions (in the 2013 word-
ing and further amendments) are as follows:
(1) Article 5 of Federal Law No.436 of 29 December 2010 on the Protec-
tion of Children from Information That Harms Their Health and Develop-
ment. Para.2(4) of this article prohibits the dissemination of information 
that “negates family values, promotes non-traditional sexual relations or 
provokes disrespect toward parents and/or other members of the family”. 
This interdiction is backed up by the penalty set forth in Article 6(17) of 
the RF Code of Administrative Offenses (CAO) providing for fines of up 
to RUB 50,000 for the dissemination of information that can harm children.
(2) Article 6.21 of RF CAO prohibiting “the promotion of non-traditional 
sexual relations among minors if said promotion results in the dissemina-
tion of information that is aimed at promoting non-traditional sexual 
patterns among minors, at interesting [minors] in non-traditional sexual 
450 For an excellent analysis of the public opinion on homosexuality in Russia, see Alexan-
der Kondakov, “Gomoseksual’nost’ i obschestvennoe mnenie v Rossii: ot negativnykh 
otsenok do bezrazlichiia” [Homoxesuality and Public Opinion in Russia: From Nega-
tive Evaluations to Insensitivity], Demoskop Weekly (2013), 565-566, available at <http://
demoscope.ru/weekly/2013/0565/analit05.php>.
451 Alexander Kondakov, “Injured Narratives and Homosexual Subjectivities in Russia: The 
Production of Rights Vocabulary in Post-Soviet Context”, in Marianna Muravyeva and 
Natalia Novikova (eds.), Women’s History in Russia: (Re)Establishing the Field (Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, Cambridge, 2014), 101-117.
452 On the offi cial strategy to use homophobia as a proxy for traditional values and to apply 
moral regulation instead of legal regulation, see Cai Wilkinson, “Putting Traditional Val-
ues into Practice: Russia’s Anti-Gay Laws”, Russian Analytical Digest (2013) No.138, avail-
able at <http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-138-5-7.pdf>.
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism.indb   137 10-10-19   14:53
138 Chapter 4
relations, at perverting the social equivalence between traditional and 
non-traditional sexual relations, or at providing information about non-
traditional sexual relations that provokes interest in such relations”.
The prevalent interpretation of the first legislative provision is restric-
tive and tends to routinely support refusals to allow gay-pride parades 
or similar actions: there is always the probability that, at any public place 
where LGBT activists can gather, there will be at least one child passing by. 
In fact, this results in an automatic ban on public LGBT demonstrations in 
populated areas.
Along with these statutory texts, there are several federal and regional 
programs that touch on family values. These programs do not have any 
direct binding effect on ordinary social relations but can be seen as justifica-
tion for judicial decisions seeking to protect these values from infringement 
by those minorities whose activities are deemed to be contrary to such 
values. Further, they serve as guidelines for the judiciary as to what the 
priorities of state policy are. These programs, thus, can indirectly influence 
judicial reasoning in this category of cases even if the courts do not directly 
cite them when adjudicating cases and justifying their decisions. A 2012 
presidential Edict453 states that social welfare is foremost endangered by 
such phenomena as alcoholism, drugs, and also by what is characterized 
as “the degradation of family and social values” (Chapter 1) calling for a 
program to propagate these family values (Chapter 5). Another Edict of the 
same year establishes national-policy priorities where “the revival of family 
values” is mentioned in point 21 as one of the main goals of the Edict.454 
The government’s development program mentions that best efforts should 
be made in the media to promulgate family values and to promote them 
especially among young people.455 One can easily imagine that any judge, 
attempting to deviate from these state policies, could be suspected of disloy-
alty to the ruling regime which would be fraught with negative professional 
consequences.
453 Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Edict of the RF President] (1 June 2012) No.761, 
“O Natsional’noi strategii deistvii v interesakh detei na 2012-2017” [About the National 
Strategy of Actions in the Interests of Children in 2012-2017], SZRF (2012) No.23 item 
2994. Since it has not been repealed or replaced by other strategies, this Edict remains 
formally in force.
454 Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Edict of the RF President] (12 December 2012) 
No.1666, “O Strategii gosudarstvennoi natsional’noi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii na 
period do 2025 goda” [On the Strategy of State National Policy of the Russian Federation 
for the period up to 2025], SZRF (2012) No.52 item 7477.
455 Rasporiazhenie Pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Order of the RF Government] (17 
November 2008) No.1662-p, “O Kontseptsii dolgosrochnogo sotsial’no-ekonomichesk-
ogo razvitiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 2020 goda” [On the Conception of the 
Long-Term Development of the Russian Federation Until 2020], SZRF (2008) No.47 item 
5489.
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4 The Constitutional-Law Framework
The Constitution contains a number of liberal principles, including on 
ideological diversity (Art.13: “In the Russian Federation ideological 
diversity shall be recognized; no ideology may be established as a state or 
obligatory [ideology]”) and on secularity (Art.14: “The Russian Federation 
is a secular state; no religion may be established as a state or obligatory 
[religion]”). These articles are included in Chapter 1, “Fundamentals of the 
Constitutional System”, implying that law creation and law enforcement in 
Russia are subject to these principles. Their pivotal significance is stressed 
in Article 16(2): “No other provision of the present Constitution may contra-
dict the fundamental principles of the constitutional system of the Russian 
Federation”.
These principles are echoed by a set of liberal rights and freedoms 
established in the following provision of the Constitution:
“The rights and freedoms of man and citizen shall be directly operative. They 
determine the essence, meaning and implementation of laws, the activities of the 
legislative and executive authorities, local self-government and shall be ensured 
by the administration of justice.” (Art.18)
Among these rights and freedoms are “freedom of conscience, freedom of 
religion, including the right to profess individually or together with others 
any religion or to profess no religion at all, to freely choose, possess and dis-
seminate religious and other views and act according to them” (Art.28); “the 
freedom of ideas and speech” (Art.29(1)); the interdiction to force anyone to 
express [their] views and convictions or to reject them (para.2); “the right 
to freely look for, receive, transmit, produce and distribute information” 
(para.3); “the right to assemble peacefully, without weapons, hold rallies, 
meetings and demonstrations, marches and pickets” (Art.31); and “the 
freedom of literary, artistic, scientific, technical and other types of creative 
activity, and teaching” (Art.44).
Article 55 of the Constitution establishes a mechanism to balance 
fundamental rights and freedoms with other constitutional principles and 
values. Para.2 of this article warns that “in the Russian Federation no laws 
shall be adopted cancelling or derogating human rights and freedoms”. On 
the other hand, the next paragraph states that “the rights and freedoms of 
man and citizen may be limited by federal law only to such an extent to 
which it is necessary for the protection of the fundamental principles of the 
constitutional system, morality, health, the rights and lawful interests of 
other people, for ensuring defense of the country and security of the State” 
(para.3).
The cited paragraph of Article 55 enumerates only a “necessity for 
protection” but, in fact, all laws in a democratic state (pursuant to Art.1, 
RF Constitution, Russia is proclaimed as a democratic state) are intended 
to provide such protection. A strictly positivist reading of these provisions 
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cannot offer a clear answer to this question. In practice, such a “necessity” 
means “where the Constitutional Court finds it necessary”. However, 
this is not a solution to the problem since there should be criteria for the 
Constitutional Court itself to decide about the necessity in question. The 
Constitution is silent on this point.
Being careful about the limits of interpretation, the authors of the Con-
stitution stressed the universality of human rights: “the listing in the Con-
stitution of the Russian Federation of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
shall not be interpreted as a rejection or derogation of other universally 
recognized human rights and freedoms” (Art.55(1)). Article 15(4) states that:
“The universally recognized norms of international law and international trea-
ties of the Russian Federation are component parts of its legal system. If an inter-
national treaty of the Russian Federation establishes other rules besides those 
envisaged by law, the rules of the international agreement shall be applied.”456
Thus, constitutional law is supposed to provide guarantees against any 
particularism or exceptionalism in the interpretation and application of 
these rights and freedoms. The “violation of the principle of equality of 
citizens before the law” by public officials can be punished by up to five 
years in prison. Such a contravention constitutes the corpus delicti described 
in Article 136, Russian Criminal Code.
However, the applicability of these principles and rules is largely lim-
ited by two major constraints: the authoritarian political system along with 
its traditionalist ideology, and the formalist legal training of judges and law 
officers who have been (and still are being) taught to see the law as noth-
ing but a set of commands from the sovereign and to consider the subjects 
of law (human beings) as merely the addressees of these commands with 
no rights independent of, or prevailing over, these commands.457 Religion, 
456 This language of the Constitution notwithstanding, under prevailing Russian legal doc-
trine, an ECtHR decision is not deemed to contain norms or principles of international 
law. See Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda RF [Decree of the RF Supreme Court 
Plenum] (26 July 2013) No.21 “O primenenii sudami obshchei iurisdiktsii Konventsii 
o zashchite prav cheloveka” [On the Application of the ECHR by General Jurisdiction 
Courts].
 In a judgment handed down two years later (14 July 2015) No.21-P, op.cit. note 16, the RF 
Constitutional Court ruled that decisions of the ECtHR are not self-executing and are not 
endowed with supreme force above the 1993 RF Constitution. There, the Court stressed, 
in particular, that the ECtHR can deviate from its proper function of protection of human 
rights, and national constitutional courts should limit the negative impact of such ECtHR 
judgments on their domestic laws. At the end of 2016, as a logical development of this 
trend, a new constitutional law (28 December 2016) No.11-FKZ was adopted conferring 
the power on the RF Constitutional Court not to execute decisions of the ECtHR when 
they are deemed contrary to the Constitution.
457 Antonov, “Theoretical Issues of Sovereignty in Russia”, op.cit. note 369. This orientation 
coincides with the autocratic policies of the political regime and its understanding of the 
rule of law. See Jeffrey Kahn, “Vladimir Putin and the Rule of Law in Russia”, 36(3) Geor-
gia Journal of International and Comparative Law (2007-2008), 511-558.
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morality, and the law work together in Russia in a rather specific man-
ner—with no prevalence on the part of the law (which is expected from a 
state based on the rule of law) and with rights being subject to concerns of 
sovereignty .458
Russia is a secular, democratic state that is based on the rule of law and 
that promotes value pluralism. But, in fact, moral and religious principles 
often prevail over legal principles not only in politics but, also, in court 
proceedings. Judges, scholars, and politicians in Russia sometimes admit 
that “liberal” constitutional human rights are binding only insofar as they 
do not contravene “public” morality, social dynamic s459 or, in some opin-
ions, also religious values.460 Such opinions are legitimized by Article 55(3) 
of the Constitution, which makes it possible to limit human rights for the 
sake of national security and, also, several other collective interests. This 
conservative logic is rather primitive: the law can exist only insofar as there 
is a state, the state is a political form of national integration, and national 
integration is possible only if there are common basic values that bring the 
nation together. Consequently, legal rules and principles (human rights 
included) are not as important as collective values and, thus, should cede in 
the case of a conflict.461
5 Case Law of the RF Constitutional Court
Russian courts have profited a great deal from this conceptualization of the 
legal effect of the constitutional principle of non-discrimination, balancing 
it against other constitutional principles and refusing to confer legal protec-
tion on sexual minorities. The RF Constitutional Court has had numerous 
opportunities to confirm its negative attitude toward LGBT culture and its 
readiness to support informal restrictions on this culture.
458 Mikhail Antonov, “Conservative Philosophy and Doctrine of Sovereignty: A Necessary 
Connection?”, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (2017) No.153, 45-59.
459 Nikolai Bondar’, “Sotsioistoricheskii dinamizm Konstitutsiii bez perepisyvaniia konstitu-
tionnogo teksta” [The Social and Historical Dynamism of Constitution without Rewriting 
the Constitutional Text], Zhurnal konstitutsionnogo pravosudiia (2014) No.2, 22-34.
460 Boris Kurkin, “Ideologema prav cheloveka i ee interpretatsiia v sovremennoi otecheste-
vennoi pravovoi teorii” [The Ideologeme of Human Rights and Its Interpretation in Con-
temporary Russian Legal Theory], Pravo: Zhurnal VSE (2008) No.2; and Mikhail Kras-
nov, “Khristianskoe mirovozzrenie i prava cheloveka” [A Christian World Outlook and 
Human Rights], Rex russica (2013) No.5, 465-477.
461 Compare with the communitarian conceptions that are promoted by some prominent 
specialists in constitutional law. See Vladimir Kruss, “Doktrinal’nye innovatsii v kon-
tekste konstitutsionalizatsii rossiiskoi pravovoi sistemy” [Doctrinal Innovations in the 
Context of Constitutionalization of the Russian Legal System], Konstitutsionnoe i munit-
sipal’noe pravo (2013) No.4, 2-11; Boris Ebzeev, “Konstitutsiia, gosudarstvo i lichnost’ v 
Rossii: fi losofi ia rossiiskogo konstitutsionalizma” [Constitution, State and Personality in 
Russia: the Philosophy of Russian Constitutionalism], Konstitutsional’noe i munitsipal’noe 
pravo (2013) No.11, 14-23.
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Back in 2006, the RF Constitutional Court ruled out the possibility of 
gay marriages in Russia, reasoning that it was up to the Russian Parliament 
to decide whether or not it was appropriate to introduce gay marriages.462 
Remarkably, this 2006 ruling was rather short and devoid of the tradition-
alist narrative that would become typical of the Court’s reasoning in the 
years to come. In denying a claim concerning the unconstitutionality of 
the RF Family Code that permitted only heterosexual marriage, the Court 
abstained from any criticism of liberal principles and the ECtHR case law 
evoked in the claim, concluding formalistically that, under international 
treaties, Russia had never assumed the obligation to introduce gay mar-
riages. No mention of traditional culture or religious beliefs was made in 
the ruling.
In 2010, in response to a claim by a well-known gay activist, Nikolai 
Alekseyev, the Constitutional Court considered administrative penalties 
for promoting homosexuality among minors. These penalties had been 
introduced, in 2006, by the local legislature in the city of Ryazan and Ryazan 
Oblast’.463 When the relevant regional laws were challenged in 2010,464 the 
Court reasoned that the remedies provided under Article 29 of the Constitu-
tion should cede to communitarian morality:
“Family, maternity and childhood in their traditional understanding inherited 
from [our] ancestors shall guarantee the uninterrupted change of generations; 
therefore, they are a condition for preservation and development of the multina-
tional people of Russia and must have special protection from the state.”
This meant that the non-discrimination remedies provided under Article 
29 of the Constitution were not valid when their use could harm the health, 
morals, and spiritual development of minors. In the Court’s opinion, this 
“harm” was implicitly present in any statement about the normalcy of 
462 Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ruling of the RF Constitu-
tional Court] (16 November 2006) No.496-O “Ob otkaze v priniatii k rassmotreniiu zha-
loby grazhdanina E. Murzina na narushenie ego konstitutsionnykh prav punktom 1 stat’i 
12 Semeinogo kodeksa Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [On the Refusal to Accept for Consideration 
the Complaint of E. Murzina on a Violation of his Constitutional Rights by Point 1 of 
Article 12 of the RF Family Code].
463 As Russia is a federal state, its constituent members (regions, republics, etc.) are empow-
ered to enact local regulations including administrative penalties for infractions of local 
regulations.
464 Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ruling of the RF Constitu-
tional Court] (19 January 2010) No.151-О-О “Ob otkaze v priniatii k rassmotreniiu zhalo-
by grazhdan N.A. Alekseeva, N.V. Bayeva i I.B. Fedorovoi o narushenii ikh konstitution-
nykh prav stat’ei 4 Zakona Riazanskoi oblasti ‘O zashchite nravstvennosti detei’ i stat’ei 
3.10 Zakona Riazanskoi oblasti ‘Ob administrativnykh pravonarusheniiakh’” [On the 
Refusal to Accept for Consideration the Complaint of N.A. Alekseev, N.V. Bayev and I.B. 
Fedorova on a Violation of their Constitutional Rights by article 4 of the Law of Riazan 
Oblast’ “On the Protection of the Morality of Children” and on Article 3.10 of the Law of 
Riazan Oblast’ “On Administrative Offenses”].
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LGBT culture that could eventually reach children. Based on these grounds, 
the RF Constitutional Court found that the protection of family under 
Article 38 of the Constitution could be endangered by information about 
“parity between traditional and non-traditional families”.
Unlike the 2006 ruling, this 2010 ruling contained indirect references to 
“normal” and “abnormal” sexual relations depending on their congruency 
with the prevailing culture and tradition. Even if religious feelings were not 
explicitly referred to in this ruling, they were present in the background. As 
has been shown above, on the one hand, Russian culture and tradition have 
always been significantly shaped by Orthodox Christianity which is hostile 
to LGBT culture (the same goes for Communist morality in the Soviet era). 
On the other hand, the new ideology of the ruling elites in Russia is explic-
itly based on adherence to Orthodoxy whereby President Vladimir Putin, 
and other members of the political establishment, overtly display their 
religiosity in spite of the secularity principle enshrined in Article 14 of the 
Constitution. The impact of the prevailing religious ideology can easily be 
seen in the words of the 2010 ruling about “normality” and “abnormality”.
Affirming this approach in a 2013 ruling, the Constitutional Court 
stressed that Russia never had accepted any binding obligation under its 
constitutional law or under its international treaties to treat LGBT culture as 
equal to Russian traditional culture. Moreover, as far as concerns children 
and their rights, the Constitution and the international treaties to which 
Russia is a party should be interpreted in a way coextensive with the consti-
tutional objective of protecting minors from the possible harmful impact of 
propaganda on their mentality and psyche.465
Until 2014, however, the Constitutional Court had not entered into sub-
stantial discussions about the limits of LGBT rights. In a 2014 judgment,466 
the Court tried to strike a balance between its jurisprudence and the case 
law of the ECtHR and considered the constitutionality of Article 6(21), RF 
CAO, which is applied to punish those who organize LGBT actions with-
out authorization .467 While finding this rule to be in compliance with the 
Constitution, the Constitutional Court called for the creation of a space for 
“unbiased public discussions about the status of sexual minorities and for 
the articulation of their position by representatives of these minorities” and 
465 Ruling of the RF Constitutional Court (24 October 2013) No.1718-O, op.cit. note 353.
466 The formal difference between an opredelenie and a postanovlenie is that the former is the 
form applied by the Constitutional Court for rejecting an inadmissible complaint while a 
ruling is a decision based on the merits of an accepted complaint. That is why the reason-
ing in judgments is usually more detailed and substantiated.
467 Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ruling of the RF Constitu-
tional Court] (23 September 2014) No.24-P “O proverke konstitutsionnosti chasti 1 stat’i 
6.21 Kodeksa Rossiiskoi Federatsii ob administrativnykh pravonarusheniiakh v sviazi s 
zhaloboi grazhdan N.A. Alekseeva, Ia.N. Evtushenko i D.A. Isakova” [On Verifi cation 
of the Constitutionality of para.1 of Art.6.21 of the RF Code of Administrative Offences 
in Connection with Applications of Citizens N.A. Alekseyev, Ia.N. Evtushenko and D.A. 
Isakov].
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warned lower courts against a “formalist approach” (para.4). The Court 
found that gay-pride parades are not interdicted per se and must be allowed 
unless they take on an “aggressive and pervasive character” and, thereby, 
could endanger the rights and lawful interests of other people.468 The Court 
agreed that state authorities have the right to monitor how “the contentious 
and delicate problem of non-traditional sexual orientation” is discussed 
in society in order to protect law and order, but this monitoring must be 
proportionate and must not be excessive.
These liberal considerations were, however, mitigated by the conserva-
tive statement that seemingly became the ratio decidendi of the case:
“Russia may decide how to regulate spheres pertaining to sexual relations and 
interpersonal relations connected with sexuality, basing this regulation on tradi-
tional ideas about these values in the context of the particularities of the national 
and confessional composition of Russian society.”
Here, along with its ubiquitous traditionalist rhetoric, the Court makes 
explicit reference to the “confessional composition” of the Russian people as 
one of the reasons for imposing restrictions on the LGBT community. Given 
the animosity toward this community from more than 95 percent of Russian 
believers (85 percent of whom are Orthodox Christians and 10 percent are 
Muslims, Jews, and Catholics469), the Court came to the not unexpected 
conclusion that the state should protect minors from the “imposition of 
social models that differ from the models commonly accepted in Russian 
society and that are sometimes perceived as unacceptable”.470
This judgment was subject to a number of critical attacks of a sundry 
of Russian legal scholars and, also, was criticized by the ECtHR in its 2017 
Bayev and Others judgment .471 Proponents of the approach proposed by the 
RF Constitutional Court retort that rights and freedoms—even if they are 
proclaimed to be fundamental—cannot be limitless; that one constitutional 
right can restrain another right, a constitutional freedom can be in conflict 
with another constitutional value or with a principle; and that, in reality, 
these limits are established for each freedom in a particular concrete case in 
the view of the circumstances of the case, i.e., the values and interests that 
468 Judgement of the RF Constitutional Court (23 September 2014) No.24-P, op.cit. note 467.
469 See “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe”, op.cit. note 
435.
470 See Ol’ga Kriazhkova, “Novyi raund bor’by za prava seksual’nykh men’shinstv: kom-
mentarii k Postanovleniiu Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossii ot 23 sentiabria 2014 g. No.24-
P” [A New Round of the Struggle for the Rights of Sexual Minorities: Comments on the 
Ruling of the Russian Constitutional Court from 23 September 2014 No.24-P], Sravni-
tel’noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie (2014) No.6, 123-131.
471 See the ECtHR judgment in Bayev and Others v. Russia  (20 June 2017) Application 
Nos.67667/09, 44092/12 and 56717/12, available at <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-174422>.
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are at stake in the case.472 This is the work of judges in any developed civil-
law society, and Russia is not an exception to this rule, some ideological dif-
ferences notwithstanding.473 It remains to be discussed, however, whether 
such considerations might justify placing religious and moral norms over 
constitutional rights.
This short case-law analysis demonstrates that, in recent years, the 
RF Constitutional Court has been evolving toward including the prevail-
ing religious creeds and beliefs into the normative framework of Russian 
law. From the 2006 ruling where the issue of gay marriages was tackled 
in a strictly formalist manner, the Court (under the pressure of its direct 
or indirect discrepancies with the ECtHR and of the general tendencies in 
Russian policy) applied the traditionalist narrative and, in the end, shaped 
its approach to LGBT rights with a clear reference to religious dogmas. In 
the Court’s opinion, they are an integral part of Russian law and even may 
overrule the statutory and constitutional guarantees of non-discrimination. 
To shed more light on the ideology behind the case law of the RF Constitu-
tional Court, we should cite the opinions of its Chief Justice, Valerii Zorkin. 
In a 2014 speech presented at the Third Congress of the World Conference 
on Constitutional Justice, Zorkin insisted that:
“The law, being the most complete reflection of the rational foundations of 
social rules, has to promote the preservation and development of all mankind and, at 
a minimum, not to undermine the foundations of its preservation and devel-
opment. Meanwhile, real life shows that a liberal-individualistic interpretation of 
human rights often contradicts this imperative. One can see this in different spheres 
of human life: from the egocentric behavior of economic monopolies grabbing 
the planet’s main life-supporting resources to the aggressive struggle of sexual 
minorities for equality of opportunities for their self-realization, including such contro-
versial issues as the upbringing of adopted children. These facts, which seem to be 
472 See, for example, the dissenting opinion of Russian Judge Dmitry Dedov at the ECtHR 
in the case of Bayev and Others, op.cit. note 471. There, he asserted that “states shall have 
[...] a wider margin of appreciation in respect of public morals, decency and religion” and 
that Russia may introduce positive discrimination against sexual minorities “to protect 
the traditional values of Russian society”.
 There are many Russian scholars who, similarly to Dedov, think that Russian traditional 
values are incompatible with LGBT culture. See Anatolii Diachenko and Evgenii Tsimbal, 
“Sotsial’naia obuslovlennost’ zapreta propagandy gomoseksualizma” [The Social Deter-
mination of Prohibiting Propaganda of Homosexuality], Lex russica (2013) No.11, 1216-
1223. These authors insist that the Russian mentality is different compared with that of 
people living in Western democracies. To support this position, they refer to numerous 
sociological polls.
473 We can refer here to the fortunate formulation by several respected authors about the 
Russia’s current legal system: “the civil law tradition with some special Russian charac-
teristics”. Peter B. Maggs, Olga Schwartz, and William Burnham, Law and Legal System 
of the Russian Federation (Juris Publishing, Huntington and New York, NY, 2015, 6th ed.), 
1-8, esp. at 7.
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very different from one another, have a common route: the individualistic ideol-
ogy that currently determines the dominant approach toward understanding the core 
meaning and content of human rights. From the perspective of this approach, a 
person regards the world not as an environment that has inner connections and 
ties with this person, which is a precondition for the continuation and uplifting 
of mankind, but rather as the sum of external means that he or she can use for 
personal well-being and success.”474
These conclusions speak for themselves: even if the Chief Justice did not 
mention religious creeds, he evidently had in mind the communitarian Rus-
sian culture based on Orthodox religious dogma. In the end, liberal rights 
are admissible insofar as they are compatible with this communitarian 
culture, and it is up to the sovereign state authorities to determine the limits 
of concession to these rights. The justification behind this reasoning is rather 
trivial: there can be no nation without common values and no country 
without laws that protect these values, and no law and order without the 
sovereign state that keeps the country together and enacts good laws. By 
this logic, in case of a conflict, national courts should abstain from applying 
human rights for the sake of the survival of the entire society.
For Zorkin, the Constitution is not only a text but “a living instrument” 
that evolves in accordance with communitarian religious morality, as he 
asserts in a 2017 speech: “From antiquity to modern times, good lawmakers 
have tried to create laws with the support of mass ideas about [what is] 
just. And the roots of these ideas have always been sanctified by a religious 
tradition of the corresponding culture and era”, as far as “law, morality and 
religion constitute an internally interconnected socio-normative complex”. 
That is why “protection of human rights should not undermine [the] moral 
foundations of society and destroy its religious identity”. The criterion for 
evaluating the admissibility of human rights is the prevailing communitar-
ian culture: “Norms of morality (i.e., social morality), norms of individual 
morality and the rule of law which, in their totality, are determined either 
by the religious tradition or secular ideology, are rooted in culture and con-
sonant with the soul of every reasonable person”.475 Evidently, LGBT rights 
fail to fit this criterion, and thus religious dogma and culture evidently have 
become an argumentative tool for justifying Russia’s particularism about 
the protection of minority rights.
474 Zorkin’s English-language report, presented at the Meeting of the Bureau of the World 
Conference on Constitutional Justice (29 September 2014), available at <http://www.
venice.coe.int/WCCJ/Seoul/docs/WCCJ_report_Session_1-Zorkin_ENG.pdf>. Empha-
sis added.
475 Zorkin, “The Essence of Law”, op.cit. note 81.
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6 Case Law of the Courts of General Jurisdiction
The lower courts476 generally abide by the approaches elaborated by the 
RF Constitutional Court and cite them when reasoning their decisions on 
limiting LGBT rights. For the most part, the cases heard in courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction about LGBT rights concern gay-pride parades and other 
rallies where these communities publicly assert and defend their sexual 
orientation.
Before the 2013 legislative amendments, there were no federal laws that 
imposed penalties for such demonstrations. The main problem for LGBT 
people was to get authorization for demonstrations, as local authorities 
generally refused to provide such authorization. Upon the requests of 
LGBT activists, regional courts regularly hear complaints about groundless 
refusals that uniformly dismiss LGBT applications. The main rationale for 
dismissing these complaints is the fact that the local authorities have the 
competence to decide about mass gatherings based on issues related to 
security and public order. However, after the ECtHR condemned Russia for 
this formalist approach in the 2010 Alekseyev case (complaints No.4916/07, 
25924/08 and 14599/09), such arguments were no longer valid. To retain 
control over the issue of gay-pride parades, local legislatures started passing 
laws about the prohibition of so-called LGBT propaganda among minors.
Before 2013, when this prohibition was also established in federal law, 
the RF Supreme Court had heard several cases where the validity of local 
laws was challenged. The subject matter of these cases was almost identical, 
and so it is enough for our purposes to provide a brief description of just 
one of these cases.477 In 2012, the RF Supreme Court formulated defenses 
for these local laws, mainly reproducing the findings of the RF Constitu-
tional Court in the case of Alekseyev, Bayev, and Fedorova (19 January 2010, 
No.151-О-О, as cited above). This 2012 case concerned antigay laws enacted 
in 2009 in the Arkhangelsk Oblast’. Citing the Constitutional Court’s 2010 
476 The Russian court system has two higher courts: the Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court, the latter being at the top of the system of courts of general jurisdic-
tion. Along with these courts, there are constitutional courts (ustavnye sudy) of the sub-
jects (constituent members) of the Russian Federation (regions, republics, etc.). But these 
courts do not have the competence to hear cases pertaining to the regulation and pro-
tection of human rights since this is within the exclusive competence of the Federation 
and its courts (Art.71, RF Constitution). Even if the Supreme Court is not formally sub-
ordinated to the Constitutional Court, given the hierarchy of laws (the Constitution as 
the supreme law of the country), the Supreme Court mostly follows the case law of the 
Constitutional Court, which is why one can consider, with some reservations, that the 
Supreme Court and its subordinated courts are “lower’ than the Constitutional Court.
477 The most illustrative cases of Rulings of the RF Supreme Court were those concerning: 
Ruling (15 August 2012) No. 1-APG12-11 (a law of the Arkhangelsk Region No.113-9-
OZ); Ruling of the RF Supreme Court (7 November 2012) No.87-APG12-2 (a law of the 
Kostroma Region No.193-5-ZKO); and Ruling of the RF Supreme Court (27 February 
2013) No. 46-APG13-2 (a law of the Samara Region No.115-GD).
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ruling, the Supreme Court argued that the non-discrimination remedy 
under Article 29 of the Constitution was not available to those whose 
behavior might endanger the constitutional values of family, maternity, and 
childhood that are protected under Article 7 of the Constitution.
It seems that the ratio decidendi in this case was that “Russian federal 
legislation does not consider homosexual relations to be family values 
pursuant to national traditions and with respect to norms of international 
law”.478 Tipping the scale in favor of a broader interpretation of Article 7 of 
the Constitution, the Supreme Court implicitly argued that civil and human 
rights (including the non-discrimination principle) should not be applied 
if they collide with family values. It goes without saying that in referring 
to “national traditions” and “family values”, the Court had religious 
dogmas in mind—although, in fact, neither the Supreme Court nor the 
Constitutional Court has ever addressed any historical facts or entered into 
a substantial discussion about what “genuine Russian traditions” are from a 
historical point of view. The main point in the Court’s argumentation was a 
kind of binary code—“acceptable/unacceptable”—where LGBT culture was 
unquestionably coded as unacceptable.
After RF Constitutional Court Judgment No.24-P of 23 September 2014, 
which legitimized identical federal antigay regulations, local legislatures 
repealed their local laws to avoid the non bis per idem problem. The crucial 
issue for the courts of general jurisdiction was to be seen in cases about 
the legality of local authorities’ decisions to prohibit LGBT demonstrations. 
We will provide a brief analysis of two cases from 2016 to show that these 
courts, generally, follow the reasoning of the RF Constitutional Court.
In one of these cases, the St Petersburg City Court rejected the com-
plaint, reasoning that the plaintiffs (LGBT activists) had failed to prove that 
they were going to assert their homosexuality in “an acceptable and neutral 
form”.479 However, the Court did not set out what this “form” had to be, 
making a meaningless reference to a “lack of neutrality” and shifting to the 
plaintiffs the burden to prove that LGBT culture can be publicly asserted 
in a form acceptable to society. Given the commonly shared animosity of 
traditionalist culture toward homosexuality, it remains unclear how this 
478 Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Suda RF [Ruling of the RF Supreme Court] (15 August 2012) 
No.1-APG12-11, “Ob ostavlenii bez izmeneniia resheniia Arkhangel’skogo oblastnogo 
suda ot 22.05.2012, kotorym otkazano v udovletvorenii zaiavleniia o priznanii nede-
istvuiushchimi otdel’nykh polozhenii oblastnogo Zakona Arkhangel’skoi oblasti ot 15 
dekabria 2009 g. No.113-9-OZ ‘Ob otdel’nykh merakh po zashchite nravstvennosti i 
zdorov’ia detei v Arkhangel’skoi oblasti’ i oblastnogo Zakona Arkhangel’skoi oblasti 
‘Ob administrativnykh pravonarusheniiakh’” [On a Restatement of the Decision of the 
Arkhangelsk Regional Court of 22 May 2012 Which Rejected an Application to Invalidate 
Certain Provisions of the Arkhangelsk Regional Law of 15 December 2009 No. 113-9-OZ 
“On Particular Measures to Protect the Morals and Health of Children in Arkhangelsk 
Region” and of the Arkhangelsk Regional Law “On Administrative Offences”].
479 Appellate Ruling of the St Petersburg City Court 22 June 2016 (No.33а-10916/2016) in 
case No.2а-2006/2016.
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might be possible for the LGBT plaintiffs. This shifting of the burden of 
proof is not compatible with the principles set forth in a 2014 judgment of 
the RF Constitutional Court about the inadmissibility of a formal approach 
to banning gay-pride parades, let alone the ECtHR approach in the 2010 
Alekseyev case.
In a similar case,480 the Court was of the opinion that the plaintiffs failed 
to demonstrate that information about homosexuality had any cultural, 
artistic, or historical value and that this information was worth being dis-
seminated publicly. Making an implicit reference to the narrative of Chief 
Justice Zorkin (as analyzed in Chapter 3 above), the Court found that 
information about LGBT culture was “aggressive because it prioritizes the 
individual autonomy of the administrative plaintiffs”. In the Court’s opin-
ion, this information transmits “the subjective and inadequate idea about 
the socially recognized models of family relations commonly accepted in 
Russian society and contradicts moral values”. Here, the Court suggested 
that there was “objective information” that is based on the values and ideas 
shared by the majority, whereas the opinions of minorities are “subjective” 
and, therefore, distort the “objective picture”.
This supposed objectivity of prevailing opinions was justified with a 
reference to:
“[…] the traditional ideas about humanism formulated in the context of the 
particularities of the national and confessional composition of Russian soci-
ety, its sociocultural and historical background, and especially with a view to 
representations about marriage, family, maternity, paternity, and childhood 
that are commonly recognized in Russian society and shared by all traditional 
confessions”.481
Having established this “objective truth” with direct references to pre-
vailing religious doctrines, the Court concluded that the dissemination 
of information about sexual relations must not challenge the morality or 
religious beliefs of the majority—forming an integral part of the Russian 
legal order—and rejected the claim.
These rulings are demonstrative of the general attitude of the Russian 
courts to LGBT culture, which, in the end, has no legal protection because it 
is not part of Russia’s traditional values. In turn, these traditional values are 
frequently defined by Russian courts with reference to prevailing religious 
ideas and to communitarian morality. On the whole, Russian case law is 
480 Appellate Ruling of the St Petersburg City Court 30 May 2016 (No.33а-10894/2016) in 
case No.2а-1897/2016. This reasoning was so persuasive for Russian judges that it was 
copied and pasted into a number of other decisions in other Russian regions e.g., Appel-
late Ruling of the Moscow City Court (4 October 2016) in case No.33а-35552/2016 and 
Appellate Ruling of the Moscow City Court (20 October 2016) in case No.33а-35769/2016.
481 Ibid.
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rather homogeneous in this category of cases, and the ordinary (general 
jurisdiction) courts do not shy away from reproducing not only the rulings 
and judgments of the Constitutional Court but, also, copying phrases from 
speeches made by its Chief Justice.
7 Russia and Europe: A Discordant Dialogue
Criticism from human rights organizations and from the ECtHR and other 
European agencies of Russia for violations of human rights can be viewed, 
formally, as well founded in a number of situations—particularly, given that 
both the ECHR and Russia’s Constitution grant almost exactly the same 
scope of rights and freedoms. Russian courts claim to protect some rights 
while limiting others, seemingly doing so in the same manner as the ECtHR 
but with a focus on different values.482 Herein, the difference can be seen 
between the case law of the ECtHR and that of Russian courts. This differ-
ence becomes obvious in the polemic between the RF Constitutional Court 
and the ECtHR about justification of discrimination.483 The theme of values 
inevitably comes to the fore when discussing differences of interpretation, 
providing one of the most viable sources for reassessing the “civilizational” 
disputes between European and Russian human rights institutions.
Conceptually, limiting human rights implies balancing individual 
values (autonomy, self-determination, personal choice, etc.) in favor of 
collective ones (security, justice, order, etc.). Currently, and in the foresee-
able future, this balancing is one of the most important stumbling blocks 
in relations between Russian and European institutions, as individuality 
and individual choice are more highly valued in Western cultures than in 
Russia. Evidently, this difference in value cannot be overcome or at least 
smoothed over without engaging in a value dialogue, for which neither of 
the parties is fully prepared.
Some Russian legal scholars, including constitutional judges, have been 
searching for a solution in the Preamble to the Constitution which solemnly 
proclaims “respect for [our] ancestors”. For example, Professor Valerii 
Lazarev insists that the Preamble justifies the traditionalist interpretation 
of human rights in the sense that human rights are respected within the 
“moral framework” of Russian statehood.484 An acting RF Constitutional 
Court Justice, Nikolai Bondar’, finds that the Preamble establishes certain 
482 On the ECtHR’s approach, see Paul Johnson, “Homosexuality, Freedom of Assembly 
and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights”, 11(3) 
Human Rights Law Review (2011), 578-593.
483 Andrey Makarychev, “Communication and Dislocations: Normative Disagreements 
between Russia and the EU”, in Reinhard Krumm et al. (eds.), Constructing Identities in 
Europe (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2012), 45-62.
484 Valerii Lazarev, “Konstitutsionnye ogranicheniia konstitutsionnykh tsennostei” [Consti-
tutional Restrictions on Constitutional Values], in V. Golubtsov and O. Kuznetsova (eds.), 
20 let rossiiskoi Konstitutsii (Statut, Moscow, 2014).
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implicit moral values of supreme importance that are “necessary regulators 
of practical life” and, therefore, justify bans on the “promotion of homo-
sexuality.” Such values, Bondar’ assures us, protect Russian society from 
“attempts to impose and take to the constitutional level so-called values of 
sexual freedoms and of the equal rights of gays”.485 Another Constitutional 
Court Justice, Konstantin Aranovskii, pursues the same line, although more 
discreetly:
“No legal protection can be granted to sexual perversions or same-sex marriages 
in a situation where the moral order of society considers homosexuality to be an 
oddity or unpleasantly exotic and if that society has not yet fully protected truly 
fundamental rights.”486
In the same vein, RF Constitutional Court Chief Justice Zorkin reiterates 
that positive law is intertwined with the web of social regulation and calls 
for:
“A good deal of sound conservatism in understanding the internal connection 
between law, morality and religious values […] when assessing the requirements 
for tolerance toward any sexual and gender permissiveness whatsoever.”487
Other Constitutional Court justices have made similar assertions in their 
publications,488 and it is no wonder that such opinions are systematically 
included in the texts of judicial acts.
Seemingly, the discrepancies between the Russian and European 
authorities are not so much about rules but, rather, about the values under-
pinning those rules and the practice of their implementation. The fact that 
the Russian courts systematically support bans on gay-pride parades can 
serve here as an illustrative example (several cases filed by Nikolai Alek-
seev can serve as an example (Alekseyev v. Russia, application Nos.4916/07, 
25924/08, and 14599/09).489 On the one hand, the ECtHR reiterates that 
485 Bondar’, “Bukva i dukh rossiiskoi Konstitutsii”, op.cit. note 459, 9.
486 Konstantin Aranovskii, “Usloviia soglasovaniia praktiki mezhdunarodnogo i konstitut-
sionnogo pravosudiia” [Conditions for Reconciling the Practice of International and Con-
stitutional Justice], Zhurnal konstitutsionnogo pravosudiia (2013) No.3, 1-10, at 6.
487 Zorkin, “Tsivilizatsiia prava: sovremennyi kontekst”, op.cit. note 159, at 10.
488 At a 2016 round table y organized by the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy 
of Sciences, Constitutional Court Justices Gadis Gadzhiev and Nikolai Bondar’ stressed 
the creative role of the Court in shaping a specifi c conservative Russian attitude toward 
religious and sexual deviance. See “Pravo i natsional’nye traditsii”: Materialy kruglogo 
stola s uchastiem: A.A. Guseinov, V.S. Stepin, A.V. Smirnov, G.A. Gadzhiev, N.S. Bondar’, 
E.Iu. Solov’ev, V.M. Mezhuev, P.D. Barenboim, V.V. Lapaeva, S.L. Chizhkov” [Law and 
National Traditions: Materials of a Round Table with the Participation of: A.A. Guseinov, 
V.S. Stepin, A.V. Smirnov, G.A. Gadzhiev, N.S. Bondar’, E.Iu. Solov’ev, V.M. Mezhuev, 
P.D. Barenboim, V.V. Lapaeva, S.L. Chizhkov], Voprosy Filosofi i (2016) No.12, available at 
<http://vphil.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1541&Itemid=52>.
489 Op.cit. note 352.
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such bans are discriminatory; on the other hand, the RF Constitutional 
Court stresses that Russian laws do not prohibit gay-pride parades as such 
and, therefore, that the systematic banning of these parades by the local 
authorities is due to some extra-statutory principles pursued by ordinary 
officials within their legitimate administrative discretion. It would be incor-
rect to explain this use of discretion as an abuse of power since officials (or 
judges) generally gain nothing (or only very little) from pursuing discrimi-
natory policies toward the LGBT population. Entwined with the broader 
machinery of social regulation—in relation to which they are both active 
agents and passive recipients at the same time—judges perform not only 
their proper legal function (that of the application of laws) but, also, the 
societal function of maintaining the existing order. This order for many of 
them is synonymous with the communitarian religious culture.
This role of Russian judges is ambiguous and controversial. Their 
factual policies violate not only Russian constitutional law but, also, 
international humanitarian law manifestly based on the principle of non-
discrimination.490 Yet, their policies are congruent with the convictions 
of the overwhelming majority of the population and of the ruling elites, 
and one would hardly expect judges to go against this. Unlike the Anglo-
Saxon judiciary, judges in civil-law countries take a less activist stance, due 
to various institutional constraints, and very seldom act as promoters of 
moral or legal changes. They do have tools, however, to avoid application 
of legislative innovations and they readily use them via conservative rein-
terpretations of constitutional principles. What is actually happening with 
the liberal principles of the Constitution is that they are interpreted in the 
style of the Soviet attitude toward human rights. Why it does not work the 
other way around (a liberal reading of conservatively formulated rules) is 
a question that requires a separate study, combining the political, cultural, 
and institutional aspects of the issue.
Evidently, the ECtHR is also engaged in a more complicated game than 
the modest interpretation and application of the ECHR, the text of which is 
silent on most of the topics discussed before this court. Whether a crucifix 
can be displayed in a public school or whether medical personnel can wear 
crucifixes around their necks: these and many other issues require going 
far beyond the text of the Convention and imply discerning and balanc-
ing basic values. If we accept moral pluralism in the sense that there is no 
universal moral system (be it Western, Christian, “civilized”, or some other) 
but, rather, many moral systems in every society—each of which has its rai-
son d’être—then courts engaged in these “penumbra” cases (to use the term 
of Herbert Hart491) are always responsible for their value choice and have 
490 Eric Allen Engle, “Gay Rights in Russia? Russia’s Ban on Gay Pride Parades and the Gen-
eral Principle of Proportionality in International Law”, 6(2) Journal of Eurasian Law (2013), 
165-186.
491 Herbert L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals”, 71(4) Harvard 
Law Review (1958), 593-629, at 607.
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to justify this with reference not to one single system (e.g., that of liberal 
values implicitly present in the “necessity for a democratic society”) but to 
various systems.492 In other words, it means that the agency (be it a court 
or a parliament), assuming responsibility for making a value choice that 
is valid for different countries, should become a platform for intercultural 
dialogue and not so much a pulpit for moralizing by activist judges.
In fact, the role the ECtHR is playing in this regard seems to be differ-
ent from the role of the Russian judiciary; their respective attitudes toward 
value innovations in society also differ significantly. This problematizes the 
role of the ECtHR for the Russian legal system and, more generally, for all 
national legal systems with which this court cooperates. This also creates 
an arena for discrepancies with national courts because of the different 
normative frameworks which frame the working of European and national 
institutions. Along with the potential conflict between international law 
and domestic laws, conflicts among regulatory backgrounds also occur. 
The national cultural environment protected and promoted by EU member 
states is not always in perfect harmony with the “common European (legal) 
culture” which the ECtHR and other European institutions are trying to 
forge. With all necessary reservations being made, one can state that the 
level of tension between the supranational jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
and the national legal orders of EU countries is directly proportional to the 
difference between the “common European culture” in statu nascendi and 
national legal cultures. The situation of Russia, Turkey, and other “periph-
eral” (in the sense of the cultures prevailing in these countries) civilizations 
can serve as an illustration. It is not unexpected that the greater the distance 
between such countries and the allegedly “pan-European” cultural core, the 
more they resist cultural uniformization by claiming that the ECtHR is not 
competent to articulate the prevalence of any values.
The stance consequently repeated both by the Russian authorities and 
by the Russian Orthodox Church is that, in the final analysis, nothing justi-
fies the validity of the moral precepts sermonized by the ECtHR or their 
pretense to universality (at least, within the European area).493 On the 
contrary, they maintain that a wider margin of appreciation is reasonably 
needed provided that there are significant differences among countries and 
cultures that, therefore, need to maintain their sovereignty. From this per-
spective, the question is not about the complete uniformity of the interpre-
tation and implementation of human rights but, rather, about the practical 
492 Sergei Belov, “Predely universal’nosti konstitutsionalizma: vliianie natsional’nykh tsen-
nostei na praktiku priniatiia reshenii konstitutsionnymi sudami” [The Limits of the Uni-
versality of Constitutionalism: The Impact of National Values on the Practice of Decision-
Making in Constitutional Courts], Sravnitel’noe konstitutsionnoe obozreniie (2014) No.1, 37-56.
493 Lauri Mälksoo, “The Human Rights Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church and Its 
Patriarch Kirill I: A Critical Appraisal”, in Wolfgang Benedek et al. (eds.), European Year-
book on Human Rights (Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Vienna, 2013), 403-416; and Kris-
tina Stoeckl, “The Russian Orthodox Church as Moral Norm Entrepreneur”, 44(2) Reli-
gion, State and Society (2016), 132-151.
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reasonableness of the restraints which national legal orders may impose on 
the exercise of human rights in their countries.494 This reasonableness can 
have two dimensions. One of them is universal: setting out to discover some 
rules valid for any nation or state. The other is relative: searching for con-
tingent rules depending on the circumstances in each country. The debates 
about LGBT rights between the ECtHR and the Russian authorities can be 
described in the logic of these two dimensions of reasonableness.495
Conclusion
This Chapter has analyzed the cultural constraints which are factually 
imposed on actors in the Russian legal system by the prevailing social phi-
losophy, characterized by a significant degree of religious conservatism. This 
conservatism emphasizes collective interests and, predictably, is opposed to 
sexual minorities and to those who want to defend (or justify) them. Such a 
cleavage between the formally valid provisions of Russian law on non-dis-
crimination, on the one hand, and the factual cultural constraints that nudge 
judges to refuse in the protection of sexual minorities, on the other hand, is 
demonstrative of the general dichotomy between formalist and decisionist 
elements of Russian law as they were elucidated in the Chapter 1 of the 
present volume. The specific development of Russian intellectual culture in 
this regard has been elucidated in Chapter 3 and was, therefore, beyond the 
scope of this Chapter. In the light of the analysis conducted in the Chapters 
1-4, it can be asserted that this development—historically rooted in religious 
traditions—still shapes the general conservative attitudes of Russians. These 
attitudes cannot be ignored by judges and other actors in the Russian legal 
system who, to some extent, are subject to the general perception of what is 
just, acceptable, and reasonable in society. The example of sexual minorities 
examined in the present Chapter can illustrate the machinery of interaction 
between “law in books” and “law in action” in Russian law.
Such a dichotomy between the liberal wording of the laws (up to and 
including the RF Constitution) and its conservative interpretation has 
provoked debates not only between Russian and European authorities 
but, also, among Russian legal scholars. Fundamentally, these debates fall 
within the province of value discourse based on a pre-established cognitive 
and axiological choice. This province and its bearing for the mind-sets of 
Russian judges were examined in Chapter 2 on the example of Chief Justice 
Zorkin and his conservative philosophy. Rational arguments are employed 
494 Chaim Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argumentation (Humanities Press, 
New York, NY, 1963); and Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a 
Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996, William Rehg 
intro. & transl.).
495 Mikhail Antonov, “Conservatism in Russia and Sovereignty in Human Rights”, 39(1) 
Review of Central and East European Law (2014), 1-40.
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too, but they come not at the point of choice but, rather, at the point of the 
justification of this choice.
This practical reasonableness—underpinning the judicial function in 
different countries—can become a tertium comparationis yielding a criterion 
for a charitable comparison of various regulative systems in Europe even if 
finding and formulating such reasonableness would be a much more dif-
ficult enterprise than a simple commentary on statutory law or a political 
assessment of legal systems. Such a thick description can be obtained from 
a historical perspective, providing the comparative background for draw-
ing parallels in the development of human rights and religious freedoms 
in Russia and in the West. This perspective involves different religious and 
philosophical conceptions developed over the course of Russian history, as 
examined in Chapter 3 above.
One more aspect, concerning the role of religion in transitory societ-
ies, can be added here to that examination. In most Western countries, the 
secularization of the state was a painful and lengthy process connected 
with the struggle for individual liberties leading to the conviction that toler-
ance is a prerequisite for the protection of rights. The Russian experience 
has been somewhat different. The Soviet state was secular from the very 
beginning, and nothing fundamentally changed with perestroika in terms of 
legal regulation. This historical experience does not allow the unambiguous 
linking of positive or negative values: secularity is conceptually associated 
with Bolshevik repressions of the clergy and believers. For this reason, the 
principle of secularity in public discussions in Russia is often critically 
reassessed with reference to the anti-religious and atheist campaigns con-
ducted by the Bolsheviks under the flag of secularity. The encroachment on 
religious freedoms seems to Western observers to be an indisputable and 
impermissible violation of civil rights; however, this is not the case for many 
Russians. The case law that indirectly promotes prevailing religious creeds 
has popular support. The authorities pragmatically endorse this case law 
and the value choice behind it to buttress their legitimacy. Judges, in their 
turn, pragmatically choose to follow the general political line and interpret 
the law conservatively. Judicial argumentation, examined in the present 
Chapter, provides some clues as to the philosophy that underpins Russian 
exceptionalism in matters concerning the rights of minorities. A closer look 
at this philosophy reveals its anti-universalist stances: the proponents of 
this conservative approach stress that Russia has religious, cultural, and 
other civilizational particularities which make the legal regulation of human 
rights in the country irreducible to the universalist humanitarian standards 
of the West.496
496 On the infl uence of political, historical, and social forces on the autonomy of the judiciary 
in Russia in cases involving minorities, see James Richardson, Galina Krylova, and Marat 
Shterin, “Legal Regulation of Religion in Russia: New Developments”, in James Rich-
ardson (ed.), Regulating Religion: Case Studies from Around the Globe (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, New York, NY, 2004), 246ff.
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The indeterminacy of the decision-making process cannot be fully 
eliminated even if the power to decide lies not in the hands of judges but, 
rather, of political actors. In the latter case, however, many more public 
debates would be required to justify the margins of appreciation in generic 
cases. Taking these debates from the secrecy of judges’ chambers to the 
public sphere would lessen the feeling of disproportionality on the part 
of peripheral countries because of the constant bickering over whether 
this or that consideration should apply to this or that country. The lack of 
cogency of judicial discretion in determining values and standards would 
(and, in reality, already does) also affect their effectiveness, given that “le 
gouvernement des juges” is seen by many political actors as incongruent with 
the conservatively viewed ideals of democracy. Whether these ideals are 
“correct” or not is a question to be decided through public debates with 
the participation of all citizens or, at least, their representatives. From 
this viewpoint, the struggle for an enhanced equal protection of rights in 
Russia implies addressing the intricate combination of the underpinning 
conventions and shared values shaping Russians’ attitudes to the limits of 
individual choice in terms of social morality. The case law on the protection 
of religious beliefs, examined in the following Chapter, provides a number 
of examples of such underpinning conventions.
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5 Religious Beliefs and the Limits of Their 
Accommodation in Russia: Some Landmark 
Cases from the Russian Supreme Court497
Foreword
As shown in the preceding Chapter, the Russian Constitution has estab-
lished liberal principles for the exercise of freedoms by minorities, but 
Russian statutory law does not provide explicit rules on how to implement 
these principles or define the limits thereof. This puts Russian courts in 
an ambiguous situation in which they have to defend minorities pursuant 
to constitutional law but, in practice, are precluded in effect from grant-
ing accommodations to these minorities. If they were to do so, the courts 
could be viewed as snatching the legislative function from parliament or 
encroaching on the sovereign prerogative of the political leadership.
Meanwhile, Russia’s legislative authorities and the political leader-
ship are reluctant to legitimize such accommodations for minorities. For 
the courts, it means that they are empowered to considering the issue of 
equal protection rather on the level of a general principle, concretizing 
it in terms of case law and providing such protection only insofar as it is 
either expressly mandated by the statutory law or indirectly requested by 
the political leadership in official narratives or political programs. This 
introduces an important cleavage point between the formalist and the deci-
sionist dimensions of Russian law: judges formally remain bound by the 
equal-protection and non-discrimination principles of the constitutional law 
but, at that same time, factually may make exceptions from these principles 
either by granting additional protection to the favored-religious denomina-
tions or striping the so-called “non-traditional” religious denominations of 
the protection which, otherwise, is formally granted to these denominations 
by constitutional law.
In this situation, Russian courts of general jurisdiction decide, in specific 
cases, on the factual limits of protection and thereby indirectly accept the 
idea of accommodation, which is not elaborated in statutory law. The courts 
are generally indisposed to recognize that their decisions develop statu-
tory law and, therefore, tend to hide their approaches and criteria behind 
formalistic language. This Chapter examines some criteria and approaches 
which the Russian Supreme Court has formulated in some landmark 
cases concerning religious freedoms. The present Chapter underscores 
497 The fi rst version of this Chapter was published in 11(1) Religion and Society in Central and 
Eastern Europe (2018), 3-19. The present Chapter is an updated version of that work.
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the relevance of such an analysis for comparative research projects aimed 
at understanding (dis)similarities of legal accommodations on religious 
grounds in different countries and their reasoning.
Based on the general theoretical background of Russian law as described 
in Chapters 1-3 and grounded in the analysis set forth in Chapter 4, the 
present Chapter studies a number of cases considered by the RF Supreme 
Court in which the same legal norms are accorded different interpretations 
depending on whether participants belong to a religious minority or the 
majority.
Introduction
Courts of law and law-enforcement agencies in various countries use dif-
ferent criteria when determining the extent to which a right or freedom can 
be restricted or extended. These criteria are of immense importance in the 
field of religious freedoms where, under some circumstances, a person may 
be released from a legal obligation because of her religious beliefs. In many 
countries, courts can also restrict a person’s religious rights in order to 
avoid a possible negative impact on others or on society as a whole where 
a person asserts her religious rights allegedly to the detriment of the public 
interest. Such cases are heard regularly by supreme and constitutional 
courts in many Western countries and provoke vivid polemics in societies 
about what can justify such restrictions and whether they are justifiable at 
all.
National and supranational courts are not always consistent in impos-
ing limitations on religious liberties and in allowing religious accommoda-
tions. Along with formal statutory provisions and abstract principles, courts 
normally take into consideration expediency and the acceptability of certain 
religious practices for entire societies, their reception in public opinion, 
and other criteria which, often, are quite subjective and circumstantial.498 
Religious freedoms cannot be put into a set of rigid normative statements in 
advance and, in this sense, fully formalized in statutory law. By this logic, 
religious freedoms precede—and, to some extent, may supersede—the 
official law in this field regardless of whether or not they are posited in 
the law. Historically, religious freedoms—in the Western legal tradition—
asserted their primacy over the posited state norms; in the end, gaining the 
upper hand and, thereby, giving way to the idea of human rights. In other 
words, these rights are prima facie rights against the state and its laws that 
can sometimes become excessively restrictive. Therefore, the very nature 
498 As one author suggests, this is exactly the case of the ECtHR, which adopts two differ-
ent strategies for locally grown and imported religious rituals and practices. See Nehal 
Bhuta, “Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights”, 
113(1) South Atlantic Quarterly (2014), 9-35.
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of these rights resists any formalization. Yet, at the same time, these rights 
need to have reasonable limits in order to make their exercise sensible in 
pluralist societies.
That is why an analysis of formal legal enactments hardly can fully 
describe the factual limits and constraints on religious freedoms existing in 
a society. These rights—albeit normatively limitless (or limited by too gen-
eral formulations)—are always constrained by public opinion which might 
also affect case law and administrative practices. At the same time, a purely 
political analysis of purported influences and power structures does not 
provide sufficient clues to a proper understanding of the machinery of law 
which, in every society, builds up its own semi-autonomous mechanisms 
of regulation (autonomy of procedures, language, legal community, legal 
technique, etc.) although the degree of this autonomy, naturally, can vary in 
different countries. This suggests looking at the language in which courts 
describe their attitudes toward certain fields of regulation. In the present 
case, toward religious freedoms and consider what is behind this language. 
Such is the central task of this Chapter which considers the approaches of 
the RF Supreme Court concerning religious freedoms: the real limits of their 
protection and restriction as they are formulated in several mainstream 
cases.
A caveat should be added about our attitude to what is described 
herein. This Chapter is focused on analyzing Russian law (constitutional, 
statutory, and case law) and the social context of its application. Readers 
will not find herein our value judgments on the cases decided by Russian 
courts or a political critique of these cases. This is a deliberate choice to 
keep ourselves as far as possible on the is side of the philosophical is-ought 
divide, and to keep this Chapter at a manageable arm’s length. Our inten-
tion here is not to praise nor to condemn any norms or practices involved 
in their application but, rather, to examine how the RF Supreme Court 
reasons in its decisions on religious freedoms, and how this reasoning can 
be representative of collective mindsets and attitudes. This analysis can help 
identify what William Ewald called “law in the minds”;499 doing so here 
with the RF Supreme Court in matters of religious freedoms. Potentially, 
it may be useful for subsequent political analyses, for a comparative-law 
examination of (dis)similarities in regulation of religious freedoms in Russia 
and other countries, and perhaps for normative judgments by policymakers 
or by those who aspire to become such.
499 Ewald, “Comparative Jurisprudence I”, op.cit. note 54, 1889-2149; and id., “Comparative 
Jurisprudence (II)”, 489-510.
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1 Constitutional Ambiguity
The Russian Constitution has established quite liberal, Western-style reli-
gious freedoms: “freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, including 
the right to profess individually or together with others any religion or to 
profess no religion at all, to freely choose, possess and disseminate religious 
and other views and act according to them” (Art.28). The Constitution also 
confirms that Russia is “a secular state where no religion may be estab-
lished as a state or obligatory [religion]” (Art.14). The basic law governing 
religious freedoms, the 1997 Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and 
on Religious Denominations,500 was expected to develop mechanisms for 
implementing these liberal freedoms but it remains mostly declarative. 
In particular, the 1997 law does not specify the conditions under which a 
person may declare their conscientious objections and be released from 
certain legal obligations because of their faith, or what the criteria are for 
courts to decide thereupon. Article 2 of the 1997 Law provides that “nothing 
in this law can be interpreted in a manner that infringes or encroaches on 
the human rights guaranteed by the Constitution or by international trea-
ties”. Following this principle to the letter, the law did not add anything 
about conditions for, or limits of, the exercise of these constitutional and 
international-law principles—apparently considering these principles to be 
self-evident.
There could have been at least two rationales for such a declarative 
approach in the 1997 law. On the one hand, in the absence of statutory limits 
to these freedoms, a strictly formalist interpretation could easily result in the 
conclusion that religious freedoms have no limits except those mentioned in 
Article 55(3) of the Russian Constitution.501 On the other hand, the Constitu-
tion establishes that it has direct effect (Art.15(1)) and that international law 
is an integral part of Russian law with primacy over domestic statutory law 
(Art.15(4)). In both these views, constitutional and international principles 
can be applied even if there are no statutory norms about implementation of 
these principles. These rationales were likely among the ideas that inspired 
500 Federal’nyi zakon [Federal Law] (26 September 1997) No.125-FZ “O svobode sovesti i 
o religioznykh ob”edineniiakh” [On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associ-
ations], Rossiiskaia gazeta (29 September 1997) No.4465. For a commentary on the law, 
see Lauren B. Homer and W. Cole Durham, Jr., “Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of Con-
science and Religious Associations: An Analytical Appraisal”, 12(1) Emory International 
Law Review (1998), 101-246.
501 Art.55 of the Russian Constitution warns that “in the Russian Federation no laws shall 
be adopted cancelling or derogating human rights and freedoms” (para.2). On the other 
hand, the next paragraph states that “the rights and freedoms of man and citizen may 
be limited by the federal law only to such an extent to which it is necessary for the pro-
tection of the fundamental principles of the constitutional system, morality, health, the 
rights and lawful interests of other people, for ensuring defense of the country and secu-
rity of the state” (para.3).
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the authors of the 1997 law. Under the conditions that exist in Russia, how-
ever, this approach—taken to the letter—has turned out to be destructive 
for religious freedoms.
As a matter of fact, the constitutional provision in Article 55(3) contains 
an empty formula which can be filled in with any restrictions whatsoever 
including those stemming from narratives about “traditional values”—cur-
rently popular and widely evoked by Russia’s political leadership and the 
judiciary.502 The problem of involving traditional values in discussions 
about human rights is not specifically Russian,503 but, as shown in the 
previous Chapters, Russia takes exorbitant measures to protect its “con-
stitutional identity” by banning “non-traditional” religious beliefs.504 In 
the same vein, Russia continues to insulate itself from international law, 
utilizing the sovereignty argument examined in Chapter 3. The 2015 Rul-
ing of the RF Constitutional Court and the ensuing statutory amendments 
have confirmed that, despite the plain meaning of Article 15(4) of the RF 
Constitution, international law has no primacy over domestic law when the 
Constitutional Court decides that the implementation of certain interpreta-
tions of international law poses a threat to Russia’s sovereignty.505
502 In recent years, especially after the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, the Russian authori-
ties have frequently referred to traditional values to justify their exceptionalist attitudes 
toward the West. The term “traditional values” constantly appears in offi cial narratives 
in Russia. Thus, it is no wonder that the ordinary courts grant protection to these values 
even if they are not formally included in the statutory law regulating matters of religious 
accommodations. In a certain sense, Russia pretends to be a leader in terms of defend-
ing traditional values in Europe. See, for example, Melissa Hooper, “Russia’s Traditional 
Values’ Leadership”, Foreign Policy Centre (1 June 2016), available at <http://www.
humanrightsfi rst.org/sites/default/fi les/Melisssa%20Report.pdf>. Such traditionalist 
discourses also prevail at the RF Constitutional Court.
503 See, for example, Jacob W.F. Sundberg, “Human Rights and Traditional Values”, in Peter 
Wahlgren (ed.), Human Rights: Their Limitations and Proliferation (Stockholm Institute for 
Scandinavian Law, Stockholm, 2010), 125-154.
504 See Alicija Curanović and Lucian N. Leustean, “The Guardians of Traditional Values: 
Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church in the Quest for Status”, Transatlantic Acade-
my Paper Series (2015) No.1, available at <http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/sites/
default/fi les/publications/Curanovic_GuardiansTraditionalValues_Feb15_web.pdf>.
505 Thus, in a mid-2015 ruling (14 July 2015) No.21-P, op.cit. note 16, the Constitutional Court 
ruled that decisions of the ECtHR are not self-executing, as we have noted above at the 
text at note 471. There the Court stressed, in particular, that national constitutional courts 
must limit the negative impact of ECtHR judgments on domestic laws and ensure that 
the principle of subsidiarity is duly observed by the ECtHR. As a logical development 
of this trend, in December 2016 a new constitutional law was adopted (28 December 
2016) No.11-Federal’nyi konstitutsionnyi zakon [Federal Constitutional Law] “O vnese-
nii izmenenii v FKZ “O Konstitutsionnom Sude Rossii” [On Introducing Amendments 
to the Federal Constitutional Law “On the Constitutional Court of Russia”], conferring 
the power on the Constitutional Court to refuse to enforce those decisions of the ECtHR 
deemed to be contrary to the Russian Constitution.
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism.indb   161 10-10-19   14:53
162 Chapter 5
The Russian legal system turned out to be resilient to the idea of the 
direct effect of the Constitution. This idea first was rejected by the RF 
Constitutional Court and then by other courts despite the clear wording 
of the Constitution itself. The long-lasting struggle between the RF Consti-
tutional Court and the RF Supreme Court about the direct applicability of 
the Constitution is illustrative in this sense. Prior to 16 April 2013, the RF 
Supreme Court had instructed its lower-level (general jurisdiction) courts 
to apply the Constitution directly when the courts found that a federal law 
(or a presidential edict) contradicted the Constitution and to refrain from 
applying such legislation or edicts.506 In a 1998 Ruling, the RF Constitu-
tional Court had condemned this practice, reasoning that no court can 
abstain from applying legislation unless such legislation has been deemed 
unconstitutional by the RF Constitutional Court.507 In other words, the RF 
Constitutional Court’s point was that ordinary judges may not consider 
whether a particular legislative provision is constitutional or not, and to 
refuse to apply such a provision in a specific court case on the grounds 
of the presumed unconstitutionality of this provision. This point was not 
supported by the RF Supreme Court which preferred the literal reading 
of Article 15 of the RF Constitution that endorses its direct effect. This 
discrepancy between these two jurisdictions lasted fifteen years until the 
RF Supreme Court abandoned its position and removed the controversial 
points from its 1995 ruling.508
This position of the RF Constitutional Court implies that neither 
international nor constitutional law can serve as suprastatutory criteria to 
ordinary (not constitutional) judges for deciding about restricting religious 
freedoms under Article 55 of the Constitution or for granting accommoda-
tions on religious grounds. As could have been expected, in this situation, 
courts have turned to traditionalist narratives to link national security 
and public morality with prevailing religious, moral, and other popular 
attitudes which, mostly, is based on conservative precepts of Orthodox 
Christianity and Islam and which are hostile to religious sects and new 
(“non-traditional”) religious denominations.509
506 Para.2(b), (v), and (g), [Ruling of the Plenum of the RF Supreme Court] (31 October 1995) 
No.8, op.cit. note 342.
507 Ruling of the RF Constitutional Court (16 June 1998) No.19-P, op.cit. note 342.
508 Ruling of the Plenum of the RF Supreme Court, op.cit. note 342. More details on this dis-
crepancy will be provided in Section 3 below.
509 For example, 80% of Russians support a ban on Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia although 
most respondents of a 2017 Levada poll have no idea about the religious teachings of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, available at <https://www.levada.ru/2017/07/13/svideteli-
iegovy/>. Almost the same percentage of Russians (79%) supports a proposal to take 
children away from members of sects who teach their children about non-traditional reli-
gious beliefs, available at <https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=116573>.
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A controversial 2017 case—involving the banning of Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses as an extremist organization by the RF Supreme Cour t510—can be 
demonstrative of the dependence of the courts on this traditionalist nar-
rative.511 The basic argument for banning the Jehovah’s Witnesses was their 
“extremism”, understood as their claim of being the holders of a supreme 
religious truth. Such claims are theoretically applicable to almost any reli-
gious denomination, and this case suggests that the RF Supreme Court may 
face an uneasy dilemma in the future: either to reconsider its approach in 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses case or enforce it in relation to other religious orga-
nizations that, for one reason or another, are not considered to be one of 
the traditional religions mentioned in the Preamble to the 1997 law. Some 
Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, and Muslim books also already have suffered 
from evidently disproportionate and inadequate judicial interference, but 
political or diplomatic pressure from within (or outside) Russia helped to 
set aside such decisions and calm the situation. The Jehovah’s Witnesses case 
may be a harbinger of another, more restrictive approach.
In this Chapter, we do not endeavor to undertake a historical or cultural 
investigation into the particularities of the Russian (Orthodox) attitude 
to rights, and we will limit our analysis to the jurisprudence of the RF 
Supreme Court preceding its findings in the Jehovah’s Witnesses case. This 
jurisprudence is very similar to the ideology of the Russian Orthodox 
Church as expressed in such documents as its 2000 Social Doctrine512 or 2008 
Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights.513 This should come as 
no surprise since the Russian Orthodox Church exerts an important moral 
510 The ruling banning Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia was rendered by the RF Supreme 
Court on 20 April 2017 in case No.AKPI 17-238. The full text in Russian is available at 
<http://www.jw-org.info/2017/05/tekst-reshenija-verhovnogo-suda-o-likvidacii-Svi-
detelej-Iegovy.html>. It was upheld by the Appellate Collegium of the RF Supreme Court 
on 17 July 2017, available at <http://vsrf.ru/stor_pdf.php?id=1564706>. On 16 August 
2017, the RF Ministry of Justice entered Jehovah’s Witnesses on its list of extremist orga-
nizations.
511 Surely, it is not an easy task to formulate what this public morality really is, and we do 
not intend to attempt to do so here. Nonetheless, one can fi nd remarkable coherence in 
statements by state authorities and other sociopolitical institutions such as the Russian 
Orthodox Church or political parties on what this morality is and what it should be. For 
example, the “opposition” parties in the Russian parliament (the Communists, the Lib-
eral Democrats led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Just Russia headed by Sergey Mironov) 
are even more hostile to religious and other minorities than the governmental party, 
United Russia.
512 “Osnovy sotsial’noi kontseptsii Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi” [The Foundations of 
the Social Conceptions of the Russian Orthodox Church] (19 July 2000), available at 
<https://mospat.ru/ru/documents/social-concepts/>.
513 “Osnovy ucheniia Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi o dostoinstve, svobode i pravakh che-
loveka” [The Basic Teachings on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights of the Russian 
Orthodox Church] (26 June 2008), available at <https://mospat.ru/ru/documents/dig-
nity-freedom-rights/>.
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influence on society and on the political authorities,514 and, profiting from 
this influence, it can fight those denominations whose teachings are hostile 
to its dogma and its institutional interests. Some researchers even claim that 
the mechanisms used to balance religious rights with other rights and privi-
leges in Russia has some specific traits which contribute to state policies for 
the formation of new national identities.515 Using the leeway provided by 
the gap between formalism and decisionism in Russian law, as examined in 
Chapter 1 above, Russian courts can indirectly utilize the creeds of the ROC 
in their decision-making to meet both political expectations and to satisfy 
public opinion.
2 Methodology
Building on the methodological considerations exposed in Chapter 1, we 
will depart from the hypothesis that there is a correlation between the 
legal formalism prevailing in Russian law and the restrained decisionism 
elaborated by the RF Supreme Court in the field of religious freedoms. This 
connection will be demonstrated below, in Section 3 based on the example 
of some mainstream cases heard in the RF Supreme Court.
This old-fashioned legal positivism—based on the presumption that 
laws contain responses to all possible legally relevant issues, so that the 
task of judges is to reveal these responses through careful interpretation of 
the laws and the legislator’s will which is enshrined in these laws—might 
explain why Russian law does not explicitly recognize the doctrine of 
“religious accommodation”. Formally, all rights and obligations are posited 
only in laws, so that judges may remain “mouths that pronounce the words 
of the laws” (according to Charles Montesquieu516) and have no discretion 
whatsoever. If a judge were to attempt to introduce an exemption to a legal 
514 Kristina Stoeckl, “The Russian Orthodox Church as Moral Norm Entrepreneur”, 44(2) 
Religion, State and Society (2016), 132-151.
515 Alexander Agadjanian, “Tradition, Morality and Community: Elaborating Orthodox 
Identity in Putin’s Russia”, 45(1) Religion, State and Society (2017), 39-60. See also, for 
example, Nikolas Gvozdev, “Religious Freedoms: Russian Constitutional Principles – 
Historical and Contemporary”, Brigham Young University Law Review (2001), 511-536; Lev 
Simkin, “Church and State in Russia”, in Silvio Ferrari and W. Cole Durham Jr. (eds.), Law 
and Religion in Post-Communist Europe (Peeters, Louvain, 2003), 261-280; John Garrard and 
Carol Garrard, Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent: Faith and Power in the New Russia (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2008); Christopher Marsh, Religion and State in Russia and 
China: Suppression, Survival, and Revival (The Continuum International, New York, NY, 
2011); Geraldine Fagan, Believing in Russia: Religious Policy After Communism (Routledge, 
New York, NY, 2012); and Roman Lunkin, “The Status of and Challenges to Religious 
Freedoms in Russia”, in Allen D. Hertzke (ed.), Future of Religious Freedoms: Global Chal-
lenges (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013), 157-180.
516 Charles Louis de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1989, Thomas Nugent transl.), Book 1, Ch. 3.
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rule (e.g., bakers must sell their cakes to everyone except when selling cakes 
to certain people whose behavior contradicts their beliefs), in Russian legal 
theory this could be taken as an expression of judicial activism and be con-
demned as a judge’s expropriation of the legislative function. It is curious 
that the term “judicial discretion” in Russian legalese still has a pejorative 
meaning and is equated with arbitrariness.517 Moreover, this formalism 
negates the idea of accommodation by referring to the secular character of 
the state and the constitutional principle of equality before the law (Art.19, 
RF Constitution) which is interpreted in such a way that it rules out any 
preferences based on an individual’s religious status.
In spite of not being recognized in the prevailing doctrine, the idea of 
accommodation makes its way through Russian case law and jurispru-
dence: the courts show a clear proclivity to grant such accommodations to 
traditional religious denominations and, especially, to the Russian Orthodox 
Church and to state-recognized Muslim spiritual congregations (dukhovnye 
upravleniia musul’man). Analyzing key precepts of the prevailing formalist 
theory can bring to light the conceptual reasons behind the discrepancy 
between the constitutional principles on religious freedoms and the practice 
of their implementation or, more correctly, their non-implementation. In 
Russian law, the rule-based reasoning prevails, while principles generally 
work only if supported by relevant statutory provisions paving the way to 
the implementation of these principles in law-enforcement practice.518
The prevalent legal theory in Russia follows the first form of positivism 
that arose in the 19th century in the spirit of John Austin and Jeremy Ben-
tham who saw the law solely as a set of commands from the sovereign.519 
Within this positivist paradigm, only subsumption (legal syllogism) can be 
accepted as the legitimate means of establishing and applying the law in 
concrete cases. In light of this theory, such procedures as balancing or pro-
portionality tests are viewed rather as theoretical attempts to justify judicial 
discretion or arbitrariness or even latently to introduce “alien Western 
values” under the guise of liberal moral discourse.520 As shown in Chapter 
1, formalism is combined with decisionism, which does not require address-
ing legal principles and suggests revealing the true political will which is 
behind legal texts.
517 Alexei Trochev, “Legitimacy, Accountability and Discretion of the Russian Courts”, in 
Martin Brusis et al. (eds.), Politics and Legitimacy in Post-Soviet Eurasia (Palgrave Macmil-
lan, Hampshire, 2016), 121-147.
518 From this point of view, Russia is similar to other post-Soviet countries. See, for example, 
Kühn, op.cit. note 122.
519 See Butler (ed.), op.cit. note 9.
520 See, for example, Mikhail Antonov, “Philosophy Behind Human Rights: Valerii Zorkin 
vs. the West?”, in Mälksoo and Benedek, op.cit. note 70, 150-187.
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Given the hierarchy of legal rules set out in Article 15 of the RF Con-
stitution—the Constitution itself, international law, constitutional and 
ordinary statutes, bylaws—judges have no authority to introduce or apply 
principles except those expressly stipulated in laws, treaties, and other 
posited sources of the law, and, furthermore, they are prohibited from 
refusing to apply any laws because of their presumed opposition to such 
principles. This approach is dubbed “legality” (formerly, “socialist legality”) 
and, in procedural codes, requires that judges be bound only by the law 
(e.g., Art.195, RF Civil Procedure Code; Art.7, RF Criminal Procedure Code). 
This attitude was expressed, in particular, in the above-cited disagreement 
between the RF Constitutional Court and the RF Supreme Court about the 
direct effect of the Constitution, and it seems to be a result of the formalist 
interpretation of Rechtsstaat (law-bound state, pravovoe gosudarstvo in Art.1, 
RF Constitution) where the law is independent of other social regulatory 
mechanisms and where it prevails over them.521
Nonetheless, the reality in Russia and elsewhere is that legal norms 
cannot provide solutions for all possible cases. Therefore, judges inevitably 
have to go beyond posited norms to render reasonable decisions in the mul-
titude of cases where the law might remain silent or ambiguous. Sometimes, 
judges also have to discard some posited norms if their application, under 
the given circumstances, would result in unjust or unreasonable decisions. 
This is especially true about such difficult cases as those connected with 
religious freedoms.
For its part, the RF Constitutional Court has continuously demonstrated 
its preference to formally abide by the principle of secularity and to abstain 
from coining any clear-cut principles or approaches in matters of religious 
freedoms. Until now, the most important case involving the intervention of 
the RF Constitutional Court in religious matters concerned a question that 
was rather formal: a 1999 ruling on the re-registration of religious denomi-
nations.522 This ruling did not contain any substantial argumentation 
about legal principles or policies in the religious domain applying, instead, 
521 Frances Nethercott, Russian Legal Culture Before and After Communism: Criminal Justice, 
Politics and the Public Sphere (Routledge, London, 2007).
522 In this case, the RF Constitutional Court (23 November 1999, No.16-P) rejected the claim 
about the unconstitutionality of the requirement that religious organizations must be 
periodically re-registered but ruled that those organizations that were incorporated in 
Russia prior to the adoption of the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience have no obliga-
tion to re-register. In another “positive” ruling (17 February 2015, No.2-P), the RF Con-
stitutional Court legitimized the power of the Prosecutor-General’s Offi ce to monitor the 
observance of legislation by religious denominations and to obtain any information from 
these denominations that—directly or indirectly—may prove that they are violating the 
laws.
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism.indb   166 10-10-19   14:53
Religious Beliefs and the Limits of Their Accommodation in Russia 167
general principles of law. The abstention of the RF Constitutional Court523 
from interfering in religious matters led, as expected, to a lack of legal cer-
tainty (predictability) in these matters.
In this penumbra and lacunae situation, the ordinary courts (courts of 
general jurisdiction), headed by the RF Supreme Court, have developed 
jurisprudence that somehow fills this gap.524 Below, we will analyze several 
rulings from the case law of the RF Supreme Court that might illustrate the 
main arguments which have been repeatedly applied in the Court’s reason-
ing about religious freedoms. Our analysis of the practice of the RF Supreme 
Court will be limited to the aims of this Chapter: we will consider only cases 
published in the official journal of the Court, the Biulleten’ Verkhovnogo Suda 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii (The Bulletin of the Supreme Court of Russia; herein-
after, “The Bulletin”).525 If case reports are published in the Bulletin, they 
have a much larger audience compared to unpublished decisions,526 and 
consequently exert more influence on the practice of lower courts and on 
the entire legal system. Moreover, the RF Supreme Court uses The Bulletin 
to promulgate decrees of its Plenum and rulings of its Presidium that have 
523 Nonetheless, there are some cases in which the RF Constitutional Court adjudicated mat-
ters concerning religious freedoms. If not to cite negative statements (opredeleniia) on the 
inadmissibility, the most important rulings (postanovleniia) are (besides the 1999 ruling 
cited above and rulings that were delivered prior to the enactment of the 1997 Federal 
Law on Freedom of Conscience): (1) a ban on the creation of religious political parties 
was held to be constitutional (Ruling of 15 December 2004, No.18-P); (2) the dismissal of a 
claim about the inapplicability of the rules on the liquidation of legal entities for liquida-
tion of religious organizations (Ruling of 6 December 2011, No.26-P); and (3) denial of a 
claim about the unconstitutionality of the requirement that religious denominations must 
ask in advance for permission to conduct mass religious meetings (Ruling of 5 December 
2012, No.30-P). See Mikhail Antonov, “Balancing Religious Freedoms: Some Examples 
from the Practice of the RF Constitutional Court”, in Piotr Szymaniec (ed.), The Principle 
of Proportionality and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European States (Wydawnic-
two Państwowej Wyższej Szkoły Zawodowej im. Angelusa Silesiusa, Wroclaw, 2017), 
259-268.
524 When courts do provide de facto accommodations, their choice hinges rather on vary-
ing political expediency and on the general logic of constraints shaping the interrelation 
between the courts and other branches of state power. There are other mechanisms and 
organizations mitigating the relations between the state and religious denominations in 
Russia, the most important organ being the Presidential Council for Interrelations with 
Religious Denominations. The logic of their activities is rather political and goes beyond 
the scope of this Chapter.
525 The Bulletin is published monthly, available <http://www.supcourt.ru/documents/
newsletters/>.
526 These unpublished decisions, nonetheless, are available on the offi cial site of the RF 
Supreme Court: <http://www.supcourt.ru/indexA.php>. Decisions and acts adopted 
by courts of law in Russia are available on the government’s Pravosudie website: <http://
www.sudrf.ru>. It should be kept in mind, however, that the research engines on these 
sites are not easy to use and, by far, not all court acts are registered in these systems. It is 
also possible to use private-sector legal databases such as KonsultantPlus (<www.consul-
tant.ru>) or Garant (<www.garant.ru>). These represent the Russian equivalents to data-
bases such as Lexis-Nexis or Westlaw allowing the user to gain more convenient access to 
court practice. Full access to these private databases requires a paid subscription.
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a normative character and are binding for lower courts and also, indirectly, 
for the entire Russian legal order. This normative character implies that if 
a decision of a lower court diverges from the position formulated in the 
decrees or rulings of the RF Supreme Court, it can be overturned on these 
grounds (point 3 of Art. 391(3) and point 5 of Art.392(4), RF Civil Procedure 
Code; point 3 of Art.341 and point 5 Art.350(1), RF Administrative Proce-
dure Code). For our purposes, we have chosen to focus on some landmark 
cases and on normative decrees in order to give readers an idea about the 
case law of the RF Supreme Court prior to the 2017 Jehovah’s Witnesses case 
cited above.527
This analysis clearly does not exhaust all the “law in action” on this 
matter in Russia, and here we will not devote any attention to the mass 
of court decisions that were pronounced by ordinary courts of law since 
their analysis would require much more extensive research.528 We will also 
skip cases that were considered and decided by the RF Supreme Court but 
were included in the case reports published in The Bulletin.529 It should 
also be mentioned that “electronic justice” in Russia is not as reliable a tool 
as one might wish it to be, especially in the courts of general jurisdiction. 
Even if the courts carry out a large amount of their workload nowadays 
in electronic form and numerous decisions are available through electronic 
resources, there still remains a trove of cases that are not entered into any 
databases because of concerns about national security, confidentiality, or 
simply due to irresponsibility on the part of court clerks and because of 
a lack of proper supervision over them. To our knowledge, no scholarly 
research has been conducted in Russia to establish the degree of reliability 
of legal databases in this regard.
In the following pages, we will provide a brief overview of the Court’s 
argumentation retrieved from the case reports of the RF Supreme Court, 
mentioning the ratio decidendi of the relevant cases and describing the 
Court’s reasoning in the general recommendations it provides to lower 
courts. As we have noted above, the highest instance of this Court (its 
Plenum) is entitled to issue binding decrees about how to interpret and 
apply the applicable laws. The commentaries made by the Plenum (decrees) 
are not necessarily connected with the particularities of concrete cases and 
527 Op.cit. note 510.
528 To give readers an idea about the number of cases in this field, we accessed the 
Rospravosudie database (<https://rospravosudie.com>) using three combinations of 
keywords within a time frame from 1 June 2017 to 1 June 2018. The combination of key-
words “freedom of belief’ (svoboda veroispovedaniia) within this period of time yielded 594 
results; the combination “freedom of consciousness (svoboda sovesti) yielded 1,394, and 
that of “religious freedoms” (religioznye svobody) yielded 14,932. The cases (court deci-
sions, statements, and other acts) retrieved in the fi rst two searches were mostly repro-
duced in the third search as well since it is the most comprehensive of the three.
529 A search for the keywords “religious freedoms” in the private database KonsultantP-
lus provided 379 results for cases considered by the RF Supreme Court in the timespan 
between 2002 and 2018.
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are of a general nature. In Russian legalese, both general commentaries 
about court practice provided by the Court’s Plenum and decisions made 
by the RF Supreme Court (by its Cassation Collegium or its Supervisory 
Collegium-Presidium) in individual cases are called postanovleniia. In order 
to avoid confusion, we will use two different terms in English: “decree” and 
“ruling” for these types of Court acts (general and individual ones). The RF 
Supreme Court sometimes considers cases as the first instance, and then its 
acts are made in the form of decisions (resheniia).
Not all of the retrieved cases are important for understanding the 
Court’s approach in the mentioned category of cases. In some cases, “reli-
gious freedoms” are only occasionally mentioned in case reports and do 
not provide any specific recommendations or comments on this matter. 
We will omit these irrelevant results and focus on those that can contribute 
to elucidating the Court’s principles and policies in “religious” cases. The 
comments given by the RF Supreme Court on judgments of the ECtHR in 
matters of religious freedoms are not provided here. Otherwise, we would 
have to substantially widen the subject matter of our research and to pro-
vide a comparative analysis of these comments and of the arguments of 
the ECtHR.530 We will also skip rulings and decrees where only procedural 
aspects (which court fee is to be paid or which district court a claim should 
be addressed to, and so on), or aspects that are not relevant for this Chapter 
(extradition cases, real-estate disputes, custody discrepancies between par-
ents, etc.) are examined. We only will discuss cases that concern principal 
issues involving the protection of religious beliefs.
The retrieved results will be organized chronologically. We warn 
readers that, as rule, certain details (like the names of the claimants or 
defendants, dates, addresses, names of judges, etc.) are not provided. The 
data-protection policy of the RF Supreme Court is such that anonymity is 
meant to protect the parties to court disputes and judges against illegal 
influence. This practice is different from the practice of the state commercial 
(arbitrazh) courts which publish their decisions online without hiding any 
of these details.
530 Pursuant to Art.15(4), Russian Constitution, norms and universally recognized principles 
of international law constitute an integral part of Russian law and have primacy over 
domestic legislation in case of a collision of norms. As shown in the preceding Chapters 
of this volume, Russian scholars and judges have a different opinion as to the norma-
tive value of the jurisprudence of supranational courts (such as the ECtHR). But there 
is a consensus that such jurisprudence should be at least respected. As a result, the RF 
Supreme Court sometimes also publishes, in its Bulletin, judgments of the ECtHR and 
of other jurisdictional bodies (such as the United Nations Human Rights Commission) 
and courts cite (although rarely) this jurisprudence. See Anton Burkov, “Impact of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on the Rus-
sian Legal System”, The EU-Russia Center Review (May 2010) No.14, 30-35, available at 
<http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/EURC_Review_XIV_
english.pdf>.
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3 The Russian Supreme Court on Religious Freedoms: 
A Selective Analysis
We begin our analysis with an interesting dilemma, already mentioned 
above, which arose before Russian courts in the mid-1990s and concerned 
the question of young men avoiding obligatory military service by claiming 
that it contradicted their religious beliefs. Making such claims meant poten-
tially facing criminal prosecution for draft evasion, and the RF Supreme 
Court needed to decide either to uphold this prosecution in accordance 
with statutory law or to absolve young men of criminal charges on the basis 
of their constitutional right to alternative civilian service. This dilemma 
even led to a confrontation between the two major Russian courts—the RF 
Supreme Court and the RF Constitutional Court—about whether conscien-
tious objection could serve as the legal basis for releasing individuals from 
compulsory military service.
This situation was made even more complicated by the fact that before 
2002 (when the law on alternative civilian service was adopted), there were 
no laws or regulations explaining what this alternative service could be, 
how (and under which conditions) it was to be carried out despite the fact 
that Article 59 of the RF Constitution already, in 1993, had introduced the 
right to alternative non-military (civilian) service for those not wishing to 
enroll in military service based on their conscientious objections. In order 
to justify not applying the applicable laws about criminal and administra-
tive liability for those who avoided military service, the courts either had to 
introduce rules on alternative service themselves and, thus, take the place of 
legislators or to clear young believers of criminal charges on the basis of the 
direct effect of Article 59 of the Constitution. The RF Supreme Court chose 
the latter option and asserted that the courts should apply the Constitution 
even in the absence of laws and regulations (the issue of direct applicability 
of the Constitution has been reiterated by the RF Supreme Court on many 
occasions both before and after) and, therefore, that the courts should reject 
the presumably unconstitutional charges and acquit the conscientious 
objectors.
This approach has been embodied in a series of rulings by the RF 
Supreme Court. For example, in the Overview of Court Practice for the first 
(The Bulletin 1996: 10)531 and second quarters of 1996 (The Bulletin 1997: 3), 
the Court indicated that in the absence of laws on alternative non-military 
service, the courts should apply Article 59 of the Constitution and, conse-
quently, should not apply the Criminal Code or the 1993 Federal Law on 
Military Service imposing criminal liability on conscientious objectors. 
This position was confirmed in Decree of the RF Supreme Court No.8 (31 
October 1995) on Certain Questions of the Application of the RF Constitu-
531 The fi rst number is this (and later citations) refers to the year of publication; the second 
number after the colon to the issue in that year of The Bulletin.
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tion in the Administration of Justice by the Courts (The Bulletin 1996: 1), 
where the RF Supreme Court instructed the lower-level courts to apply the 
RF Constitution when these courts determine that a federal law contradicts 
the Constitution and to refrain from applying such legislation (points b, v, 
and g of para.2, Decree No.8).
As already mentioned, the RF Constitutional Court disagreed with this 
position and, in 1998, implicitly condemned it as an encroachment on its 
exclusive competencies. It held that no court in Russia can abstain from 
applying federal legislation on the grounds of purported unconstitution-
ality unless such legislation has been deemed unconstitutional by the RF 
Constitutional Court itself. This implied that the RF Supreme Court and 
its subordinate courts cannot deviate from the application of federal laws 
even if these courts find that these laws contradict the Constitution. In such 
a case, the RF Constitutional Court preferred the courts to suspend pro-
ceedings and submit a query to the RF Constitutional Court. This approach 
underscores that constitutional principles in Russia do not function prop-
erly without mechanisms for their implementation established by statutory 
law.
The aforementioned Supreme Court Decree No.8 also touched on 
a number of other principal issues and, in particular, on balancing the 
freedom of religious activities with other human rights and freedoms. 
The courts were instructed to pay attention to a possible collision between 
values protected by the Constitution and to assume responsibility for choos-
ing between them. However, this responsibility of the courts was about 
resolving possible value conflicts in light of the decrees and rulings of the 
RF Supreme Court.
As a starting point for analysis, the RF Supreme Court took the expres-
sion of religious beliefs: Article 28 guarantees the right to propagate and 
disseminate religious beliefs, but Article 13 of the Constitution prohibits 
the establishment of organizations fomenting religious strife. This latter 
prohibition, in the Court’s opinion, is absolute and cannot be overridden 
on the basis of any religious freedom (point 11 of the decree). Therefore, the 
RF Supreme Court itself determined in advance which value has priority: 
this is characteristic of formalist jurisprudence which leaves ordinary judges 
with no room for activism and rules out the possibility of balancing various 
principles. In the second issue of The Bulletin in 1996, the Chief Justice of 
the RF Supreme Court, Vladimir Lebedev, published his commentary on 
this decree in which he also stressed that the constitutional right to create 
religious organizations is not absolute and is limited by the provisions of 
Article 13 of the Constitution. This reasoning signified that violations of 
religious freedoms could be remedied in a court of law if it is proven that 
the exercise of said freedoms does not contravene statutory laws against 
fomenting religious strife. In other words, religious freedoms can be 
discarded if said freedoms are considered dangerous in accordance with 
Russia’s anti-extremism laws. Here, one can see the origins of the argumen-
tation embodied in the 2017 Jehovah’s Witnesses decisions.
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This issue was also at stake when the RF Supreme Court considered a 
headscarf case (The Bulletin 2004: 2) in which several Muslim women chal-
lenged a police instruction that prohibited individuals from using passport 
photos while wearing a headscarf. Here, the Court’s position was that tradi-
tional religions may claim exemptions. The first instance of the RF Supreme 
Court had denied the petition (using reasoning similar to that of the ECtHR 
in the 1993 case of Karaduman v. Turkey), following a formalist approach. 
However, the Cassation Collegium of the RF Supreme Court quashed the 
verdict and allowed the petition, ruling that the restriction was invalid (Rul-
ing of 15 May 2003, No.KАС-03-166) because the main function of passport 
photographs is to depict a citizen in the way s/he usually appears in public. 
Therefore, if certain Muslim women usually wear a headscarf in their daily 
life in accordance with established traditions, there are good reasons for 
them to use a photo depicting them in their typical head covering. The 
Ruling stressed that Russian laws do not prevent women from wearing a 
headscarf in public places. Therefore, these limitations were unjustified and 
were held to violate the religious freedoms of Muslim women.
In a series of hijab cases considered by the RF Supreme Court between 
2012 and 2016, the Court reasoned that wearing a hijab in schools is allowed 
not as a religious accommodation but, rather, as a tribute to national tradi-
tions. As the hijab is an Arab custom rather than a local one, there is no 
justification for allowing it in public schools of the Muslim regions of Russia 
tradition (Bashkir, Chechen, Dagestan, Tatar, etc. schools). The ratio decidendi 
in these cases was expressed by President Vladimir Putin, who interfered in 
the matter, saying publicly in 2004 that there is no good reason to allow the 
wearing of the hijab in schools since there has never been such a tradition 
in Russia’s Muslim regions. This reasoning implied that religious accom-
modation could be legitimately conceded to “traditional” religions only 
provided that such religious practices are compatible with national tradi-
tions. This reasoning was repeatedly used afterwards when Russian courts 
struck down several regulations upon requests from Orthodox or Muslim 
communities paying a tribute to national traditions in public religious cer-
emonies, but at the same time turned down similar petitions from religious 
minorities.
This policy can be illustrated by another case considered in 2004 in 
which the Court used a broad interpretation of the 1997 Law on Issues of 
the Corporate Status of Local Religious Organizations (The Bulletin 2004: 
10). Muslims living in a town in the Kamchatka Oblast’ had established a 
local religious organization in which Muslims living in other neighboring 
towns were also members. The RF Ministry of Justice claimed that this 
organization was illegal since the members did not live in one locality as 
required by the 1997 law. The Ministry’s petition to close down the organi-
zation was rejected by the RF Supreme Court (Ruling of 6 February 2004, 
No.60-G04-3), which argued that the term “local organization”, according 
to the logic (but not pursuant to the literal text) of that law, implied the 
territory of a subject of the Russian Federation. Since all the members of the 
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Kamchatka Muslim Religious Community lived in the Kamchatka Oblast’, 
which is a subject of the Russian Federation, there was nothing to prevent 
them from establishing such a community. At the same time, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, Scientologists, and other religious minorities were desperately 
fighting to convince the Russian state to accept them as legitimate religious 
denominations based on similar arguments.
In its Ruling No.49-G04-48 (21 May 2004), the RF Supreme Court com-
mented on religious educational activities and formalities to be observed 
when engaging in such activities (The Bulletin 2004: 11). In the case of the 
Church of Scientology’s Dianetica branch office in Bashkortostan, the Court 
ruled that representing a religious dogma in the form of a scientific concept 
and regularly teaching that concept is a particular kind of education. Thus, 
teaching the concept of L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Church of Scien-
tology, is not solely a missionary activity but, also, a process of transferring 
scientific and religious knowledge or an educational process that, accord-
ing to Russian legislation, requires a license. In the opinion of the Court, 
a religious denomination providing religious education is fully eligible to 
receive a license since Russian laws do not introduce any exemptions for 
religious education in this regard. In addition to exercising psychological 
pressure, including hypnosis on adherents,532 the Court held that the fact of 
illegal (i.e., without a license) educational activity may serve as grounds for 
liquidation of this religious denomination.
In a judgment rendered a few years later, the RF Supreme Court (Ruling 
of 16 October 2007, No.31-G07-8) confirmed this finding and held that the 
mere fact of engaging in educational activities without a license constitutes 
sufficient grounds to close down a religious organization (the Biblical 
Center of the Evangelic Church in Chuvashia).533 These findings are con-
firmed by the observation that other religious schools (Catholic, Lutheran, 
Orthodox, and other Christian denominations) normally obtain licenses 
for offering religious education at their theological seminaries. But Ruling 
No.31-G07-8 ignored the difference between professional education (such 
as theological studies at a religious university) and day-to-day meetings 
with discussions which are commonplace in many Russian public schools 
where traditional religions are studied. In the case of Dmitrii Bondar’, who 
challenged the legitimacy of teaching ROC dogma at schools and its indi-
rect inclusion in school curricula, the Court took an unfavorable position. 
Reasoning quite formalistically, the RF Supreme Court disagreed with the 
claimant’s suggestion that the constitutional principle of secularity is a legal 
obstacle preventing the RF Ministry of Education from including religious 
532 Similar arguments were made earlier by the RF Supreme Court in Ruling No.58-G2-38 
(26 November 2002) against Dianetica in Khabarovsk.
533 This case was later reconsidered by the ECtHR, which found violations of the right to 
religious freedom in the licensing requirement applied to Sunday schools ECtHR Judg-
ment. First Section, Biblical Center of the Chuvash Republic v. Russia (14 July 2014) Applica-
tion No.33203/08.
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dogma of the prevailing religious denomination (the ROC) as a part of 
school instruction (and allowing priests to visit school classes) and rejected 
Bondar’s petition.534
As an example of this selective approach, the Cassation Collegium of the 
RF Supreme Court (The Bulletin 2005: 5) stressed that the constitutional right 
to freedom of religion also implies that prisoners should have an opportu-
nity for exercising their religion in prisons and, for this purpose, for taking 
literature, icons, and other religious items to their cells. This right has been 
restricted by para.23 of a RF Ministry of Justice Regulation (2001) No.224. 
This restriction was challenged by a prisoner who claimed that his religious 
freedoms were being arbitrarily restricted since he was unable to pray with-
out icons (which had been prohibited by the prison authorities pursuant 
to para.23 of Regulation No.224). The RF Supreme Court’s First Instance 
Collegium invalidated this provision of the Regulation. Reconsidering this 
case on a cassation petition from the RF Prosecutor-General’s Office, the 
RF Supreme Court’s Cassation Collegium agreed (Ruling of 2 September 
2004, No.KAS04-351) with the first instance’s holding, stressing that human 
rights and liberties can be restricted only in order to assure national secu-
rity, public morality, or the health or rights of other citizens (Art.55, RF 
Constitution) and finding that it was not the case concerning the right of 
prisoners to exercise their religion in line with established traditions. In the 
RF Supreme Court’s opinion, this balance will not be affected if prisoners 
follow their religious practices in their cells so that the Prosecutor-General’s 
arguments—that prisons have prayer rooms and libraries for such prac-
tices—are unjustified. This case fits the reasoning of the RF Supreme Court 
in the previous cases where it confirmed that religious accommodation 
can be granted to “traditional” religions (to Orthodox icons in this case).
However, Russian courts do not always protect the interests of the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church. As an example, one can cite the controversial point 
of restitution where the interests of the state and of the Church seem to be in 
a permanent conflict. In a 2004 ruling (5 October 2004, No.GKPI04-1253), the 
RF Supreme Court turned down the application of the St. Elea-the-Prophet 
Orthodox temple in Moscow (The Bulletin 2005: 6), which claimed that of 
the RF Government’s 2001 Regulation No.490 (point 8)—about the process 
for transferring former ecclesiastical buildings back into the ownership of 
the religious denominations possessing these buildings prior to the 1917 
Revolution—was invalid. The basis of this claim was that the federal laws 
on this issue imperatively prescribed restitution of all ecclesiastical build-
ings to the ownership of churches. Nonetheless, the challenged regula-
tion allowed the termination of restitution only under certain conditions. 
Therefore, in the claimant’s opinion, the government exceeded the bounds 
conferred upon it by the law. The Court disagreed and rejected the petition, 
reasoning that the obligation of restitution was not absolute and the rights 
534 Ruling of the RF Supreme Court in case No.AKPI13-810 (13 October 2013), available at 
<http://supcourt.ru/stor_pdf.php?id=565700>.
Formalism, Realism and Conservatism.indb   174 10-10-19   14:53
Religious Beliefs and the Limits of Their Accommodation in Russia 175
of religious denominations should be balanced with the ownership rights 
of the current occupants of buildings. In this case, the Court had to balance 
religious freedoms not only with historical traditions but, also, with the 
state interest. Equating the latter with the public interest, the RF Supreme 
Court prioritized it over other values. Later on, this argument will reap-
pear in cases involving the Jehovah’s Witnesses when Russian courts began 
confiscating this denomination’s real estate subsequent to its liquidation.535
For several years, one controversial point related to tax legislation for 
Russian ultra-Orthodox adepts was the use of a taxpayer identification 
number (TIN). These adepts had fought for the right not to have a TIN, 
arguing that it is inadmissible to categorize human beings by numeric iden-
tifiers and, thus, to replace the names given to them at baptism. The Russian 
courts have regularly dismissed these claims. The RF Supreme Court in its 
Ruling (30 May 2000) No.GKPI00-402 held that this sort of tax identification 
is compatible with the believers’ principal religious beliefs and, therefore, 
did not violate any freedoms. This finding was confirmed by the RF Consti-
tutional Court in its Ruling No.287-O (10 July 2003).
New arguments—heard in 2004 by two courts in Tambov Oblast’—
appealed to the freedom of conscience, to human liberty, and to reason-
ability in general. The petitioner insisted that the tax inspectorate should, 
first, inform a taxpayer about the TIN chosen for them and assign it only 
after the taxpayer confirms that this number does not contradict their 
beliefs. The courts of the first and the second instances allowed the peti-
tion, reasoning that in this situation there were no concerns about national 
security or public morality and therefore religious freedom could not be 
limited under Article 55 of the Constitution. The RF Supreme Court (The 
Bulletin 2007: 2) quashed these decisions and held (Ruling of 1 March 2006, 
No.13-V05-13) that the state authorities are not under any obligation to 
consider religious beliefs of taxpayers. It is enough that attributing a TIN is 
not contrary to the beliefs of the main (traditional) religious denominations 
in Russia, which was confirmed by the position expressed by the Holy 
Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church: in a statement of 7 March 2000, 
it came out in favor of the use of TINs.536 In this case, the Court ruled that 
535 In St Petersburg, for example, real estate belonging to the Jehovah’s Witnesses was con-
fi scated in 2018 following a decision of the Sestroretsk District Court. See Mikhail Telek-
hov, “Imushchestvo Svidetelei Iegovy na 881,5 mln rublei iz”iato v pol’zu gosudarstva” 
[The Property of the Jehovah’s Witnesses Valued at 881,5 Million Rubles Is Confi scated 
in Favor of the State], rapsinews.ru (5 March 2018), available at <http://www.rapsinews.
ru/judicial_news/20180503/282635534.html>. A similar decision was taken by a Petro-
zavodsk court in Karelia in 2018 and in a number of other regions: “Sud lishil Svidetelei 
Iegocy prava na zdanie v Petrozavodske” [The Court Dispossessed a Jehovah’s Witness-
es’ Building in Petrozavodsk], interfax.ru (4 April 2018), available at <http://www.inter-
fax.ru/russia/606962>.
536 In a decision from the end of the 2000s, the ECtHR rejected as inadmissible the subse-
quent petition of one of the claimants in this case: Skugar v. Russia (3 December 2009) 
Application No.40010/04.
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the petitioners had failed to support their claim of using a tax identifica-
tion number as being contrary to their own religious beliefs: they had not 
proven that an identification number was not congruous with national 
traditions or the religious creeds of “traditional” denominations.
Shaping its symbolic policy, the RF Supreme Court ruled that certain 
signs or images could not be displayed or worshipped; that the use of 
such signs or images could constitute grounds for banning a religious 
denomination (Ruling of 6 February 2007, No.18-G07-1). In this case, the 
Ingilistic Aryan Church of Old Believers had challenged the interdiction 
of the RF Prosecutor-General’s Office preventing them from exercising 
their religion. The petitioner reasoned that the image of a swastika used 
in their rituals was an old Aryan Sun symbol serving as a cult object long 
before the National-Socialists in Germany had started using the symbol 
in their ideology. Dismissing the petition, the RF Supreme Court held that 
the image of a swastika has a clear cultural connotation in contemporary 
societies; that its use normally provokes a clear link with the ideology of 
Nazism; that the existence of any religious denomination worshipping the 
swastika is incompatible with the basic codes of public morality in Russia 
(The Bulletin 2007: 12). The sole fact of worshiping this symbol is enough 
to prohibit the activity of such denominations regardless of the historical 
context in which the “new Aryans” interpret the swastika or how they 
correlate this symbol with their beliefs. In vain, the applicant had argued 
that the ROC also utilizes a number of symbols similar to swastika, e.g., 
on ceremonial dresses of Orthodox priests: the Aryan Church had no 
traditional background similar to that of the ROC to justify its right to the 
same use of this symbol.
Here, the RF Supreme Court also confirmed that it had evaluated the 
religious beliefs and symbols against the backdrop of prevailing tradition.
Conclusion
This analysis suggests that there are earlier cases connected with religious 
freedoms that paved the way to the 2017 Jehovah’s Witnesses decision. Legal 
argumentation in Russia can be characterized as mostly rule-based—mostly 
relying on legal formalism and its technique. If there is a statute clearly 
regulating a matter, the courts—in cases about the rights of religious 
minorities—would be reluctant to re-evaluate or reinterpret the rules of the 
statute from the point of view of reasonability, proportionality, or other non-
formal criteria. If there is no statutory law on religious matters, the courts 
likely will refuse to protect religious matters unless the case touches upon 
interests of the prevailing denominations. This fact is obvious in many of 
the judgments brought by the ECtHR against Russia in cases of religious 
freedoms where the Russian courts remained obsessively faithful to the 
letter of the 1997 Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associa-
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tions” without taking account of the absurdity of applying the rules in some 
specific situations.537
In certain difficult cases, however, the RF Supreme Court decided to go 
beyond the literal meaning of rules and regulations; reasoning in terms of 
values and policies. The literal wording of Russia’s 2002 anti-extremism law 
leaves the Court no choice but to ban almost all religious denominations 
because they insist on their spiritual superiority over other religions and, 
in this sense, fall under the category of “extremist’, understood as claiming 
“national or religious superiority” over other religious groups. This literal 
approach was followed in the Jehovah’s Witnesses case.
Nonetheless, the analysis in this Chapter shows that the RF Supreme 
Court has in its arsenal more flexible methods of reasoning allowing it to 
avoid applying this legislation to “traditional denominations”; even grant-
ing them exemptions from general legal obligations. Utilizing the technique 
of doublespeak, Russian courts shy away from making their argumentation 
transparent and from explicitly recognizing any substantial difference in 
protecting “traditional” and “non-traditional” religions. On the contrary, 
the courts insist that protection is equal; that they are abiding by constitu-
tional principles which are interpreted restrictively, except for the situations 
where the courts would decide to introduce exceptions from this restrictive 
interpretation in favor of the ROC. Such an interpretative approach reveals 
once again the tension between formalism and decisionism that is specific 
to Russian law. As follows from the analyzed case law, this doublespeak 
predictably leads to contradictions in argumentation on the part of the RF 
Supreme Court and its subordinate courts.
This analysis can be demonstrative of what may be one of the major 
paradoxes of Russian law: the Russian state formally endorses liberal norms 
and principles which do not fit the current political situation, interpreting 
them selectively, in clear contradiction to their original and literal meanings. 
This doublespeak in official narratives touches upon the rule of law, democ-
racy, non-discrimination, human rights, supremacy of international law, and 
other pillars of the Russian constitutional order; solemnly proclaimed but, 
by and large, not respected. As was shown in the example of Russia’s anti-
extremism laws or laws protecting the feelings of religious believers in the 
present Chapter or the equal protection principle for sexual minorities in 
the previous Chapter, the authorities introduce laws that make it possible to 
overrule the constitutional principles on freedom without repealing them. 
Russian courts, while formally supporting liberal constitutional principles, 
reinterpret them in a conservative sense generally reflecting the conserva-
tive mood prevailing among the population; implying the use of specific 
argumentation in referring to national values, traditions, popular mindsets, 
etc. The extent to which this court practice is a result of political interference 
and influence is not discussed in this Chapter and in this volume generally.
537 See, for example, the 2012 ECtHR Judgment Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, op.cit. 
note 18.
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We can, however, reasonably suggest that even if such influence contin-
ues to persist in Russian law, it is not the only factor shaping court practice. 
There are also a number of informal mechanisms of “social control” in every 
society imposing common values upon the judiciary shared by the major-
ity. It means that judges will sometimes make exceptions in rulings against 
religious minorities or in favor of the ROC, based on their own estimation 
of the communitarian values which serve as the intellectual background of 
Russian law or balancing these values with the political or public interest 
that might be involved in such cases. In turn, these values have an impact 
on the formation of the attitudes, prejudices, and biases of judges and, thus, 
can be expected to influence their decisions. Our general comments on the 
political, historical, and legal frameworks for the protection of human rights 
have been provided in the earlier Chapters of this volume. Therefore, here 
we will not revert to the broader cultural and social contexts surrounding 
the legal regulation of religious freedoms.
Summing up twenty-five years of development of the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR in religious cases, one cannot fail to observe that the first case 
came to this Court from Greece,538 and many other intricate and contro-
versial issues on religious freedoms have been raised since then by Greece, 
Moldova, Romania, Russia, and other Orthodox countries (those in which 
the Orthodox denomination is prevalent and/or has a privileged status). 
It has been justly noted that religious identities may, to a certain extent, 
prefigure believers” attitudes toward legal regulations, and this is, for 
example, the case of Orthodox Christianity.539 At the same time, proponents 
of Orthodox religious denominations tend to adopt some standard view-
points and stances toward law and rights making the legal interpretation 
and application of laws in Orthodox countries somewhat more particular 
as compared with legal regulations in other societies.540 When seeing to 
unveil the real policies behind the formalist language of court decisions, 
the example of Russia can provide an important basis for further research 
into the particularities of understanding the divide between the sacred 
and profane, the religious and non-religious in Orthodox societies. This 
final Chapter is intended to demonstrate, once again, that there are certain 
ideological or, more broadly, philosophical constraints which impede Rus-
sia from adhering to the liberal standards for the protection of religious 
freedoms. These constraints are based on conservative and communitarian 
mind-sets which predictably shape the legal reasoning of judges and nudge 
them to re-interpret liberal legal provisions so that these provisions will be 
in better harmony with these mind-sets.
538 ECtHR Judgment Kokkinakis v. Greece (25 May 1993) Application No.14307/88.
539 See an important collection of analyses, from different points of view, in Maria Hämmerli 
and Jean-Francois Mayer (eds.), Orthodox Identities in Western Europe: Migration, Settlement,
and Innovation (Ashgate, Burlington, VT, 2014).
540 Kristina Stoeckl, The Russian Orthodox Church and Human Rights (Routledge, London and 
New York, NY, 2014).
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In the present study, we analyzed the formalist and decisionist elements, 
present in Russian legal thinking, and examined the impact of conservatism 
on the interplay of these elements. The focus of this study was on the concep-
tualization of rights in Russia: in legal theory (Chapter 1), in legal commu-
nity (Chapter 2), in social philosophy (Chapter 3) and in case law (Chapters 
4 and 5). This is one of the aspects in which the foundational narratives of 
Russian law underscore its civilization distinctiveness and legal exceptional-
ism. In case law, the argument of distinctiveness is frequently referred to 
as the rationale for crafting exceptions to the constitutional equal-protection 
principle as it is applied to religious, sexual and other minorities. In their 
turn, such discussions about distinctiveness reveal certain features of Rus-
sian legal culture and, specifically, the intellectual culture that is continually 
transmitted in Russian (previously: Soviet) legal education, scholarship and 
practice: there are legal rules that shall be obeyed by all the addressees, but 
some of these addressees might be given exceptional treatment to secure the 
best interests of the state. We examined the historical dimension, philosophi-
cal background and normative implications of this culture, paying particular 
attention to the prevailing understanding of rights, the validity of law and 
its application, and how this understanding influences legal practice. Our 
findings are summarized in the following pages.
The main research question, with which we undertook this work, 
revolved around the specific style of legal thinking in Russia and its impact 
on the practice of interpreting and applying the law. We identified the gap 
which exists between the wording of Russian laws, their interpretation and 
application which establishes that Russian judges in penumbra and lacunae 
cases sometimes decide them contrary to the letter of the law. To justify their 
decisions in such cases, Russian court judgments sometimes refer—directly 
or implicitly—to fundamentals of the social order such as cultural and 
civilizational distinctiveness, social cohesion around certain values or the 
collective interest understood as guiding principles of social development. 
Such approaches can be found in other legal orders. Therefore, it is not 
the tension between the prerogative and the normative or, in other words, 
between the decisionist and the formal elements in law which makes Rus-
sian law peculiar. This peculiarity concerns rather the specific interpreta-
tion and application of fundamental legal concepts and of the intellectual 
frameworks that lie behind these concepts.
In its turn, a conservative reading and interpretation of these fundamen-
tals is a source for further identification of legal principles. In other words, 
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if the law is silent or ambiguous, or if the law seems to be bad (obsolete, 
intrusive, etc.), judges act (or are supposed to act) in the logic of the legal 
system so that their decisions maintain and reinforce the social order. For 
many other legal orders, this also is the general rule which can be dubbed 
as “justice”, “sustainability”, or “certainty” or by other terms which display 
the dialectic of rule-and-exception that is at work in a particular legal order.
In contemporary Russian law, it is often asserted that a correct balanc-
ing of rule and exception is attainable if judges follow tradition, protect the 
collective interest and defend the cultural specificity of their country. Such 
is the main message of the conservative philosophy that can be revealed 
behind the texts of court decisions in lacunae/penumbra cases and in the 
narratives of senior judges as well as of other legal or political actors. The 
situation is complicated by the fact that Russian constitutional law and a 
number of statutory laws, adopted in the 1990s, are liberal in both letter 
and in spirit. We argued that this tension between liberal laws and their 
conservative reading and application in contemporary Russian law can be 
seen as one of its distinguishing features.
At face value, Russian legal theory largely continues to adhere to the 
methodological premises of legal positivism dating from the turn of the 
19th-20th centuries. For a number of practical and ideological reasons, Soviet 
law—from the late 1930s on—continued to utilize pre-revolutionary positiv-
ist theories of law, distilling them with ideological assertions but without 
changing them profoundly. Soviet (Russian) textbooks usually reproduced 
the formalist approach to law, and this suggested to a number of researchers 
that the Soviet (Russian) law-enforcement and legal scholarship by-and-
large are positivistic. This suggestion seems to be oversimplified. On the 
one hand, formalism required fidelity to the letter of the law. On the other, 
Marxist ideology considered the law practically to be a means of the class 
struggle and exploitation—viewing it epistemologically as an epiphenom-
enon of production relations. In its core, this Marxist approach rendered 
senseless any respect for the letter of the law and added much ambiguity 
to the positivist side of the Soviet theory of state and law, introducing into 
legal theory the prerogative element under the cover of “class will”.
Our analysis led us to the conclusion that formalism cannot serve as the 
only theoretical hallmark of Russian (and previously, Soviet) law; that there 
was, and still is, a collateral tendency which one can dub “Russian legal 
realism”.541 This tendency entails three main hypotheses. First, in high-
541 Despite the conceptual reservations made in Introduction above, we have retained this term 
in the title of the present volume as it grasps two essential elements characterizing Ameri-
can and Scandinavian versions of legal realism: its decisionist (“law is what judges say law 
is”, insofar as legal texts do not factually determine court decisions), ideological aspects 
(law is the means for implementing state policies and for educating citizens about these 
policies) and the function of “social engineering” implicitly attributed to judges—to use the 
law and the legal order to push social life forward, to attain certain ideals, and to change it 
accordingly. Similar “realist” elements—albeit with different implications and ideological 
messages—also can be identifi ed in Soviet law as well as in contemporary Russian law.
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profile cases judges are not bound by words of the law (legal texts, “law 
in books”) and can decide—independently or counseled by state officials, 
party members or higher judges—about exceptions to the law in order to 
attain certain ideological objectives. Second, court decisions and proceed-
ings must educate lay people and transmit to them knowledge about 
such objectives, showing how rights and obligations should be exercised 
for the common good. Third, judges and their decisions must contribute 
to building and maintaining a better social order. In the 21st century Rus-
sian context, “better” usually is interpreted to mean “backward”: i.e., to 
some facts of Russia’s glorious past. But such value preferences also can be 
projected forwards: e.g., to the “bright future” as was the case with Soviet 
legal ideology.
Naturally, analogous facts can be identified in other legal systems where 
conservative narratives recurrently infer the need to make a country “great 
again” or similar slogans, which have some evident implication for law and 
which influence its application. In order to avoid misunderstandings, we 
underscore here once again the following: our analysis is not to be taken 
in the sense of asserting that a conservative combination of decisionist and 
formalist elements is peculiar only to Russian law or that the impact of con-
servative philosophies on law is only a Russian specificity. On the contrary, 
our initial thesis—on which this research builds—is that comparable com-
binations and impacts also can be seen in other legal orders. Yet, the present 
volume does not contain any comparative analyses of the Russian situation 
with other legal orders and legal cultures. Such an ambitious project would 
go far beyond the limits of this work and require a more detailed examina-
tion than that which we have included here.
The subject matter of our research has been an examination of insti-
tutional, cultural, political and other factors of the Russian situation and 
of the particularities which shape the style of legal thinking in Russia. We 
hope that this analysis can help to remove artificial academic barriers, be 
they the logic of “the West and the Rest” or the unending quest to uncover 
legacies of “socialist law” in various transitional systems—the barriers that 
may, conceptually, impede comparative lawyers from drawing insightful 
parallels and comparing different legal cultures in new perspectives. Using 
similitudes and differences in this respect, one can employ different combi-
nations of decisionism and formalism and the variable role of conservative 
and liberal philosophies in law as a tertium comparationis for viewing Rus-
sian law along with other legal systems.
Furthermore, another of our assertions was that value choice (conser-
vative, liberal, socialist or something else) is a secondary variable in the 
respective style of legal thinking. Very roughly sketched, the conceptual 
scheme prevailing in Russian law can be described as “norms plus facts 
yield the decision” (the formalist element) “unless sovereign will mandates 
otherwise” (the decisionist element). At the same time, this “sovereign will” 
does not always mean “the will of political leaders”. One hardly could 
imagine a person or persons (be they the President, senior members of the 
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Presidential Administration or other authorities) who could be in a position 
to specifically express their will about the tens millions of cases annually 
decided by Russian courts. In most of the cases in which an impact of such 
“sovereign will” can be reconstructed, it will be judges who anticipate the 
dispositions and moods of their superiors and of the political authorities 
standing above these superiors, and who engage in guesswork about what 
this “sovereign will” might be in some of the cases they hear (“high-profile 
cases”) or whether there is any room for thinking about “sovereign will” 
in other cases (“ordinary cases”). There is an array of examples where 
judges, in their anticipations, go far ahead. In such cases, their decisions 
(e.g., prohibiting some religious texts, as illustrated in Chapter 5) in fact can 
strike against the will of the political leadership. Consequently, defining this 
“sovereign will” is vital for interpreting and applying law, and it highlights 
the importance of the debates about sovereignty in Russian law.
There can be two main theoretical solutions of the sovereignty issue 
along with sundry possible combinations. On the one hand, sovereign will 
can be formulated by legislative, administrative or other actors of the state 
(the first part of the formula) and, therefore, can be attributed to parliament 
or another competent authority to which formally belongs the lawmaking 
function or a respective part thereof (the second part of the formula). This 
second part can become redundant, as sovereign will is tantamount to that 
which is established by the lawmakers. On the other hand, as the power 
to decide about exceptions from rules, sovereignty can factually be shared 
among various actors (judges, party bosses, the executive or presidential 
power, secret agencies, the clergy, sundry lobbying forces, etc.). This factual 
power remains formally unwritten in the law. Consequently, there are no 
clear demarcating frontiers between factual powers and competences 
of different actors to “act on behalf of the sovereign”; no established rules 
for drawing these frontiers ad hoc. In such a case, “sovereign will” indicates 
the frames of reference for identifying and interpreting the real unwritten 
rules factually determining actions and decisions of judges and other legal 
actors.
This latter case characterizes the conceptual state of affairs in contempo-
rary Russian law where the sovereign power of exception de facto is shared 
by different actors and is a contentious issue for a number of reasons. Any 
explicit assertion of this power is beyond and contrary to constitutional 
statutory and law. Pursuant to the generally accepted principle of legality, 
exceptions almost always are formally excluded; yet, practically are often 
inevitable. The lack of explicit rules for exception-making has been com-
pensated in court practice by implicit rules that are based on a conservative 
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philosophy,542 including references to the prevailing ideology (in the Soviet 
era) or to the collective interest, cultural and civilizational distinctiveness, 
fidelity to tradition and national identity, the inviolability of state sover-
eignty, as well as to a number of other variables, in post-Soviet law. Already 
in Soviet law, supreme courts at the levels of the Union and of the republics 
were granted the power to provide “guiding directions” (rukovodiashchie 
raz”iasneniia) so that some coherence was brought into this “gray zone”.
Under Russian law, the only legitimate organ formally empowered to 
make exceptions from legislative rules (also through “ascertaining their 
constitutional meaning”)—or to annul their legal effect—is the RF Constitu-
tional Court. However, this Court only deals with an infinitesimal number 
of cases as compared with the judicial load of other courts across the Rus-
sian Federation. The RF Constitutional Court took the lead in formulating 
these implicit rules that, as a result, are regularly being brought to the sur-
face—despite that fact that are no explicit rules for constitutional interpre-
tation which could contribute to the transparency of exception-making in 
Russian law. In any case, even after concretization on the case-by-case basis 
of so-called “constitutional values” (konstitutsionnye tsennosti)—serving as 
the justification for exceptions in the argumentation of the RF Constitutional 
Court—implicit rules do not become entirely explicit as this argumentation, 
to a large extent, is doublespeak.
This is quite explicable in terms of normative unity: creating a parallel 
system of such rules would plainly contradict the Constitution and would 
introduce a dualist divide into the legal system (similar to the divide which 
was seen in English law, in the past, between common law and the law of 
equity). At the same time, the strategy of doublespeak—adopted by the RF 
Constitutional Court and other actors who practically formulate such rules, 
naming them in metaphysical terms (such as constitutional values, the fun-
damentals of law-and-order, etc.) and introducing them as interpretations 
of posited law—could not fail to produce a divisive effect in Russian law in 
which formal, general rules co-exist with informal (or semi-formal) rules of 
exception.
The decisionist tendency was not clearly visible in pre-revolutionary 
Russian law (before 1917) and mostly developed in the first years of Soviet 
rule. It was the time when legal formalism was condemned by the Bolshe-
viks as a part of bourgeois legal ideology and when Soviet lawyers were 
542 We prefer this term of “philosophy” (in the sense of a system of ideas) to that of “ideol-
ogy”, as it would be too a strong proposition to say that, in Russian reality, judges may 
introduce ideologies, given the explicit prohibition of state ideology under Art.13 of the 
RF Constitution. At the same time, it is plausible that judges—especially when balancing 
different principles at high courts—have in a mind a certain Weltanschauung and embody 
it in their decisions; sometimes, also in their writings and discussions. Another reason is 
that one can fi nd quite different (and, sometimes, contradictory) ideas and assertions in 
grand narratives of Russian leaders. Therefore, these narratives are not so much similar 
to conventional defi nitions of ideology as they are a more or less coherent compendium 
of ideas that can be dubbed “philosophy” (or “theory”).
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called upon to find law, immediately, in the social reality. Mikhail Reisner, 
Piotr Stuchka, Evgeny Pashukanis and many other Soviet legal theoreti-
cians of that time insisted that the formal law always lagged behind social 
development, especially in periods of revolution. Fidelity to the letter of the 
law is only a trick for diverting the working class from political struggle 
and revolution, and there is no practical or ideological value to keep it up to 
date. Social reality itself—correctly identified and interpreted in the light of 
Marxist-Leninist teaching—would point to the exceptions that judges and 
other law-enforcement officials could make from the general rules when 
the literal application of general rules resulted in purported damage to 
the collective interest (class interest, national interest, etc.) as this interest 
was defined by the political power. To a certain extent, the formal (posited) 
law could be entirely replaced by the living law identified by bearers of 
the revolutionary legal consciousness (revoliutsionnoe pravosoznanie), as the 
1917 Soviet Decree No.1 “On Courts” attempted to do. Yet, according to 
Marx’s writings, law was doomed to wither away soon after the proletarian 
revolution. This “soon” became the object of theoretical discussions among 
Soviet lawyers after the 1917 Revolution; in the course of these discussions, 
it turned into “anytime soon”, “after the full and decisive victory of the 
revolution”, “after the full suppression of hostile classes”, and other concep-
tually flexible formulations.
In the 1930s, “anytime soon” was projected into the undiscernible 
future, while this anti-formalist (decisionist) tendency of Marxism began 
to be balanced with legal formalism. When Vyshinsky coined the Soviet 
theory of state and law in the late 1930s, he combined these two tendencies, 
inevitably bringing into this theory a significant measure of inconsisten-
cy.543 After the end of Soviet rule in the early 1990s, the ideological element 
was removed from Russian law. But the cited combination of formalism and 
decisionism—and its applications in legal reasoning—largely remained the 
same and still constitutes the intellectual framework in which many Rus-
sian lawyers understand their law and its machinery. After some years of 
Yeltsin’s attempts to reshape Russian law according to Western patterns, the 
liberal spirit of constitutional and statutory law gradually has been replaced 
with a conservative philosophy which bears a striking resemblance to the 
communitarian ideologies of Soviet law and of the preceding legal system 
of Imperial Russia: the individuality and her rights are largely molded by 
community relationships and, therefore, are not a value per se. It implies that 
individual rights cannot be used against the majority or against the state 
which acts as the personification of the social community.
The prevalence of the collective interest over individual rights in Russian 
law has a long history and, occasionally, is perceived as a sort of “Russian 
legal tradition” supposedly distinguishing Russia from the West. Such 
romanticism in the legal sphere reminds one of Russian conservative authors 
543 Kelsen, op.cit. note 66.
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such as Karamzin, Ilyin or Berdyaev (and the philosophical origins of their 
inspiration in the German philosophy of Hegel, Schelling or von Savigny). 
The main tenets of (post-)Soviet legal theory with its anti-individualist back-
ground can also be seen as coextensive with this communitarian trend.544
This tension between formalism and decisionism nowadays has become 
one of the main discussion-points about “legal politics” (pravovaia politika) in 
Russian legal scholarship. Quite often, justices of the Russian higher courts 
and other leading Russian legal actors make references to Russian “tradi-
tions” so as to assert their power to decide upon exceptions when dealing 
with the protection of minority rights. In Russia and elsewhere, references to 
“tradition” usually involve the philosophical paradigm prioritizing organic 
historical development over revolutionary changes, majority opinion over 
dissenting minority views, established patterns and mind-sets over innova-
tions in religion, morals, gender and other main symbolic spheres of the 
social; according preference to stability of the social structure over attempts 
to make this structure more just, equitable or simply better. In short, this par-
adigm refers to a conservatism which, by definition, is hostile to new patterns 
of behavior—especially in such susceptible spheres as family or religion.
At face value, the conservative logic—as applied to the issue of rights—
is simple: Russia does not endorse the Western accentuation of individual 
rights to the possible detriment of collective rights and interests, as in the 
“Russian legal tradition” individual rights never have been accepted as 
constitutive elements of the legal order. Prioritizing individual interest can 
split the organic collective whole and lead to the destruction of the whole of 
society which cannot survive if it loses its integrity and cohesion; or, at least, 
it can impede organic social development. This argument is not new: it can 
be traced from Plato and Thomas Aquinas to Soviet international lawyers 
or to Valerii Zorkin who have made similar arguments about the correlation 
between the collective and the individual.
However, oversimplifications about this conservatism can be mislead-
ing as it has several implications for legal thinking. As we mentioned above, 
this legal thinking comprises two main contradictory elements: formalism 
544 A renown Russian expert with the long experience in various Western projects concern-
ing the modernization of ex-USSR legal systems, points out at what he calls the “theoreti-
cal deformation of the legal framework”: Leonid Golovko, “The Space for Legal Reform 
in Central Asia: Between Political Limits and Theoretical Deformations”, OSCE Yearbook 
2010 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 105-115, implying that obsolete legal knowledge is 
being reproduced at law schools in the ex-USSR. Professor Golovko has good reason to 
assert that “without proper theoretical preparation, a one-time normative measure that 
aims to remove a complex deformation will not be understood or will be distorted at 
either the law-enforcement or the judicial level. The theoretical basis is also vital to ensure 
the coherence of subsequent legislative steps” (ibid., 111). Citing some exemplary “defor-
mations”, he refers to the aberrant distinctions between public and private law, between 
criminal and administrative law, between police and judicial functions, and insists that 
“the reform most urgently needed is the removal of this historical deformation at the 
theoretical level. Otherwise, all efforts to “normalize” legal systems, in order to overcome 
their protracted “transition state”, are misplaced and futile” (ibid., 115).
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endorsing the sovereign’s commands in law; and decisionism justifying the 
prevalence of collective morality over legal texts. In Russian law, this tension 
is intensified by the discrepancy between the universalist language of the 
Constitution (commitment to universal human-rights standards which are 
prioritized as the supreme standards of legality under Article 18 of the RF 
Constitution) and official narratives about how Russia is not ready to scarify 
its civilizational distinctiveness for the sake of such universal standards.
In the historical perspective of its naissance in the 1920s, this decisionism 
was epistemologically based on Lenin’s idea that law (as all other elements 
of “superstructure”) mirrors the existing social relations in the prism of 
the ideology of the ruling class. This idea was developed by Piotr Stuchka 
and became one of the cornerstones of the Soviet theory of state and law in 
the 1930s. In the Soviet era, this relationship of basis (economy) and super-
structure (law) implied that the cognition of law necessitates addressing the 
real economic structure of production relations (especially in Evgeny Pas-
hunanis’ commodity exchange theory) or the ideology of the working class 
which reflects laws and objectives of historical development of mankind.
This ideology expectedly drew from the Marxist-Leninist philosophy 
which was supposed to form correct mind-sets and, thereby, to uncover 
social processes and regularities in an appropriate perspective. According to 
this philosophy, production relations create a social structure (an interaction 
of classes and their struggle), and this structure creates the system of political 
power while the latter, organized as the state, creates its law. Such a concep-
tualization, only sketched here in general lines, logically led to the conclu-
sion that the correct interpretation and application of law must be based 
on the correct ideology introduced and ascertained by the political power. 
In this sense, law reflects production relations, the system of class domina-
tion and the class struggle that are the immanent results of these relations.
In cases where judges were not sure of fully understanding the ideo-
logical implications of high-profile cases, the internal logic of the Soviet legal 
system nudged them to consult with party officers who were supposed to be 
familiar with the esoteric philosophical knowledge of dialectical materialism 
(diamat) and its correct practical applications. The practice of interference of 
the CPSU into judicial processes, on one hand, and the strategy of Soviet 
judges asking advice from partkoms, on the other hand, are well documented 
in Soviet history. In Western scholarship, these Soviet practices were labelled 
as “telephone law” or “politicized justice”.545 Surely, analogous schemes also 
can exist in other societies where ideological knowledge plays a similar role.
545 E.g., Maria Popova, Politicized Justice in Emerging Democracies: A Study of Courts in Russia 
and Ukraine (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012); Alena Ledeneva, Can Rus-
sia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2013); and Maria Popova, “Putin-Style ‘Rule of Law’ & the Prospects 
for Change”, 146(2) Daedalus (2017), 64-75. For a more general perspective, see Tom Gins-
burg and Tamir Moustafa (eds.), Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2008).
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Contemporary Russian law has rejected Marxist-Leninist ideology: the 
diamat no longer is the prevailing social philosophy, but this style of legal 
thinking did not suffer any cardinal shifts. Law is still mainly taught at law 
schools as an “objective phenomenon” (ob”ektivnoe iavlenie) rooted in the 
social structure, collective mentality and historical tradition, and dialecti-
cally mirroring them. Implicitly, it means that a cleavage between the real/
objective law546 which exists directly in social structure and collective men-
tality, on the one hand, and the formal law which is contained in legal texts 
and more or less mirrors the real/objective law on the other. Nowadays, 
this legal ontology supports the nationalist romanticism: the legal system 
of a country is not a result coincidence but, rather, a product of organic 
growth; if anything is transplanted from the outside, it must be brought into 
conformity with the native legal culture. Otherwise, the legal system will 
become dysfunctional because of the incongruity between formal law and 
real law.
Such methodological tenets are advantageous for great historical nar-
ratives and discourses about the civilizational role of Russia that, unsur-
prisingly, also become the foundational narratives for the legal system. 
Practically applied to law, this philosophy means that judges do not have 
unfettered discretion when they deal with high-profile cases. In order to 
make good decisions, they have to check how their decisions contribute 
to reaching the ultimate objectives of Russian organic development and 
whether these decisions fit the “collective consciousness” reflecting this 
development and revealing its objectives. As in the Soviet system, these 
objectives will be defined by those who have the factual political power (in 
a limited number of high-profile cases) or by judges themselves (in other 
cases).
It is evident that such a Herculean mission (in terms of Ronald Dworkin 
and his construction of the ideal judge Hercules) is hardly bearable for ordi-
nary justice. Thence, it is practical that the power of formulation of exoteric 
knowledge about organic social development and the power of naming of 
its objectives belong to an “intellectual aristocracy”; to policy-makers from 
the executive or from the higher ranks of the judiciary. This decisionist (or 
realist) perspective of Russian law synchronizes with its formalist tenets: 
judges are bound by the formal commitment of legality to apply the laws to 
their letter.
This combination of two incompatible elements (legal formalism and 
decisionism) predictably leads to theoretical contradictions and to practi-
cal tensions between supporters of different political views who may find 
justification for their positions in either of these two elements. It happens 
546 Not to be confused with the distinction between “objective law” and “subjective law” 
which, although is based on the same philosophical premises, refers to another con-
ceptual distinction. Here, the defi nition of the “true” law as “real law” refers to another 
dimension of realism: that of a philosophic apriorism as it was formulated in the medi-
eval polemic between realists and nominalists.
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also in other legal orders: for example, the opposition of originalism and 
interpretivism in US constitutional law. In a number of important issues, 
tensions between decisionism and formalism suggest to Russian legal schol-
ars and practitioners that they should take issue with the ensuing theoreti-
cal and practical problems. Some of these problems have been examined in 
the chapters of the present study. Without pretending to deal with them in 
all their possible implications and aspects, we concentrated on the problem 
of rights, examining the impact of the tensions between formalism and 
decisionism on the conceptualization of rights and the delimitation of the 
scope of their protection in Russian law.
As the first step, we sought to clarify methodological grounds and 
implications of the combination of decisionism and formalism in Russian 
legal thinking in Chapter 1 (“Formalism and Decisionism in Soviet and Rus-
sian Jurisprudence”). One of the important implications is that Russian legal 
scholarship still endorses “mechanical jurisprudence” requiring passivity 
from judges to act as the “mouth that pronounces the words of the law’. In 
this paradigm, judges only have to apply—but not change—the words of 
laws. Tense discussions are taking place in Russian legal scholarship about 
the limits of judicial discretion; about a judge’s fidelity to the words of the 
law and the right to reinterpret these words. Facing theoretical impasses of 
formalism, quite a few judges and prominent legal scholars have decided to 
move from this formalism toward a realist methodology, trying to get free 
from the statutory constraints in interpretation and insisting that judges and 
other law officers have the final say about the true meaning of laws.
Examination of this theoretical background of Russian law reveals a 
number of clues for understanding some current debates in Russian legal 
theory oscillating between two principal theses (excluding smaller meth-
odological and conceptual issues): either the judge547 is bound by the law 
and shall in no case transgress the will of the legislator, or the judge is free 
to decide cases against the law, relying on considerations that she might 
extract from traditional values, conservative (or different) ideologies, or 
from other sources. In other words, the dilemma—apparent in many aca-
demic writings—is that the judge shall either abide by the legal rules also in 
the cases brought to courts by individuals against the state and its interests, 
or that she may depart from them in order to secure the best interests of 
the collective—even when these interests are contrary to individual rights 
and freedoms posited in the constitutional and statutory law and formally 
protected by it.
On the one hand, the official attitude to such decisionist narratives 
remains rather negative as they can potentially undermine the entire political
547 The term “judge” in this context does not mean that our conclusions are applicable only 
the judiciary. For the purposes of the present study, this term was utilized broadly as a 
shortcut to all law-enforcement offi cials and court clerks as they all are trained within the 
same system of legal education that translate similar values, conceptual ideas and theo-
ries.
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system which, formally, relies on legislative rules. On the other hand, the 
strict observance of laws and a literal interpretation of legal rules can be 
cumbersome—from time-to-time—for attaining political goals in high-pro-
file cases. At this point, the official attitude can change, nudging judges to 
look behind statutory texts in order to decide a case in accordance with the 
ultimate political objectives underpinning these texts (or, rather, construed 
as underpinning these texts). However, it would be dangerous to leave 
judicial discretion unbridled in these cases: for the sake of predictability 
and manageability of the legal system, this discretion needs to be framed 
within a certain Weltanschauung setting out priorities for the interpretation 
and application of law.
One of the technical difficulties for fixing such a Weltanschauung in 
statutory law lies in the general interdiction of Article 13 of the Russian 
Constitution against establishing a state or obligatory ideology. The only 
institution that may legitimately outline such a Weltanschauung in the 
legal sphere—through coining “constitutional values” or through other 
intellectual highways and byways—is the RF Constitutional Court. The 
identification of constitutional and other legal values, theoretically, also can 
be carried out by other Russian courts; but, as we showed in Chapter 1, the 
Constitutional Court jealously bans such attempts, asserting its exclusive 
competence in this symbolic sphere.
Our analysis showed how—in formulating a particular conservative 
Weltanschauung—the RF Constitutional Court has reinterpreted the concep-
tion of human rights so that, in fact, it excludes its application in sensitive 
high-profile cases. According to this reinterpretation, in a conflict between 
individual rights and the collective interests, the former shall be defeated as 
is well illustrated in the series of cases concerning YUKOS and, personally, 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky. To defend this reinterpretation, the Constitutional 
Court chose to deny the universality of human rights, arguing that national 
states have the unrestrained power to make exceptions with a view to 
national interest, cultural specificity and other similar reasons.
Following this strategy, the RF Constitutional Court pragmatically 
extended its scope of competences, de facto assuming an ideological func-
tion—at the same time, encapsulating itself from normative criticism from 
within or from without. In terms of competence, no other opinion can pre-
vail over the Court’s opinion. This is the main premise in the long conten-
tious debates with the ECtHR, culminating in the RF Constitutional Court’s 
famous 2015 Judgment 21-P concerning the prevalence of constitutional 
interpretations rendered by the Constitutional Court over international law 
and the ECtHR case law. To a certain extent, this conflict can be seen as a 
struggle for the decisionist power to make exceptions from legal rules—the 
power that the RF Constitutional Court unambiguously considers as its 
exclusive prerogative.
Comparing various versions of decisionism in Russia and in other 
countries, we suggested that decisionism in the Russian context is based on 
different methodological assumptions than the judicial or the administra-
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tive powers of exception are to be found in realist jurisprudence in US or 
Scandinavian law (or in other legal systems). The apparent similarity of 
their theoretical conclusions—the ideological nature of law-enforcement 
and the de facto uncheckable discretion of judges—cannot hide the differ-
ence of the intellectual contexts in which the respective realist approaches 
are coined. Thus, the intellectual environment of pragmatism—common to 
American legal thinking—normally requires judges to provide a rational 
justification for their decisions thereby constraining their discretion by 
the limits of practical rationality accepted in the legal community and in 
society in general (public opinion). Similar intellectual constraints exist in 
the Nordic legal culture where the theoretical use of realist jurisprudence is 
also wide-spread.
Such pragmatism is not observed in Russian culture in general or in 
Russian legal culture in particular. This culture is mostly antirational and 
communitarian; historically rooted in grands récits about the superiority 
of “heart” (belief, intuition) over “reason”, about collective identity with 
assertions of its preeminence over individual choice. The state and its com-
mands are supposed to have absolute priority over individual rights and 
interests since the state represents and defends the collective interest, while 
individual reason is supposed to be too weak to grasp the entire web of 
social life and to critically assess it. “Disenchantment”548 with state power 
can, in this sense, lead to its delegitimization in the Russian context—a con-
cern that is consistently expressed by protagonists of the conservative legal 
philosophy in Russia. Thereby, the factual social structure (legal system 
inclusive) evades criticism and discards calls for change. At the same time, 
this logic provides for argumentation tools in situations of exception.
In the interplay of rule and exception that is common to all legal orders, 
exceptions from rules in Russian law usually are justified with reference 
to the social, cultural or sometimes the religious specificity of Russia, and 
finally to the sovereign power of the state. In this logic, the state is autho-
rized to define this specificity and, also, Russian “limits of concession” to 
international standards. Argumentation from the standpoint of individual 
rational interests turns out to be of secondary relevance at best or irrel-
evant—even if formally they are cited in some court decisions. Viewed from 
this angle, the discussion about “margins of appreciation” predictably leads 
to the issue of sovereignty, this term in Russian legal parlance being applied 
to a wide range of phenomena and utilized with various adjectives (e.g., cul-
tural sovereignty, language sovereignty or even “alimentary sovereignty”, 
etc.).
We concluded Chapter 1 with the proposition that decisionist elements 
in Russian law are based on similar methodological premises as in Western 
legal culture but that their intellectual contexts differ. This difference was 
548 In terms of Max Weber’s Entzauberung which refers to the modern style of thinking that 
demystifi es the world and renders it transparent, removing theological and supernatural 
accounts and putting faith in the ability of science to explain the world in rational terms.
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illustrated in Chapter 2 by the reasoning of Chief Justice of the RF Con-
stitutional Court Valerii Zorkin. Zorkin explicitly builds his theory on a 
conservative social philosophy. This philosophy leads to a rejection of the 
alleged individualism of Western legal culture (or what Zorkin condemns 
as such “individualism”) in which the idea of human rights is rooted. This 
traditionalist conception of human rights is not meticulously elaborated in 
Zorkin’s writings, but its reconstruction provides an interesting perspective 
from which to evaluate the dualism of Russian legal thinking and the role of 
conservatism in shaping of the theoretical foundations of Russian law.
We argued that, in his conservative philosophy, Zorkin combines two 
perspectives of law. On the one hand, he endorses statist positivism which 
presupposes that the sovereign power of state is the source of rights and 
the supreme criterion of the validity of all legal rules and principles. Unsur-
prisingly, this positivism leads Zorkin to a dualist account of the relation 
between international and domestic law (existing as two independent sys-
tems) and, consequently, to the denial of the universal and absolute charac-
ter of human rights. On the other hand, Zorkin is well aware that consistent 
positivism precludes judges from checking the validity of legal norms and 
principles from the standpoint of supra-statutory criteria of justice and the 
like; the power that belongs to his Court and that he is reluctant to give away.
Considering the Russian Constitution as a “living instrument”, he 
argues that the living substance in each constitution unveils its continued 
and variable relevance for maintaining the social order. Therefore, “living 
constitutions” (understood as tools of social control) are based on values 
and mind-sets which, generally, are accepted in corresponding societies. 
This suggests to Zorkin that constitutions be considered as statements of 
national distinctiveness; that preference be given to the social whole over 
the individual. In this conservative logic, distinctiveness is produced by the 
organic development of each country and touches not only on cultural but, 
also, on political and legal aspects, excluding subordination of domestic law 
to universal standards.
Zorkin’s starting point is the well-known conservative logic, pursuant 
to which the loss of distinctiveness in any of the existentially important 
spheres—including that of legal regulation—may cause death for a nation. 
From this perspective, Zorkin unleashes his merciless criticism of globaliza-
tion and its effects in the legal sphere. Among such effects he counts the 
idea of the universality of human rights which undermines the principles 
of law-and-order and legality, threating to bring national legal orders into 
chaos. Rights cannot be interpreted and protected in the same way in dif-
ferent countries precisely because of the national distinctiveness of each 
country. There are no universal legal principles that would be equally valid 
in every country. That is why legal universalism not only is theoretically 
unwarranted but, also, poses an existential menace to national law. Con-
stitutional judges must be the final instance in defining which norms are 
valid in the Russian legal order and which are not. In this sense, they act as 
guardians of the “living constitution”.
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In his numerous publications, the Chief Justice rejects the idea that 
human rights can be universal, considering conceptions of universality to 
be products of postmodernist, globalist and multiculturalist discourses that 
are unacceptable to Russian society and the Russian state.549 He justifies 
this criticism by contending that the inviolability of sovereignty—invariably 
interpreted, in terms of Westphalian sovereignty, as absolute and perpetual 
power—must remain unchecked if it is really sovereign power.550 In order 
to create legal (i.e., binding) norms and principles, the political power must 
be sovereign; in other words, sovereign is the one who is unchecked by any 
norms or principles over which this power has control (in terms of excep-
tion-making). If state power ceases to be sovereign, it cannot maintain law-
and-order (pravoporiadok) and no longer is state power properly speaking. 
Political entities that are not sovereigns (such as international organizations 
and supranational courts, NGOs, etc.) can neither create binding norms 
and principles nor challenge the power of the state to create legal norms. 
The validity of such norms and principles only is derived from the state’s 
acceptance thereof. From this standpoint, any ideology which attempts 
to dissolve this system, and prioritize supranational legal regulation, will 
be considered to be destructive for law-and-order. This set of arguments 
became Zorkin’s main analytical tool against the universalizing human-
rights discourse and international criticism.551 But the issue of human rights 
turned out to be more complicated from a practical perspective.
Following the statist positivism, Zorkin feels himself on the safe road 
and concludes that legal norms and principles only are created by the state; 
or, at least, need to be recognized by the state. There can be no superior 
authority (i.e., the international community) above the state that might over-
rule legal commands issued by the state or invalidate them. The Westpha-
lian sovereignty which lies in the foundation of Russian constitutional order 
is not compatible with universal human rights, as it cannot tolerate superior 
instances imposing legal rules and principles on states. On the other hand, 
human rights are established in the 1993 Russian Constitution with the sta-
tus of supreme values standing above positive legal rules (Art.18, RF Con-
stitution), and—as Russia acknowledged that the ECHR and other treaties 
ratified by Russia are integral parts of its law (according to para.4 of Art.15, 
RF Constitution)—human rights are directly applicable in Russian courts of 
law. However, taken as ius cogens, human rights conceptually undermine 
the perspective of legal positivism.
Here, Zorkin faced a dilemma. Human rights are not universally bind-
ing in the sense that there is no instance to check state authorities and pre-
vent them from encroaching on human rights. The RF Constitutional Court 
has the right to repeal federal laws in case they contradict the Constitution 
and, in particular, if they violate human rights—including those which are 
549 Nussberger, op.cit. note 95.
550 Antonov, “Theoretical Issues of Sovereignty in Russia”, op.cit. note 369.
551 Zorkin, op.cit. note 24.
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not mentioned in the Constitution (Art.55, para.1) or those established only 
in international law (Art.17, para.1). Therefore, human rights are crucial for 
the institutional survival of the RF Constitutional Court, in its present form, 
and are one of the main tools for maintaining and expanding the symbolic 
power of this Court, its legitimacy. At the same time, human rights are 
potentially dangerous for the existence of this Court and for the entire Rus-
sian state because of possible subjugation to supranational organizations 
and to the international community which can use human-rights narratives 
for criticizing the state authorities and, thereby, undermining their legiti-
macy. In this latter aspect, Zorkin is anxious that human rights not become 
a Trojan horse for international law insofar as their direct application 
can mean that national law is subordinated to international law; that the 
validity of national law is dependent on its congruency with international 
principles and standards.
At first sight, it seems that Zorkin found an easy way to solve this 
conundrum. Only after implementation into national law can human 
rights acquire legal validity and become a part of the national legal order. 
Before such positivation, human rights are simply a part of some extralegal 
ideology and are not directly binding on the state. To a certain extent, this 
interpretation coincides with the Soviet perception of human rights as a 
part of the “bourgeois ideology”552 as argued by Professor Tumanov and 
numerous other Soviet legal scholars. For Zorkin, before being defined by 
the competent national court or introduced into national law by its legisla-
tion (including the Constitution), human rights serve only as a morality of 
the law (in the sense of “positive morality” as John Austin called norms of 
international law) but not as law properly said; to wit, not something that 
is posited and, therefore, binding. Still, in order to be utilized as arguments 
for repealing federal laws through constitutional justice, human rights need 
to be defined. This power of definition must, in Zorkin’s opinion, belong to 
national courts.
However, granting to ordinary (non-constitutional) national courts the 
power to define human rights and decide on their applicability against 
the posited law can be dangerous. This can lead to a difference of opinion 
between courts (which, in fact, happened in the mid-1990s between the RF 
Constitutional Court and the Russian Supreme Court about the direct appli-
cation of the Constitution by ordinary judges) and, therefore, to the factual 
disintegration of “sovereign will”. This is the scenario Zorkin seeks to 
escape by conferring upon his Court the exclusive power to define human 
rights and decide about their prevalence over federal laws.
Employing Schmittean language, one can sum up Zorkin’s position: 
the Constitutional Court is the only “Guardian of the Constitution” who 
can decide on exceptions from legislative rules and from international law. 
552 Vladimir A. Tumanov, Contemporary Bourgeois Legal Thought: A Marxist Evaluation of the 
Basic Concepts (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974).
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In other words, this Court works as a normative gatekeeper which does 
not let in pernicious normative elements from the outside (or from inside 
via regional authorities or political opposition) and puts an end to internal 
normative discrepancies. The justification is rather trivial: there can be no 
nation without common values and no country without laws protecting 
these values, no law-and-order without sovereign state power keeping 
the country together and enacting binding laws. In this logic, in case of a 
conflict with constitutional law (which expresses the “living constitution”), 
human rights will be put on the back burner by constitutional judges for 
the sake of survival of the entire society, no matter what the wording of the 
Constitution may be about their prevalence.553
The theoretical framework of this conception makes clear that all the 
solemn declarations about fidelity to human rights and about their direct 
effect notwithstanding, in fact human rights work in Russian law rather 
as the “morality of law’ providing only orienteers for developing national 
law; not as direct legal instruments for defending freedoms and for compel-
ling the state to observe them.554 Several important cleavages between the 
ECtHR and the Constitutional Court have developed in recent years under-
scoring this problem. Such cases as Markin,555 Anchougov556 or Yukos557 have 
shown that international human-rights treaties and ECtHR jurisprudence 
do not, in fact, have direct effect in Russian legal system: their application 
only can be allowed within limits formulated by the RF Constitutional 
Court (sovereignty, traditional values, etc.). Zorkin’s discussions pertaining 
to these cases are illustrative of the consequences of this conception for legal 
practice. In this connection, one of Zorkin’s main theoretical challenges has 
been to insulate his Court and his country from international criticism for 
disobeying not only international law but, also, the spirit and the letter of 
the Russian Constitution itself.
For this effect, Zorkin emphasized the “civilizational argument” refer-
ring to a specific legal culture and to traditions in Russia that, presumably, 
differ from the Western ones. If international-law norms and their interpre-
tations contravene so-called traditional (or constitutional) values, judges 
may give preference to national law in which these values are embodied 
or, even better, turn to the foundational narratives relying on the idea of 
553 See, e.g., Zorkin, “The Essence of Law”, op.cit. note 81.
554 Most of the citations to ECHR and to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR were clearly decora-
tive, with no real value for reasoning of Russian courts. See Burkov, op.cit. note 321.
555 Op.cit. note 176; ECtHR Judgment Markin v. Russia (Grand Chamber) (22 March 2012) 
Application No.30078/06; and RF Constitutional Court Ruling (6 December 2013) No.27-
P, op.cit. note 176.
556 ECtHR Judgment Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia, op.cit. note 177; and RF Constitutional 
Court Ruling No.12-P, op.cit. note 177.
557 ECtHR Judgment Yukos v. Russia (31 July 2014) Application No.14902/04; and RF Consti-
tutional Court Ruling (19 January 2017) No.1-P.
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organic development.558 It was exactly this legal romanticism and conser-
vatism that Zorkin employed in his diatribes against the ECtHR in order to 
explain the reasons and criteria of the conservative interpretations which 
his Court gives to Russian federal laws and to Russia’s international trea-
ties. With this, he defended the exclusive right of his Court to decide about 
exceptions and, in doing so, eliminated the direct effect of the Constitution 
and of international law.
The next Chapter in this work (“Conservatism in Russia and Sover-
eignty in Human Rights”) examined the foundational narratives about state 
sovereignty and their conceptual relation to conservatism and the inter-
pretation of human rights in Russian law. In this Chapter, we argued that 
the move of Russia from the enthusiastic acceptance of human rights in the 
early 1990s to more reserved attitudes toward these rights in the 2000s can 
be explained through the prism of the normative incongruence of human 
rights with the basic conceptual premises of Russian law. Once incorporated 
into Russian law, human rights took the form of high ideals remote from the 
practice of Russian law. When it turned out that human rights are not only 
about lofty words but, also, impose positive obligations on state authori-
ties and sometimes require that the respective societies reconsider their 
mind-sets and values in such sensitive issues as LGBT rights or freedom 
of expression, the normative incongruence between human rights and the 
conservative narratives became ostensible.
As we demonstrated in Chapter 1, from the formalist standpoint, 
human rights cannot become binding unless they are transformed into com-
mands of the sovereign and, especially, they may lose their validity if at any 
moment they contradict the sovereign’s will. In the decisionist perspective, 
international treaties, constitutions, laws and any other legal texts do not 
determine court decisions and, rather, only provide frames of reference 
for justifying decisions taken by judges discretionally and/or under influ-
ences of various sorts. Neither of these perspectives compels the state and 
its agencies (the judiciary inclusive) to unswervingly observe and protect 
human rights.
To understand this incongruence, our analysis turned to the context of 
Russia’s legal development during last three decades. The breakdown of 
Soviet rule was accepted by many in Russia with enthusiasm. In the begin-
ning of the 1990s, the main legal provisions of the Russian legal order were 
enacted formally creating a new normative framework.559 Among these 
laws is the 1993 Constitution, seen by its authors as a continuation of Rus-
sian liberal constitutional acts of the early 20th century (the 1906 Basic State 
558 See the manifesto of this Kremlin’s ideology “National Identity and the Future of Rus-
sia,” Valdai Discussion Club Report (February 2014), available at <http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/
valdai/Identity_eng.pdf>.
559 See Ferdinand J.M. Feldbrugge, Russian Law: The End of the Soviet System and the Role of 
Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1993).
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Laws).560 There were no conceptual problems in relating the new legisla-
tion with human-rights discourses as long as the judiciary could stick to 
the literal interpretation of these laws and, at the same time, remain true 
to their spirit; to the liberal values enshrined in these laws. However, after 
Putin’s coming to power in 2000, the political trends and objectives began 
changing quite significantly, marking a propensity to authoritarianism and 
isolationist attitudes.561
For some important practical reasons, no attempts have been made by 
the Russian political authorities to change the liberal wording of the 1993 
Constitution, even if there are many voices insisting that the liberal consti-
tutional provisions must be abrogated or amended. It easily explains itself: 
touching upon the fundamentals of the constitutional order and bringing 
any substantial amendments into the RF Constitution through convocation 
of a Constitutional Assembly could be fraught with unpredictable outcomes 
(it would have been the first convocation of such an Assembly under the 
1993 Constitution). So, the political strategy employed during in the last 
years has been to change the interpretation without changing the words 
of the Constitution;562 similar to the living constitutionalism in the US and 
other countries.
This brought a performative contradiction into the Russian legal sys-
tem. From the formalist standpoint, the enacted rules (the posited law) shall 
prevail and judges have to apply the law and only the law (the principle of 
legality). Meanwhile, political objectives in effect prevail over formal rules 
and create factual constraints for judicial decision-making (the principle 
of expediency).563 This tends to limit the rights of minorities (religious, 
political, sexual, etc.) with references to the political expediency of protect-
ing sovereignty, maintaining traditional values, or evoking other similar 
reasons. As a result, such objectives—and the conservatism underpinning 
them—collide with the liberal values enshrined in the formal norms of the 
560 Andrey Medushevskii, Russian Constitutionalism. Historical and Contemporary Development 
(Routledge, London, 2006).
561 The ideological rationale was that democracy, human rights and other Western liberal 
values can be utilized to undermine the Russian sovereignty and lead the Russian people 
astray. See, e.g., Viacheslav Morozov, “Western Hegemony, Global Democracy and the 
Russian Challenge”, in Christopher S. Browning and Marko Lehti (eds.), The Struggle for 
the West: A Divided and Contested Legacy (Routledge, London, New York, NY, 2010), 185-
200.
562 With all necessary reservations, this situation can be compared with that of Germany in 
1930s when the German lawyers re-interpreted the Weimar laws in the way to fi t them 
to the new ideology (so called “Rechtserneurung”). See Karl Larenz, Deutsche Rechtserneu-
erung und Rechtsphilosophie (J.C.B. Mohr, Berlin, 1934).
563 This modality implies rather the pragmatic choice. In Russia, as in some other civil-law 
countries, the judiciary is dependent both on the executive power (the Ministry of Justice 
that provides material resources to courts) and on the presidential power that decides on 
appointments and on promotion of judges, so that pragmatically judges have all reason 
to avoid confl icts with these powers and, therefore, not to contravene the political objec-
tives of these powers.
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Constitution. This situation puts the RF Constitutional Court in an ambigu-
ous situation where it has to bring its interpretations in line with the politi-
cal objectives without losing face and without completely abandoning the 
wording and the spirit of the Constitution.564
At face value, the conservative philosophy employed by the Constitu-
tional Court—collectively in its decisions and individually in the writings 
of its justices—often repeats the ideas of German and French conservative 
romanticism of the 19th century developed in Russia in the 19th century565 
and by such exiled philosophers of the 20th century as Ivan Ilyin or Niko-
lai Berdyaev,566 among others. Basic constitutional principles such as the 
supremacy of human rights, the prevalence of international law, the values 
of democracy or rule-of-law, formally remain parts of valid Russian law. 
Yet, gradually they are being interpreted contrary to the literal text of the 
Russian Constitution and, also, to the initial interpretations of the Constitu-
tion by Russian courts in the 1990s. Practically, this situation now means 
that courts are motivated to depart from the literal meanings of legal texts 
and invest meanings in them that do not correspond either to their literal 
wording or to the intent vested in these laws by their authors (i.e., in the 
early 1990s). Predictably, this development reshuffles the balance between 
the formalist and the decisionist elements of Russian law.
In this context, it unsurprisingly conflicts with the idea of human rights 
imposing normative limits on state power and, in turn, excluding for this 
power the unbridled possibility to make exceptions from universally recog-
nized standards of freedom and non-discrimination. As such, sovereignty 
in the Russian conservative legal discourse is conceived as an integral 
component of traditionalism. In present-day traditionalist interpretations 
of sovereignty, it is called upon to resist multiculturalism and globalism 
of contemporary Western legal discourse and is a conditio sine qua non for 
maintaining “normal” social order. This theoretical scheme is cemented by 
a trivial chain of ideas: it is only living in a society that one can become a 
human being; no contemporary society can exist without a state; rejecting 
564 See an important analysis by William E. Pomeranz, “Uneasy Partners: Russia and 
the European Court of Human Rights”, 19(3) Human Rights Brief (2012), available at 
<https://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/19/3pomeranz.pdf>.
565 Alexander M. Martin, Romantics, Reformers, Reactionaries: Russian Conservative Thought 
and Politics in the Reign of Alexander I (Northern Illinois University Press, De Kalb, IL, 
1997). It is quite common for Russian thinkers to fi nd the specifi city of Russian legal 
philosophy in this kind of holist and traditionalist discourse. See Pavel Nowgorotzeff, 
“Uber die eigentumlichen Elemente der russischen Rechtsphilosophie”, 2 Philosophie und 
Recht (1922/1923).
566 President Putin has mentioned Ilyin, Berdyaev and some other conservatively minded 
philosophers in his presidential addresses in 2013 and 2014 as well as at some other occa-
sions. See an interesting discourse-analysis of Putin’s references to Russian conservative 
philosophers by Michel Eltchaninoff, Dans la tête de Vladimir Poutine (Solin/Actes Sud, 
Arles, 2015). The role of the pre-revolutionary Russian conservative philosophy for the 
formation of the current Russian ideologies has already been underscored by Western 
scholars: e.g., Bowring, Law, Rights and Ideology in Russia, op.cit. note 35.
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state-created legal norms undermines the social order and leads to destruc-
tion of humanity; therefore, state legal norms are absolutely binding and 
cannot be trumped by any other reasons or values.
To be sovereign in the prevailing Russian legal parlance implies stand-
ing above the law. This language use is apparent in the exceptionalist rheto-
ric based on the sovereignty argument: being bound by any limitations—be 
they human rights or universal legal principles—would mean that the 
state is not sovereign and, therefore, no longer is a state. This approach is 
even more radicalized than those proposed by Jean Bodin or by Thomas 
Hobbes. Both accepted that, even having absolute power, the sovereign is 
subject at least to divine law and natural law. “Sovereign”—in the Russian 
official legal parlance of the Constitutional Court and, eventually, of other 
courts—implies that no checks or limits may be imposed upon sovereign 
power. In this Schmittean logic, the state is enabled to do whatever it wants 
to do—above international law and other supra-statutory rules and prin-
ciples—and to transgress its commitments as this ability to act above rules 
is precisely what makes a power “sovereign”.
The poly-semantic use of “sovereignty” and the specific understanding 
of the concept of state (gosudarstvo) in the Russian legal culture add to this 
ambiguity. Unlike the Western linguistic meaning of the term “state” (the 
impersonal system of political power), in Russian language gosudarstvo 
indicates the personality of ruler (gosudar’)567 and, in this aspect, is closer to 
the Antique understanding of politeia or to the concept of autocracy (samo-
derzhavie). “Sovereign” is conceived primordially as a holder of autocratic 
power who stands above limitations. This linguistic aspect may explain 
why, in the Russian context, sovereignty is taken to be tantamount to the 
unlimited character of power. To the extent “sovereignty” coincides with 
the supreme and independent political power (summa potestas), there is 
no cognitive dissonance for Russian lawyers. In this light, the state and its 
agents are not subject to the legal control of other powers, and their actions 
remain unchecked—unless they themselves confer the power upon state 
courts to control their actions. But when the question comes to the limits 
of their power that are marked by absolute and inviolable rights, this obvi-
ously leads to a dissonance—representing such human rights as a threat to 
sovereignty.
If humans may have some rights inherent from the moment their lives 
begin, in the positivist perspective it implies that these rights are incorpo-
rated into the state legal order, and only due to this fact are these rights 
legitimated and validated as legal rights. This conception of human rights 
matches both the Westphalian conception of sovereignty and the philoso-
phy of conservatism. The former implies that the state is a last resort; decid-
ing which rights its citizens may have. According to the latter, each state is 
free to endorse the rights which it finds acceptable, while the cosmopolitan 
567 Oleg Kharkhordin, “What is the State? The Russian Concept of Gosudarstvo in the Euro-
pean Context”, 40 History and Theory (2001), 206-240.
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idea of universal rights—identical for all human beings—is destructive for 
society. If each country, each culture, and each civilization have their own 
standards of legality and legitimacy, it may decide to what extent it would 
(or would not) incorporate into its legal order (i.e., validate) the values and 
norms which pretend to be universally recognized. These conclusions, in 
turn, seem to be rooted in a particular social philosophy which relies on 
a Hobbesian picture of society in the state of bellum omnium contra omnes, 
where dispersed individuals can be tamed and peace can be secured only 
by an almighty Leviathan. If the state falls apart, it will lead to destruction 
of society.
The concept of sovereignty in Russia is mainly understood in the 
Westphalian sense and even more particularly, depending in which pole 
of the tension between formalism and realism it is employed. Taken to the 
letter, it means that political power-holders have no normative limitations 
whatsoever. Here we notice the striking proximity of this conceptualization 
of sovereignty to decisionism: whatever competent bodies decide about the 
rights of citizens will be correct. The only remedy here is to appeal against 
such decisions within the national court system. In the Russian case, this 
system is headed by the Constitutional Court which considers itself to be 
the last instance to express and, eventually, to change the sovereign will. 
From this perspective, one gets more clues for interpreting the recent dis-
putes between the RF Constitutional Court and the ECtHR. While the latter 
insists on the universality of fundamental human rights, the former warns 
that human rights can be utilized as a pretext for the interference of interna-
tional organizations in the sovereign affairs of Russia. As these interferences 
are justified by the universal character of human rights, the natural reaction 
of the Constitutional Court is to keep its sovereignty shielded from such 
interference and to reject the universalism of human-right discourses.
The relativist argumentation—based on the presumption of cultural 
distinctiveness and organic development of every nation—comes as an 
expected conceptual rejoinder to universalist claims. In this context, a con-
servative philosophy effectively works as a conceptual ally of the doctrine 
of sovereignty. The latter is employed to strengthen the formalist element 
of Russian law (statutes adopted in the name of the sovereign are binding 
and do not tolerate competition with other sources of law, such as interna-
tional principles, human-rights standards, and so on) and to promote the 
decisionist element (acting as sovereign agents on behalf of the people—the 
supreme bearer of sovereign power—political authorities can find better 
ways to implement the public interest as it is established by constitutional 
or statutory law). The logical conflict between these two elements is, 
thereby, practically solved through a balancing of sovereign power by the 
political leadership either in favor of legality (the formal requirement to 
abide by legal rules) or of exception (the prerogative power of exception).
This ambiguous attitude toward human rights—their formal acceptance 
and, at the same time, their factual rejection as checks on the state and on 
its sovereign power—was examined in Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4 
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(“Religion, Sexual Minorities and the Rule of Law in Russia: Mutual Chal-
lenges”), we turned to the specific understanding of rule of law which in the 
Russian context often is equated to legality (zakonnost’). Legality in Soviet 
law meant the uniformization of the application of the law and fidelity to 
its letter. The formalism that is at the foundation of this legality in Russian 
(and, previously, in Soviet) law hinges on the requirement that sovereign 
will must be executed to the letter. More complicated situations arise when 
there is a discord between sovereign will as it is expressed in statutory law 
and as it is expressed by state authorities and their representatives ad hoc 
relating to concrete high-profile cases. This problem was outlined in Chap-
ter 1 with reference to “telephone law’ and similar phenomena in Soviet 
and contemporary Russia. The case of sexual minorities can serve here as a 
paradigmatic example, and in Chapter 4 we tried to develop this analysis 
and illustrate it with some examples taken from case law.
Chapter 4 analyzed the cultural constraints that are factually imposed 
on actors in the Russian legal system by the prevailing conservative phi-
losophy, this analysis being continued also in Chapter 5. Judges and other 
law-enforcement officials are subject to social pressure which in Russia, 
as in many other countries, is hostile to sexual minorities. In the light of 
the dichotomy between the formalist and the decisionist sides of Russian 
law, judges frequently face the dilemma of choosing between the legal 
requirement of equal protection and the prevailing social morality that 
denies equal protection to sexual minorities. The principle of legality can, 
therefore, require from judges two contradictory actions at the same time: to 
protect rights to the letter of the posited law and not to protect these rights 
because of the prevailing communitarian mentality that is supported and 
promoted by the state. Both actions can, to a certain extent, be congruent 
with the requirement of zakonnost’, while this latter can serve as an “empty 
signifier” in the Lacanian sense either for the lawful or for prerogative use 
of sovereign power.
Additionally, judges may experience the pressure of public opinion 
which, predominantly, shares these conservative opinions about gender and 
the family. In contemporary Russia, these opinions largely are imposed by 
the Russian Orthodox Church. Thereby, religious canons and dogmas can, 
indirectly, sneak into the legal system (as was illustrated by the 2012 Pussy 
Riot case) albeit formally secular and separated from the Church (Art.14, 
RF Constitution). This brings us back to a more general perspective of the 
fundamental mechanisms of legal regulation in Russia, and to the difference 
between law in books and law in action—between the letter and the spirit 
of law—as they are understood in Russian legal theory. In its turn, this dif-
ference can be easily grasped in terms of the dichotomy of the formalist and 
decisionist elements of law, as suggested in the present work.
The linguistic difference between zakon (the law, loi, Gesetz, de wet) 
and pravo (law, droit, Recht, rechten) is surely common to many Western 
languages and legal systems, but the specificity of Russian language usage 
is that—due to historical convolutions—pravo was not associated with 
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doctrines of natural law, social contract, common good, with the idea of 
rule-of-law or with other formulations of ideals of social or political justice. 
Historically, as opposed to official law, pravo referred rather to customary 
law. In Russian realities, this did not mean that pravo was necessarily better 
than zakon as far as the protection of individual rights is concerned. Rather, 
to the contrary, customary law—backed by the prevailing Orthodox religion 
and retrograde social tradition—favored communitarian values and tended 
to underplay individual rights and freedoms.568
In fact, pravo frequently is perceived by many Russians as something 
pertaining rather to morality or custom than to a legal order.569 Conse-
quently, the law (zakon) and morality are often seen as detached from each 
other, with informal moral and religious commands normally standing 
above official legal norms.570 Harmonization of pravo and zakon, finding 
their ideal synthesis (a kind of natural law) never was the first issue on the 
agenda of Russian legal philosophers. For such Russian conservative think-
568 An illustrative example can be seen in a mid-2010s presentation of Chief Justice Zorkin 
devoted to the 1861 abolition of servitude (krepostnichestvo). He suggested that “servitude 
was that spiritual buckle that maintained the unity of nation” and, in this sense, that 
abolition undermined the fundamentals of the legal order and was, after all, against the 
living law of the Russian Empire. Zorkin, “Sudebnaia reforma Aleksandra II”, op.cit. note 
151.
569 The ideas of Ivan Ilyin, one of the legal philosophers the most cited by the Russian 
authorities, are very representative for this rupture. Symptomatically, Ilyin draws a dis-
tinction between a “correct” legal consciousness based on conservatism, morality and 
religion (this consciousness leads to the contemplation of pravo) and a “formalist” legal 
consciousness that considers only the posited, rationalized law (zakon) and, therefore, 
gives no clues to understanding what law is. This idea was developed by other infl uen-
tial legal philosophers such as Vladimir Soloviev or Nikolai Berdyaev. In Soviet jurispru-
dence, Stuchka proposed differentiating between the “general” legal consciousness (it 
refl ects the social structure and, therefore, is correct) and the “concrete” legal conscious-
ness that people, based on statutory law, can have about their rights and obligations. This 
latter consciousness is not “objective” and, therefore, can be wrong.
570 See an analysis of the language use concerning the term “zakon” in Russian legal schol-
arship of the 19th century by E.G. Luk’ianova, Uchenie o zakone v russkoi iurisprudenst-
sii [Uniderstanding Law in Russian Jurisprudence] (Moscow: Norma, 2014). As shown 
by Professor Zolotukhina, after the acceptance of Christianity by Russia in 988, the term 
“zakon” received sacred meaning: the laws of God, the laws of the Old and New Testa-
ments. The word “zakon” was not taken out of its former connotation but was accorded 
additional characteristics relating directly to God: verity, justice, eternity, and infin-
ity. Meanwhile, the term “pravo” was not included in the vocabulary of the entire Rus-
sian Middle Ages. Its appearance is associated with the spread of the theory of “natural 
law” in Russia. N.M. Zolotukhina, “Srednevekovye mysliteli Rossii o pravde, zakone, 
spravedlivosti, istine i blagodati” [Medieval Russian Thinkers on Truth, Law, Justice, 
and Grace], 13(2) Trudy IGPAN (2018), 102-142. As narratives about Russia’s golden past 
frequently refer to the premodern era (prior to the reforms of Peter the Great), this semi-
religious connotation of “zakon” endows it with prevalence over “pravo” and, at the same 
time, opens the way for reconstruction of statutory law (zakon) not only in accordance 
with its literal meaning but, also, against the backdrop of societal and occasionally reli-
gious values considered to be “traditional” to Russia.
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ers as the Slavophiles, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy or Solzhenitsyn, the primary 
concern was to the contrary: how to protect moral and religious convictions 
against the decaying effect of rationalized law? One can mention, here, the 
famous idea of the Byzantinist Nikolai Danilevsky to “freeze” Russia in 
order to save it from putrefying Western liberalism. In his 1897 Opravdanie 
dobra, Vladimir Soloviev famously tried to justify law (pravo) as a “mini-
mum of morality”—prioritizing the substantial value of morality in law and 
discarding the formal value of the posited law for societal regulation. This 
prioritization became the stumbling block in the debates between Soloviev 
and Boris Chicherin at the end of the 19th century. These philosophical 
connotations can be seen as some of the reasons why the political regimes 
believe moral and religious commands may trump the literal meaning of 
legal enactments or international legal obligations; there is no conceptual 
discrepancy if it is accepted that pravo stands above zakon.
The law is often formalistically considered by Russian lawyers as a 
closed system. Thus, when it collides with morality or religion, the task 
before the judge will be, at best, to choose between them; not to reconcile 
them. In positivistic doctrine, pravo does not have the same binding force as 
zakon and must cede to zakon in case of a conflict. But in certain situations, 
pravo can gain the upper hand and work against the rational disenchant-
ment of the world (Max Weber). In these situations, the defenders of pravo 
can invoke fundamentals of social solidarity, century-long traditions, 
Volksgeist and similar frames of reference to resist the rationalization of legal 
regulation. When a question arises about sexual minorities and protection 
of their rights, the dialectics of pravo and zakon can suggest that even if the 
formal posited law (zakon in the broad sense, including ratified international 
treaties), goes against the prevailing sense of justice (associated with pravo), 
this latter shall prevail. This dialectic was analyzed in Chapter 4 through 
the prism of several decisions of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme 
Court based on the proposition that perversions and socially dangerous 
practices (LGBT and others) may not be protected under the banner of 
human rights.
This contrast between pravo and zakon can, in fact, be traced in a num-
ber of aspects of Russian law, including the protection of human rights. If 
human rights collide with state sovereignty or individual rights collide with 
communitarian morality, the choice between them might involve the philo-
sophical perspective of pravo and zakon. If preference is given to pravo, in 
the Russian context this normally can either encourage disrespect of zakon 
or justify the strict application of zakon, without inciting discussions about 
the “best fit” to reconcile individual freedom and the collective interest. In 
this light, when constitutional justices depart from the statutory law (zakon) 
reasoning about pravo, it does not mean that rights will be better protected 
when statutory law is overridden with such references to pravo. This termi-
nological equivocality reflects the inner rationality of Russian law and, in 
particular, the balance of the formalist and realist elements, as suggested in 
the present volume.
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The last Chapter of this work (“Religious Beliefs and the Limits of Their 
Accommodation in Russia: Some Landmark Cases of the Russian Supreme 
Court”) was an analysis of case law of the Russian Supreme Court from 
a similar perspective. Referring to several widely discussed examples, 
we studied how this Court prioritizes rights of the traditional religious 
denominations and denies equal protection to religious minorities in 
analogous situations—despite the formal constitutional and statutory anti-
discriminatory guarantees. This Chapter dealt with the same theoretical 
divide between “law in books” and “law in action” discussed in previous 
chapters. Law in books establishes the equality of religious organizations 
before the law, while law in action prioritizes Orthodoxy, a state-friendly 
Islam, and a number of other traditional confessions—restricting or even 
banning other confessions.
This divide confirms the concealed theoretical dualism between formal-
ism and decisionism, and shows the conceptual significance of conservative 
philosophy for their reconciliation. The mentioned contradiction between 
anti-discriminatory laws and their discriminatory application is reconciled 
through the foundational narratives based on a conservative philosophy. 
This latter can compatible both with legalistic formalism and nihilistic deci-
sionism and, therefore, is able mitigate the conceptual conflict between them.
The logic of exception, as described above, is illustrated by the choice of 
the applicable norms and principles in the case law on protecting religious 
freedoms. Relying on the formalist approach in ordinary cases where rights 
of followers of non-traditional religions are at stake, courts are reluctant to 
re-evaluate or reinterpret rules of prohibitive laws (such as anti-extremist 
legislation) from a viewpoint of reasonability, justice, or other non-formal 
criteria. Statutory laws, in such ordinary cases, are likely to be applied with 
inexorable strictness—sometimes, even contrary to common sense.
If there is no statutory law on certain religious matters, courts will sim-
ply refuse to protect non-traditional believers despite the possible unreason-
ableness of the results that can flow from such an approach. This fact was 
observed in a number of judgments of the ECtHR on religious freedoms in 
Russia. In such judgments, the ECtHR analyzed how Russian courts main-
tained fidelity to the letter of the 1997 Law on religious freedoms without 
taking account of the absurdity of applying the formal rules to the letter in 
certain concrete situations.571
The literal wording of anti-extremist legislation leaves to the Russian 
Supreme Court no choice in subsumption: if a religious denomination 
insists on its spiritual excellence over other denominations and, in this 
sense, falls under the category of “extremism”—understood as propaganda 
of national or religious superiority over other religious groups—it shall be 
banned. This literal approach was followed in the controversial 2017 Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses case in which this large religious denomination was banned 
571 E.g., the 2010 ECtHR Judgment Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, op.cit. note 18.
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from Russia. Quite evidently, the same subsumption can be made for any 
other confession—including Orthodoxy. But, in these cases, the Court 
adopts other strategies for interpreting the law.
Here again, the interplay of rule and exception—of legality and collec-
tive interest—comes to the fore, and makes the entire legal situation much 
more complicated than a simple formalist subsumption or ideological 
control. In some cases where the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church 
or other traditional denominations have been involved, the Supreme Court 
went far beyond the literal meaning of the rules and turned to weighing 
and balancing rights and restrictions. Explicitly, it does not recognize the 
substantial difference in protecting “traditional” and “non-traditional” 
religions, insisting, to the contrary, that the protection is equal—even if the 
normative conclusions from its decisions blatantly contradict this thesis. 
Here, the Russian Supreme Court employs the style of legal thinking and 
reasoning that strikingly resembles the doublespeak and metaphysical style 
of the RF Constitutional Court.
The analysis undertaken in the present research demonstrates what can 
be seen as one of the major paradoxes of Russian law. The Russian state 
has endorsed a lengthy list of liberal norms and principles that do not fit 
the actual political objectives of the state but is unwilling to change or 
repeal these norms and principles. To mitigate this paradox, the Russian 
state (the judiciary inclusive) interprets them in plain contradiction to their 
original and literal meanings. Political developments in Russia (the rise of 
authoritarianism) shattered the previous liberal ideas about prevalence of 
human rights572 that once inspired the authors of the 1993 Constitution. The 
actual normative state of affairs in Russian law shows the distance between 
the normative and the factual regulations; as legal realists would put it, 
between “law in books” and “law in action”.573
This doublespeak in the official narratives touches upon the rule of law, 
democracy, non-discrimination, human rights, supremacy of international 
law and other pillars of the Russian constitutional order that are solemnly 
proclaimed but largely disrespected.574 Russian courts continue this strat-
egy of doublespeak and, formally supporting liberal constitutional prin-
ciples, courts reinterpret them in a conservative sense generally reflecting 
the conservative moods prevalent among the population.
572 We are aware of the multiplicity of possible meanings of the term “human rights” and, 
in this work, utilize it in the sense of the rights supported by the international commu-
nity against potential abuses from the part of national states. For this understanding of 
human rights see Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (The Belknap 
Press, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2010). In this way, human rights can be 
distinguished from civil rights and fundamental rights; the distinction which is ignored 
in the jurisprudence of the RF Constitutional Court and is largely neglected in Russian 
legal scholarship.
573 E.g., Hendley, Everyday Law in Russia, op.cit. note 47.
574 See some comments on this doublespeak by Antonov, “Conservative Philosophy and 
Doctrine of Sovereignty”, op.cit. note 458.
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Concluding Chapter 205
The present research had a modest task: to problematize this conceptual 
and methodological ambiguity of Russian law, and the role of the formalist 
and decisionist elements in it. Its author hopes that it succeeded in making 
a modest contribution to the discussion about philosophical aspects of Rus-
sian law and Russian legal culture.
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Samenvatting (Dutch summary)
Formalisme, realisme en conservatisme in de Russische wet
In deze studie worden het formalisme en het decisionisme in het Rus-
sische denken geanalyseerd, evenals de invloed van conservatisme op het 
samenspel van deze beide elementen. De wijze waarop in Rusland rechten 
worden geconceptualiseerd geeft uitdrukking aan ’s lands juridische spe-
cificiteit en meer in het algemeen: geeft mede vorm en uitdrukking aan de 
Russische cultuur. Deze studie onthult een eigenaardige combinatie van 
formalisme, decisionisme en conservatisme in het Russische recht. In de 
jurisprudentie wordt deze culturele eigenaardigheid regelmatig gebruikt ter 
rechtvaardiging van uitzonderingen die worden gemaakt op de grondwet-
telijke principes van non-discriminatie van politieke, religieuze, seksuele en 
andere minderheden.
Analyse van discussies over culturele verschillen geven zicht op deze 
bijzondere kenmerken van de Russische cultuur, en bieden meer specifiek 
zicht op de intellectuele habitus die in de (Sovjet-)Russische juridische 
opleidingen wordt overgedragen, en die ook thans de rechtswetenschap en 
de rechtspraktijk in Rusland kenmerkt. De historische en filosofische ach-
tergronden alsmede de normatieve gevolgen van deze cultuur worden in 
dit proefschrift geanalyseerd; bijzonder onderwerp van studie zijn de heer-
sende rechtsidee, de wijze waarop rechten worden verleend en—door die 
rechtsidee beïnvloed—de wijze waarop in de praktijk recht wordt gedaan.
In dit proefschrift wordt onderzocht wat de specifieke stijl van het 
juridische denken in Rusland is. Wordt het Russisch recht gekenmerkt door 
de (specifieke) wijze waarop rechten in Rusland worden begrepen? Wat 
zijn in dat geval de verschillen met de manier waarop rechten in andere 
juridische tradities worden begrepen? Er wordt gewezen op de kloof die 
bestaat tussen de wetstekst in Rusland en de interpretatie en toepassing 
daarvan. Russische rechters—in penumbra en lacuna zaken—beslissen 
soms in tegenspraak met de letter van de wet. Ter rechtvaardiging van 
zulke beslissingen verwijzen Russische rechtbanken soms—direct of indi-
rect—naar grondkenmerken van en basisvoorwaarden voor de sociale orde, 
zoals (respect voor) verschillen in cultuur, de wenselijkheid van sociale 
cohesie rond bepaalde waarden, of naar het algemeen belang als richtlijn 
voor sociale ontwikkeling.
Conservatieve lezingen en interpretaties van deze grondkenmerken die-
nen zelf weer als bronnen voor verdere ontwikkeling van juridische princi-
pes. Als de wet zwijgt of als de wet onduidelijk is, of als de wet slecht lijkt 
te zijn (verouderd of te ingrijpend), zullen rechters handelen volgens die 
logica van het juridische system die er toe strekt met hun beslissingen het 
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sociale systeem te handhaven of te versterken. En zulk handelen (oordelen) 
met het oog op het handhaven of versterken van het sociale systeem—van 
de sociale orde—wordt ook van rechters verwacht.
Het onderzoek levert een aantal conclusies op. Een belangrijke conclu-
sie is dat de (on)geldigheid van rechten in de Russische juridische cultuur 
voornamelijk wordt gerechtvaardigd met verwijzing naar gemeenschaps-
belangen, meer dan naar individuele belangen. In mensenrechtenzaken kan 
deze van ‘de westerse’ afwijkende Russische lijn ook gedeeltelijk verklaard 
worden door een afwijkende waardering van (het relatieve gewicht van) 
individuele en collectieve belangen.
Men zou deze afwijkende waardering kunnen zien als een voorzetting 
van conservatieve vertogen van vóór de revolutie en van de latere Sovjet-
ideologie betreffende mensenrechten. Anderzijds kan worden gesteld dat 
de overheersende Russische rechtstheorie is gebaseerd op een combinatie 
van formalisme en decisionisme, die de formele vereisten van legaliteit in 
overeenstemming zoekt te brengen met de behoefte aan handhaving van de 
sociale orde.
Deze dualistische juridische theorie sluit goed aan bij (eerdere) con-
servatieve vertogen, wat weer verklaart waarom een liberaal rechtsbegrip 
weinig opgeld doet in Russische rechtbanken (en in het algemeen in de 
Russische juridische denkwijze), hoewel individuele liberale rechten wel 
in de Russische Grondwet zijn opgenomen. De combinatie van formalisme 
en decisionisme leidt tot tegenstrijdigheden in de rechtstheorie, die worden 
‘opgelost’ door een overkoepelend conservatief vertoog. Het Russische 
recht heeft zijn eigen logica—of zo men wil een gebrek daaraan—een eigen 
rationaliteit en traditie. Onderzoek naar (de werking van) het recht in Rus-
land dat alleen oog heeft voor de actuele politieke dienstbaarheid van het 
rechtsbedrijf doet te weinig recht aan de eigenheid—en ook de zelfstandig-
heid—van het rechtsbedrijf in Rusland. Ook toekomstige onderzoekers valt 
aan te raden het Russische recht (inclusief zijn theoretische tegenstrijdig-
heden) te bestuderen vanuit een ruimer (historisch) perspectief.
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